NEW JERSEY SUED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN DENYING IMMIGRANT PARENTS ACCESS TO STATE-FUNDED MEDICAID

Class Action Seeks Relief for 12,000 Lawful Permanent Residents Affected by Immigration-Based Medicaid Cuts

NEWARK, NJ - Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Social Justice and Gibbons, P.C., filed a class action complaint today in New Jersey, alleging that the State’s Department of Human Services (”Agency”) is violating permanent residents’ equal protection rights under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions by denying them State-funded Medicaid because of their alienage and immigration status. The Plaintiffs, many of whom work at low-wage jobs, are lawful-permanent-resident parents in New Jersey, who because of their low-income were deemed eligible to receive and, until recently, did receive State-funded Medicaid known as New Jersey FamilyCare (”NJFC”). Citing the State’s financial crisis, however, in April and July of this year, the Agency terminated Plaintiffs’ Medicaid coverage, stating that Plaintiffs were no longer eligible for NJFC because they have not been lawful permanent residents for at least five years.

The complaint describes the harm experienced by the nearly 12,000 low-income, lawful permanent residents affected by those cuts: without NJFC assistance, Plaintiffs can no longer afford regular checkups, preventive care, and treatment for serious illness. One of the named plaintiffs, a single mother with two small children, had surgery to remove a kidney in 2007. She is now unable to afford monitoring of her kidney problems or medical care in the event of future illness. Two other plaintiffs-working parents from Haiti and Ecuador-required emergency medical care last month, but after being terminated from State-funded Medicaid, were unable to pay for such treatment. Several of the Plaintiffs have family histories of heart disease, high cholesterol and diabetes and worry that without regular check-ups and preventive care, they will be unable to prevent irreversible damage to their health.

The complaint alleges that by singling out this group of immigrants for termination of their healthcare coverage, the Agency is discriminating against plaintiffs on the basis of their alienage and immigration status in violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Federal and State Constitutions.

“Not only is it unconstitutional to distinguish between New Jersey residents on the basis of their alienage and immigration status when dispensing critical health care assistance-it is counterproductive,” said attorney Jenny-Brooke Condon, an Associate Professor at Seton Hall’s Center for Social Justice. “Many of the 12,000 lawful permanent residents affected by these State-Medicaid cuts are hard-working residents of the State, who pay taxes and support their families by working inlow-wage jobs. Ensuring that the working poor receive essential, preventive healthcare and treatment for illness keeps New Jersey residents healthy, which, in turn, keeps them working.”

Many of the Class Representatives named in the lawsuit expressed outrage at being singled out for healthcare cuts on the basis of their immigration status. “I work hard, pay taxes, and play by the rules; I am a lawful resident of this State,” said Class Representative Nadia Chery, a native of Haiti who works as a home healthcare aide. “So when the government said it was cutting my benefits because of my immigration status, it was as if I had done something wrong because I am an immigrant. I felt that I was being discriminated against.”

Class Representative Manual Guaman, a native of Ecuador who works as a cook to support his wife and three small children, described the anguish he felt when he suffered a severe allergic reaction in July after losing his NJFC assistance. “I didn’t know what to do. Should I get treatment at a hospital, knowing I will not be able to afford the bill, or should I take my chances that I will get better?” said Guaman. “I decided to go to the hospital, thinking that if I became sicker I might not be able to keep working and support my family. Being healthy for my family is my first priority.” But Guaman added that not being able to pay the hospital bill he received after his July emergency room visit has discouraged him from seeking follow-up care and additional medical assistance.

In addition to asserting equal protection claims, the complaint alleges that in denying Class Members NJFC assistance, the Agency has also violated a New Jersey statute governing the State Medicaid program. That statute provides that both citizens and lawful permanent residents are eligible for State-funded Medicaid. The complaint filed today amends a complaint filed by Plaintiffs on June 29, 2010, and newly challenges the Agency’s July 6, 2010 regulation, which the Agency published only after it had already terminated most Class Members’ NJFC assistance. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the court that the agency’s actions and regulation violate the Federal and State Constitutions and the NJFC statute, and also seek injunctive relief restoring Class Members’ NJFC assistance.

A copy of the complaint can be found at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/CSJ/upload/Guaman_Amended_Complaint.pdf

Seton Hall University School of Law, New Jersey’s only private law school and a leading law school in the New York metropolitan area, is dedicated to preparing students for the practice of law through excellence in scholarship and teaching with a strong focus on clinical education. The Center for Social Justice, a core of Seton Hall Law School’s Catholic mission, provides clinical education and volunteeropportunities to students and engages in various forms of advocacy, scholarship and direct legal services in an effort to secure equality, civil rights and legal protection for individuals and communities in need. Seton Hall Law School is located in Newark. For more information visit, http://law.shu.edu/.

The law firm Gibbons P.C. sponsors the John J. Gibbons Fellowship in Public Interest & Constitutional Law under the guidance of John J. Gibbons, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, and Lawrence S. Lustberg, Director of the Gibbons Fellowship Program. The Gibbons Fellowship, supported by the broader resources of the firm as a whole, undertakes public interest and constitutional law projects and litigation. Working with a broad cross-section of public interest groups, the Fellowship Program has become widely known in New Jersey and nationally as a voice for the poor and underrepresented. The Fellowship has been and remains involved in the most significant and controversial issues that confront the Federal and State courts today. For more information visit http://www.gibbonslaw.com/about/index.php?view_page=3

Missouri Votes Against Individual Mandate, May Impact Standing Argument in Federal Court

Recently, Missouri voters overwhelmingly approved a ballot initiative which, according to the AMA’s amednews.com, “ask[ed] voters in part if they want to ‘deny the [federal] government authority to penalize citizens for refusing to purchase private health insurance or infringe upon the right to offer or accept direct payment for lawful health care services.’”

More than 71% of voters approved the initiative which seeks to negate the individual mandate, 29% voted against.

As recent events in California regarding Proposition 8 have shown, a referendum deemed unconstitutional  is without force of law.

In the AMA’s article, it is noted that

Few legal experts consider the state proposals more than symbolic, as federal law generally trumps state law. But lawsuits filed or joined by officials in 21 states challenging the federal government’s authority to require health insurance have the potential to overturn the federal law.

Generalities aside, as is best in this regard, it strikes me that the Missouri initiative may have more than just symbolic value. Importantly, in the recent federal court decision regarding Virginia’s suit against the individual mandate, the judge in that case found standing for the state of Virginia–an exceedingly important, though procedural, ruling. It is exceedingly important because without standing the case could simply not go forward. The judge in the case found standing for Virginia’s 10th Amendment claim largely based upon a law passed subsequent by the state of Virginia. Regarding that matter I wrote:

In deciding the standing issue, Judge Hudson, according to Professor Jack Balkin, made much of the “Virginia Health Care Freedom Act– which asserts that no Virgina citizen may be forced to purchase health care insurance; that this law conflicts with the federal Affordable Care Act, and therefore Virginia has standing to challenge the act under the 10th amendment.”

Virginia’s Act was passed subsequent to the federal law in question; other states challenging the individual mandate do not, at present, have such a law to rely on. As Professor Balkin points out, however, the Virginia Act being deemed sufficient to buttress standing in a States’ rights Tenth Amendment claim is interesting– to say the least. It begs the question.

In more than just symbolic terms, Missouri may have just answered that question–at least in terms of 10^th Amendment standing–if, of course, its federal district court sees the matter in the same way as did Judge Hudson. Certainly not guaranteed– the Missouri Federal Court is not bound by the Federal Court of Virginia– but nonetheless, Missourian’s just laid claim to an argument that has won elsewhere.

Judge Rules, Virginia Moves Forward Against Individual Mandate

Federal District Court Judge Henry E. Hudson has ruled that Virginia’s suit against the federal government for imposing an individual mandate to purchase health insurance can go forward. Which is to say that the suit survived the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A primary consideration therein being whether or not Virginia had standing to bring such a claim.The judge ruled that it did.

Which means that the judge has ruled that the case can go forward and the issues be heard and then decided on their merits. No small thing, sine qua non in fact, but largely a procedural hurdle in what most believe will be a long and arduous trek through the legal system, subject to myriad appeals culminating, ultimately, before the Supreme Court.

In deciding the standing issue, Judge Hudson, according to Professor Jack Balkin, made much of the “Virginia Health Care Freedom Act– which asserts that no Virgina citizen may be forced to purchase health care insurance; that this law conflicts with the federal Affordable Care Act, and therefore Virginia has standing to challenge the act under the 10th amendment.”

Virginia’s Act was passed subsequent to the federal law in question; other states challenging the individual mandate do not, at present, have such a law to rely on. As Professor Balkin points out, however, the Virginia Act being deemed sufficient to buttress standing in a States’ rights Tenth Amendment claim is interesting– to say the least. It begs the question.

Balkin:

Indeed, the logic of the opinion seems to suggest that if Virginia had objections to any other part of the federal tax laws, it could pass a Virgina Tax Freedom Act related to that provision, claiming that the tax provision was beyond the reserved powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment. This new act would give it standing to challenge any other part of the Internal Revenue Code, and it would also get around the tax anti-injunction act. Moreover, under the logic of the opinion, every other state in the Union could also create its own tax freedom act, and each of them would also be entitled to begin a series of tax protest challenges to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. This cannot be consistent with the purposes of the tax anti-injunction act.

If you have a minute, it would actually be well spent on reading Professor Balkins post. Even if you are not a lawyer, I think you’ll find his writing accessible– and rewarding. He frames the difficulties of the opinion well.

Having said that, in a recent post we recounted the NY Times recap of the government’s argument regarding “inactivity” and the Commerce Clause:

Ian H. Gershengorn, a deputy assistant United States attorney general, countered that the insurance requirement fitted well within the Supreme Court’s parameters for Congressional regulation of interstate commerce. A choice not to obtain coverage, he said, is not inactivity, as Virginia and the other state plaintiffs claim, but an active decision to pay for future medical care out of pocket.  Because many Americans cannot afford the cost of surgeries and hospitalization, their choice to go uninsured shifts the uncompensated cost of their care to hospitals, taxpayers and commercial policyholders.

The argument seems to have not persuaded Judge Hudson. Quoting from the opinion, Daily Finance writes:  “From a legal standpoint, the judge defined the issue as:

‘whether or not Congress has the power to regulate — and tax — a citizen’s decision not to participate in interstate commerce [by choosing not to buy health insurance.]‘”

For those of you with more interest in the subject, I would suggest these two posts:

1) “Is it Unconstitutional to Mandate Health Insurance? ,” which was originally published here on HRW by Professor Mark Hall and then later cited by the New York Times, Washington Post, etc.

And

2) “The Original Individual Mandate, Circa 1792,” which was originally published here on HRW by Bradley Latino, a Seton Hall Law student, and then by The Health Care Blog and on Maggie Mahar’s Health Beat Blog.

The Original Individual Mandate, Circa 1792

Regardless of one’s opinion on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s constitutionality, most commentators–and no less an authority than the Congressional Budget Office–agree (or concede, as the case may be) that Congress has never required Americans to purchase a good or service from a private entity as a condition of citizenship.  But, importantly,  they are wrong. The ongoing debate over the mandate’s constitutionality has uncovered an unlikely precedent to the PPACA’s individual mandate to possess health coverage. I recently wrote about this overlooked original individual mandate in an article, “The First Individual Mandate: What the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 Tells Us about Fifth Amendment Challenges to Healthcare Reform.”

The Militia Acts of 1792, passed by the Second Congress and signed into law by President Washington, required every able-bodied white male citizen to enroll in his state’s militia and mandated that he “provide himself” with various goods for the common weal:

[E]ach and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States . . . shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia . . . .provid[ing] himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein . . . and shall appear so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise or into service

This was the law of the land until the establishment of the National Guard in 1903.  For many American families, compliance meant purchasing-and eventually re-purchasing-multiple muskets from a private party.

This was no small thing.  Although anywhere from 40 to 79% of American households owned a firearm of some kind, the Militia Act specifically required a military-grade musket.  That particular kind of gun was useful for traditional, line-up-and-shoot 18th century warfare, but clumsy and inaccurate compared to the single-barrel shotguns and rifles Americans were using to hunt game.  A new musket, alone, could cost anywhere from $250 to $500 in today’s money.  Some congressmen estimated it would cost £20 to completely outfit a man for militia service-about $2,000 today.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the militia mandate is how uncontroversial it was.  For instance, although the recently-ratified Bill of Rights was certainly fresh on Congress’ mind, not one of militia reform’s many opponents thought to argue the mandate was a government taking of property for public use. Nor did anyone argue it to be contrary to States’ rights under the Tenth Amendment. Rather, the mandate was criticized as an unfair burden upon the poor, who were asked to pay the same amount to arm themselves as the rich.  Indeed, the Militia Acts did nothing to defray costs, although a few years later Congress did appropriate funds to pay militia members for the use of their time and goods-in effect subsidizing the purchases.

All this history is potentially important to the health insurance mandate’s upcoming legal challenges, such as those recently filed by the Thomas More Law Center and the citizens of Mississippi.  Both lawsuits assert Fifth Amendment-based rights the Supreme Court has, up to this point, never recognized.  The Court could change its position on these issues, but only if context permits.  These are the situations where historical precedent, or the lack thereof, can make or break a constitutional argument.

For example, one interesting complaint in the Mississippi class action asserts that the plaintiffs “have the constitutional right to be free from entering a private contract or an involuntary association.”  The complaint considers such a right as an element of “substantive due process,” a set of constitutionally-protected “fundamental rights” that may not be expressly mentioned in the   the Constitution itself, but are read as expressed through the word “Liberty” and are held to be  ”deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States.”  Many healthcare issues fall under the substantive banner.  Through this doctrine, for example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees have been read to protect privacy and reproductive choices.

The 1792 mandate directly contradicts the notion that longstanding American values somehow establish a freedom from government-mandated purchases.   If such rights truly are deeply rooted in our history and traditions, Americans throughout the several states saw little need for legal recourse:   in fact, many states updated their militia laws in the early 19th century specifically to conform with the federal statutory requirements. The Militia Acts’ roots reach back to colonial New England, where it seems Massachusetts lead the way again in 1632 with its own firearm mandate.

The Militia Acts may be less applicable to other constitutional issues.  Both of the aforementioned class actions, as well as Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum’s suit, also argue that Congress simply cannot regulate interstate commerce by requiring Americans to participate in it. Of course, the procurement of supplies under the Militia Acts did require Americans to engage in commerce, and, perhaps, Interstate Commerce. But it is not particularly tenable to cite the Commerce Clause as the power under which Congress and President Washington moved. More apt would be the Militia Clause, wherein Congress may “call forth the Militia” coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause:  ”Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,” as Justice Marshall famously wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland “and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end . . . are constitutional.”   Importantly, McCulloch is still good law (for some idea of the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause power, See U.S. v. Comstock, recently decided by the Supreme Court). And yes, the Necessary and Proper Clause may work in tandem with the Commerce Clause.

What is “Necessary and Proper” to the execution of one power (Militia Clause), however, may not be ultimately determined by the Court to be constitutionally so for another (Commerce Clause). But as Constitutional Law Professor Edward Hartnett of Seton Hall Law has pointedly queried, “At least so long as McCulloch v. Maryland is good law, why would the necessary and proper clause in aid of the militia power allow for an individual mandate, while the necessary and proper clause in aid of the commerce power would not?”

Either way, however, it is simply wrong to say that Congress has never required Americans to purchase a good or service from a private entity as a condition of citizenship. In fact, in light of the Militia Acts, the individual mandate to purchase goods or services to protect oneself and one’s neighbors can readily be described as “deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States.”  The debate needs to be altered to accommodate this history.

As I continue researching the Militia Acts and the militia system, what surprises me most, and what seems most relevant to the current populist arguments against healthcare reform in general, is how invested Americans once were in the idea of personal sacrifice.  My favorite quotation comes from James “Left Eye” Jackson, an antifederalist-leaning congressmen who was no friend of the Washington Administration:

“Though it may prove burthensome to some individuals to be obliged to arm themselves, yet it would not be so considered when the advantages were justly estimated . . . . [A]s this nation is rising fast in manufactures, the arts and sciences, and from her fertile soil may expect great affluence, she ought to protect that and her liberties from within herself.”

[Bradley Latino is a third-year student at Seton Hall Law School and a guest blogger at Health Reform Watch. He graduated cum laude from Butler University in 2005, where he majored in literature.  He is currently working with the New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law Center on an overview of potential conflicts between New Jersey private health insurance regulation and the newly-passed federal law.]

Virginia, the First State to Challenge the Health Care Law in Court

Effective 2014, as part of the new health care law, most U.S. citizens will be required to obtain some type of health care insurance or be hit with a tax penalty.  This federal mandate is part of an effort by the Obama administration to use the penalty (or tax) to prevent uninsured Americans from shifting their $43 billion in healthcare costs to others.

However, this mandate did not sit well with some states, as many have filed suits seeking to invalidate the law.  Virginia was the first to butt heads with the federal government in court.  In a two-hour hearing, the federal government and Virginia both made their arguments before U.S. District Judge Henry E. Hudson.

The NY Times reports that Judge Hudson, “who was appointed by the first President George Bush, questioned both sides aggressively and said he would rule within 30 days. The judge predicted that the challenges to the health care law ‘will at some point in time define the outer boundaries’ of federal regulatory power.”

Although the hearing primarily concerned the issue of whether Virginia had legal standing to bring this claim, part of that analysis requires the court to look at the likliehood of the party seeking standing to have the injury alleged redressed. The requirements for standing are nicely stated in “The ‘Lectric Law Library“:

Standing. The legal right to initiate a lawsuit. To do so, a person must be sufficiently affected by the matter at hand, and there must be a case or controversy that can be resolved by legal action.There are three requirements for Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, which means an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, which means that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and has not resulted from the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, which means that the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling is not too speculative. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (Lujan). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each of these elements. Id.

The state here would seem to bear the burden of showing, among other things, that any harm that may or may not be experienced by its individual citizens is a concrete and particularized harm to the state itself. As for the crux of the issues beyond standing, The NY Times reports:

[States'] central argument is that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution cannot be interpreted to allow government penalties on Americans for refusing to buy a product, or as Virginia’s lawsuit puts it for “an absence of commerce.”

“We’re saying you can’t draft someone into activity so you can regulate him,” Virginia’s solicitor general, E. Duncan Getchell Jr., told Judge Hudson.

Mr. Getchell said the Justice Department’s defense of the law “evinces hostility to federalism.” He called the law “a radical, radical claim of power” that, if upheld, would allow the federal government to require citizens to buy most any commercial product in the name of advancing the national interest.

Ian H. Gershengorn, a deputy assistant United States attorney general, countered that the insurance requirement fitted well within the Supreme Court’s parameters for Congressional regulation of interstate commerce. A choice not to obtain coverage, he said, is not inactivity, as Virginia and the other state plaintiffs claim, but an active decision to pay for future medical care out of pocket.  Because many Americans cannot afford the cost of surgeries and hospitalization, their choice to go uninsured shifts the uncompensated cost of their care to hospitals, taxpayers and commercial policyholders.

Despite Virginia’s efforts to protect the interest of the state and its citizens, not everyone in Virginia is pleased with the state’s action to nullify the new health care law.  Some citizens of Virginia seemed more concerned about affordable health care than state’s rights.  As one small business owner puts it, “…seems to me that our attorney general and our current administration are putting politics first and are not taking care of the citizens of the commonwealth of Virginia.”

The Attorney General of Virginia, Ken Cucinelli “said at a news conference after the hearing that the state has “a better than even chance of prevailing” at each step along the way to the lawsuit’s ultimate destination: the U.S. Supreme Court.”

Judge Hudson’s comment, that “the health care law ‘will at some point in time define the outer boundaries’ of federal regulatory power,” is interesting in this context. It seems to denote a question, even if not answered at this time, as to where the line lay.

Professor Mark Hall, in posts here at HRW and later picked up by the Washington Post and New York Times, would beg to differ with Mr. Cucinelli (and perhaps Judge Hudson). Professor Hall’s posts appear below:

Is it Unconstitutional to Mandate Health Insurance?

Are The Attorneys General’s Constitutional Claims Bogus?

photo credit, kjd via Flickr

Is Medicaid a Right? Are Medicaid Rate Cuts Unconstitutional?

By: Matt McKennan

Seton Hall Law
Class of 2011

Expanding Medicaid Rolls and Limited Access to Care

Medicaid beneficiaries have a difficult time accessing care.  Physicians are not required to participate in the program and due to low reimbursement rates, among other factors, many physicians choose not to join.  The President, federal and state lawmakers, physicians, hospitals, and patients (regardless of their political views) undoubtedly agree that access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries is a growing problem.  Notably, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will likely add approximately 16 million beneficiaries to state Medicaid rolls.  According to Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, “it dumps 15 to 18 million low-income Americans into a Medicaid program that none of us would want to be a part of because 50 percent of doctors won’t see new patients. So it’s like giving someone a ticket to a bus line where the buses only run half the time.”

Interestingly, Medicaid’s “Equal Access provision” requires that participating states,

“assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area.”

If Sen. Alexander is right — and there is substantial evidence that Medicaid participants face significant obstacles to access – then states are violating federal law, or the federal law is so lax in its enforcement or its mandates that it has become ineffective.  Health reform vests huge responsibility in the hands of the states, and the ability to enforce federal law or the willingness of states to comply will play a crucial role in achieving its goals.

In response to Medicaid’s expansion, states face a number of critical decisions.  Currently, states are contemplating cuts to already low Medicaid rates.  According to the National Association of State Medicaid Directors, “state budget shortfalls in the coming fiscal year . . . will total $140 billion.”  Adding additional pressure, state constitutions generally require that state governments maintain a balanced budget.  As Medicaid expands, states will face even more difficult decisions when balancing budgets and implementing Medicaid consistently with federal guidelines.

How Will the States Respond?  Are Rate Cuts the Final Answer?

In response to increasing federal demands and local financial pressures, states are pursuing legal action as a successful lawsuit would surely decrease future state obligations under Medicaid.  States are also enacting legislation to oppose the bill and according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 36 states have legislation to oppose certain reforms.  Others are lobbying Congress for repeal and those interested have already attested “that if any federal health care takeover is passed in 2010, I will support — with my time, money, and vote — only candidates who pledge to support its repeal and replacement with real reforms that lower health care costs without growing government.”

States may eventually decide to drop the program altogether.  After all, Medicaid is voluntary.  States are not obligated to provide medical assistance if they choose not to participate.  According to the Heritage Foundation, states would save over $1 trillion by opting out and “failure to leave Medicaid might be viewed as irresponsible on the part of elected state officials.”   On March 18, Arizona dropped its Children’s Health Insurance Program, foregoing millions in federal aid and leaving 47,000 children without insurance.  Earlier this year, Governor Jim Gibbons of Nevada stated, “[b]ecause it appears Sen. Reid’s plan is no longer viable, this crushing additional cost to the state isn’t forcing us to seriously consider opting out of Medicaid at this time.  However, if Congress wants to pass the buck and shift the fiscal burden of health care reform directly onto the states instead of looking seriously at ways to reduce spending and costs, we will be forced to revisit the issue.”  Like the Reid bill, the ACA also increases state Medicaid obligations.  And even if it increases the federal share, it is still worth asking whether Gov. Jim Gibbons  is once again seriously considering opting out of the program.

Alternatively, States may decide that Medicaid is just not that bad.  They may decide that it might just be a good idea to take advantage of the federal government’s helping hand.  Realistically, it is highly unlikely that states will drop Medicaid.  Dropping a program that provides care to low-income families is morally indefensible, especially without an alternative safety net.  Moreover, dropping Medicaid is fiscally irresponsible as the uninsured would undoubtedly wind up in emergency rooms seeking high-cost care at the private payers’ expense.  However, even if states decide to continue participating in Medicaid, the requirements of Medicaid must be enforced to achieve success.  After all, states administer Medicaid and states set reimbursement rates.  Drastic rate cuts by financially strapped states will undeniably balance budgets, but at the same time cuts will likely limit access to care.  So what happens when states cut Medicaid rates? See here, here, and here.

Is Medicaid a Right?  Are Rate Cuts Unconstitutional?

Thankfully, Medicaid’s “Equal Access provision” requires that states pay reimbursement rates that are sufficient to assure access to care.  Unfortunately, it is not easily enforced and the remedies are limited.  On the one hand, the federal government can withdraw its support from states that fail to live up to the statute’s demands.  On the other hand, providers and beneficiaries can also pursue legal action.  Legal action, however, is not that easy.

Shortly after the Civil War, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, providing equal rights to all “persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”  In response, many Southern Governors refused to comply, frustrating Congressional intent as the KKK violently opposed the bill and terrorized the South without state intervention.  Congress then enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  It provides a private cause of action against state or local actors that violate federal rights.  At its most basic level, the cause of action reins in rogue states and local actors.  A plaintiff that pursues a Section 1983 claim to enforce Medicaid’s requirements is in essence alleging that a state is violating federal rights by failing to comply with the federal law (Medicaid).

Initially, the Supreme Court adopted this line of reasoning.  In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the Supreme Court held that Medicaid providers can file suit under Section 1983 when a state fails comply with Medicaid by setting unreasonable and inadequate rates.  Notably, Chief Justice Roberts, as deputy Solicitor General at the time, filed a brief in Wilder arguing that private citizens cannot force states to comply with Medicaid under Section 1983.  After Wilder, courts consistently held that Section 1983 provided a cause of action to enforce state compliance with Medicaid.  Over time, the circuit courts split regarding what the “Equal Access provision” requires.  Some courts held that it requires states to conduct a study before setting rates, while others held that it requires states to achieve results, such as setting rates that actually achieve equal access to care, regardless of a study.

However, in Gonzaga v. Doe, the Supreme Court  limited the availability of a cause of action under Section 1983.  Interestingly, now-Chief Justice Roberts argued before the Court in Gonzaga as well, this time successfully.  Since Gonzaga, circuit courts throughout the country have refusedto allow Medicaid providers and beneficiaries to file suit under Section 1983 to enforce Medicaid’s “Equal Access provision” holding that Medicaid does not confer individual rights.  Compare pre-Gonzaga Orthopaedic Hospital with post-Gonzaga Sanchez.  In effect, Roberts’ argument in Wilder is now law and private citizens can no longer file suit under Section 1983 when states cut rates and limit access to care.

Fortunately, providers and beneficiaries have one more option.  Rather than filing suit under Section 1983, providers and beneficiaries are now successfully pursuing claims under the Supremacy Clause.  Under this theory, a state law that cuts reimbursement rates and decreases access to care conflicts with the “Equal Access provision.”   Therefore, because the state law conflicts with federal law, and federal law is the supreme law of the land, the state law is null (unconstitutional).  Plaintiffs have filed successful actions under the Supremacy Clause in California, resisting attempts to cut Medi-Cal payments for purely budgetary reasons.  A similar suit was filed in Washington last year.  On January 28, the Connecticut Association of Healthcare Facilities also filed suit, pursuing a Supremacy Clause action to enforce the “Equal Access provision.”

Although plaintiffs are experiencing success under the Supremacy Clause, there are a few drawbacks.  Unlike a suit under Section 1983, an action under the Supremacy Clause does not generally result in legal damages or attorney’s fees.  Instead, a plaintiff simply enjoins the unlawful state action.  Moreover, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have observed that the Supremacy Clause does not provide a cause of action to enforce Medicaid.  Rather, the Justices note that the only remedy is the withdrawal of federal funds.  Therefore, under the only legal theory available to enforce Medicaid at this time, states generally face no financial responsibility for cutting rates and decreasing access.  Further, the only cause of action to enforce Medicaid may rest on shaky ground.

In summary, history demonstrates that federal preemption will play a major role in implementing health reform, and these lessons must not be ignored.  The ACA expands Medicaid rolls and relies greatly on state compliance.  States have a limited number of options in response to their increasing responsibilities.  Eventually, constitutional challenges will end and states will likely continue to provide Medicaid assistance.  However, financially strapped states may end up administering a watered down program that denies access to care.  Therefore, to achieve the goals of reform, it is vitally important that states face realistic consequences if they refuse to administer Medicaid in compliance with federal law.  Ultimately, however, if states continue to cut rates, a strict federal standard regarding Medicaid reimbursement may be necessary.

Huq on Constitutional Challenges to HCR

As constitutional challenges to health care reform mount, many prominent commentators have debunked the legal arguments behind them. Aziz Huq puts them in context:

Highly speculative and doctrinally out-to-sea, these suits cannot be about the law. As their timing shows, they are a continuation of politics by other means. . . .In filing these lawsuits, the attorneys general and their allies have picked up on an emerging current of popular constitutionalism, and ratified it with the dignity of official sanction and a space on the national political stage. Even if these suits fail, the constitutional ideas that animate the complaints and that bubble through tea party rhetoric will be raised again to the attention of a wide public and given new credence.

By contrast, one is hard-pressed to find any such movement linking popular constitutionalism and effective national political actors on the progressive side. These lawsuits should thus be an embarrassment and worry for progressive constitutionalists, who have not articulated a general vision of the Constitution that finds resonance among a wide populace. They should be an embarrassment for the White House, which has generally opted for “safe” and “moderate” picks for the federal bench–not judges with vision. On the right, judges pick up and carry forward popular constitutionalism impulses. On the left, they play a fragmented defense that Obama apparently doesn’t care to improve.

Even progressive commentators like Jay Rosen can’t seem to imagine a “third way” beyond Left and Right other than libertarian. If supporters of health care reform can’t get the debate to turn to real pocketbook issues like insurance rate regulation, they will forever be stuck arguing about “first principles” in a media landscape stacked against the very idea of social insurance.

States Disclaim Own AG’s Suit

A few days ago we published Professor Mark Hall’s post, “Are The Attorneys General’s Constitutional Claims Bogus?” It seems he is not the only asking that question. As noted in The Plum Line, The Governors of four states,  Chris Gregoire of Washington, Bill Ritter of Colorado, Ed Rendell of Pennsylvania, and Jennifer Granholm of Michigan, have expressed their dismay at the prospect of the AG’s suit in a letter to US Attorney Eric Holder:

We believe their legal efforts will fail in court, unnecessarily delay the urgent need to get our citizens access to health care and waste our state tax dollars. As you prepare and deliver your defense of this landmark legislation, you have our commitment to work with you, at your request, to assist in this effort.

Again courtesy of The Plum Line, read the full letter here.

Are The Attorneys General’s Constitutional Claims Bogus?

Immediately after passage of health care reform, over a dozen state A.G.s sued to declare it unconstitutional, as violating states’ rights.  The Florida complaint is here, and Virginia’s here. Reminiscent of southern governors in the 1960s blocking their state universities’ gates, these legal officers in effect are saying “not on our sovereign soil.”  Since the constitutional issues have already been hashed through so thoroughly, what’s new to talk about?

First, the Florida complaint, which a dozen other states joined (AL, CO, ID, LA, MI, NE, PA,SC, SD, TX, UT, WA), focuses mainly on the financial burdens of expanding Medicaid.  This is challenged under the “commandeering” principle, as requiring states to devote sovereign resources to achieve federal aims.  But, as we know, states are free to withdraw from Medicaid, so the argument seems to fall entirely flat.  The complaint makes a bait-and-switch type of estoppel argument , that states got into Medicaid without any expectation of this expansion, and now it’s too damaging for them to withdraw.  So, in effect, states argue that the Constitution allows them to keep the federal carrot but refuse the federal stick.  Good luck selling that to an appellate court.

Second, these states complain about having to implement the insurance purchasing exchanges and their rules, but here again, states are entirely free to opt out and let their citizens use the federal exchange.  The only reason states have to implement exchanges is that they insisted the legislation give them this option, rather than forcing everyone into a single national exchange.  States can hardly complain about the responsibilities they asked for, especially when they’re still free to duck them.

Third, there are procedural problems.  States probably have no standing to enforce arguments about violation of individual rights (which is the main concern regarding the individual mandate).  Also, consider the remedy if states were to prevail:  It would wreak havoc to overturn the mandate to purchase, but not the mandate for insurers to sell without any medical underwriting.  Doing that would cause massive adverse selection and probably destroy some companies and some portions of the market, so a court would have little option but to strike down most or all of the entire law.  Surely that measure is extreme enough to give even the most activist judge pause, and so will compel most courts to find every possible way to uphold constitutionality, regardless of political persuasion.

Finally, do state nullification statutes like Virginia’s make a difference?  Not according to Harvard’s Charles Fried (who was Reagan’s Solicitor General):

The notion that a state can just choose to opt out is just preposterous…. As long as the federal law is independently constitutional, it doesn’t matter what Virginia says… It’s like Virginia saying we don’t have to pay income tax….One is left speechless by the absurdity of it.

This leaves only the well-worn arguments about exceeding powers to regulate commerce and to tax for the general welfare.  On these, most legal scholars are loud and clear about the merits.  In sum, as Sandy Levinson’s (Univ. Texas) says, “The argument about constitutionality is, if not frivolous, close to it.”

Originally posted at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health, Legal Issues in Health Reform.

[Ed. Note: Also Read Professor Hall's prior post on Health Reform Watch, "Is it Unconstitutional to Mandate Health Insurance?"]

Reform Rodeo: Latest News & Interviews; CER; the Constitution; HIT; Robotic Surgery

1. News: Kaiser Health News keeps you up to date by rounding up various stories on the Dems’ latest down-to-the-wire push on health reform. Their coverage of Representative Dennis Kucinich’s (and other reluctant Dems’) endorsement of the bill is here.

2. Betting on Health Care: The New York Times asks health wonks for opinions on the chances of passing health reform. Respondents include Robert Reich, former secretary of labor Gail Wilensky, Project Hope; Paul Starr, professor of public policy;  James C. Capretta, Ethics and Public Policy Center; Karen Davenport, Center for American Progress; Jacob S. Hacker, political science professor.

3. Evidence-based Medicine: A group at the New England Journal of Medicine proposes 5 steps to advance one of the most promising–yet often ignored–means of reforming our health care system: comparative effectiveness research.

4. Deem and Pass: Jonathan Adler at the Volokh Conspiracy discusses the constitutionality of the “deem and pass.” Regardless of its constitutionality, Ezra Klein exposes some factual inaccuracies in recent reporting on the tactic.

5. The Blues: The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette alerts us to a lawsuit by Highmark Inc. against the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance, which claims that the Department exceeded its authority when challenging Highmark’s proposed merger with Independence Blue Cross.

6. Meaningful Use Partial Credit: John Halamka at Life As A Healthcare CIO discusses the aggressive thresholds for meaningful use that have been set in the most recent rules, and what the HIT Policy Committee is doing to assuage those concerns.

7. Wild Card: A new TED talk about the current state of robotic surgery. An article covering the topic can be found here.

Reform Rodeo

1a. Massachusetts: A blog post by Harold Pollock can be found here, discussing why 47 health policy experts have sent a letter urging the House to pass the Senate’s bill in the wake of Scott Brown’s upset victory.

1b. Interesting Poll of Brown Voters: As MoveOn.org’s poll reveals: “Nearly half (49%) of Obama voters who voted for Brown support the Senate health care bill or think it does not go far enough.”

2. Health Care Economics: David Herszenhorn at the New York Times discusses William J. Baumol’s theory of cost disease, and why it should give us pause in expecting too much from health care reform.

3. Health IT: Adrian Gropper M.D. describes the advantages of the OAuth system of linking electronic health record systems.

4. The Science Behind Reform: The NEJM has a short editorial describing the findings of a recent study that underscore the importance of lowering salt consumption; findings that associate reduced salt intake with public health benefits on the level of smoking cessation and weight reduction.

5. Individual Mandate Constitutionality Redux: At the O’Neill Institute, Mark Hall responds to the Constitutional argument that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it regulates inactivity as opposed to activity.

6. Visualizing Health Care: Comments on  a National Geographic piece apparently spurred National Geographic to discuss why they chose the plot on the top instead of the plot on the bottom.

Click the images below to enlarge:

The Filibuster, Supermajority and the Constitution

Ezra Klein has published an engaging  series of  interviews regarding the filibuster, and the prospects and shape of reform for the Senate’s  much maligned rule of procedure. The prospects for reform don’t look particularly bright. And as we come to reckon with one of the final products of the filibuster floor, the Senate’s health reform bill, we may want to take a moment to consider the filibuster itself– this need for 60 votes.

Klein writes

According to UCLA political scientist Barbara Sinclair, about 8 percent of major bills faced a filibuster in the 1960s. This decade, that jumped to 70 percent. The problem with the minority party continually making the majority party fail, of course, is that it means neither party can ever successfully govern the country.

It should also be noted that unlike today, a filibuster in the early 60’s required the arduous (and, it would seem, daunting) physical task of continued speech and an inability to consider other legislation during the pendency of the filibuster. A set of circumstances which at times brought sleeping cots onto the Senate floor and may have served to limit the filibuster’s use.

The Health Reform bill has served to highlight the dysfunction of the filibuster in modernity. The filibuster is not enshrined in the Constitution, it is merely a rule of the Senate.

The United States Senate requires a supermajority of three-fifths to move to a vote through a cloture motion, which closes debate on a bill or nomination, thus ending a filibuster by a minority of members. In current practice, the mere threat of a filibuster prevents passing almost any measure that has less than three-fifths agreement in the Senate. Since there are 100 members, three-fifths is sixty Senators.

The need for a supermajority is not unknown to the Constitution, but to say it is used sparingly and for matters of great import is not to engage in hyperbole. A quick glance at the Great Document bears this out. The original Constitution contains only five instances which require a supermajority; the Amendments two. A supermajority of two-thirds of both houses of Congress is required for Congress to propose a constitutional amendment and to pass a bill over a presidential veto; two-thirds concurrence of all members of the Senate present is necessary to convict under Impeachment; two-thirds concurrence of all members of the Senate present is requisite to consent to a treaty. The Constitution also requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate to “expel a member.” The Fourteenth Amendment forbids those who formerly held office, either civil or military, and had engaged in “insurrection or rebellion” from holding any office–either civil or military– unless two-thirds of both the House and Senate  acted to “remove such disability.”  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment requires a two-thirds majority of each house to determine that an Acting President “is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”

Constitutional amendment, over-ride a presidential veto, convict under impeachment, expel a member, ratify a treaty, remove a punishment for rebellion, and judge a president incompetent. These are fairly characterized as “exceptional situations,” not the everyday stuff of a legislature doing business. But because of the Senate’s filibuster rules, the need for a supermajority of 60 has become a part of the everyday stuff of a legislature attempting to do business.

Under Article 1, Section 5 [2] “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings….” And the filibuster is very much a rule of the Senate’s proceedings. But at a certain point, the procedural rule can be said to have overtaken the substantive– I would suggest we begin considering whether or not we are at that point.

In U S v. BALLIN, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) the Supreme Court looked at the rule making power of Congress and had this to say

The constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the house, and, within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.

There are at least a few things to consider in this regard. Perhaps foremost is the ability of the Senate to change the filibuster rule (”The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted.”). Also, it may well be a stretch, but I find it interesting nonetheless: does the present form and practice of the filibuster (a defacto supermajority requirement for the passage of legislation in the Senate) “ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights?” (i.e., does it, as described in INS v. Chadha, offend the “framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” (See also Powell v. McCormack, where the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional  a House resolution to not permit the duly elected Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. to take his seat in the House of Representatives (”Moreover, it would effectively nullify the [Constitutional] Convention’s decision to require a two-thirds vote for expulsion.”).

Which is to say, in this matter, does the filibuster, as practiced currently, effectively nullify the simple majoritarian requirement for the passage of legislation in the Senate? Of course, the Constitution lacks an explicit textual commitment to majority rule. But the argument in favor of majority rule is a powerful one, hinged upon that venerable canon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ‘the expression of the one is the exclusion of the other.’ Which is to say, that by listing these five supermajority exceptions in the original constitution that I have listed above, the drafters made simple majority in all other cases the default position. To appreciate the power of this argument (and this canon of construction) on need not look any further than the Bill of Rights. Madison balked mightily at the proposal for a Bill of Rights as being “dangerous” because the act of listing certain rights  would, under black letter principle, ‘the expression of the one is the exclusion of the other,’ negate the existence of others. The solution to Madison’s fear– the anti-expressio unius est exclusio alterius– is contained in the Ninth Amendment:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, in certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The textual analysis regarding majority and supermajority goes something like this: Article II, Section 2 [2] regarding the powers of the President reads

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law…. (emphasis added)

The presence of the requirement that two-thirds of the Senators concur in the ratification of a treaty, shows that when the drafters wanted to provide for a supermajority requirement they knew how; that they failed to include the clause requiring a two thirds majority appointment for “Ambassadors… and judges of the supreme Court” is strong evidence that they did not want to as it regards “Ambassadors… and judges of the supreme Court.” Furthermore, had they not provided for a two-thirds supermajority for treaties, one might argue that a supermajority applied to Treaties and Ambassadors and supreme Court judges– as the question may have remained open. But by expressing the requirement in the one instance (”Treaties”), they excluded, or closed the door on, the others (”Ambassadors… and supreme Court judges”).

Similarly, the various (but few) provisions scattered throughout the Constitution  show that the drafters knew how to create a supermajority requirement when they wanted to, and by virtue of simply being, these supermajority requirements show themselves to be exceptions to the unstated rule. In this case, the unstated rule being that a simple majority is necessary for the passage of legislation.

In addition, it should be noted that the Constitution gives a vote to the Vice-President only in instances where the Senate is “equally divided.” The presumption of course is that in doing so it will allow the Vice-President to break the tie and, by a one vote majority, allow for the legislation to either pass or fail. Importantly,  an “equally divided” Senate is rendered meaningless in the light of  a supermajority requirement.

The argument in favor of the 60 vote requirement to invoke cloture and end a flilibuster largely rests upon the premise that the Constitution grants to the Senate plenary power under Article 1, Section 5 [2] “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings….” That within that clause lay the ability to proscribe the numerical meaning of the requirements for Senate procedure. But what happens when the rule of procedure swallows the law?

One might also ask if there is a constitutional argument that can be made if one can point to the concrete harm in a particular bill effectuated? Not effectuated? (But See Raines v. Byrd (1997) for the standing difficulties for Federal Senators bringing a claim against diminishment of Congressional power wrought by the Presidential line item veto, dismissed on standing grounds by the Supreme Court and characterized as “a type of institutional injury which damages all Members of Congress equally.” But, importantly, especially considering the disparate financial impact on states regarding Medicaid funding in the Senate bill, See Clinton v. New York (1998), where the state of New York did have standing and successfully challenged the same presidential line item veto after the use of the same resulted in the loss of $955 million to New York for the payment of expenses related to the medical care for the indigent).

The balance of power in Congress between large and small states was hotly contested at the Constitutional Convention. The compromise, in which members of the House of Representatives would be apportioned through population and members of the Senate would be limited to a flat two members per state, could certainly be characterized, like the process of legislation itself, as being a “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” So much so in fact that the compromise which gave birth to the form of the Senate and its particularized distribution of power is, in a sense, a distinct creature within the Constitution. An anomaly, if you will. When Alabama attempted to implement such a plan in 1964, patterned closely after the Federal Legislature, for the configuration of its State Legislature, it was deemed unconstitutional as repugnant to the Equal Protection clause. The Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 379 U.S. 870 (1964) stated:

“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”

The Court distinguished the federal construct of the Senate as “ingrained in our Constitution as part of the law of the land” and “conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic. Arising from unique historical circumstances….”

In the Free Exercise religion case,  Employment Division v.  Smith, 497 U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Scalia speaks of the increased weight and power of “hybrid” rights–rights in which the Free Exercise clause is coupled with other constitutional protections “such as freedom of speech or  the press.” What then is the result of a Constitutional scheme that outside of the Constitution is actually repugnant to a fundamental right?   Considering the offensiveness of the scheme to the Equal Protection Clause, at least when applied to putative state action to effectuate such a scheme, one wonders if a tighter leash isn’t appropriate? Perhaps somewhat akin to the strict adherence we require of “granfathered” zoning usages? This may be a bit afield, but so also may be a Senate rule which de facto requires a supermajority to pass legislation.

It is also worth noting that the Constitution jealously protects a state’s stake in the power of a Federal Senate seat. It protects the legislative power of states in the federal government by forbidding the creation of new states “formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.” (Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1).

The fear addressed being that a state such as New York could create within it’s borders– or with the help of a bordering state– “New York. West,” thereby increasing its number of Senators by 2 (and if the population of the newly created state was less than 30,000, a House member as well). In doing so, a state such as New York could thereby increase its own senatorial power and diminish the senatorial power of the other states. The Senate, particularly, is a zero sum game. But the clause in Article IV, importantly, essentially prohibits the diminishment of a state’s Congressional power–especially senatorial power–by forbidding an action which would do so– unless Congress, both the Senate and House, agree. One could argue that the filibuster as practiced accomplishes a similar diminishment of  senatorial power–but does so without the consent of the House (or, for that matter, the State Legislators).

And the point is this:

“According to UCLA political scientist Barbara Sinclair, about 8 percent of major bills faced a filibuster in the 1960s. This decade, that jumped to 70 percent.”

I loved “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” as much as the next fellow; but this isn’t that. And although I’m not saying that the filibuster, as presently configured, is unconstitutional, I am saying that we may seriously wish to begin looking to the Constitution to formulate answers regarding the modern problem of the filibuster. The Constitution is not a suicide pact, but the Senate rules may be.

Is it Unconstitutional to Mandate Health Insurance?

Is it unconstitutional to mandate health insurance? It seems unprecedented to require citizens to purchase insurance simply because they live in the U.S. (rather than as a condition of driving a car or owning a business, for instance).  Therefore, several credentialed, conservative lawyers think that compulsory health insurance is unconstitutional.  See here and here and here. Their reasoning is unconvincing and deeply flawed.  Since I’m writing in part for a non-legal audience, I’ll start with some basics and provide a lay explanation.  (Go here for a fuller account).

Constitutional attacks fall into two basic categories:  (1) lack of federal power (Congress simply lacks any power to do this under the main body of the Constitution); and (2) violation of individual rights protected by the “Bill of Rights.”  Considering (1), Congress has ample power and precedent through the Constitution’s “Commerce Clause” to regulate just about any aspect of the national economy.  Health insurance is quintessentially an economic good.  The only possible objection is that mandating its purchase is not the same as “regulating” its purchase, but a mandate is just a stronger form of regulation.  When Congressional power exists, nothing in law says that stronger actions are less supported than weaker ones.

An insurance mandate would be enforced through income tax laws, so even if a simple mandate were not a valid “regulation,” it still could fall easily within Congress’s plenary power to tax or not tax income.  For instance, anyone purchasing insurance could be given an income tax credit, and those not purchasing could be assessed an income tax penalty.  The only possible constitutional restriction is an archaic provision saying that if Congress imposes anything that amounts to a “head tax” or “poll tax” (that is, taxing people simply as people rather than taxing their income), then it must do so uniformly (that is, the same amount per person).  This technical restriction is easily avoided by using income tax laws. Purists complain that taxes should be proportional to actual income and should not be used mainly to regulate economic behavior, but our tax code, for better or worse, is riddled with such regulatory provisions and so they are clearly constitutional.

Arguments about federal authority deal mainly with states’ rights and sovereign power, but the real basis for opposition is motivated more by sentiments about individual rights - the notion that government should not use its recognized authority to tell people how to spend their money.  This notion of economic liberty had much greater traction in a prior era, but it has little basis in modern constitutional law.  Eighty years ago, the Supreme Court used the concept of “substantive due process” to protect individual economic liberties, but the Court has thoroughly and repeatedly repudiated this body of law since the 1930s.  Today, even Justice Scalia regards substantive due process as an “oxymoron.”

Under both liberal and conservative jurisprudence, the Constitution protects individual autonomy strongly only when “fundamental rights”  are involved.  There may be fundamental rights to decide about medical treatments, but having insurance does not require anyone to undergo treatment.  It only requires them to have a means to pay for any treatment they might choose to receive.  The liberty in question is purely economic and has none of the strong elements of personal or bodily integrity that invoke Constitutional protection.  In short, there is no fundamental right to be uninsured, and so various arguments based on the Bill of Rights fall flat.  The closest plausible argument is one based on a federal statute protecting religious liberty, but Congress is Constitutionally free to override one statute with another.

If Constitutional concerns still remain, the simplest fix (ironically) would be simply to enact social insurance (as we currently do for Medicare and social security retirement) but allow people to opt out if they purchase private insurance.  Politically, of course, this is not in the cards, but the fact that social insurance faces none of the alleged Constitutional infirmities of mandating private insurance points to this basic realization: Congress is on solid Constitutional ground in expanding health insurance coverage in essentially any fashion that is politically and socially feasible.

Mark Hall
Professor of Law and Public Health
Wake Forest University School of Law

[UPDATE: 03/26/10 http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/03/26/are-the-attorneys-generals-constitutional-claims-bogus/]