TIM JOST INTERVIEWS ANDY KOPPELMAN ABOUT KOPPELMAN’S NEW BOOK, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION (Oxford University Press 2013).
Q. (Tim Jost) Your book explains, for the general reader, what was at stake in the health care fight and what the Supreme Court did. Why should the general reader care? All this is old news.
A. (Andy Koppleman) If you’re sitting on a hill, and a large boulder rolls past you, it’s a good idea to look uphill to see if any more boulders are coming. The history matters because it shows that there are real dangers.
Last spring, the Supreme Court came within one vote of taking health insurance away from more than 30 million people. Chief Justice John Roberts declined to join the four judges who wanted to do that, but he embraced all their principles. Those principles are nasty. All five judges think that universal health care would be unconstitutional. All are suspicious of a law that asks the healthy and rich to support medical care for the sick and poor. All of them are still on the Supreme Court. They continue to exercise political power over the rest of us. Americans need to understand what happened.
Q. So what do you tell us that we don’t already know from the news stories?
A. My book explains why Obama decided to include the unpopular provision requiring everyone to have insurance. I also show that the Republicans, who originally proposed that idea, turned against it just because they wanted to deny Obama a victory. Most importantly, I show where they got the idea that the mandate was somehow a violation of an important liberty.
Q. Why did the constitutional case take the form it did?
A. The Republicans’ objection to the Act was a combination of politics and substance. Some of them honestly thought it was bad policy. But you can’t challenge a law in court because you don’t like the policy. You need to make a constitutional objection. The constitutional objection was invented, in sketchy form, just as the bill neared passage and almost instantly became Republican Party orthodoxy. It relied on an extreme libertarian philosophy, which holds that, if you get sick and can’t pay for it, that’s your tough luck. The challengers’ arguments would have struck down the Act even if the alternative was a huge population of uninsured. The dark heart of the case against the ACA is the notion that the law’s trivial burden on individuals was an outrageous invasion of liberty, even when the alternative was a regime in which millions were needlessly denied decent medical care.
Q. What about the legal arguments?
A. These are less complex than many people think. Insurance is part of commerce among the several states. Congress can regulate it. Therefore, Congress can prohibit health insurers from discriminating on the basis of preexisting conditions. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it gets to decide what means it may employ to make that regulation effective. I explain how the challengers tried, and failed, to get around this simple argument.
Q. Much of your book deals with the history of these constitutional provisions that formed the basis for the ACA litigation. Why should we care about this history?
There are two reasons. One is that, in interpreting any law, it is helpful to know the reasons why the law was passed. The second is that the framers of the Constitution were very bright people, and their insights are useful in addressing today’s problems.
The Constitution was adopted specifically in order to give Congress power adequate to address the nation’s problems. That is its fundamental and overriding purpose. The health care issue is one that the states had tried and failed to address: only Massachusetts did it, and its circumstances were very unusual. A situation in which neither the states nor the federal government could solve the country’s problems was what we had under the Articles of Confederation. It is precisely what the Constitution was intended to prevent.
Q. What are the boulders that you suggest may still be coming down the hill?
A. The real moral force behind the challenge to the ACA wasn’t any technical legal argument. It was most clearly stated at the oral argument, by Justice Antonin Scalia. The counsel for the United States argued that the state legitimately could compel Americans to purchase health insurance, because the country is obligated to pay for the uninsured when they get sick. Scalia responded: “Well, don’t obligate yourself to that.”
Q. Does Justice Scalia really think that there’s no obligation to care for sick people? Why was he saying this?
A. The answer has to do with the structure of constitutional law. If you want to trash the ACA –- and Scalia did –- you have to assert constitutional limits that would exist even if there were no other way to deliver medical care to everyone.
This is why so many people (including, in the end, a near-majority of the Court) who were not Tough Luck Libertarians at all, who would find that philosophy repellent, nonetheless found themselves saying Tough Luck Libertarian things, and making claims based on a Tough Luck Constitution –- a constitution in which there is no realistic path to universal health care. That Constitution won’t be attractive unless Tough Luck Libertarianism is right that it is acceptable to deny people the medical care they need. The challengers to the ACA talked a lot about slippery slopes – at the bottom of this one was a law requiring you to buy broccoli – but there’s a slope in the other direction as well. Once you decide that it’s acceptable to hold your nose and make this kind of argument, it will be easier next time.
Q. The NFIB case which the Supreme Court decided was only one of dozens of cases that have been brought challenging the Affordable Care Act. One of those cases brought by Liberty University challenged that provision of the ACA requiring large employers to offer health insurance to their employees or pay a tax penalty. Liberty University lost that case in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the Supreme Court remanded it for reconsideration. Is there any possibility the courts will find that Congress lacks the power to require large employers to offer health insurance? Would Tough Luck Libertarianism go this far?
A. It’s hard to see how. The employer mandate is described as a tax in the statute. The individual mandate isn’t, but the Court upheld it as a tax. Chief Justice Roberts also objected to the mandate because you don’t have to do anything to be subject to it. To be subject to the employer mandate, you have to decide to employ people. Congress has had the power to regulate economic transactions for nearly a century. Even the Roberts Court isn’t going to change that.
Q. Several states are refusing to implement the insurance market reforms imposed by the ACA and one state is considering legislation that would prohibit the licensure of an insurance plan that would participate in an ACA exchange. Does the Supreme Court’s decision give any hope to states that are still refusing to assist in implementing the ACA?
A. If states won’t participate in the health exchanges, then the Federal government can and will do it for them. That has already been happening. It has been well settled for years that state laws designed to disrupt the operation of a federal law are unconstitutional.
The one part of the Court’s decision that empowers the states to stay out of the federal scheme is Chief Justice Roberts’s decision that states could refuse to provide Medicaid to their poorest citizens. The Court ruled that the states could turn down the Medicaid expansion while continuing to participate in the old Medicaid program. One might have expected that no state would turn down such a good deal: the federal government will pick up 100% of the costs until 2016, with its contribution gradually declining to 90% in 2020 and thereafter. And there is added pressure to take the money, because previous forms of federal aid were cut off. Hospital associations agreed to accept cuts to their reimbursement rates, expecting that this would be more than made up by money from patients newly insured through Medicaid. States refusing the money would not only be hurting their own working poor. They’d be rejecting a huge infusion of cash into their economies, creating many, many jobs –- good jobs, for doctors and well-paid medical technicians. That money has a powerful multiplier effect, creating jobs outside the health sector as well.
Many Republican governors have now turned down the money, but that number is shrinking. Gov. Rick Scott of Florida, for instance, recently changed his mind. The big question mark is Texas. One in four Texans is uninsured. The ACA would insure almost two million of them. The expansion would give Texas an additional $52.5 billion from 2014-2019, which is more than half of the state’s annual budget. Gov. Rick Perry has insisted that he won’t take the money. If you are a hospital executive in Texas, you probably have a fiduciary duty to do all you can to defeat Rick Perry. Meanwhile, the Court has succeeded in hurting millions of people. Four days before Perry announced his decision, the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality ranked Texas as having the worst health care in the nation. This is the Court’s notion of “liberty.”
Timothy S. Jost holds the Robert L. Willett Family Professorship of Law at the Washington and Lee University School of Law. He is a co-author of the casebook, Health Law, used widely throughout the United States in teaching health law, and of a treatise and hornbook by the same name. His other publications are simply to numerous to list.
Andrew Koppelman is John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. He has written extensively about the legal debate surrounding the Affordable Care Act for Salon. His latest book, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Healthcare Reform, will be published by Oxford University Press on March 22, 2013 and available online and through bookstores everywhere.
“Andrew Koppelman has magnificently captured the current legal, political and policy-related lay of the land in Washington. His insightful analysis here should be mandatory reading for anyone concerned about the future of health care in America.”
–Tom Daschle, former Senate Majority Leader
United States v. Caronia: Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Second Circuit’s Decision Invalidating the Ban on Off-Label Promotion
Filed under: Advertising & Lobbying, Health Law, Pharma
Earlier this week, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals at last issued its decision in United States v. Caronia and it is momentous (and predicted to be heading to the Supreme Court). A two-judge majority of the Circuit Court held that Alfred Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales representative, “was convicted for his speech – for promoting [the central nervous system depressant Xyrem] for an off-label use – in violation of his right of free speech under the First Amendment.”
The majority’s decision begins with a threshold question. Was Caronia convicted for conspiracy to misbrand Xyrem because he engaged in off-label promotion qua off-label promotion, that is, for his speech? Or, was his speech simply “evidence that the ‘off-label uses were intended ones for which Xyrem’s labeling failed to provide [the required] directions[,]” as the government argued on appeal? The former would implicate the First Amendment, but the latter would not. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he First Amendment … does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.” As the Caronia dissent (colorfully) explained, “Abby and Martha [do not have] a First Amendent right to offer arsenic-laced wine to lonely old bachelors with the intent that they drink it. … And any statements Abby or Martha made suggesting their intent—even if all of the statements were truthful and not misleading—would not be barred from evidence by the First Amendment…”
The majority found that Caronia was convicted for his speech alone, pointing to the lower court’s instructions to the jury and to a number of statements that the government made at trial including “[Caronia] conspired through some act of misbranding, and that act of misbranding … was the promotion on October 26th and November 2nd[,] marketing [a] drug for unapproved uses.” Caronia’s conviction must therefore be vacated, the majority concluded. The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act does not “criminaliz[e] the simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use because such a construction would raise First Amendment concerns.” The majority did not disagree with the general proposition that speech may be used as evidence of intent, and it expressly declined to decide the specific question whether the FDCA violates the First Amendment by “defin[ing] misbranding in terms of whether a drug’s labeling is adequate for its intended use, and permit[ting] the government to prove intended use by reference to promotional statements made by drug manufacturers or their representatives.” Even if the Second Circuit’s decision stands, then, the government may be able to argue that Caronia is a case about an erroneous jury instruction with limited practical effect
The majority went on to hold that a ban on off-label promotion qua off-label promotion—like the Vermont law barring drug companies from using physician-specific prescribing data to craft physician-specific sales pitches at issue in the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health (which I discussed on this blog here)—is unconstitutional regardless of whether strict or intermediate scrutiny applies. The majority gave short shrift (no shrift, really) to the argument that the ban on off-label promotion is necessary to preserve the integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process, suggesting that the government could “minimize … manufacturer evasion of the approval process” by imposing “ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions.”
The majority did not elaborate on how ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions would work, on the grounds that the First Amendment puts the burden on the government to demonstrate that they would not. Here, too, there may be an opening for the government, to make a stronger case to the Supreme Court than it did before the Second Circuit (in its briefs or at oral argument) that ceilings or caps would not be “administrable, feasible, or otherwise effective” and that the ban on off-label promotion therefore provides a direct, narrowly-tailored, and crucial incentive to clinical research into already-approved drugs. As the dissent suggested, “[a] ceiling on off-label prescriptions would require collecting data from countless numbers of doctors and patients and, given the medical uncertainties involved, could needlessly (and simultaneously) result in the denial of some effective treatments and the overprescription of ineffective and even dangerous ones.”
As Frank Pasquale noted recently at the Health Law Prof Blog and here at HRW, law review scholarship is starting to emerge on the Supreme Court’s holding in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s expansion of the Medicaid program was an unconstitutionally coercive exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause authority. Professor Pasquale recommends Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases, an article co-authored by Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, writing that it is “sure to make an impact.”
Also well worth reading is Samuel R. Bagenstos’ article, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, which is forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal. Professor Bagenstos contends that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in NFIB is best read narrowly as setting forth a three-part test–which Professor Bagenstos terms the “anti-leveraging principle”–for determining whether a condition Congress places on participation in a joint federal-state program unconstitutionally coerces the states to participate. To apply the anti-leveraging principle, one must first ask whether a condition on federal spending “change[s] the terms of participation in [an] entrenched cooperative program[.]” The second question is whether the condition leaves a state without a real choice to decline the funds at issue because, for example, there is a “very large amount of money at stake[,]” as there was with the Medicaid expansion. The third and final question is whether “Congress was using a state’s desire to continue to participate in a lucrative program as leverage to force the states also to participate in a separate and independent program.” Only if the answer to all three questions is yes, Professor Bagenstos contends, should a court find that a spending condition is unconstitutionally coercive.
The final section of Professor Bagenstos’ article, in which he applies the anti-leveraging principle, is particularly interesting. Professor Bagenstos analyzes, among other things, the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid maintenance-of-effort requirement, which Maine Governor Paul LePage has challenged, the Clean Air Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, Mitt Romney’s education reform proposal, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and concludes that the Clean Air Act, which requires states to comply with certain provisions on pain of losing federal highway funding, is particularly vulnerable post-NFIB.
Stepping away from the constitutional questions addressed by the Supreme Court in NFIB, Jessica L. Roberts’ article Health Law as Disability Rights Law, which is forthcoming in the Minnesota Law Review, views the Medicaid expansion and other changes the ACA makes through the lens of “the historical division between the health and civil rights paradigms within disability law.” As Professor Roberts explains, in the 1970s and beyond, disability rights activists actively rejected the health paradigm as grounded in an outdated, medical model of disability that failed to recognize that the barriers to access that people with disabilities faced had a strong social component. The civil rights paradigm has its limits, though. Courts have been reluctant to apply civil rights legislation such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Medicaid and other public programs “in a manner that ensures health-care services for people with disabilities.” In the landmark Supreme Court case Alexander v. Choate, for example, the Court found that a state Medicaid program’s fourteen-day limit on in-patient hospital care did not discriminate against people with disabilities. In so doing, the Court “construed the benefit at stake as a ‘package of health care services,’ not adequate, equitable, or accessible health care.” Professor Roberts argues that “the ACA’s changes to public health insurance hold the promise to eliminate those barriers previously experienced by people with disabilities and, consequently, to reduce existing health disparities.” Thus, while the Medicaid expansion and certain of the Act’s other changes “fall under the health law umbrella substantively, insofar as they promote access and equality for people with disabilities, they make a civil rights law impact.” Professor Roberts’ article is thoroughgoing and thoughtful; I highly recommend it.
[Ed. Note: If you haven't read this piece from Professor Joondeph first published on the day of the Supreme Court's decision in the aca litigation blog-- you should; it makes great sense that a version of it is posted now at Scotusblog.]
(Note: a revised version of this essay is now posted here at SCOTUSblog.)
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion held that the minimum coverage provision falls within Congress’s power to impose a tax, and thus is constitutional. At the same time, he concluded that the mandate exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Moreover, he (along with two Democratic appointees, Justices Breyer and Kagan) also held that the Act’s dramatic expansion of the Medicaid program is unconstitutional insofar as it jeopardizes the states’ preexisting Medicaid dollars. In short, the Chief Justice upheld the entirety of the ACA, but with some important caveats.
The end product was-not to put too fine a point on it-brilliant. It is brilliant act of judicial statesmanship in a way that parallels another landmark decision, Marbruy v. Madison.
Marbury is best known for its statement in defense of judicial review, the authority of the Court to declare acts of Congress (and the executive branch) unconstitutional. But to really understand Marbury, one has to place the Great Chief Justice’s decision in its political context. In February of 1803, Chief Justice Marshall knew that the Jefferson administration would have completely ignored the Court’s decision in Marbury had the justices ordered Madison to grant Marbury his judicial commission. (Indeed, the administration did not even dignify the proceedings by appearing. Only one side argued at the Court.) Thus, Marshall reached the Court’s conclusions-that the Jefferson administration had acted unlawfully, and that the Court had the authority to say so-while ultimately holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction, forcing it to dismiss the case. Marshall asserted the Court’s authority in a muscular fashion, delineating the constitutional constraints on Congress and the President, but without actually challenging the other branches’ powers. Marshall set down important constitutional markers while reaching an immediate result that favored the incumbent President, shielding the Court from any significant political danger or threat of retribution.
In the Health Care Cases, the immediate danger to the Court was not so grave or immediate. There was no chance that the President would simply ignore or disobey the Court’s judgment. Indeed, a sizable majority of Americans would have supported the conclusion that the individual mandate was unconstitutional.
Yet there was a real longer-term danger to the Court: it risked staining itself with the appearance of partisanship. This risk was especially acute given some other recent decisions (most prominently, Bush v. Gore and Citizens United) and some others headed the Court’s way (such as those involving the constitutionality of affirmative action and the Voting Rights Act). A steady string of 5-4 decisions on a range of controversial issues, cleaving perfectly along partisan lines, would present a real threat to the Court’s diffuse support–support that depends on the public’s faith that the Court stands above partisan politics, that it renders its decisions based on legal and constitutional principles.
The Chief Justice’s opinion today can rightly claim the mantle of bipartisanship and judicial modesty, and in this highest of high-profile cases. “We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies. That judgment is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions.” The Chief’s paens to the limited role of the judiciary in our constitutional framework, stated eloquently during his Senate confirmation hearings, suddenly ring much more true.
Further, the opinion’s power to lift the Court above the polarized, partisan fray is apt to prove enormously valuable to its long-term institutional standing. Today’s decision largely immunizes the Court, at least for some time, from Democratic attacks that the five Republican appointees are “conservative judicial activists,” partisan hacks in judicial robes. If the Court declares that all governmental affirmative action programs violate the Equal Protection Clause next spring in Fisher, for instance, liberals will have a much harder time making the predictable accusations of partisanship stick. Today’s Case of the Century will stand as a salient counter-example.
At the same time, the Chief Justice established some important, conservative doctrinal beachheads. Specifically, he reaffirmed or established (depending on your perspective) some potentially important limits on Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the General Welfare Clause. In fine, Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to regulate commerce in a manner that compels people into commerce; it can only regulate existing commerce. Further, such regulation, even if “necessary,” can never be “proper,” no matter its importance to a broader regulatory scheme. And the General Welfare Clause does not permit Congress to use the states’ dependence on an existing conditional spending program as a means to forcing them to accept significant, qualitative changes to that program; rather, states must be given the choice to accept or deny the funds associated only with the program’s modifications–at least when the program is huge like Medicaid.
We can debate the significance of these limits. And whatever we think today, what will really matter is how future Court majorities interpret today’s opinion. But regardless, the Chief Justice stated clearly that the Obama administration’s principal defense of the Act–as a regulation of interstate commerce–amounted to a regulatory overreach. He embraced the essence of the conservative constitutional argument–that Congress cannot uses its commerce power to regulate “inactivity.” And in wrapping the Court in bipartisanship, he has made it much more difficult for liberals to attack the Court’s conservative decisions going forward.
Further, it is important to keep in mind an important difference in these controversies. Today’s decision merely held that the ACA is permissible; a Republican Congress and President could repeal the Act in toto in January. By contrast, decisions like Citizens United–or potential decisions declaring affirmative action or Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional–could only be undone via constitutional amendment (or a subsequent overruling).
Liberals should be extremely excited by today’s decision. The bottom line is that the most significant piece of social welfare legislation since the 1960s survived the exacting review of a conservative Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, in an age of growing economic inequality, the Court has validated the biggest effort at redistribution since the end of the Great Society. But liberals should not forget that, in the long run, it was the views of the Federalists–and Chief Justice Marshall in particular–that ultimately shaped the Nation. By cultivating the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy, Marshall was able to pursue his nationalist visions, even while conceding momentary defeats to the Jeffersonians. Marshall saw that, as the Court’s prestige grew, so, too, did the influence of the Chief Justice over the growing Nation.
Today’s real winner was the Court–and by extension the Chief Justice. It was a stroke of judicial genius. A Marbury for our time.
During his Senate confirmation hearings, John Roberts famously said that he would “call balls and strikes,” and not “pitch or bat.” It was a memorable promise of judicial modesty, but one that sometimes rang hollow after decisions like Citizens United. On Thursday, in a remarkable opinion that surprised almost everyone, Chief Justice Roberts joined the four liberal justices to uphold the individual mandate as a constitutional tax. Was this the modest umpire he promised us? Did he break ranks to preserve the Court’s reputation? (Note, Justices Breyer and Kagan also broke ranks on the Medicaid expansion question.) Was this Marburian or Machiavellian?
Either way, the Court’s opinions are full of curveballs. So I’d like to add to the chorus (cacophony?) of law professor post-game analysis and try to make sense of some of the fault lines and themes.
Death and taxes: The mandate as a tax snuck up on most of us. My favorite internet meme from yesterday was Admiral Ackbar’s warning: “It’s a tax!” Judge Posner on Slate.com astutely observed that legislators rarely call revenue provisions or anything else “taxes” anymore, because it has become a dirty word. President Obama still refused to say “tax” when addressing the Court’s decision. (Admiral Ackbar is not a cabinet member.) The Roberts majority held that the mandate was not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act, but was a tax for constitutional purposes. The label Congress gave to the mandate (calling it a “penalty” rather than a “tax” in the Affordable Care Act) was helpful to the former but not the latter. Tax scholars, good luck with this one.
Inactivity: As many of us predicted, the Commerce Clause argument would rise or fall based on whether Kennedy Roberts bought into the action/inaction distinction, something that well-respected conservative jurists like Judge Silberman and Judge Sutton didn’t. In fact, Roberts bought the Congress-is-creating-not-regulating-commerce argument whole cloth (pp. 18-23). He and the conservative justices wrote about the uninsured like they exist in some sort of Precambrian pre-commerce period where they face zero risk of getting sick or injured and don’t free ride on the rest of us.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion could not have been better on this point–her opinion is a realist tour de force on how health insurance really works. In the real world. She doesn’t bother with silly analogies. She even identifies some limiting principles: the free rider problem is significantly worse in health insurance than in other markets; the free rider problem is directly related to interstate commerce, and is not at all attenuated; there’s no problem with proximity. She obliterates the broccoli analogy (pp. 28-29 of her dissent). So much so that she even quotes Robert Bork (“Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski to the bottom.”). It would take a remarkable (and probably imaginary) string of events and causal links for Congress to ever justify a vegetable mandate (luckily, my wife and I are not constrained by the Commerce Clause at home with our children).
What disappoints me about the joint dissent (by Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) is that it doesn’t seem to appreciate why health insurance is a unique problem of unique scale that requires unique solutions like mandates. How do you pretend that the uninsured are pre-commerce? How do you pretend a $2.5 trillion industry doesn’t exist? (Roberts at pp. 18-19). Is health care like Kaiser Soze? The uninsured cost each insured family about $1,000 per year in additional premiums. The uninsured consume $100 billion in health care each year. Over 60% of the uninsured visit a doctor or the ER every year. If this is what Precambrian pre-commerce looks like, it would be like single-celled creatures riding motorcycles and talking on cell phones. Luckily for the humans impacted by the Affordable Care Act, inaction shields us only from the Commerce Clause, not the Tax Clause. (Roberts, at p. 41).
Congress can create choices, but not coerce: It struck me that both the mandate and Medicaid expansion essentially boiled down to whether Congress is forcing individuals and states to do something or merely giving them choices. First, the mandate survived as a tax rather than a penalty because Roberts found that the amounts charged in section 5000A for going uninsured (the “shared responsibility payment”) were proportionate and weren’t coercive. On page 35 of his opinion, he notes that “for most Americans the amount due will be far less than the price of insurance, and by statute, it can never be more.” In footnote 8, he then notes that someone making $35,000 a year in 2016 would owe the IRS only $60 per month for going uninsured, which is less than the $400 a month it would cost to buy insurance. That’s a real choice and it’s not coercive. That little passage may have saved the entire Affordable Care Act, characterizing the mandate as a tax and not a penalty.
Likewise, Medicaid expansion boils down to the same issue– Is Congress coercing states and thus abusing its spending power, or do states have a real choice? The threat to withhold all Medicaid funding if states don’t expand along with the Affordable Care Act is coercive; but withholding new funds and preserving existing federal Medicaid funding isn’t– it’s “a genuine choice.” (Roberts, at p. 58). In the coming weeks, I look forward to discussing with colleagues what this means for all the joint federal-state programs we have. Does it mean Congress can giveth but not taketh away? Will this decision open the floodgates to litigation challenging federal spending conditions? Will Congress, as Justice Ginsburg argues, avoid amending these sprawling statutes and instead decide to repeal and reenact huge programs like Medicaid to avoid this issue? (Ginsburg, at p. 38) For my money, the conditional spending decision will affect many more ongoing and future laws than the Commerce Clause holding.
Weak dissent: Finally, Judge Posner also remarked on the surprisingly weak joint dissent by the conservative justices, which also struck me when I read it. We didn’t get Scalia’s customary fire-breathing screed. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion reads like a genuine dissent, which might be a sign that Roberts changed his vote, as many are speculating.
In any case, the 193-page document will give law nerds like me a lot to chew on in the coming weeks, months, and years. The umpire certainly threw us a few curveballs.