Human Farming & the Limits of Medical Research

A Museum of Modern Art exhibit by Michael Burton once proposed that human beings themselves would be the soil for a “future farm:”

Future Farm predicts that the emerging pharmaceutical research in harvesting adult stem cells from fat tissues and its convergence with future nanotechnologies, will bring with it scenarios that reconsider the body as income. We live in a world where industries exist to offer financial rewards for those willing to sell a kidney or produce hair to beautify others. Industries have grown to facilitate transplant tourism as a result of the success of contemporary surgery. And scientific and technological advances continue to bring new possibilities for the practice of farming the body.

This may seem like an overly dramatic or even science-fictionalized description of desperation due to poverty and larger economic trends. But the global economic race to the bottom has now so influenced medical research that Burton’s dark vision is coming closer to realization.

A recent article by Bartlett & Steele and a book by Carl Elliott describe the rise of “contract research organizations” that organize the initial phases of drug trials. Bartlett and Steele choose a provocative metaphor to describe the trend:

To have an effective regulatory system you need a clear chain of command—you need to know who is responsible to whom, all the way up and down the line. There is no effective chain of command in modern American drug testing. Around the time that drugmakers began shifting clinical trials abroad, in the 1990s, they also began to contract out all phases of development and testing, putting them in the hands of for-profit companies.

It used to be that clinical trials were done mostly by academic researchers in universities and teaching hospitals, a system that, however imperfect, generally entailed certain minimum standards. The free market has changed all that. Today it is mainly independent contractors who recruit potential patients both in the U.S. and—increasingly—overseas. They devise the rules for the clinical trials, conduct the trials themselves, prepare reports on the results, ghostwrite technical articles for medical journals, and create promotional campaigns. The people doing the work on the front lines are not independent scientists. They are wage-earning technicians who are paid to gather a certain number of human beings; sometimes sequester and feed them; administer certain chemical inputs; and collect samples of urine and blood at regular intervals. The work looks like agribusiness, not research.

Because of the deference shown to drug companies by the F.D.A.—and also by Congress, which has failed to impose any meaningful regulation—there is no mandatory public record of the results of drug trials conducted in foreign countries. Nor is there any mandatory public oversight of ongoing trials.

Therefore, it is up to journalists like Bartlett & Steele to uncover problems. And they are legion:

The Argentinean province of Santiago del Estero, with a population of nearly a million, is one of the country’s poorest. In 2008 seven babies participating in drug testing in the province suffered what the U.S. clinical-trials community refers to as “an adverse event”: they died. . . . In New Delhi, 49 babies died at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences while taking part in clinical trials over a 30-month period. . . . In 2007, residents of a homeless shelter in Grudziadz, Poland, received as little as $2 to take part in a flu-vaccine experiment. The subjects thought they were getting a regular flu shot. They were not. At least 20 of them died.

Bartlett and Steele also discuss problems in research in the US. Exploitation probably should not be a surprise in a country where unpaid prison labor appears to be a strategy to boost productivity. US companies are also driving the “initial stages of distributed human computing that can be directed at mental tasks the way that surplus remote server rackspace or Web hosting can be purchased to accommodate sudden spikes in Internet traffic.” (Such “human intelligence tasks” can be purchased for as little as a penny each on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.) But the slow infiltration of less developed countries’ standards into US drug testing should be a concern for the FDA.

The system also appears to give drug companies a wide latitude to manipulate results, leading to the rise of “rescue countries” that are particularly prone to produce positive results:

One big factor in the shift of clinical trials to foreign countries is a loophole in F.D.A. regulations: if studies in the United States suggest that a drug has no benefit, trials from abroad can often be used in their stead to secure F.D.A. approval. There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be especially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called “rescue countries.” Rescue countries came to the aid of Ketek, the first of a new generation of widely heralded antibiotics to treat respiratory-tract infections. . . In 2004—on April Fools’ Day, as it happens—the F.D.A. certified Ketek as safe and effective. The F.D.A.’s decision was based heavily on the results of studies in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. The approval came less than one month after a researcher in the United States was sentenced to 57 months in prison for falsifying her own Ketek data.

Massive global inequalities render populations around the world vulnerable to exploitative testing conditions.

Carl Elliott’s book White Coat, Black Hat covers similar terrain, as well as the conflicts of interest and other issues we’ve addressed at Seton Hall’s health law center. His review of recent books on medical research described a “mild torture economy.” His piece “Guinea Pigging” suggests that “rescue counties” in the US may complement the “rescue countries” of Bartlett and Steele:

This unit was in a university hospital, not a corporate lab, and the staff had a casual attitude toward regulations and procedures. “The Animal House of research units” is what [one research subject] calls it. . . . Although study guidelines called for stringent dietary restrictions, the subjects got so hungry that one of them picked the lock on the food closet. “We got giant boxes of cookies and ran into the lounge and put them in the couch,” Rockwell says. “This one guy was putting them in the ceiling tiles.” Rockwell has little confidence in the data that the study produced. “The most integral part of the study was the diet restriction,” he says, “and we were just gorging ourselves at 2 A.M. on Cheez Doodles.”

Elliott’s litany of poorly controlled or ramshackle studies gives us one more item to add to Dr. John Ioannidis’s many reasons for doubting medical research:

Ioannidis [has] laid out a detailed mathematical proof that, assuming modest levels of researcher bias, typically imperfect research techniques, and the well-known tendency to focus on exciting rather than highly plausible theories, researchers will come up with wrong findings most of the time. Simply put, if you’re attracted to ideas that have a good chance of being wrong, and if you’re motivated to prove them right, and if you have a little wiggle room in how you assemble the evidence, you’ll probably succeed in proving wrong theories right. . . .

When a five-year study of 10,000 people finds that those who take more vitamin X are less likely to get cancer Y, you’d think you have pretty good reason to take more vitamin X . . . But these studies often sharply conflict with one another. Studies have gone back and forth on the cancer-preventing powers of vitamins A, D, and E; on the heart-health benefits of eating fat and carbs; and even on the question of whether being overweight is more likely to extend or shorten your life. How should we choose among these dueling, high-profile nutritional findings? Ioannidis suggests a simple approach: ignore them all.

For starters, he explains, the odds are that in any large database of many nutritional and health factors, there will be a few apparent connections that are in fact merely flukes, not real health effects—it’s a bit like combing through long, random strings of letters and claiming there’s an important message in any words that happen to turn up. But even if a study managed to highlight a genuine health connection to some nutrient, you’re unlikely to benefit much from taking more of it, because we consume thousands of nutrients that act together as a sort of network, and changing intake of just one of them is bound to cause ripples throughout the network that are far too complex for these studies to detect, and that may be as likely to harm you as help you. . . .[S]tudies rarely go on long enough to track the decades-long course of disease and ultimately death. Instead, they track easily measurable health “markers” such as cholesterol levels, blood pressure, and blood-sugar levels, and meta-experts have shown that changes in these markers often don’t correlate as well with long-term health as we have been led to believe. . . .

And these problems are aside from ubiquitous measurement errors (for example, people habitually misreport their diets in studies), routine misanalysis (researchers rely on complex software capable of juggling results in ways they don’t always understand), and the less common, but serious, problem of outright fraud (which has been revealed, in confidential surveys, to be much more widespread than scientists like to acknowledge). . . .If a study somehow avoids every one of these problems and finds a real connection to long-term changes in health, you’re still not guaranteed to benefit, because studies report average results that typically represent a vast range of individual outcomes. Should you be among the lucky minority that stands to benefit, don’t expect a noticeable improvement in your health, because studies usually detect only modest effects that merely tend to whittle your chances of succumbing to a particular disease from small to somewhat smaller. “The odds that anything useful will survive from any of these studies are poor,” says Ioannidis—dismissing in a breath a good chunk of the research into which we sink about $100 billion a year in the United States alone.

To summarize: Ioannidis casts some doubt on even the best of studies, and Elliott, Bartlett, and Steele show that bad studies may be far more common than we suspect. It’s a troubling set of observations for all concerned. We should at the very least insist on much more systematic monitoring of global drug trials.

Supreme Court to Address Adverse Event Disclosure in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano

On January 10, 2011, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, a case involving a pharmaceutical company’s duty under securities law to disclose adverse event reports that is “perhaps the most significant business case in the Supreme Court this term.”

Under the Zicam brand name, petitioner Matrixx manufactured over-the-counter intranasal zinc sprays and gels to treat the common cold.  Because the products at issue were homeopathic preparations sold over-the-counter, they were not subject to the Food & Drug Administration’s rigorous prescription drug approval process or, at the time, the requirement that adverse event reports be submitted to the FDA.  Between the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2004, Matrixx became aware of but did not make public reports of between 12 and 23 (the parties disagree on the exact number) patients who complained that taking Zicam had caused them to experience persistent anosmia (loss of their sense of smell).

The central issue in the case is whether the reports of anosmia ever become material under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, such that Matrixx had a legal duty to disclose them to investors.  (The test for materiality is whether a reasonable investor would consider the information important in deciding to buy or sell the company’s stock.)  Matrixx argues that the reports were not material because they were not statistically significant, while Siracusano contends that it adequately pled materiality “by pointing to facts including, among others, the expert physicians who had concluded … that a causal link existed between intranasal Zicam use and persistent anosmia; the seriousness of persistent anosmia and the threat it posed to Zicam as Matrixx’s principal revenue source; and the actual movements of Matrixx’s stock price after the truth came out[.]“  The Ninth Circuit sided with Siracusano and Matrixx appealed.

The question of whether and when adverse event reports are pharmacoepidemiologically significant is a difficult one, for a number of reasons.  For one, a company will know of a certain number of adverse events but it will not know how many adverse events occurred that were not brought to its attention and it usually will not know how many times the product was used without incident.  Matrixx emphasizes in its briefs that it knew of, at most, 23 adverse events while millions of units of Zicam were sold.  Even if the number of adverse events and the number of times a product was used can be estimated, a company must then determine the “background rate” of the reported adverse event.  In this case, Matrixx had to determine the percentage of people not using an intranasal zinc product who go on to develop anosmia.  Finally, the causation determination can be made more difficult by any number of confounding factors.  In this case, anosmia can be caused by the common cold — the very condition that Zicam was developed to treat — a phenomenon called “confounding by indication.”

The question of when adverse event reports are legally significant is difficult too.  Negative information about a pharmaceutical product can trigger duties across legal and regulatory regimes, but not all negative information is alike in significance.  Companies have to exercise judgment.  For example, a company can be held liable in tort for failing to warn patients and/or doctors of a product’s risks, but it cannot respond to this legal risk by adding any and all adverse event reports to the product label, due to the FDA’s concerns about information overload.  Similar concerns obtain in the context of securities disclosure.  Matrixx argues that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s rule would effectively compel pharmaceutical companies to disclose all [adverse event reports] (to avoid potential securities fraud liability), flooding the market with trivial or meaningless information that would only obscure genuinely important information and thereby undermine sound investment decisionmaking.”  Siracusano counters that Matrixx ignores the “[l]egions of professional securities analysts and investment advisers” who help the nationwide securities markets assimilate massive volumes of information, including nuanced statistical information, about public companies.

In this case, Matrixx responded to concerns raised about Zicam by announcing that “alleg[ations] that intra-nasal Zicam products cause anosmia (loss of smell) are completely unfounded and misleading” and that the “safety and efficacy of zinc gluconate for the treatment of symptoms related to the common cold have been well established in two double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials.”  This show of confidence seems to have been ill-advised.  As Professor Barbara Evans explained in a recent article, double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized trials are typically designed to test efficacy hypotheses.  While participant safety is monitored, there are almost never enough participants to produce “even high-quality observational evidence of safety.”  Matrixx eventually acknowledged that it did not know whether there was a causal relationship between Zicam and anosmia and it has since withdrawn the products at issue from the market.

Regardless of the outcome in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, companies will likely continue to be faced with difficult judgment calls about disclosing adverse event reports.  As Siracusano suggests, even if the Supreme Court adopts a statistical significance or broader scientific reliability requirement, it is unlikely to get into specifics, e.g. “to adopt a threshold of p < 0.05.”  Companies will continue to be well-advised to consult expert regulatory counsel.  The advice Jacqueline Wolff and I gave in a 2004 article in the Business Crimes Bulletin still applies:

“[L]egal and regulatory review of promotional materials is an accepted and oftentimes required practice in the pharmaceutical industry. A company may wish to consider expanding the jurisdiction of review committees to cover sections of financial filings, press releases, analysts’ calls and all public statements relating to any matter within the FDA’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the SEC has suggested as much. In a Nov. 25, 2002 cease-and-desist order against the General Counsel of ICN Pharmaceuticals, the SEC found that he should have consulted with regulatory counsel before issuing a press release addressing the status of ICN’s new drug application.”

HHS-OIG Issues “Roadmap” to Help New Physicians Steer Clear of Fraud and Abuse

As others have noted, earlier this month the HHS-OIG issued “A Roadmap for New Physicians: Avoiding Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse,” a pamphlet which it developed to educate medical students, residents, and fellows about fraud and abuse law.  The HHS-OIG was spurred to act after a 2010 survey it conducted revealed that less than half of the nation’s medical schools provide instruction on the topic.  The Roadmap is sensibly organized around the relationships physicians have with (1) payers, with an emphasis on Medicare, (2) fellow health care providers, and (3) vendors.  It uses well-chosen “case examples” to make the rules governing those relationships concrete.  The Roadmap concludes with a helpful list of additional resources, a list of steps to take “[i]f you are engaged in a relationship you think is problematic or have been following billing practices you now realize were wrong,” and a plug for the HHS-OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol.

As David Harlow points out on his HealthBlawg, the release of the Roadmap coincides with an effort by the federal government to re-think current fraud and abuse laws to facilitate the development of accountable care organizations and other efforts to better organize and pay for health care.  Harlow notes that “the fraud and abuse and self-referral rules, intended as a brake on bad behavior in the context of fee-for-service medicine, become less relevant — and even become an impediment — to new systems of care and new systems of financing of that care.”  (Professor Frank Pasquale discusses the move to modify or waive the rules in more depth here.)  Of course, fee-for-service medicine is not going to disappear overnight, so today’s doctors in training need to learn about the current legal regime.

The government’s new willingness to look beyond drug and device companies to hold physicians personally accountable for fraud and abuse violations should make it easier to get the attention of doctors in training.  The Roadmap highlights HHS-OIG’s ongoing investigation into many of the orthopedic surgeons who allegedly received kickbacks from the hip and knee implant manufacturers who entered into a landmark settlement with the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey in 2007.  In May 2010, an orthopedic surgeon in Florida paid $650,000 to resolve claims that he was compensated by two device companies ostensibly for consulting services but allegedly “for ordering, or causing to order, … orthopedic products.”

The Roadmap also reminds physicians that transparency is coming, using large, orange text to emphasize that “[t]he public will soon know what gifts and payments a physician receives from industry.”

A Well Placed Question by Professor Mirkay: “Should Medical-Related Charities Increase Disclosure of Their Donors?”

We’ve written a great deal here at HRW about the need for transparency in industry/profession interactions and the elimination of conflicts of interest–the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy here at Seton Hall Law has, in fact, over the course of the last two years, issued two White Papers on the subject–with another on the way. In the last, “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” the Center proposed legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationships between industry and doctors that can create unwarranted risks to trial participants and to the scientific integrity of research. In the Paper prior,  ”Drug and Device Promotion: Charting a Course for Policy Reform,” The Center recommends: (1) making payments by drug and device companies to doctors transparent, with public disclosure by industry and physicians of their financial relationships; (2) adopting federal legislation to ban gifts, meals and other benefits provided to doctors as part of the current marketing model; (3) setting new policies to give FDA the authority to require studies of safety and efficacy of drugs and devices used off-label; and (4) undertaking a fundamental change in funding for continuing medical education to end industry support.

But over at Nonprofit Law Prof Blog, Professor Nicholas A. Mirkay of Widener University School of Law, has a post–and an additional question–well worth considering:

“Should Medical-Related Charities Increase Disclosure of Their Donors?”

Professor Mirkay points to a recent Chronicle of Philanthropy article which raises the issue as the National Alliance of Mental Illness (NAMI) has begun disclosing the names of corps and foundations who (does Citizens United make that “who” correct? Never mind appropriate.) donate more than $5,000. NAMI is said to have done so on the heels of an investigation by Senator Chuck Grassley into their financial relationship with the pharmaceutical industry. Mirkay writes:

NAMI’s actions have given Grassley further impetus to force 33 other nonprofit medical associations to follow NAMI’s lead.  In a related article, the Chronicle reports that Grassley’s inquiry into these other groups represents a “broader effort by the senator and others to expose and curtail corporate influence on the medical field.”  Grassley commented that “[t]hese organizations have a lot of influence over public policy, and people rely on their leadership.  There’s a strong case for disclosure and the accountability that results.”

Professor Mirkay also writes

In December 2009, Grassley sent a letter to 33 such nonprofit associations requesting information on the amount of funds received from pharmaceutical, medical-device and insurance companies from 2006 to 2009, the identity of the donors and how their money was spent by the medical group, and additional information on the outside income earned by the groups’ top executives and board members.

The (partial) results of those queries are not particularly heartening, but are certainly worth considering. Mirkay writes:

The Chronicle acquired more than half of the solicited groups’ responses to Grassley’s letter, finding that such groups receive aggregately more than $100 million annually from medical-related companies via “donations, advertising revenues, exhibit fees, corporate memberships, and support for continuing medical education.”  For some groups, this can represent as much as 78% of their revenue, while for others it only represents a small percentage of their total receipts.

Despite the longings of Elvis Costello, it’s hard to bite the hand that feeds you–and 78% of revenue pretty much constitutes (in)visible means of support. In pushing further with our (or more accurately, the Supreme Court’s) Citizens United “who” conceit, one might think 78% sufficient in some sense to constitute dependent status under the tax code–at least for purposes of context. Having said that, in addition to not biting, it’s not hard to imagine the dependent regularly fed doing that which it may to help assure the continued regularity of that feeding. Especially if the feedings are invisible.

It should also be noted that Mirkay rightly points out that “This effort is further evidence of Grassley’s commitment to increased transparency of tax-exempt nonprofits.” He’s right. And being that Senator Grassley follows HRW on Twitter, and as I have at times been critical of some of his positions in the past regarding other issues, it’s worth noting that the Senator should be roundly applauded for his efforts.

[And if you haven't been over to the Nonprofit Law Prof Blog, you should. It's in our blog roll for good reason-- their work is informative, brief and well written.]

Finding an Understanding Between Doctors and Patients

A general perception has been that doctors choose their profession over their patients. The perception takes shape as medical professionals sometimes choose to protect their profession over the chance to improve the quality of medical care– whether doctors refusing to report a colleague’s mistake or perhaps even hindering the efforts of a doctor rating system.

So when medical mistakes occur and possible lawsuits are on the horizon, it’s no shock that medical professionals sometimes fail to own up to their mistakes–implementing instead a code of silence about the case to avoid or limit liability.  In a critical time when patients or family members are looking for answers, doctors can be unavailable to provide it for them. It would also not be a shock if, after any such information could be helpful to the patient, doctors did so under the advice of counsel.

However, a study has been recently reported by the NY Times which suggests that perhaps silence may not be the most prudent approach.  According the NY Times,

Since 2001, the University of Michigan Health System has handled patient injuries by initiating discussions with patients and families, conducting internal investigations and offering apologies with offers of compensation should those investigations reveal medical errors. To examine the repercussions of such an open disclosure with compensation policy, researchers analyzed the number of claims and lawsuits filed against the hospital system between 1995 and 2007, comparing data from before and after the policy took effect.

Contrary to fears that such transparency might worsen litigation, the researchers found that there were actually fewer lawsuits and claims after the hospital began its disclosure with compensation program. Moreover, the hospital system’s liability costs for lawsuits, patient compensation and legal fees dropped, and claims in general were resolved faster than ever before.

While it may seem counter-intuitive to admit fault from a litigation standpoint, these efforts at transparency and an acknowledgment have actually decreased the number of lawsuits.  Richard C. Boothman, who devised and carried out the disclosure program, says, “[w]hen you break that paradigm of litigation and give patients the chance to understand the human element of the other side — of the doctor and what they are struggling with — you find that people are far more forgiving and understanding than has been typically assumed.”

It’s an interesting proposition,  disclosure and accountability as both a means to litigation loss reduction and changing negative perceptions of the profession. In revealing the doctor’s ordeal– in disclosing the fault, one may move forward towards greater understanding between patients and doctors.

It’s also worth noting that additional disclosure methods are being studied.  The Wall Street Journal reports a study about a project, known as OpenNotes, where doctors share their notes with their patients electronically.  While doctors do complain that the OpenNotes may be burdensome, there are those who think it it may be worth the additional burden because it shows– perhaps whether or not the handwriting is decipherable–that doctors are willing to take the extra time to attempt to keep them informed.

But of course, it would better if patients actually understood their doctors. But this would be in stark contrast to a recent study we wrote about here on HRW last week. The study showed a woeful lack of communication (and a wide gap in perception) between hospital staff physicians and “their” patients:

• Only 18% of patients knew their main doctor by name.
• Sixty-seven per cent of doctors believed their patients knew them by name.
• Fifty-seven per cent of patients knew their diagnosis.
• Seventy-seven per cent of doctors believed their patients knew their diagnosis.
• Fifty-eight per cent of patients thought that physicians always explained things in a comprehensible way.
• Twenty-one per cent of doctors stated they always provided explanations of some kind.
• Sixty-six per cent of patients reported receiving a new medication in the hospital, 90% noted never being told of any adverse effects of these medications.
• Ninety-eight per cent of doctors stated that they at least sometimes discussed their patients’ fears and anxieties.
• Fifty-four per cent of patients said their doctors never did this.

Recommended Reading, “Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Research: The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth”

Jesse Goldner’s Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Research:  The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1211 (2009), is a must-read for anyone who has anything to do with oversight of researchers’ conflicts of interest.  The article reflects an insider’s understanding of academic physicians’ perspectives on this still-contentious topic, provides a terrific survey of the literature, and proposes regulatory fixes by the feds that HHS will hopefully seriously consider.  The article’s timing is perfect, given that HHS is receiving comments until August 19, 2010 on proposed changes to its conflict of interest regulations.  See http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coi/. Even in the short time since the publication of Goldner’s article, HHS OIG has issued yet another report on conflicts of interest management, entitled “How Grantees Manage Financial Conflicts of Interest in Research Funded by the National Institutes of Health,” (Nov. 2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-07-00700.pdf.  Based upon an in-depth audit of 41 grantee institutions that reported conflicts in FY 2006, the OIG found that equity interests represent the most pervasive form of financial conflict of interest. The most popular tool employed by entities managing conflicts is disclosure to publications or at academic presentations; entities only rarely required the reduction or elimination of conflicts.  As important, and unsurprising based upon AAMC surveys, is the unreliability of the conflict reporting mechanisms used by most academic institutions.

The OIG report emphasizes the need for increased oversight of conflicts of interest.  Academic medical centers have had plenty of time and forewarning to address the issue but, as demonstrated by a vignette described by Goldner about his own efforts to accomplish this through the IRB which he chaired, faculty resistance is significant.  Consequently, Goldner is exactly right in calling upon HHS to issue aggressive regulations that accomplish the necessary reforms.  He would require the establishment of conflict of interest committees at every research institution, comprised primarily of independent members, to which faculty would report all financial relationships that create conflicts of interest. Resolution of such conflicts would be a condition precedent to proceeding with proposed research, and violations would result in significant penalties, including debarment from research.

As shall be discussed in a forthcoming Seton Hall White Paper entitled The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, I do not have confidence in benefits accruing from requiring disclosure of conflicts to research participants in consent forms, although research participants do have a right to know of such conflicts.  This is a minor quibble.  Goldner’s article is a great contribution to the literature. 

Sunlight is a Weak Disinfectant

One of the most robust “memes” in contemporary law is the power of disclosure. In health law, disclosure comes up again and again: patients need to give “informed” consent, insurers are supposed to explain their policies clearly, and conflicts of interest, when not proscribed, should at the very least be exposed. But there are growing challenges to the disclosure meme, both within health law and without.

George Lowenstein and Peter Ubel note some problems with disclosure approaches in this article on the weaknesses of behavioral economics generally:

It seems that every week a new book or major newspaper article appears showing that irrational decision-making helped cause the housing bubble or the rise in health care costs. Such insights draw on behavioral economics, an increasingly popular field that incorporates elements from psychology to explain why people make seemingly irrational decisions, at least according to traditional economic theory and its emphasis on rational choice. . . . But the field has its limits. As policymakers use it to devise programs, it’s becoming clear that behavioral economics is being asked to solve problems it wasn’t meant to address.

[T]ake conflicts of interest in medicine. Despite volumes of research showing that pharmaceutical industry gifts distort decisions by doctors, the medical establishment has not mustered the will to bar such thinly disguised bribes, and the health care reform act fails to outlaw them. Instead, much like food labeling, the act includes “sunshine” provisions that will simply make information about these gifts available to the public. We have shifted the burden from industry, which has the power to change the way it does business, to the relatively uninformed and powerless consumer.

The same pattern can be seen in health care reform itself. The act promises to achieve the admirable goal of insuring most Americans, yet it fails to address the more fundamental problem of health care costs. . . . [T]he act tries to lower costs by promoting incentive programs that reward healthy behaviors. . . . [But s]tudies show that preventive medicine, even when it works, rarely saves money.

At its worst, disclosure can become merely pro forma; as Kafka (via Trudo Lemmens) puts it, “Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance, and it becomes part of the ceremony.” Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that disclosure is one of many aspects of consumer protection law with little real impact on individual welfare. As Amelia Flood reports,

Ben-Shahar, who spent last summer studying all the mandated disclosure statutes in Illinois, Michigan and California, argues that consumer protection advocates have gotten it wrong when it comes to mandating information access for consumers. He says consumers get lost in a sea of technical language, unread disclaimers and long-shot lawsuits. . . . According to Ben-Shahar, disclosures are of more use to consumer ratings groups like Zagat and Consumer’s Digest than they are to most consumers.

So perhaps there is some hope here: third-party aggregators and raters might use disclosures as part of an overall effort to rate various hospitals or doctors. The question then becomes–who shall pay (and rate) the raters? One irony here is that doctor rating sites have themselves been accused of being insufficiently transparent about the ways in which they evaluate physicians. New York Attorney General Cuomo even pursued the matter. His office eventually settled with insurers who ran rating sites. They pledged to “fully disclose to consumers and physicians all aspects of their ranking system.”

What’s the lesson here? First, that consumers are, by and large, too busy to process piecemeal disclosures by professionals like physicians and other health care providers. Second, third party raters can fill some of this information gap by aggregating information. Third, this process of aggregation and rating itself will likely need to be closely supervised by a good-faith regulator, lest it fail to take into account the full range of interests (and quality of information) proper for the task.

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy Issues White Paper Calling for Major Reforms in the Financing and Oversight of Clinical Research

Seton Hall University School of Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has called for major substantive reforms in the financing and oversight of clinical research. In a White Paper entitled “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” the Center proposes legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationships between industry and doctors that can create unwarranted risks to trial participants and to the scientific integrity of research.

Kathleen Boozang, a dean who oversees the Law School’s Center, explains that “Some of the ways that drug and device trial sponsors pay the physicians who lead clinical trials can tempt them to recruit individuals for clinical trials who would be better off receiving conventional therapy. This is of particular concern if physicians encourage their own patients to enroll in trials that these same physicians are overseeing.”

Over 60% of testing of experimental drugs and medical devices now occurs in physicians’ private offices; unlike years past, industry funds a much higher percent of clinical trials than government, frequently paying researchers significantly more than government does.  For some physician practices, conducting clinical trials represents a significant portion of their income.

According to Carl Coleman, a Seton Hall Law professor who collaborated on the White Paper, “A different kind of problem arises if people are enrolled in trials who don’t meet the criteria for who should participate - these individuals’ health can be put at risk, and their participation can skew the results of the trial, which is bad for everyone.”

Federal regulations in this area have not kept up with the rapid changes in how research occurs, and even those regulations that exist are poorly enforced, according to recent government studies.  Understanding that the collaboration among industry, government, and medicine in the pursuit of clinical research is critical to driving scientific progress, particularly as industry increasingly replaces the government as the primary source of research funding, the Center’s recommendations include:

1) Establishing a norm of financial neutrality between treatment and research. Ensuring that physicians receive comparable compensation for treatment and research will help ensure that their decisions to conduct research, as well as to recommend that a particular individual participate in a clinical trial, are grounded in reasons unrelated to their personal financial interests. This will be best accomplished, in the first instance through regulations that ban certain kinds of research compensation, and provide examples of acceptable payment methodologies that industry can follow. Reform by prosecution signals what practices government dislikes, but does not provide a clear vision of ideal approaches to managing conflicts of interest related to the conduct of research.

2) Establishing federal guidelines as to the principles or methodology by which to determine fair market value of physician time spent in clinical work. Federal regulations should be promulgated that establish a benchmark formula for determining fair market value of physicians’ time, effort and expenses for clinical research. Such regulations would promote the goal of financial neutrality between treatment and research. Physicians cannot be underpaid for research either - compensation for clinical trial work should therefore include reimbursement for any additional expenses that are unique to the research environment.

3) Banning payments with equity interests; disqualification of investigators who hold direct interests in the outcome of the research. Federal regulations should prohibit compensation for research in the form of an equity interest in the sponsor of a clinical trial. The law should preclude researchers who have investments that give them a direct interest in the outcome of the research from leading clinical trials.  Where absolutely necessary, such individuals might appropriately serve as consultants.

4) Banning payments of finder’s fees and bonuses for recruitment and retention of trial subjects. Certain forms of compensation create conflicts of interest that can incentivize investigators to enroll individuals in a clinical trial who are too healthy or too sick to participate, or to deemphasize information that might discourage individuals from consenting to trial enrollment. Federal law should ban such compensation methods, including finder’s fees and bonuses for meeting recruitment and retention goals.

5) Reforming federal regulations to compel and better guide the evaluation of relationships between industry and would-be physician investigators prior to the commencement of research.   The White Paper includes overlapping but sometimes distinctive recommendations for federal regulation to evaluate and oversee investigator or institutional conflicts of interest, both for research within and without academic medical centers.  Specific to research outside of academic medical centers, federal regulations should spell out clearly the obligation of community-based physicians acting as investigators or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for research and other financial interests to Institutional Review Boards.

Summarizing the importance of this White Paper, Boozang states, “The pharmaceutical and medical device industries save millions of lives each year with their innovations.  It is imperative that we maintain the integrity of research, and the public’s trust in the process.”

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. The Center is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices. The White Paper, “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” may be found here.

Seton Hall University School of Law, New Jersey’s only private law school and a leading law school in the New York metropolitan area, is dedicated to preparing students for the practice of law through excellence in scholarship and teaching, with a strong focus on clinical education. The Law School’s health law program has been ranked as one of the top programs in the country. Founded in 1951, Seton Hall Law School is located in Newark and offers both day and evening degree programs. For more information visit law.shu.edu.

Communication and Transparency: An Answer to Our Health Care Woes?

This past week, I had the good fortune to attend two fascinating but very different — in terms of content and setting– talks by preeminent health experts.  The first was by Princeton University Professor Uwe Reinhardt at a Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs alumni event, entitled “The U.S. Economy and Health Care: Implications for Health.”  Professor Reinhardt spoke briefly and generally on health care and insurance reform, touching on the necessary changes on both the “demand side” (insurance reform) and the “supply side” (health care delivery). The second talk was by Dr. Atul Gawande as part of the New Yorker Magazine’s 10th Annual festival, entitled “The Death of the Master Builder: A Story of Risk, Medicine, and Skyscrapers.”  Dr. Gawande’s talk, in which he expounded his 2007 New Yorker article The Checklist, argued for the implementation of a basic 19-item surgical checklist, citing a marked reduction in complications from surgery (the World Health Organization’s 2009 Surgical Safety Checklist, implementation manual, and Guidelines for Safe Surgery are all available online).

Despite addressing very different issues, I took away from these two talks a very important message: little can be accomplished in fixing our broken health care system without communication and transparency, with which come increased accountability and discipline.

While addressing the changes necessary on the health care delivery side in order to fix health care, Professor Reinhardt called for “[g]reater transparency on, and accountability for, the use of resources and outcomes.”  As an example of such transparency, he cited his proposals as chair of the New Jersey Commission on Rationalizing Health Care Resources.  In its January 2008 report, the Commission recommended to Governor Corzine that New Jersey require that nonprofit hospitals’ governance documents– IRS form 990s (including financial reports and submissions), board composition, and meeting minutes– be made available to the public on the entities’ web pages (for-profit hospitals routinely post their annual financial reports and submissions to the SEC on their websites).  Such full transparency would ostensibly lead to increased accountability on the part of managers of non-profit hospitals by allowing the public insight into their finances and economics.

In his talk, Dr. Gawande focused on the fact that one of the most useful aspects of the checklist is the introduction step (”Before skin incision, the entire team (nurses, surgeons, anesthesia professionals, and any others participating in the care of the patient) orally: Confirms that all team members have been introduced by name and role.”).  According to Dr. Gawande, this simple introduction fosters discipline because when everyone knows their roles and fulfills their designated functions, coordination and trust are increased — and both are very important when time is short and the stakes are high.

Of course, these calls for increased communication and transparency are nothing new — and they pervade almost every aspect of health care reform and improved medical delivery.  For example, this summer, Tim Jost espoused the benefits of the public plan, but noted that no research comparable to the data that has emerged from the Dartmouth research group on variations in health care spending “can be done on the under 65 population because private insurers regard whatever data they have to be proprietary.”  He hopes that “a public plan could make anonymized data available to researchers and be open with its subscribers about coverage and utilization policies.”  Likewise, just last week, in his “Principles for the Homestretch” for health reform, Frank Pasquale called for more competition and transparency in insurance markets.  Moreover, appeals for greater communication and transparency, and, in turn, accountability and discipline, is indicative of the larger movement to the medical home model, which “provid[es] comprehensive primary care… that facilitates partnerships between individual patients, and their personal  physicians, and when appropriate, the patient’s family.”  Increased communication and sharing of information across health care providers has been known to reduce adverse drug-drug reactions, lower medical errors, and bring attention to alternative care possibilities.

It is important to note that increased communication and transparency is not a panacea for all of our health care woes — particularly without balancing openness with ways of addressing privacy concerns.  However, as I gleaned from the talks by Professor Reinhardt and Dr. Gawande, the evidence speaks to the value of a policy of openness in many aspects of health care and medical reform.

Jost on the Public Plan

Timothy S. Jost is one of the leading figures of the American health law academy. He has unparalleled knowledge of comparative health law, which he’s applied to the American debate in an impressive series of articles and books.

When I heard that Jost was writing on current debates, I really wanted his insights on our blog. Here is the first part of an essay he wrote making a case for a public option, which 83% of Americans support.

Why Public Plan Choice?
by Timothy Stoltzfus Jost

One of the most significant and innovative proposals of the 2009 health-reform debate has been the concept of public plan choice. Although the exact features of a public plan have not been specified, the public plan concept offers several significant benefits:

Cost control. Health reform cannot happen unless we can control the continual upwards spiral of health care costs. The public plan would control costs in three ways. First, it would be able to keep its costs down by not having to make a profit and by avoiding many of the administrative costs incurred by private insurers. Second, it would introduce competition into the health insurance industry. Although there may be, as Karl Rove asserted yesterday, 1300 health insurers in the United States, health insurance markets are segmented into the large group, small group, and nongroup markets and within each of those categories competition is exceedingly local. In 36 states, 65% of the small group market is controlled by 3 insurers; in 16 states one insurer controls half of the market. In any one locality, moreover, the market is even more concentrated. In my home town of Harrisonburg, Va., one insurer controls 86% of the market.

Private insurers simply do not compete; they simply take prices from providers and pass them on to consumers, driving the health care price spiral. A national public plan would introduce vigorous competition into every part of the country, forcing private insurers to compete for business and to bring down their premiums. Third, a national public plan would also have the bargaining clout to make providers moderate the increase in their prices, bringing down the cost of health care itself.

Choice. Right now the only choice available to most Americans is private insurance and, in many markets, small businesses have only a choice of one or two insurers. Americans want to have alternatives to choose among to best meet their needs. A public plan offers this.

Delivery System Reform. A national public plan could drive delivery system reform and improve the quality of care, as Medicare has been doing through its demonstration projects, payment reforms, and consumer information initiatives.

Transparency and Accountability. One of the most important developments in the health care reform debate over the past decade has been the data that has emerged from the Dartmouth research group on variations in health care spending. This data, discussed by Atul Gawande in his widely noted recent article on health care costs and the President in his speech at Green Bay, could only be collected because Medicare data are available to researchers. No comparable research can be done on the under 65 population because private insurers regard whatever data they have to be proprietary. Private insurers are also much more secretive about their coverage and utilization review policies. A public plan could make anonymized data available to researchers and be open with its subscribers about coverage and utilization policies.

A National Strategy. We have waited for decades for the states to make affordable health care available to Americans. A few have tried, most have failed. None have developed an effective alternative to private insurance. All Americans are experiencing the same problems with health care–lack of access, high costs, and uneven quality. We need a national strategy for health care reform that will help all Americans, not just some. We also need a national public plan that offers uniform benefits to all Americans and national bargaining power.