Health Reform, a Class Act

Class Act

Thomas (Tim) Greaney
Director, Center for Health Law Studies
Saint Louis University School of Law

A few headlines from coverage of the passage of the health reform bill:

Winners, Losers in the House Healthcare Bill (Reuters)

Health Reform: What’s in it for you? (US News) 

Already Insured? Get Ready to Pay More (CBS)

Almost immediately after the House vote on Sunday, the media switched its “horse race” coverage from analyzing the politics of the affair to what it characterized as a clash of economic classes. Analysts were often quick to suggest that the average American might find himself in the loser column.  Others offered the conventional  ”on the one hand, on the other hand” pseudo-journalism, probably leaving most to assume (not unreasonably, based on their experience under trickle-down economics) that they have little to gain.  And inevitably, confusion spawns cynicism: The first question on Monday from my 91 year old uncle  was:  ”Do I still have Medicare?”

If we are going to do a triage by economic class, lets get it right:  I’m still waiting for a headline writer to capture the real story of the legislation: Health Reform Law Reallocates Opportunity to the Working Class

One unassailable fact that emerged from the year-long legislative debate is that the working poor and those in the middle economic stratum are the primary victims of our dysfunctional health system.  It is widely recognized that health care debt ranks at or near the top causes of personal bankruptcies. Less commented on, however, is the effect of widespread financial insecurity resulting from the high cost and lack of access to care.  More than 4 in 10 people earning under $40,000 per  year say their household has had problems paying medical bills over the past year. Not only does that statistic imply that many households are adjusting their budgets away from socially-important expenditures, like childcare and education, but it also reveals the personal toll imposed on lower income individuals and families. For those who have insurance, increasing premiums have forced them to take on more risk: Nearly one in five Americans say cost increases caused them or their employer to switch to a less comprehensive health plan, while almost half of all people purchasing insurance in the dysfunctional individual market say they have had to switch to a less comprehensive plan.

The misinformation spread throughout the debate has lent credence to those who would paint health reform as a victory for elites.  Judging from the expressions of outrage about health reform by some middle class citizens, many appear to carry the misapprehension that the primary beneficiaries of the legislation are those unwilling to work.  Nothing could be further from the truth; today’s uninsured are predominantly found in working families. In fact over 15% of employed workers and a stunning 41% of low income workers lack health insurance. And given the stampede of employers dropping health care coverage for their workers, the epidemic of uninsurance or underinsurance is undoubtedly spreading upward in the economic class order.

Also under-reported are the many ways the current health care system works to disadvantage the working class. Most prominent is the tax benefit which gives a significant and regressive tax subsidy to wealthy elites.  Excluding employer contributions for health insurance from taxable income–at $168 billion per year– is the largest “tax expenditure” in the budget– and obviously benefits the higher brackets more than the lower ones. (Revising this indefensible and economically inefficient  redistribution would have been a sensible way to help fund reform, but Congress settled for adding some progressivity to the payroll tax and some other taxes aimed at upper income citizens).

In addition, the health care system perversely redistributes wealth in a variety of other ways.  For example, as Mark Hall and Carl Schneider have made clear, hospitals and physicians price discriminate against those with lower incomes:  the uninsured and those in the individual market –who generally lack the bargaining power to command lower prices–pay higher prices to hospitals (often as much as two or three times higher) than those with group insurance.

Even less widely acknowledged is the fact that insurance favors the upper classes in subtle ways.  Co-pays, for example, burden those with low incomes much more severely than upper class insureds. Havinghurst and Richman aptly summarize the “distributive injustice” of the system:

[C]onditioning eligibility for insurer payments on patients’ willingness to make certain out-of-pocket payments causes lower income participants in employee health plans to get disproportionately fewer benefits than their more affluent coworkers receive in return for equivalent premiums

To be sure, the health reform legislation does not assure equal access to care among the social classes; but it certainly is a big step in the right direction.

I doubt that most Americans accept the idea that social class should dictate vast differences in opportunity for our citizens.  The capacity of health reform to lessen the economic and physical burdens imposed on the working class then should be headline news.

[Ed. note, post script: See excellent analysis published after this post by David Leonhardt characterizing the bill as "the federal government's biggest attack on economic inequality since inequality began rising more than three decades ago"
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/24leonhardt.html?src=me&ref=homepage]

IT PASSED!

In what is surely a watershed moment in American social and political history, the Health Reform bill passed on Sunday, March 21, 2010. In the company of historic enactments such as  Social Security and Medicare, the bill passed, 219 Yea, 212 Nay. The bill required 216 votes to pass.

Republican members of the House voted en masse against and vowed to further obstruct enactment of the bill through any means at their disposal.

To say that the battle to pass a health reform bill was long and arduous is not to engage in hyperbole. The debate raged on throughout the year, with a raucous and often maddening to and fro in an attempt to reach at first bipartisan consensus, and then just critical mass in a parliamentary sense.

To say, however, that the passage of this bill is an end to the battle to bring about health care reform is to miss the point. It is, I believe, a first but crucial step in what must be an ongoing effort. The bill encompasses well over a thousand pages; like anything that large it will have to be adjusted as need requires. The health care system is, perhaps, today one step closer to being just that– a system, as opposed to just an ill-fit hodgepodge of perverse incentives and dysfunction.

Last year, as President Obama took office, considering health care and national productivity, I wrote that

One of the first national health lessons this country received came on the heels of World War I.

“With the United States’ entry into the battle, hundreds of thousands of military personnel were drafted and trained for combat. After the war was fought and won, statistics were released from the draft with disturbing data regarding fitness levels. It was found that one out of every three drafted individuals was unfit for combat and many of those drafted were highly unfit prior to military training. Government legislation was passed that ordered the improvement of physical education programs within the public schools.”

“During the period from September 1917 through November 1918, records show that 2,801,635 men were inducted into the Army. Out of the approximately 10,000,000 registered men, roughly 2,510,000 were examined by local draft boards. During the first 4 months of mobilization, roughly one in three men were rejected on physical grounds, but the rejection rate dropped to one in four during the following 8 months.” (p. 149)

Having put forth the effort to remedy such, we were better physically prepared when it came time to fight World War II. We will be fortunate if some cataclysmic event does not lead us now to some statistical reckoning of our “unfit” and “extremely unfit” as regards our national productivity.

I do not point this out as a means of suggesting that we need to actively prepare ourselves for some form of larger global military conflict. But perhaps in some ways the “event” has already occurred, and only the reckoning remains. In his inaugural address President Barack Obama entreated us:

“Let it be told to the future world … that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive…that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet (it).”

“America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.”

He’s right. We must “come forth to meet it.” We cannot turn back and we cannot falter as we struggle to deliver this hard won gift of freedom to future generations. And it would be best if– as we brave these icy currents in this winter of our hardship– we were not sick. And if we were sick, that we all had doctors. And if we all had doctors, that they were not too busy filling out paperwork designed to frustrate them. As we learned through World War I, as a nation, we simply cannot afford to squander our physical and intellectual capital.

And now, on March 21, 2010 we have come further forth to meet that challenge. It is reckoned that because of the enactment of the bill an additional 32 million people will now have health insurance. That is 32 million people who can see a doctor when they get sick. 32 million people who mostly will not show up in emergency rooms in a critical and costly condition which they could have avoided had they merely gone to a doctor sooner.  32 million people who stand a far better chance of not having to declare bankruptcy related to medical costs. And 32 million people who will not contribute to the shameful amount of deaths each year attributed in this country to a lack of health insurance.

A good start.

Obama in Ohio, a Letter from Natoma Canfield

As the Health Care Reform debate winds to a frenzied conclusion, President Obama visited Ohio to reach out in favor of the bill’s passage. I’ll let the President speak for himself, but there’s a letter below this video that you should read. Natoma Canfield sent the letter to President Obama back in December; it epitomizes, I believe, the every day tragedy which is the current state of health care and health care finance. Since then, it’s gotten even worse. Facing the prospect of unaffordable increases in her insurance premiums, Ms. Canfield took, and lost, the gamble that no one wants to take. Unable to pay, she discontinued insurance coverage; she was just recently diagnosed with leukemia.

Win-Win: Obama’s Student Loan Reform Decreases Student Loan Premiums and Works towards Health Reform Passage

Student loan legislation is being twinned with the health care reform legislation proposed by the House for reconciliation.  The language contained in the House “fix it” bill would stop federal subsidies to private lenders like Sallie Mae and would instead originate all federal student loans in the Department of Education.  Such reform is estimated to save taxpayers $67 billion over ten years according to the Congressional Budget Office.  The savings would be used to fund more need-based Pell grants, which are provided to low-income students to promote access to higher education.  In the past year alone, applications for Pell grants have skyrocketed due to the fact that many people are returning to school given the difficult economy.

Because only one reconciliation bill may be passed per year, the student loan reform legislation has been included in the health care reform bill.  President Obama wants to include the loan language in the bill because of its estimated savings as well as the benefits it will offer need-based students, and he finds the inclusion a “no brainer.”  The Democrats will need at least 51 votes in the Senate to pass the bill, however, and several members from their own party, including Ben Nelson of Nebraska and Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas, have already voiced concerns about the negative impact these changes will have on the loan companies and their employees.

The House Education and Labor Committee has already tried to discredit the claims of those who want to keep the loans with private lending companies. Rachel Racusen, communications director for the Committee was quoted as saying:

Lenders’ claims about job losses have already been debunked as another scare tactic to save their sweetheart deal.  While this legislation will trim the profits of banks, it will not lead to enormous jobs losses.

Democrats in favor of the bill add that the private lending companies will still be utilized for other loan services.  Some point to the alliances created in the Senate between loan companies and Senators.

Dissenters of the loan reform are missing the bigger picture concern: the benefits reaped by society through the intellectual development and financial security for America’s students.  Senator Patty Murray of Washington said:

My own personal perception is, when we have thousands of kids on the street marching because they can’t get into our universities and don’t have the capability of pay for college, this is the best time for us to act.

Reform Rodeo

1. The Final Push: Kaiser Health News compiles the latest news stories detailing the final push that is underway by Democrats and the White House to try and pass their comprehensive health reform plan.

2. Rep. Paul Ryan: Ezra Klein interviews Republican Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin; the two discuss the economic impact of the Democrats’ health reform plan.

3. Abortion: Tim Jost does a yeoman’s job of laying out the differences between the House and Senate bills regarding abortion funding.

4. Health Summit Redux: Ewe Reinhardt discusses the lessons learned from the Health Summit.

5. Health IT: John Halamka covers the new HITECH-related NPRM that HHS recently released. The newest NPRM deals with the process of certifying EHR systems under the CMS’s incentive-based framework for meaningful EHR use.

6. Health IT Review: For those trying to catch up on health IT developments, Computerworld has a critical yet thorough account of the high speed push towards EHR adoption.

7. Isn’t That Nice:  A feel good story about the The Oracle of Omaha  and Dr. Atul Gawande.

Healthcare Reform and Excise, Part III, or: “Are You Sure That’s a Cadillac?”

Part II of this series described the general effects of the excise provision of the Senate’s Health Care Reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), as projected by CBO, JCT, and CMS.  The post concluded:  “The excise generates revenue, reduces affected premiums, and ‘bends the cost curve.’  So, what is the problem?”  Here, I will attempt to describe the problems with the excise provision as written in the Senate’s PPACA.

The most obvious flaw in the excise is its “kill-em all” approach to determining which plans would be subject to the 40% tax.  According to JCT, the excise would affect 27% of “single” employer-sponsored plans and 22% of “family” employer-sponsored plans by the year 2019.  It is hard for one to imagine that a quarter of all active employee health insurance plans are “Cadillac plans.”  Either the Senate was disingenuous in purporting to target “excess benefits,” or the excise provision was drafted in a grossly careless manner.  (Note:  The short excise provision in the PPACA uses the term “excess benefit” ten times.)

Simply looking at the text of the PPACA shows that the Senate failed to consider (or simply ignored the fact) that affected plans would be disproportionately composed of the following:

• Plans with large number of women and/or older workers
• Plans providing coverage in high-cost areas (as opposed to simply high-cost states)
• Plans negotiated through collective bargaining
• Plans covering those in high-risk professions that are not specifically exempted by the PPACA

The excise also works to disproportionately burden middle-class workers.  According the JCT, over 80% of the revenue generated by the excise from 2013-2019 would be in the form of additional taxable income from those enrolled in affected plans.  Such additional taxable income would come from the conversion of non-taxable healthcare benefits into cash compensation.  Simply put, health benefits would be reduced, wages would be increased proportionately (although some increased wages may be eaten-up by increased cost-sharing), and taxes would be levied on the increased wages.  By 2019, affected persons earning $20K - $100K would, on average, be paying an additional 1% - 2% in federal taxes.  However, affected persons earning $1,000,000+ would, on average, be paying only additional .1% in federal taxes.  Of course, this is assuming that in our current economy, employers will actually pass-on savings from reduced healthcare benefits to wage-earners.

These flaws garnered significant amounts of criticism, particularly from organized labor, whose members would be disproportionately affected by the excise.  During reconciliation of the House and Senate bills, labor unions achieved a tentative compromise with legislators regarding the excise, which would:

• Exempt collective bargaining contracts, state and local workers and VEBAs through January 01, 2018.
• Raise the threshold to $8,900 for single plans and $24,000 for family plans. (Taft-Hartley plans will be considered at the family rate.)
• Add adjustments for gender and age, raising the threshold for plans that have significant numbers of women and/or older workers.
• Raise the threshold for plans with workers in high-risk professions, affecting more than 9 million workers.
• Raise the threshold for plans with retirees age 55 and up.
• Exempt dental and vision costs beginning in 2015.
• Raise the threshold on plans further if health care costs grow faster than expected from 2010-2013.

Putting aside the massive political implications, the compromise merely puts lipstick on the pig.  What about other affected “non-Cadillac” plans not exempted under the compromise?  What about the lost excise and income tax revenue?  How much would the compromise “un-bend” the cost-curve?

Furthermore, if affected plans choose to increase-cost sharing to avoid exceeding the premium threshold, the excise could actually decrease health and increase health expenditures:

If the excise tax pressures people to purchase health plans with increased cost-sharing (e.g., higher copayments), consumers may very well respond to this effective price increase by haphazardly cutting back on medical spending.  However, many of the interventions that are avoided may turn out to be health-improving and/or cost-effective. This problem is especially true for vulnerable populations. Research has demonstrated that low-income and chronically ill populations are generally harmed by higher cost-sharing and may actually incur higher overall costs in response to the introduction of this cost-sharing, as they cut back too much on the cost-effective managing of chronic conditions.

Research has found that the optimal cost-sharing rate for many chronic conditions and large classes of prescription drugs is very low or even zero. This same research shows that increased cost sharing in certain areas (e.g., prescription drugs or primary care) can lead to higher overall costs due to increased utilization in other areas (e.g., hospitalization).

Bad ideas are Congress’ second-most abundant resource.  Really bad ideas are its’ first.  The excise on high-cost employer-sponsored insurance plans constitutes the latter.  I hope that continuing to discuss the excise provision may deter Congress from considering any similar provision in future legislation.

Excise & Healthcare Reform, Part II, or: “What Overall Effect Would the Cadillac Plan Tax Have?”

Part I of this series provided an overview of the excise on high-cost health insurance plans contained in the Senate’s healthcare reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  This part summarizes the projected general effects of the excise provision.  The final part of this series will address the problematic and controversial consequences of the excise and possible alternatives.

Three governmental agencies have been primarily responsible for calculating the effects of healthcare reform legislation for Congress:  the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  Both the CBO and JCT operate under the auspices of Congress, while CMS operates within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

Additionally, numerous private entities separately analyze legislative language to ascertain its effects.  As expected, private entities often issue findings that differ, in varying degrees, from those provided by governmental entities.  This post focuses on the government findings regarding the excise provision, upon which the Senate relied (presumably) in passing the PPACA.  This post is summarized from information contained in the following documents:

JCT letter to Representative Joe Courtney, Dec. 08, 2009

JCT letter to Representative Joe Courtney, Oct. 16, 2009

CBO letter to Senator Bayh, Nov. 30, 2009

CBO letter to Senator Reid, Dec. 19, 2009

CMS memorandum “Estimated Financial Effects of the ‘Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,’ as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009,” Jan. 08, 2010

Present tax law allows for the exclusion of employer-provided health benefits from individual income tax and contributions made by employers from FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) tax. The excise would generate approximately $148.9 billion dollars in revenue from 2010-2019.  The excise tax itself would not be deductible from Federal income tax.

For each year after 2013, the actual excise tax collected would account for a smaller percentage of the total revenue collected as a result of the excise provision.  This would be the result of an increase in wages following shifts away from the high-cost insurance plans.  The JCT provided the following explanation:

[T]he Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the excise tax would be mainly passed along [to consumers] through increases in premiums and that many consumers respond by reducing their demand for insurance above the excise cap.  As described above, because health insurance premiums are a component of compensation, which is not likely to fluctuate due to the excise tax, as consumers spend less on tax-excluded benefits, their taxable cash wages will increase.  Therefore, as the value of health insurance plans decline, the income tax base will increase in the long run.

The total number of health plans affected by the excise would increase from 2010-2019 due to the compounding difference between the inflation rate applied to the premium threshold and medical cost inflation.  The percent of active plans affected by the excise tax would increase during the 2013-2019 period from 14% to 27% and 9% to 22% for single plans and family plans, respectively.  The average premium for those affected plans would actually be lowered.  How?  CBO provides:

For policies whose premiums remained above the threshold, the tax would probably be passed through as a roughly corresponding increase in premiums.  However, most employers would probably respond to the tax by offering policies with premiums at or below the threshold; CBO and JCT expect that the majority of the affected workers would enroll in one of those plans with lower premiums.  Plans could achieve lower premiums through some combination of greater cost sharing (which would lower premiums directly and also lower them indirectly be leading to less use of medical services), more stringent benefit management, or coverage of fewer services.

The excise certainly generates a significant amount of revenue to fund other aspects of healthcare reform.  However, the excise is also expected to decrease the overall national health expenditures (NHE).  According to CMS, the excise “…would have an initial, significant impact on the overall level of expenditures.”  Furthermore, “In 2019, these impacts would reduce the total NHE by an estimated 0.3 percent.”   The current NHE projection for the year 2019 is $4.7 trillion.  That puts the savings at $14.1 billion.

The excise generates revenue, reduces affected premiums, and “bends the cost curve.” So, what is the problem?

Excise & Health Reform, Part I, or: “What is an Excise & How Would this Tax on Cadillac Plans Work?”

[Ed. Note: We are very pleased to introduce James Christiano to the blog. He is a law student here at Seton Hall Law and, after receiving his B.A. in psychology in 2002, worked from 2003 to 2008 as a District Adjudications Officer for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security.  During his time with USCIS, James was primarily responsible for adjudicating applications for immigration benefits, including naturalization, lawful permanent resident status, and work authorization. As you might imagine, James has an eye for regulatory analysis, and will be offering a series of posts (to start) on provisions in the health reform bill regarding  "excise" along with analysis as to their potential impact.]

One of the many controversial aspects of healthcare reform is the Senate’s proposed excise on high-cost health insurance plans.  Such high-cost plans have often been referred to, arguably inappropriately, as “Cadillac plans.”  This post provides an introduction to the proposed excise on high-cost plans as provided in the Senate Bill.  Subsequent posts will address the ramifications and controversies of the excise.  (Note: The Senate Bill contains other excise provisions, including a 5% excise on elective cosmetic surgery procedures, which this post does not discuss.)

What is an excise?

Black’s Law Dictionary defines excise as “[a] tax imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette tax), or on an occupation or activity (such as a license tax or an attorney occupation fee).”  Excises are commonly, and redundantly, referred to as “excise taxes.”

A quick skim of Subtitles D and E of Title 26 of the United State Code provides one an idea of the types of goods and activities that Congress has deemed deserving of an excise.  A few examples are luxury passenger automobiles, certain vaccines, communications services, authorized and unauthorized wagers (i.e., gambling), petroleum, firearms, cigarettes, and “excess expenditures to influence legislation.”

Excise currently imposed on group health plans

Federal law already subjects group health plans to an excise under certain circumstances.  For instance, 26 USC § 5000 imposes an excise on certain group and large group health plans deemed “nonconforming” — i.e., those that do not comply with the requirements of particular subsections of 42 USC § 1395y(b)(1) and (2).  Additionally, 26 USC § 4980B and D impose an excise (as a form of penalty) on group health plans that fail to meet HIPAA and COBRA requirements.

Excise on high-cost plans in the Senate Bill

The Senate Bill includes a provision imposing a 40% excise tax on high-cost, employer-sponsored health insurance plans.  High-cost plans would include those costing $8,500 for individuals and $23,000 for those other than self-only, beginning in the year 2013.  Starting in 2014, the threshold for high-cost plans would be increased annually by the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) plus 1%.  These thresholds are further increased for individuals employed (or previously employed) in certain high-risk professions or the repair or installation of electrical or communications lines.  Also, residents of states that rank in the top 17 among the highest-costing average employer-sponsored health insurance plans would be subject to more lenient thresholds for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 (120%, 110%, and 105% of the threshold, respectively).

For each given high-cost plan, the coverage provider would be responsible for paying a 40% tax on the amount equal to the cost of the coverage exceeding the threshold.  For example, a coverage provider would be subject to an excise of $400 for a plan costing $24,000 in 2013 ($24,000 - $23,000 = $1,000; $1,000 x 40% = $400).  A coverage provider may be the insurance issuer, the benefits plan administrator, or the employer, depending on the coverage arrangement.

An Overview of Exchanges under the House and Senate Bill

On January 8th, 2010, the Alliance for Health Reform and The Commonwealth Fund  co-sponsored and moderated a panel discussion on the health insurance exchanges that are being proposed in both the House and the Senate health reform bills. The panel consisted of Washington and Lee professor Timothy Jost, John Kingsdale of the Massachusetts Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, and Philip Vogel of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association (CBIA), which runs the non-profit CBIA Health Connections, a health insurance exchange for the state of Connecticut.

The co-sponsors have uploaded all of the event’s materials, including a webcast of the entire event, as well as all of the powerpoint slides and papers. All of this information can be found here.

Professor Jost and the Commonwealth fund created detailed charts comparing the differences between the two bills. Below is a reproduction of Professor Jost’s chart, which can be viewed by clicking on the thumbnails.

Both the House and the Senate bills would create new health insurance exchanges that would help consumers and employers navigate the purchase of health insurance. Though the common thread of a regulated marketplace runs through both bills, all three panelists noted the stark difference in the vision and implementation of the exchanges under the respective bills.

Below are some of the key distinctions between the two bills.

The House Bill — Public Option with Opt-Out Possibility

The House’s bill, H.R. 3962 (click here for entire pdf) provides for a federal exchange that would essentially eliminate the individual marketplace for health insurance going forward. A public plan would be offered that would reimburse providers at negotiated rates between those of Medicare and commercial rates. The applicable section of the House’s bill is Title III, entitled Health Insurance Exchange and Related Provisions.

Title III of the House Bill would create the Health Choices Administration with a Commissioner who would oversee the exchange. Citing Section 301 and 308 of the Bill, Professor Jost notes on page 17 of his paper:

The exchange operates at the national level, established within a new Health Choices Administration. The Commissioner of the HCA can, however, permit individual states or groups of states to administer an exchange within their territory in place of the national exchange if specific requirements are met, subject to revocation if the state ceases to meet the requirements of the bill. Even if the HCA delegates exchange authority to a state, the Commissioner retains enforcement authority and can further specify functions retained by the Commissioner and not delegated.

Thus, the House’s bill would create an exchange system that is fairly centralized and regulated, but with added flexibility. If the states fail to implement their own exchange then HHS will implement an exchange for them. Only those policies considered “grandfathered” could be sold outside of the exchange, and such “grandfathering” can only occur in the individual market. (See Section 202). Insurance offered inside the exchange would fit into one of four tiers: basic, enhanced, premium, and premium plus. (See Section 303). These tiers would correspond to different actuarial values of the plans. Subsidies would be provided on a sliding scale that is determined by the purchaser’s income.

The House bill would also limit the medical loss ratio of plans offered in the exchanges to 85 percent, largely prohibit the rescission of contracts, eliminate lifetime coverage limits, eliminate pre-existing condition exclusions, as well as require guaranteed issue and renewal of plans. Variations in premiums based on the age of the insured could only vary by a maximum of 2:1.

Not all of the panelists agreed with every provision. For example, Mr. Vogel took issue with the dependence on the medical loss ratio in regulating the market, instead arguing for a greater reliance on the “claim dollar” as a guide post.

Whether offered inside the exchange or grandfathered, all plans must meet certain requirements in terms of essential benefits, which would be determined by HHS, and would be based on the recommendation of the Health Benefits Advisory Committee–a public/private hybrid entity.

• Click here to jump to section 223 outlining the Health Benefits Advisory Committee

These benefits would include hospitalization, outpatient care, prescriptions drugs, equipment, and a host of other benefits.

• Click here to jump to the section 222 which details the essential benefits.

The House bill would also impose rules regarding the transparency of the plans offered in the exchange by requiring certain information about the plans to be disclosed.

The Senate Approach — No Public Option; Multistate Substitute Would Exist

For whatever reason, the Senate crafted a more complicated framework of exchanges.

A crucial point of divergence from the House bill is the Senate bill’s lack of a federally financed public plan offered through the exchange. However, as discussed below, part of the Senate plan attempts to act as a substitute. Another area of divergence is that existing individual and group plans may continue alongside newly created exchanges, in addition to any grandfathered plans. This is in stark distinction to the House bill that would eliminate some existing policies. Though as noted, the House bill would allow for some grandfathering.

The Senate’s exchange framework is based on section 1001 of the bill which provides that HHS will, with the help of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), craft standards regarding the minimum benefits and other aspects of the plans sold through the various exchanges.

In terms of the Senate’s framework for exchanges, it is as follows. The Senate bill will allow for a number of exchanges that would exist on variety of different governmental levels. Whereas the House bill envisions a more federal exchange system, the Senate bill would instead allow for state-based exchanges, multistate exchanges (i.e. regional), or substate exchanges.

• Click here for a pdf version of Senate bill, as passed.

State-based Exchanges
For the individual and the small group markets, the Senate bill would require each state to create a American Health Benefit Exchange for individual purchasers of insurance, and a Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) for small businesses purchasers. HHS would regulate these exchanges (See section 1321(a)(1)). These exchanges would be governed by regulations promulgated by HHS, unless the states adopt alternative standards that the HHS finds acceptable.

The state may combine the individual market exchanges with the small business (SHOP) exchanges. Additionally, states have the flexibility to establish regional exchanges or smaller subsidiary exchanges that target specific geographic areas within the state. (See Section 1311(f)). If the states do not create a system of either separate exchanges for individuals and small business, or some combination, HHS will establish an exchange or utilize a non-profit insurer to fill the void. See 1321(c).

The multistate exchanges are important, as they may mollify those who have been touting the idea of interstate health insurance offerings as a panacea for the woes of U.S. health insurance.

Regardless of how any states’ exchange(s) plays out, many of the important provisions of the Senate’s bill such as certain minimum benefits, the ban on lifetime or annual dollar limits, the ban on rescission, and medical loss ratio requirements would apply across the landscape of exchanges.

State Opt-Out Possible
Under the Senate bill, the states would be eligible in 2017 to opt-out of the federal requirements listed above if they can demonstrate that they are providing affordable coverage that is at least as affordable and comprehensive as the Bill requires. Alternatively, the state may be allowed to create a “public health plan” for those under 200% of the federal poverty level. Under this arrangement, the federal government would compensate the state for 95 percent of what would have been provided through premium tax credits as well as cost-sharing reduction payments. (See Section 1331).

Multistate plans: A Compromise?
One major amendment passed on December 24th was section 1334 which amended section 1333 which dealt with multistate exchanges. Under section 1334, The Office of Personnel Management (OPM)–the agency that governs the federal employees health benefit program (FEHB)–will enter into contracts with insurance carriers to offer at least 2 multistate plans through each exchange in each state. (See 1334(a)(1)). These plans will cover the individual and small group market. At least one of those plans must be a non-profit insurance plan, and must be in accordance with the general standards set forth for health insurance plans.

Though there would be a minimum level of benefits and protections required for all plans, the States would be entitled to offer multistate plans with more substantial benefits. However the state will have to defray the costs of the additional benefits.

Unlike the House bill which eliminates the state-based individual market, the Senate bill envisions exchanges that would co-exist with both the individual and small-group markets, and operate under the same rules. Though the Senate bill allows for flexibility, the subsidies provided by the federal government could only apply to insurance plans sold through the exchange.

One of the most important and controversial sections of the amended Senate bill is section 1334(a)(4), which specifies that, in administering the multistate plan, OPM will have the same bargaining power as they currently have for plans offered in the FEHB. Thus, OPM would be able to negotiate for a specified medical loss ratio and profit margin, as well as specified premium rates and any other terms in the “interest of the enrollees.” The goal is for these plans to be offered nationwide. Whether the OPM-run exchange will succeed is obviously yet to be determined, but some like Professor Timothy Jost are worried that the Senate’s plan to allow some plans to operate outside of the exchange complicates the federal government’s job in risk adjustment.

Reconciliation Without Conference: The Health Reform Bill Moves Closer to a Vote

[Ed. Note: Health Reform Watch is very pleased to welcome Corey Klein to the blog. Corey is both a journalist and a law student here at Seton Hall Law. As a reporter, Corey garnered numerous awards from both the New Jersey Society of Professional Journalists and the New Jersey Press Association. We look forward, as we're sure will you, to his contributions to HRW.]

Congressional Democrats have been attempting to iron out a final health care reform bill behind closed doors this week in order to avoid delay tactics by Republicans, according to media reports.

The House and Senate passed two versions of the bill. Typically, an official public conference would be held to resolve differences between the two versions, but Democrats want to keep Republicans from extending the debate in an effort to stall the bill. President Barack Obama has not been critical of this move, stating that he is eager to sign a health care bill into law as soon as practical, according to Reuters.

A few key differences between the House and Senate versions are how the bill will be financed and whether the bill will include a public health care option.

Congressional Republicans have stated that they would block the bill by any means necessary. In response, Democrats decided to finalize the bill behind closed doors.

If the bill had gone to a public conference, a number of Senators and Representatives would meet together to work out differences between the two bills. The members of the conference committees, known as managers, cannot substantially change the bill, but they could keep provisions in one version of the bill or drop amendments in another. They cannot add any new amendments.

Each house of Congress has several managers. For example, the House may have seven and the Senate may have four. The numbers do not need to be equal.

After reaching a decision, the managers return to their respective houses of Congress and tell their fellow Congressmen and Senators if they were able to agree on all or part of the bill or if they were not able to agree on the bill.

If they were able to agree on the entire bill, the bill is revoted upon in both houses. If they were not able to agree on the entire bill, or if they were only able to agree on parts of it, the bill returns to the conference committee. If the differences are too vast, the bill could just die out.

The members of these conference committees are usually senior members of standing committees. These conference committees would have been made up of members of both parties and high-ranking Republicans vowed to block efforts to let the bill leave their respective committees to go up for a final vote.

Also, the House and Senate support the bill by slim margins, with some Democrats opposing certain aspects of the bill. By negotiating informally and out of the public eye, Democrats can bring a final version of the bill to a vote without a formal conference.

Democrats responded by negotiating with their own party behind closed doors. The decision to finalize the bill behind closed doors was met with some criticism. CSPAN has issued a letter to Democrats urging them to make the negotiations public.

Republicans seized on CSPAN’s letter as evidence that Democrats were not being transparent, but Democrats dismissed these criticisms as further efforts to kill the legislation.

Dollars and Sense & Health Care Reform

With health care reform approaching its culmination point, like all things most memorable of the past year, the overarching question remains, “How much will this cost us?”  As it currently stands, the House version of health reform will cost an estimated $1 trillion over a decade, while the Senate version comes in at $871 billion.  Next, comes the obvious second question, “How will the government pay for it?”  As Kaiser Health News summarizes in its recently released guide to health reform:

Both bills hit up the wealthy, but in different ways. The House would impose a 5.4 percent income tax surtax on individuals who earn more than $500,000 a year and couples that earn more than $1 million. The Senate would increase the Medicare payroll tax rate from 1.45 percent to 2.35 percent for people who earn more than $200,000 a year and families that earn more than $250,000.

To raise money to pay for the legislation, the Senate would impose a 40 percent tax on the portion of most employer-sponsored health coverage that exceeds $8,500 a year for individuals and $23,000 for families. The Senate also would raise the threshold for deducting medical expenses to 10 percent of income, up from 7.5 percent.

Overall, the financing provisions could spur a pitched battle; the House hates the Senate tax on high-cost policies, while the Senate opposes the House’s income-tax surcharge.

In addition, many Americans worry that efforts to contain costs within the bills will lead to decreased standards of care.  As a New York Times piece reveals, however, this may not be the case.  The article examines the health system in Richmond, Virginia, where there are stringent state infrastructural expansion guidelines placed on health care practices and hospitals to contain costs.  The state requires large medical infrastructural expenditures by health care providing institutions– in the form of hospital expansion or even major equipment purchases– to be approved by the state through a “certificate of need.”  Neither of the House or Senate bills  includes such a provision, but there is a great deal of speculation that the oversight and cost-cutting measures in both will have a deleterious impact on the quality of health care.

While Richmond spends less than average per capita on Medicare than other metropolitan areas, patient outcomes are better than average. The Times reports

The quality of care in Richmond is better than in most American metropolitan areas, according to various measures, and it continues to improve. Medicare data, for example, shows that Richmond hospitals do a better-than-average job of treating heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia.

But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Times’ analysis relates to those states that do not police their health care infrastructure expenditures– or, as in South Dakota, had done so formerly, but ceased to do so.  When South Dakota “scrapped” its certificate of need program, one chief operating officer reported going on an expansion binge. In such cases, the number of patients that providers treat is said to correspond proportionally to the level of health care resources available.  One medical officer found this “supply-sensitive” phenomenon to mean that the more hospital beds a hospital has, the more patients it is likely to see.  Build it and they will come– or perhaps more to the point– they will be sent. At our expense.