High-Risk Pools: a Precarious Pillar of Republican Reform

At the Health Summit last week we were able to more fully observe the Republican vision for reforming health care. A constant idea that the Republican leadership came back to was the concept of “high risk pools.” But what are high risk pools, and what potential do they have to lower costs?

High-risk pools are state-run programs that provide insurance for those who suffer from pre-existing conditions or have some other issue that makes them “medically uninsurable.”  They are often utilized by those in limbo who were previously covered by an employer’s group coverage, but for whatever reason are now relegated to the veritable disaster that is the individual market. Currently, 34 states have high-risk pools, with the combined number of insured from those pools at 200,000. (See Kaiser Family Foundation, State High Risk Pools: An Overview). As noted by Kaiser, coverage is typically at 125% to 200% of the standard market rate for health insurance.  In some states, the high-risk pool insurance costs as much as $14,000 per year. Thirty states offering high-risk pool coverage have waiting periods before pre-existing medical conditions can be covered.

Edmund Haislmaier of the Heritage Foundation has provided a succinct and helpful discussion of the relationship between high-risk pools and the related concept of “reinsurance.”  Haislmaier breaks down these risk-transfer tools into two groups: “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” risk-transfer mechanisms:

The “exclusionary” mechanisms segregate high-risk individuals from the low-risk population, subsidizing them in a separate pool. The “inclusionary” mechanisms keep high-risk individuals in the same pool as everyone else but seek to redistribute and/or subsidize their more expensive claims.

A common exclusionary mechanism is a state-run “high-risk pool” for the individual health insurance market. The pool offers coverage to people who have been refused coverage in the individual market due to poor health status. Although coverage carries high premiums, the premiums are not enough to cover the cost of claims by enrollees. To make up the difference, lawmakers use a mix of assessments on private insurers and public subsidies. In some states, the losses are funded entirely out of assessments on insurers and, thus, ultimately included in the premiums paid by everyone with health insurance coverage. In other states, the losses are funded primarily out of general revenue appropriations and, thus, are ultimately born by all the state’s taxpayers. Still other states use a mix of both funding sources.

Inclusionary risk transfer mechanisms operate on essentially the same principle, except that high-cost individuals are not given separate coverage. Instead, some portion of their claims is pooled and then proportionately redistributed among the carriers in the market. As with high-risk pools, public subsidies may also be used to offset some of the cost of claims. This type of mechanism is often called, somewhat inaccurately, a “reinsurance pool.” A more precise termed is “risk-transfer pool.”

Notably, Haislmaier recognizes that high-risk pools offer little help when it comes to the true goal of health reform: reducing costs:

Regardless of design, risk transfer mechanisms only shift or redistribute costs among funding sources. Specifically, risk transfer mechanisms offer ways to more equitably redistribute the costs of a small number of expensive cases or individuals across a broader population. While these features enable health insurance markets to function more smoothly, they are not a solution for controlling health care costs in general.

This is noteworthy coming from the Heritage Foundation. However, to be sure, high-risk pools are not peculiar to Republican health reform proposals. Both the House and the Senate bills provide for high-risk pools. The follow table is from The Kaiser Foundation’s paper “High-risk Pools: An Overview”:

The important row of the above table is “Timeline.” Whereas the House and Senate bills utilize high-risk pools as a temporary measure to provide insurance to those with pre-existing conditions before the exchanges take shape, the Republican proposal would implement risk transfer mechanisms as the primary means by which individuals with pre-existing conditions can obtain coverage. For those purchasing on the individual market, the Republican proposal would provide federal funding for state-run high-risk pools. Reinsurance mechanisms would operate in the small group market.

This is in contrast to both the House and Senate proposal which both prohibit the insurance exchanges  from denying coverage because of an applicant’s pre-existing condition–thus negating the need for high-risk pools.  Instead of subsidizing high-risk pools that would segregate the sick from the healthy, the individual mandate in the Democrats’ bill would ensure that the costs of high-risk and currently sick individuals would be spread throughout the exchange.

As Haislmaier noted, it is unclear how risk transfer mechanisms would lower health care costs. For example, whereas exchanges would increase competition by making the purchase of health insurance more accessible, high-risk pools and reinsurance would not alter the current maze that is the individual insurance market.   It is somewhat remarkable that the Republicans opt for high-risk pools instead of a proscription against pre-existing condition preclusions, especially given the public disdain for pre-existing condition preclusions. But the Republicans have little choice. Since they are wholly opposed to the individual mandate, insurers and states running high-risk pools under the Republican plan would not have healthy individuals paying into the system to offset the cost of sick insureds.

Reform Rodeo! The Summit, Speed Dating, and More.

1. Summit!: Fretting about how to get your dose of tomorrow’s “summit”? Don’t worry, CSPAN has got you covered for the Health Care Summit that is kicking off at 10am.

2. Managed Care Meltdown?: Joe Paduda at Managed Care Matters points out that the Anthem rate increases have shown an inability for private insurers to control costs.  What Paduda is missing in his piece is advice to private health insurers about how to manage costs without another “managed care backlash” like we had in the 1990s.

3. The Cost Conundrum’s Conundrum, or Just a Canard?: Maggie Mahar has a beef with the New York Times’ channeling of Dr. Bach’s New England Journal of Medicine article, where Dr. Bach criticized the  Dartmouth Atlas researchers’ methodology by claiming that they failed to risk adjust. Dr. Atul Gawande also believes the criticism is misplaced.

4. Health Care and Reconciliation are BFFs: NPR reports on a somewhat cozy relationship between reconciliation and previous health care initiatives.

5. What do speed dating and OB/GYN docs have in common? Kevin MD discusses how hospitals are utilizing speed dating techniques to match obstetricians with potential patients.

6. HIT, Yeah You Know Me: Dr. John Halamka with a slew of handouts from the HIT Policy Committee’s recent meeting, as well as notes from a recent meeting of the HIT Standards Commitee.

Why Angela Braly, CEO of the WellPoint Insurance Co., Deserves a Raise

Angela Braly, CEO of  health insurance giant WellPoint, deserves a raise. As regular readers of this column know, Ms. Braly did not make as much as Aetna’s Ronald A. Williams in 2008.

In a post written back in May of 2009 I noted of Insurance Company CEO Total Compensation:

Aetna’s Ronald Williams received $24,300,112 last year. That’s $467,309.85 per week. That’s a house. Maybe not a house that Mr. Williams would live in, but a house nonetheless. The man makes a house a week. And interestingly enough, if Mr. Williams were to eschew the purchase of a house on any given week and instead look to deposit the money in a bank– in order to remain FDIC insured (up to $250,000)– he would actually need to open more than one account–every week. Lest we lament the fate of the other CEOs on the list, in 2008 Ms. Braly had to get by on $189,311.76 per week….

Less than half of what Mr. Williams brought in, in 2008 Ms. Braly was forced to make ends meet on $9,844,212.

In 2007, her first year on the job: $9,094,271. Which, for those keeping score at home, is $174,889.83 per week. Her predecessor at Wellpoint, Larry Glasscock, received  $23,886,169 in total compensation in 2006. Again, in 2008 Ms. Braly had to get by on $189,311.76 per week. True, it was $14,421.93 more per week than she had made the year prior, but that won’t be nearly sufficient for this year.

So why does Angela Braly deserve a raise? Pay so high that the  FDIC limits on insurance (yes, it’s somewhat ironic) won’t work for her weekly paycheck? Because WellPoint subsidiary Anthem Blue Cross of California has found the audacity to raise individual insurance premiums in that state 39%. That’s right, 39%. This, according to Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius, “as WellPoint Incorporated, has seen its profits soar, earning $2.7 billion in the last quarter of 2009 alone.”

Profits “soar,” raise rates. What more could Wall Street want?

Secretary Sebelius has demanded “justification” for the increase. In a letter sent to the Wellpoint subsidiary Anthem Blue Cross, she writes:

One of the biggest pressures facing families, businesses and governments at every level are skyrocketing health insurance costs.  With so many families already affected by rising costs, I was very disturbed to learn through media accounts that Anthem Blue Cross plans to raise premiums for its California customers by as much as 39 percent. These extraordinary increases are up to 15 times faster than inflation and threaten to make health care unaffordable for hundreds of thousands of Californians, many of whom are already struggling to make ends meet in a difficult economy.

Your company’s strong financial position makes these rate increases even more difficult to understand. As you know, your parent company, WellPoint Incorporated, has seen its profits soar, earning $2.7 billion in the last quarter of 2009 alone.

And there you have it, profits soar, raise rates, the stock soars–as will, presumably, Ms. Braly’s stock options. She won’t have “to get by on $189,311.76 per week” for all that much longer. With that kind of move it’s only a matter of time before she finds herself in Mr. Williams’ neighborhood.

Now that the healthcare reform debate awaits its Summit, from the vantage point of its nadir, one might imagine other Insurance Company CEO’s to embark upon a similar strategy. Good thing we jettisoned all those proposed pesky insurance regulations contained in the House & Senate bills.

Because it never gets old to me, here’s the list of Insurance Company CEO Total Compensation:

Res Ipsa Loquitur.

Ins. Co. & CEO With 2007 Total CEO Compensation

• Aetna Ronald A. Williams: $23,045,834
• Cigna H. Edward Hanway: $25,839,777
• Coventry Dale B. Wolf : $14,869,823
• Health Net Jay M. Gellert: $3,686,230
• Humana Michael McCallister: $10,312,557
• U.Health Grp Stephen J. Hemsley: $13,164,529
• WellPoint Angela Braly (2007): $9,094,271
  L. Glasscock (2006): $23,886,169

Ins. Co. & CEO With 2008 Total CEO Compensation

• Aetna, Ronald A. Williams: $24,300,112
• Cigna, H. Edward Hanway: $12,236,740
• Coventry, Dale Wolf: $9,047,469
• Health Net, Jay Gellert: $4,425,355
• Humana, Michael McCallister: $4,764,309
• U. Health Group, Stephen J. Hemsley: $3,241,042
• Wellpoint, Angela Braly: $9,844,212

See Nonprofit Health Related CEO Compensation Here.

Little Beds and Little Help at Jfk Hartwyck at Edison Estates

We speak here of health care and health care reform, most often in the larger, policy sense. This weekend I had occasion to witness the beast up close. My younger brother had his knee replaced earlier in the week at JFK Medical Center here in Edison, NJ. By all accounts the operation was a success; although he is only 45 years old (which I’m told is considered young for a knee replacement) he has had a history of knee problems initially ensuing from his having been struck by a car while working a number of years ago. After the surgery, his doctor asked him how he had even been walking– there was, he said, no cartilage left to speak of.

Initially his insurance company balked (perhaps pro forma?) at the prospect of my brother entering a convalescent center for physical therapy and rehab, citing his relatively young age, but relented under the demands of the doctor. He was initially to have been transferred to the rehab center on Thursday, but was inexplicably delayed until Friday late afternoon. He was sent to Jfk Hartwyck at Edison Estates, which seems to function primarily as a Nursing Home– but not a particularly highly rated one.

On Saturday at around 1:30 pm, as I set out to see him, I called to a) make sure he had in fact been transferred and was there; and, b) find out his room number. After three call transfers and three fairly frustrating conversations I was finally able to confirm that he was there; I also learned that he was on the third floor. I gave up on the room number.

To say the place is a bit run down is not to engage in hyperbole; to say that there was an absence of care is merely to mimic the US News Report on the Nursing Home and Rehab Center.

My brother is a big man– 6′ 3″ or 4″ tall, and having lost some weight, scales in at about 295lbs. Despite the fact that his chart says such, provisions were not made to accommodate him. He did not fit in the bed: his head struck against the headboard and his feet crushed against the footboard if he tried to lay straight. Presumably, with his knee having just been replaced, this matters even more than it would normally. There is a contraption that he was supposed to put his leg and knee in– it would not fit on the bed. Furthermore, the foam mattress that came with his too-short bed was so old and beat up that he sunk into the bed’s metal slats tossing and turning (though not laying straight) while trying to sleep. In doing so,  he had actually been cut.

In addition, no one had thought to give him an elevated toilet seat; his knee precluded him from reaching a standard seat.

He had made these problems known to staff earlier, and was told that they would fix them. This did not happen.

After I arrived and reiterated these needs to various levels of staff, I was told of a number of different, but conflicting remedies and the schedules for such. They did not have a bed long enough but would  remove the footboard so that his feet would hang off the bed??? until they could fasten an extender or buy or rent a bed to fit him– which could take either a few hours or a few days.  I said I could live with a few hours, but that a few days was patently unacceptable. The contraption would have to wait.

He is 6′ 3″ or 4″ tall, he is not 7′ 2.” It is decidedly not a new facility. They have 280 beds. Surely, from time to time they get patients taller than 6′ 2″? They acted as though they never had.

The shoddy mattress was soon replaced, though, inexplicably, no one entered the room to assist my brother as he struggled to get out of the bed and hoist himself precariously onto the walker as the mattresses were exchanged. Throughout the four or so hours I was there, this absence of assistance was a recurring theme. Having been trained as a lawyer, this willingness on the part of staff to court, if not embrace, liability was, quite frankly, appalling. I assure you, somewhere there’s an in-house attorney prematurely gray.

As for the elevated toliet seat? I had to ask again, but urgently, as he had to go. The nursing assistant unable to find one elsewhere, ultimately snatched one from another patient’s room and hurried to clean it as my brother, the outcome uncertain, anxiously waited.

The truth is, they ultimately moved in response to my demands formulated in accord with my legal training. Otherwise, I imagine he’d still be lying there with a too-short bed, presumably covered in his own fecal matter as he vainly attempted to make his new knee bend and descend to an unprepared toliet.

In the end, they gave up on removing the footboard as they realized while taking it apart that it would actually disable the bed controls by doing so. When the rental bed came, they had no mattress to fit it but, tired of it all, we assented to pillows shoved in at the end. When the bed was set up, after the rental bed man told the nurse that she was going to want to go over the bed– which had different controls than the former bed– with my brother–and to make sure we set up the height of the bed to accommodate him–the nurse nodded her head and promptly walked directly out of the room. We managed without her.

I won’t bore you with more, but I will say that the attending doctor had briefly visited my brother earlier in the day and, without so much as asking him his relative pain level, apparently changed his pain prescription for the afternoon, but didn’t bother to actually tell my brother that she was doing so. Tentative about leaving the direct care of his surgeon, before he left the hospital my brother actually asked his surgeon if he would continue on this particular prescription that seemed to be working–the surgeon assured him that this prescription was “the law” and would remain in place wherever he went to combat the pain. Apparently, the rehab’s attending had not heard of the law and by the evening it became apparent that something was wrong. My brother, who is tough as nails and has worked a harsh blue collar job all his life, began to cry. The nurse informed us soon thereafter that his prescription had been changed. A lengthy explanation/argument with the nurses and phone call to the doctor filling in for the attending resulted in a reinstatement of “the law.”

It is also worth mentioning that although we were told by the nurses that standard protocol for incoming sub-acute was a physical therapy evaluation within at least, the very next day– that never happened. And although I was assured that although there must have been some form of communication failure which deprived him of his evaluation, he would be evaluated very first thing the next morning. That did not happen either. My brother was told this morning that “no physical therapy staff work on Sundays.” Obviously, he has received no physical therapy yet. At best, he will be evaluated for such come Monday morning– he got there on Friday. His knee and leg have further swollen. Insurance will only pay for so many days stay. It is also my understanding that the first few days of rehab are crucial to an effective recovery.

I routinely villify insurers (as they deserve it), but I can’t help but see at least one of their points here. My question is this: exactly what will this medical facility be charging the insurer for this weekend? Therapeutic Services? Rehab? He was warehoused– and poorly at that.

I’ll keep you posted.

An Overview of Exchanges under the House and Senate Bill

On January 8th, 2010, the Alliance for Health Reform and The Commonwealth Fund  co-sponsored and moderated a panel discussion on the health insurance exchanges that are being proposed in both the House and the Senate health reform bills. The panel consisted of Washington and Lee professor Timothy Jost, John Kingsdale of the Massachusetts Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, and Philip Vogel of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association (CBIA), which runs the non-profit CBIA Health Connections, a health insurance exchange for the state of Connecticut.

The co-sponsors have uploaded all of the event’s materials, including a webcast of the entire event, as well as all of the powerpoint slides and papers. All of this information can be found here.

Professor Jost and the Commonwealth fund created detailed charts comparing the differences between the two bills. Below is a reproduction of Professor Jost’s chart, which can be viewed by clicking on the thumbnails.

Both the House and the Senate bills would create new health insurance exchanges that would help consumers and employers navigate the purchase of health insurance. Though the common thread of a regulated marketplace runs through both bills, all three panelists noted the stark difference in the vision and implementation of the exchanges under the respective bills.

Below are some of the key distinctions between the two bills.

The House Bill — Public Option with Opt-Out Possibility

The House’s bill, H.R. 3962 (click here for entire pdf) provides for a federal exchange that would essentially eliminate the individual marketplace for health insurance going forward. A public plan would be offered that would reimburse providers at negotiated rates between those of Medicare and commercial rates. The applicable section of the House’s bill is Title III, entitled Health Insurance Exchange and Related Provisions.

Title III of the House Bill would create the Health Choices Administration with a Commissioner who would oversee the exchange. Citing Section 301 and 308 of the Bill, Professor Jost notes on page 17 of his paper:

The exchange operates at the national level, established within a new Health Choices Administration. The Commissioner of the HCA can, however, permit individual states or groups of states to administer an exchange within their territory in place of the national exchange if specific requirements are met, subject to revocation if the state ceases to meet the requirements of the bill. Even if the HCA delegates exchange authority to a state, the Commissioner retains enforcement authority and can further specify functions retained by the Commissioner and not delegated.

Thus, the House’s bill would create an exchange system that is fairly centralized and regulated, but with added flexibility. If the states fail to implement their own exchange then HHS will implement an exchange for them. Only those policies considered “grandfathered” could be sold outside of the exchange, and such “grandfathering” can only occur in the individual market. (See Section 202). Insurance offered inside the exchange would fit into one of four tiers: basic, enhanced, premium, and premium plus. (See Section 303). These tiers would correspond to different actuarial values of the plans. Subsidies would be provided on a sliding scale that is determined by the purchaser’s income.

The House bill would also limit the medical loss ratio of plans offered in the exchanges to 85 percent, largely prohibit the rescission of contracts, eliminate lifetime coverage limits, eliminate pre-existing condition exclusions, as well as require guaranteed issue and renewal of plans. Variations in premiums based on the age of the insured could only vary by a maximum of 2:1.

Not all of the panelists agreed with every provision. For example, Mr. Vogel took issue with the dependence on the medical loss ratio in regulating the market, instead arguing for a greater reliance on the “claim dollar” as a guide post.

Whether offered inside the exchange or grandfathered, all plans must meet certain requirements in terms of essential benefits, which would be determined by HHS, and would be based on the recommendation of the Health Benefits Advisory Committee–a public/private hybrid entity.

• Click here to jump to section 223 outlining the Health Benefits Advisory Committee

These benefits would include hospitalization, outpatient care, prescriptions drugs, equipment, and a host of other benefits.

• Click here to jump to the section 222 which details the essential benefits.

The House bill would also impose rules regarding the transparency of the plans offered in the exchange by requiring certain information about the plans to be disclosed.

The Senate Approach — No Public Option; Multistate Substitute Would Exist

For whatever reason, the Senate crafted a more complicated framework of exchanges.

A crucial point of divergence from the House bill is the Senate bill’s lack of a federally financed public plan offered through the exchange. However, as discussed below, part of the Senate plan attempts to act as a substitute. Another area of divergence is that existing individual and group plans may continue alongside newly created exchanges, in addition to any grandfathered plans. This is in stark distinction to the House bill that would eliminate some existing policies. Though as noted, the House bill would allow for some grandfathering.

The Senate’s exchange framework is based on section 1001 of the bill which provides that HHS will, with the help of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), craft standards regarding the minimum benefits and other aspects of the plans sold through the various exchanges.

In terms of the Senate’s framework for exchanges, it is as follows. The Senate bill will allow for a number of exchanges that would exist on variety of different governmental levels. Whereas the House bill envisions a more federal exchange system, the Senate bill would instead allow for state-based exchanges, multistate exchanges (i.e. regional), or substate exchanges.

• Click here for a pdf version of Senate bill, as passed.

State-based Exchanges
For the individual and the small group markets, the Senate bill would require each state to create a American Health Benefit Exchange for individual purchasers of insurance, and a Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) for small businesses purchasers. HHS would regulate these exchanges (See section 1321(a)(1)). These exchanges would be governed by regulations promulgated by HHS, unless the states adopt alternative standards that the HHS finds acceptable.

The state may combine the individual market exchanges with the small business (SHOP) exchanges. Additionally, states have the flexibility to establish regional exchanges or smaller subsidiary exchanges that target specific geographic areas within the state. (See Section 1311(f)). If the states do not create a system of either separate exchanges for individuals and small business, or some combination, HHS will establish an exchange or utilize a non-profit insurer to fill the void. See 1321(c).

The multistate exchanges are important, as they may mollify those who have been touting the idea of interstate health insurance offerings as a panacea for the woes of U.S. health insurance.

Regardless of how any states’ exchange(s) plays out, many of the important provisions of the Senate’s bill such as certain minimum benefits, the ban on lifetime or annual dollar limits, the ban on rescission, and medical loss ratio requirements would apply across the landscape of exchanges.

State Opt-Out Possible
Under the Senate bill, the states would be eligible in 2017 to opt-out of the federal requirements listed above if they can demonstrate that they are providing affordable coverage that is at least as affordable and comprehensive as the Bill requires. Alternatively, the state may be allowed to create a “public health plan” for those under 200% of the federal poverty level. Under this arrangement, the federal government would compensate the state for 95 percent of what would have been provided through premium tax credits as well as cost-sharing reduction payments. (See Section 1331).

Multistate plans: A Compromise?
One major amendment passed on December 24th was section 1334 which amended section 1333 which dealt with multistate exchanges. Under section 1334, The Office of Personnel Management (OPM)–the agency that governs the federal employees health benefit program (FEHB)–will enter into contracts with insurance carriers to offer at least 2 multistate plans through each exchange in each state. (See 1334(a)(1)). These plans will cover the individual and small group market. At least one of those plans must be a non-profit insurance plan, and must be in accordance with the general standards set forth for health insurance plans.

Though there would be a minimum level of benefits and protections required for all plans, the States would be entitled to offer multistate plans with more substantial benefits. However the state will have to defray the costs of the additional benefits.

Unlike the House bill which eliminates the state-based individual market, the Senate bill envisions exchanges that would co-exist with both the individual and small-group markets, and operate under the same rules. Though the Senate bill allows for flexibility, the subsidies provided by the federal government could only apply to insurance plans sold through the exchange.

One of the most important and controversial sections of the amended Senate bill is section 1334(a)(4), which specifies that, in administering the multistate plan, OPM will have the same bargaining power as they currently have for plans offered in the FEHB. Thus, OPM would be able to negotiate for a specified medical loss ratio and profit margin, as well as specified premium rates and any other terms in the “interest of the enrollees.” The goal is for these plans to be offered nationwide. Whether the OPM-run exchange will succeed is obviously yet to be determined, but some like Professor Timothy Jost are worried that the Senate’s plan to allow some plans to operate outside of the exchange complicates the federal government’s job in risk adjustment.

John V. Jacobi on Health Reform & Care for the Chronically Ill

In case you missed it: Health Reform Watch regular, Professor John V. Jacobi, interviewed by Lester Feder for Legal Issues in Health Reform, a publication of The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University. In part:

Covering the Chronically Ill: An Interview with John V. Jacobi

John V. Jacobi is Dorothea Dix Professor of Health Law and Policy at the Seton Hall University School of Law. The O’Neill Institute’s Lester Feder spoke with him about health reform and covering those with chronic illness.

Lester Feder: Generally speaking, what do you think of what it is looking like we’re going to get out of Congress?

John V. Jacobi: I think that there are two big clusters of issues: one is covering the uninsured, which has gotten most of the attention, for good reason. The other issues, which I’ve been most concerned about is access for the most vulnerable: people with chronic illness and disabilities. On the first part it’s anybody’s guess on how well we’re going to do at covering the uninsured. On the second part, there are lots of interesting structural pieces in the bills that will help people with chronic illness, but I think that the overall structure of the reform may end up undercutting that quite a bit.

The pieces in the bills that are helpful are the ones that create medical homes, or chronic care management, or assure coordination of care for people with chronic illness. It is the sort of change that our delivery system and our finance system really need to be looking at. The problem with getting those innovations to actually work is that much of the coverage under the plans for the chronically ill will be provided through the private marketplace.

And here’s the problem with that: Private insurance companies are more or less profitable  depending on the risks that they accept. They are much more likely to be profitable if they are good at risk selection than if they are efficient and provide good service in other ways. There is such a dramatic concentration of cost in any actuarial pool that if an insurance company can avoid the 10 percent of the sickest people it is going to be doing quite well, whether it’s good or bad at delivering its services. And the ones that attract those 10 percent of the sickest are going to be in trouble unless there’s quite a good risk-adjustment program for premiums, which doesn’t seem to be available yet.

Read More

Reform Rodeo

1. Getting Up to Speed: Kaiser Health News breaks down where reform currently stands now that the Senate has passed their version of the Bill.
2. Multimedia Perspective: A thorough and well-done interactive timeline of U.S. Health Care Reform helps to provide some much-needed context. Clicking on the event gives a synopsis as well as a link to an NEJM piece on the event from that era.
3. No Snow(e) in Sight: Sam Stein notes how Olympia Snowe–a Senator who not long ago garnered the attention of all health reform followers–rationalized her “Nay” by questioning the Bill’s constitutionality.
   1. Speaking of the constitutionality of the Senate’s bill: As we have noted on this site earlier, questions of constitutionality pervade the dialogue. For those whose interest has been piqued, bloggers at the Volokh Conspiracy have penned a number of pieces on the issue, here, here, and here.
4. Senate Bill’s impact on health insurance companies: Bob Laszewski discusses the Bill’s impact on insurance company–channeling the skepticism of non-profit Harvard Pilgrim’s CEO Bruce Bullen.
5. Impending Car Crash?: Michael Goozner reiterates his view that the tax on “Cadillac” plans is the biggest issue facing health reform.
6. In case you missed it (an oldie but goodie): A Health Reform Watch article on the impact of lobbyists included in the Wikepedia entries for “Health Care Reform, United States” and “Health Insurance.” Which, now that a bill has passed in the Senate, begs the question: do you think those lobbyists might be in line for a bonus?

Senate Passes Health Reform Bill, Republicans Challenge Constitutionality

The Senate has passed its version of a Health Reform bill, 60-39. The votes were cast, with Vice President Joseph Biden presiding, at 7:00 am on Thursday, December 24th. The Washington Post reports that

Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), who is 92 and ailing, bellowed when his name was called: “Mr. President, this is for my friend Ted Kennedy. Aye.”

Aye indeed.

Washington Monthly notes that a number of Republican Senators, many of whom in recent months had formerly brushed aside the issue of constitutionality for the provision for insurance mandates, have experienced a change of direction– if not heart– and have openly challenged that which they formerly embraced.

For an explanation of the mandate’s constitutionality, Washington Monthly cites this article, “Is it Unconstitutional to Mandate Health Insurance?” by Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University, Mark Hall–which originally appeared here on Health Reform Watch, and was later cited by the Washington Post’s Ezra Klein among numerous others.

The Price of Sausage in Nebraska (and elsewhere)

“Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made.” The quote, and a number of variants thereof, is most often attributed to Otto von Bismarck. The Boston Globe/A.P. does a nice job taking us through the cost– the spoils, if you will– of the votes requisite thus far to have taken the Senate’s Health Reform bill to its present status. The picture is not particularly pretty– with sizable benefits inuring to the holdout Senators and their constituents. The cost of 60 votes– filibuster-proof critical mass– is, one might say, the cost of doing business. But it is a risky business. By virtue of being so, the 60th vote,  Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska, brought home the following pieces of bacon home for his constituents:

the federal government will pay the full cost of a proposed expansion of Medicaid, at an estimated cost of $100 million over 10 years; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Nebraska will be exempted from an annual fee on insurers; supplemental Medigap policies such as those sold by Mutual of Omaha are exempted from the annual fee on insurers; and a physician-owned hospital being built in Bellevue, Neb., could avoid a new ban on referrals from doctors who own such hospitals.

And what does the 23rd vote tell his constituents who will have to shoulder the costs of their state’s expansion of Medicaid?

The Boston Globe/A.P.  list is partial but telling. You can see it here.

For a more thorough look at the cost control and program implications of the bill, Professor Timothy Jost’s latest article in Health Affairs is a must read. In addition to a wealth of other information, Jost provides the following:

…the bill provides a cures acceleration program” to fund research for “high need cures” for which incentives in the commercial market are unlikely to result in timely development.  The Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and a new Cure Acceleration Network Board are supposed to work together to facilitate the discovery of such cures and to translate them from bench to bedside.  Grants can be made under the project of up to $15 million a year to eligible entities such as academic medical schools, biotech companies, and drug companies, who need only meet a $1 to $3 matching requirement.  $500 million is appropriated for this program for 2010.

This is all well and good and a great idea.  But nothing that I can see in the legislation gives the taxpayer any stake in this investment.  A drug or biotech company that in fact discovers a blockbuster drug or biologic through the federal government’s investment (perhaps for an off-label use) owes nothing in return.  Shouldn’t we the taxpayers get some return on  our investment, or at least the promise of reasonable prices?

Bismarck also is said to have said,  “Politics is the art of the possible.” To see that, you’ll want to read the rest of Professor Jost’s article.

Maybe Instead of a Dollar We Should Send Joe Lieberman Instructions on How to Use YouTube

A little while back Senator Joseph Lieberman stated that, seemingly contrary to his prior positions, he would not–and could not– support a bill which contained a public option–nor would he join in a vote to end a filibuster against the same. Relying heavily on the underlying analysis of Tim Noah, I opined at the time that perhaps we all needed to send Joe Lieberman a dollar so that he could vote his conscience as opposed to the will of Private Insurers: that the financial constraints involved in being an Independent (i.e., little or no infrastructural help from either the Democratic or Republican Parties) meant that Senator Lieberman, if he wished to continue being Senator Lieberman, would have to curry favor among donors to finance a bid for re-election.

I also noted that Chris Dodd, by virtue of his support for a public option and health reform in general, had alienated said Private Insurers and seemingly vacated his seat as “the Senator from Aetna.” I also noted that, as one might imagine, considering the sudden advent of available Aetna money, that a man (or Senator) from Aetna’s home town seeking money (such as Mr. Lieberman) might, somewhat understandably, look to align himself with the will and desires of that money. As much as it pains me to say, my antidote–sending Joe Lieberman a dollar with the words “Public Option” written on it– did not work. Sadly, the efforts of Yale students, who took a concilliatory approach in beseeching Senator Lieberman to back health reform, have seemingly not worked either.

Since then, Mr. Lieberman has come out in opposition to the plan to allow  people from 55-64 years old to buy into Medicare. Unfortunately for Mr. Lieberman, he seems to be unaware of YouTube as a means of chronicling statements made on video. Back when he was attempting to explain his desertion of the Public Option he said (thank you Merril Goozner) this:

‘Taking Aim’ at Insurance Co. Executive Compensation

Over the weekend, the Associated Press published a story that told us: “Senate Takes Aim at Insurance Company Executive Pay.”

We’ve taken aim at Insurance Company executive compensation before here on Health Reform Watch, and you can find our article linked here in this interesting article by Morton Mintz at the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University’s Nieman Watchdog (or even at the bottom of the Huffington Post posting of the A.P. story, after WSJ).

What Mintz points out is worth noting: he says of Ronald A. Williams, CEO of Aetna:

If Williams would care to justify his compensation — $64,857.46 a day, every day of the year; $2,702.39 an hour every hour of every day — I’d gladly extend him the opportunity to do so.

“Justify his compensation.” The truth is, I have honestly tried to imagine what an Insurance Co. executive could possibly do during the course of any given day to warrant that kind of compensation. Williams’ official bio tells us that:

Under his leadership, Aetna has sought to make a positive impact on health care in America by serving as a catalyst for change, focusing the industry, public policy leaders, physicians and employers on issues aimed at increasing access and affordability.

As a job description, I’m not entirely sure what qualifies as seeking “positive impact” or “serving as a catalyst,” but I’m pretty sure the following, as described by Mr. Mintz, will not qualify as aiming at “increasing access and affordability.”

Now, as I just read in Huffington Post, “Aetna is planning to force up to 650,000 clients to drop their coverage next year as it seeks to raise additional revenue to meet profit expectations.” Maybe he [R.Williams] can justify that, too.

Mintz goes on to list the numbers, but then makes an additional point worth noting regarding the totals:

Others in similar positions are also raking it in. I’ve learned from Seton Hall University School of Law’s Health Reform Watch that Williams’s 2007 compensation of $23,045,834 was nearly $2.8 million less than Cigna CEO H. Edward Hanway’s $25,839,777. Also in 2007, Coventry’s Dale B. Wolf received $14,869,823, United Health group’s Stephen J. Hemsley $13,164,529, Humana’s Michael McCallister $10,312,557, WellPoint’s Angela Braly $9,094,271. and Health Net’s Jay M. Gellert $3,686,230. Total 2007 pay for seven health-insurance CEOs: $100,130,021.

In 2008, Williams led the pack, with $24,300,112, followed by Hanway, $12,236,740; Braly, $9,844,212; Wolf, $9,047,469; McCallister, $4,764,309; Gellert, $4,425,355, and Hemsley, $3,241,043. Total 2008 pay for the seven: $67,859,240.

Suppose the seven had been paid, say, only $1 million each. That compensation would have enabled significant premium reductions — in 2007, of roughly $93 million; in 2008, of about $61 million — that would have enabled purchase of coverage by many of the 45,000 Americans whose deaths each year are linked to lack of health insurance.

Seven execs, two years’ compensation, $154 million in excess of $1 million per year.

Having said that Articles Editor of the Yale Law Journal, Aaron Zelinski, makes some very interesting and worthwhile points over at the Huffington Post regarding some of the shortcomings in the proposed Senate measure to curb Insurance Co. exec compensation. The subject readily lends itself to political grandstanding, and the Senate bill looks only to change the corporate tax deduction of health insurance executive compensation. Zelinski’s article, “Political Grandstanding: Excessive Compensation and the Health Care Bill,”  is well worth reading and well worth quoting at length. He writes:

Currently, publicly held corporations can effectively deduct unlimited amounts of executive compensation from their federal corporate income tax returns. Although Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code purports to limit such deductions to $1,000,000 annually per executive, Section 162(m)(4) contains a loophole large enough to sail a mega-yacht through: Deductions are still allowed for any “performance based” pay, no matter how high.

The Internal Revenue Service has interpreted 162(m)(4) to allow almost any compensation plan to pass muster, even when executive compensation is tied to comically low performance metrics. Thus, Section 162(m) has become largely a dead letter; unlimited amounts of executive compensation can be structured as performance-based and therefore deducted for federal income tax purposes.

The current Senate health care bill seeks to revive Section162(m) by removing the “performance based” exceptions. However, the bill applies only to corporate salaries paid to health insurance executives, not to compensation for employees in any other industry.

Under the bill, health insurance companies would only be able to deduct compensation below $500,000 (or, under a pending amendment by Senator Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas, $400,000). More importantly, health insurance companies would be denied the Section 162(m)(4) loophole for performance-based pay. These insurance companies could still pay their executives large amounts, but taxpayer money would no longer subsidize such salaries via corporate income tax deductions.

Zelinski further states:

“Unfortunately, the Senate Democrats’ decision to target only the compensation paid to insurance executives belies an unwillingness to address the broader issue at hand: the taxpayer’s subsidy of excessive executive compensation via tax deductions.”

He also points out that “the proposed changes will do nothing substantial to address health care costs, since executive compensation is a minuscule fraction of such costs.”

I think Mr. Zelinski has a point; the net taxpayer result of this provision will certainly not cure what ails us as a country healthcare wise –but, grandstanding aside, it may be a step in the right direction. Some things seem more a matter of principle than money– and if they could speak, I wonder what those 45,000 Americans whose deaths each year are linked to lack of health insurance would say when looking at Ronald Williams’ pay.

“15 Years or 7 to Pay Off Your Debt. . .”

I have been watching the Alex Gibney documentary film version of Maggie Mahar’s book Money-Driven Medicine. It’s fascinating, and I’ll definitely do a few more blog posts on it. For now, I’d like to reflect on a quote from early in the film, from a Dr. Berwick who’s been a keen observer of the US health system. He notes that physicians who are specialists do lots of compensable and specific procedures, and therefore usually earn much more than primary care doctors, leading to an artificial glut of specialists. I’d known this for some time, but Dr. Berwick makes the fact particularly compelling by comparing the concrete choices faced by med students: “15 years or 7 to pay off” their educational debts. It’s no wonder there are so many specialists.

The quote reminded me of Jesse Larner’s recent idealized “health care speech” for President Obama, which would promise a “publicly paid medical education for qualified medical students, researchers, and other health care workers so that the profession is open to all who are bright and dedicated, regardless of financial resources.” Just as our tax code pushes the average citizen toward unnaturally high levels of debt via the mortgage deduction, medical education financing currently is biasing physicians toward unsustainable debt loads that ultimately drain the public weal by fueling an entrepreneurial mindset in a profession founded in the public interest.

The US already has some limited loan forgiveness programs for physicians who work in underserved regions. It is time to expand these subsidies to cover more physicians working in primary care.

Genetic Discrimination and the Future of Health Insurance

Have health insurance companies outlived their useful life?

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) is taking effect.  The employment provisions are effective on November 21.  The health coverage provisions began to apply on May 21, 2009, with group coverage required to comply with on the start of the plan or policy year following that date.  As a Monday NYT story describes,  the purpose of GINA is to prohibit discrimination in employment and health coverage on the basis of genetic condition.  The Times cites examples of denial of coverage on genetic grounds;  some additional “horror stories” are told of people denied coverage due to a genetic marker for a medical condition.

Genetic discrimination is widely regarded as an “unfair” basis on which to deny health coverage.   As then-President George W. Bush explained in 2001:

Genetic discrimination is . . . unjustified — among other reasons, because it involves little more than medical speculation. A genetic predisposition toward cancer or heart disease does not mean the condition will develop. To deny employment or insurance to a healthy person based only on a predisposition violates our country’s belief in equal treatment and individual merit.

This assessment seems to match our general sense of fairness.  But why is a genetic predisposition different from other predispositions for insurance underwriting purposes?  Does hypertension mean that stroke or heart attack will develop?  Does the occurrence of a heart attack mean that another will occur?  Not necessarily, but both are statistically valid indicators of future health costs, as are some genetic predispositions.  One person’s medical speculation is another’s actuarial probability.  So why ban the use of genetic information, but not the use of preexisting illness?  Or, for that matter, age and gender?

GINA passed overwhelmingly, but Congress has otherwise been slow to limit health-based underwriting.  Part of the explanation for carving out genetic information is its novelty, and the fact that one’s DNA is never one’s “fault.”  But manifestation of genetic conditions is also not one’s fault, and GINA has nothing to say about underwriting based on symptomatic genetic disease.  Maybe a more powerful force behind GINA’s passage was researchers’ fear that genetic discrimination would drive test subjects away from genetic research.  Dr. Francis Collins, then-Director of NIH’s National Human Research Genome Institute, testified to this concern:

[T]he science of genomic medicine is rocketing forward. But fear of genetic discrimination threatens to slow both the advance of such groundbreaking biomedical research and the integration of the fruits of that research into our nation’s health care.

So, is GINA’s incursion into health insurers’ common freedom to charge more for those likely to be sick an anomaly?  It does seem to run afoul of what Donald Light, in 1992, wryly called the “inverse coverage rule”:

the inverse coverage law: the more people need coverage, the less coverage they are likely to get, or the more they are likely to pay for what they get.

Increasingly, Americans seem to have had it with business models premised on denying care to those most in need.   A recent WSJ/NBC poll found that the most popular currently proposed reform provision “by a mile” was that forbidding exclusions for pre-existing medical conditions.

Here’s a modest proposal.  It is time to end insurers’ use of risk selection.  Insurers face steady erosion in their ability to risk-select as that practice increasingly rubs against our basic moral principles.  In addition, health coverage is less and less like “insurance,” as routine care is covered, and as it is easier and easier for insurers and consumers alike to discern who is likely to need to draw down on the “insurance” pool.   Insurers already do a great deal of their business, without bearing risk or using risk selection to generate income, administering self-funded plans for large employers (as ASOs or TPAs).  It is time for government to bear the risk (which it increasingly does anyway), and for insurers to be set to tasks that add social value.  They add value in their ability to form, maintain, and administer provider networks.  Why should their profit or loss depend on their ability to identify and exclude the needy?   Clearly health reform in 2009 won’t get us this far, but let’s start admitting it: exclusion from coverage and care on the basis of need for health care should not be a business model supported in America.

NY State Senator Eric Schneiderman, Ian’s Law & the Insurance Company Two-Step

Interesting conversation over at WNYC on The Brian Lehrer Show: New York State Senator Eric Schneiderman (D-Manhattan/Bronx) was interviewed about legislation he and State Senator Neil Breslin (D-Delmar; Insurance Committee Chair) recently introduced called “Ian’s Law.”

Ian’s Law is meant to combat an insurer practice whereby insurers attempt to rid themselves of costly policies through a two-step process which circumvents state laws which forbid insurers from dropping policy holders because of conditions which require costly care.

The Insurance Company Two-Step, How it Works

Because insurers are forbidden by NY State law to drop individuals because of costly care, the insurer merely drops an entire class or group of people and then re-offers policies to that group– but omits coverage in the newly “re-offered” policies for the specific kinds of care which the costly care individual needs, and the insurer had formerly paid for. So… if someone has a chronic condition, which requires say… regular or  continuous skilled nursing care, the insurer just drops the entire group, and then offers everyone in that group a policy that does not include regular or continuous skilled nursing care. Voila! Pretty much everyone except the person who needs the skilled nursing care accepts and “re-applies” and the problem is solved. Two steps, no violation of the law and no more having to pay for all that costly care.

The following comes from Sen. Schneiderman’s website and describes Ian’s law and the litigation which brought the practice to light.

The bill is named for Ian Pearl, a 37-year-old man with muscular dystrophy who lost his insurance when Guardian, acting under current New York law, terminated the entire class of policies in the State  that covered Ian and others. Mr. Pearl became ventilator-dependent in 1991 and relies on a skilled nursing benefit under his insurance policy to receive care that has kept him alive since he suffered respiratory arrest.

The Pearl family charged in court that Guardian terminated the entire class of policies in New York in order to get around the fact that New York law prohibits an insurance company from dropping the policy of an individual simply because he or she needs care. An internal document from the insurer, released as a result of a legal challenge, showed that company officials justified dropping the entire line of policies statewide in order to get rid of “the few dogs”, like Ian Pearl, who were filing claims. Guardian, which denies any wrongdoing, has since settled with the Pearl family and restored Ian’s coverage.

In the interview with Brian Lehrer Senator Schneiderman said that the practice is “actually not limited to one company or one individual” and that “the litigation that Mr. Pearl brought revealed internal documents showing that they [the Insurance Co.] actually were scanning through their list of expensive patients preparing what they called “hit lists” of people who they were really trying to find a way to get rid of.” As noted in the quote above, these expensive insureds were referred to as “dogs.”

And that, in a nutshell is for profit health insurance. But I think there may be a larger lesson here as well. In many ways, this practice is not very different than the design of  “wellness incentives” substituting for pre-existing condition discrimination and penalties, a topic we covered just a little while back:

It may also be useful to consider how, in practice, “incentives” have been utilized by employers in the marketplace. By engaging in a two-step process, an employer may rather easily render a “wellness incentive” into a preexisting condition premium.

The Washington Post reports that

Valeo, an auto parts supplier, four years ago raised the deductible on an employee health plan to $2,200 from $200 for individual coverage and to $4,400 from $400 for family coverage. Then it gave employees the opportunity to reduce the deductible to its starting point by not smoking and by meeting goals for blood pressure, cholesterol and body mass index, said Robert Wade, Valeo’s director of human resources for North America.

“If they don’t comply, they end up being penalized, if you will, but we refer to it as a Healthy Rewards program,” Wade said.

And the point is this–Insurers hire the best and brightest they can find, and almost any legislation or regulation meant to protect the public from unconscionable unfairness is just one smart executive and two steps away– maybe three– from being danced around.

Thanks for Sharing, The Republican Party Offers Up a Health Reform Plan

Ezra Klein over at the Washington Post does a fine job of analyzing the political lesson in the recently proffered Republican health care reform plan–and the even more recent initial Congressional Budget Office analysis of the plan:

Late last night, the Congressional Budget Office released its initial analysis of the health-care reform plan that Republican Minority Leader John Boehner offered as a substitute to the Democratic legislation. CBO begins with the baseline estimate that 17 percent of legal, non-elderly residents won’t have health-care insurance in 2010. In 2019, after 10 years of the Republican plan, CBO estimates that …17 percent of legal, non-elderly residents won’t have health-care insurance. The Republican alternative will have helped 3 million people secure coverage, which is barely keeping up with population growth. Compare that to the Democratic bill, which covers 36 million more people and cuts the uninsured population to 4 percent.

But maybe, you say, the Republican bill does a really good job cutting costs. According to CBO, the GOP’s alternative will shave $68 billion off the deficit in the next 10 years. The Democrats, CBO says, will slice $104 billion off the deficit.

The Democratic bill, in other words, covers 12 times as many people and saves $36 billion more than the Republican plan.

Congressman Boehner had this to say: “Not only does the GOP plan lower health care costs, but it also increases access to quality care, including for those with pre-existing conditions, at a price our country can afford.”

In regard to savings, CBO notes that

some provisions of the legislation would tend to decrease the premiums paid by all insurance enrollees, while other provisions would tend to increase the premiums paid by less healthy enrollees or would tend to increase the premiums paid by enrollees in some states relative to enrollees in other states.

As to provisions of the legislation which would “tend to decrease the premiums paid by all,” CBO points out that savings may be derived from

“Changes in the extent of insurance coverage purchased”

Yes, that’s exactly what that says: the Republican plan will afford us all the opportunity of saving money on insurance (but not nearly as much as the Democrats’ plan), by granting us the right and ability to have less insurance coverage.

CBO states:

The second source of change in average insurance premiums is changes in the average extent of coverage purchased. Those changes can reflect both changes in the scope of insurance coverage–the benefits or services that are included–and changes in the share of costs for covered services paid by the insurer–known as the “actuarial value.” With other factors held equal, insurance policies that cover more benefits or services or have smaller copayments or deductibles have higher premiums, while policies that cover fewer benefits or services or have larger copayments or deductibles have lower premiums. Provisions in the amendment that would reduce insurance premiums by affecting the amount of coverage purchased include the State Innovations program, which would encourage states to reduce the number and extent of benefit mandates that they impose, and provisions that would allow individuals or affiliated groups to purchase insurance policies in other states that have less stringent mandates. CBO’s assessment was that the amendment would not have a substantial effect on actuarial values.

So the actuarial costs– “the share of costs for covered services paid by the insurer,” will not be substantially affected; but “the scope of insurance coverage–the benefits or services that are included” for people, will be decreased. Worse insurance, less money–thus a lower premium and Republican “savings.” Couple that with 17 percent uninsured after 10 years, increased premiums for “less healthy” enrollees, some malpractice “reform” and a few other sundry measures and we’ve got us a plan. Thanks for sharing.

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