Medicare Payment, a System in Need of Fixing

[Ed. Note: We are pleased to welcome Andy Braver, Esq. back to Health Reform Watch. Andy is a health care attorney who recently completed an LL.M in Health Law at Seton Hall Law. Prior to entering the LL.M. program, Andy spent five years as a healthcare provider, running a state of the art medical diagnostic imaging center.  During that time, he dealt with many important health law issues faces by providers today, including Fraud and Abuse, Medicare and Medicaid licensing and reimbursement, state and private accreditation organizations, private payers, electronic health records, and HIPAA and other privacy issues, to name just a few.]

Medicare’s fee for service payment system has many problems that need fixing.  While recent studies have predicted that Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may very well achieve better care and lower costs, any savings generated as a result of these new groups of providers will be just a drop in the bucket solution to a vast problem.

Medicare was projected to spend over $500 billion on patient care in 2010.  Notwithstanding the fact that the White House Office of Management and Budget believes $36 billion of the Medicare and Medicare Advantage payments made in 2009 were improper.

The problem is, there is no distinction made for the provision of quality medical care.  Conversely, there is no check in the system to make sure that the care provided is inadequate.  If you provide the service, you get paid.

I realize that in many areas of medicine, it is difficult or even impossible to create a system to accurately and impartially judge the adequacy of care provided.  How in fact do you measure the ‘quality’ of healthcare?  Do you look at the structure of an entity, its organization and ability to provide what is generally regarded as good care?  Or do you look at the actual process or provision care, measuring relative malpractice claims among other objective factors?  Many believe that better outcomes suggest better care.  While I do not believe that outcome or evidence based medicine is the answer to every problem, it certainly can be a solution to some of these challenges.

There are differences in the Medicare program based on geography, and local coverage determinations and reimbursement rates, whether using the PPS or RVU systems (Part A & B), vary greatly across the country.  That part of the system makes sense by taking into account cost of living, cost of employment, property costs, and local tax rates.

In my mind, however, these processes fail because they do not further take into account advances in technology, or reward investment in the future.  For example, Medicare pays the same amount of money for an MRI exam regardless of the type of machine that was used to take the picture, and without a thought given to the type of storage system employed by the medical provider.  Imagine a facility with a two decade old system, state licensed and able to take pictures, with a machine equivalent to the first generation digital camera I owned 15 years ago, and printed pictures that are stored in a file room.  Then imagine a state of the art facility with an HD camera taking high resolution digital pictures, stored in an electronic file system, in a format that is able to be sent electronically to specialists all around the country (or world), and accessed by the patient quickly and securely on the internet.  Are those two pictures worth the same to Medicare?  There certainly is increased value to the patient in the ‘new’ system.  Better picture quality undoubtedly leads to better diagnostic capability (better medicine), and fewer picture redos over time; long-term storage and record portability is certainly going to lower future treatment costs if the issue is a chronic one.  HITECH and the new EHR incentive programs recognize the importance of electronic medical records, but it remains to be seen how those requirements will affect licensing and reimbursement rates.  Will there be a license ranking and a tiered payment system based on perceived quality or outcome?

I certainly hope that payments are tiered when advanced technology is used, but not according to self-assessment rankings and quality benchmarks.  I would argue that medicine is the one area where any kind of ranking and result (or outcome) based assessment is virtually impossible.   People are not cars, and JD Power cannot provide meaningful answers when it comes to medicine; there is no way to objectively determine a specific course of treatment for a particular patient is better at one hospital versus another.  No two patients are the same, though it is entirely possible they might both drive the same car.  Determining quality in healthcare is exceedingly difficult.  Patient bases are different, whether because of socio-economic reasons, or geography.  So do you then look to the education of the physician to determine quality?  We don’t do the same for lawyers?  Or do we?  Do you look at healthcare structure (how an entity is organized, its equipment, etc…) to determine quality?  Or process (the # of lawsuits against it, for example)?  Better outcomes alone do not mean better healthcare, and none of these items taken alone should affect licensing of healthcare providers.  In the end, this highlights the fact that designing a system that is fair and without major flaws may never be possible with so much money in the system and with so many parties having opposed interests. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try to fix the expensive and broken (the status quo is unsustainable), it just means that attainable reform could very well mean significantly less unfairness and less major flaws. Because ultimately, in this context, the perfect may be the enemy of the good.

Physician Payment Sunshine Act Proposed Regulations Out

CMS has published proposed rules for its implementation of the Physician Payment Sunshine Act (SUNSHINE ACT or Act), which was enacted by Congress as part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  In short, the SUNSHINE ACT requires life science companies to report annually to CMS their conferral of anything of value, whether it be payment for services or a dinner, in connection with a particular product of the paying company.  By requiring CMS to post the information on its website, the Act seeks to ensure that interested patients become aware of physicians’ conflicts of interest that could affect their prescription of a branded drug or choice of a specific medical device.

The SUNSHINE ACT represents another example of the transparency movement, which has had varying degrees of success in either changing the behavior of the parties subject to disclosure, and/or enabling consumers to make better decisions based upon their access to the disclosed information.  It is likely that the SUNSHINE ACT will impact physicians and manufacturers’ behavior more than it will enlighten consumers about conflicts of interest.  Some physicians will simply conclude that accepting certain gifts or benefits from pharmaceutical or medical device companies isn’t worth having their names on the CMS website.  Some companies have already discovered that they haven’t necessarily reaped the value of the costs of gifting many physicians, or that the cost of recording certain activities simply isn’t worth the return on investment.  Unquestionably, certain transactions will continue to be valuable to both physician and company, and will continue.

It is unlikely that most patients will access the information either before or after a physician visit, or know what to do with the information even if they discover that their physician has an equity interest in the knee she plans to use in next week’s surgery - does such a close relationship with the knee manufacturer signal that the physician is great, or that something nefarious is going on?  The information is likely to be used by consumer watchdog groups, as well as hospital formulary committees and medical school deans interested in knowing the sources and amounts of outside income being earned by faculty.  Divorce attorneys are likely to find the information useful if their client’s soon-to-be ex-spouse hasn’t reported significant pharma consulting fees as income.

CMS rulemaking is behind schedule, thereby delaying the SUNSHINE ACT’s implementation.  It is likely, however, that the ultimate rules will still require that 2012 data be submitted, even if not by the deadline originally contemplated by Congress.

The statute requires manufacturers of drugs, devices, biological or medical supplies covered by Medicare, Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (”applicable manufacturers”) to report annually to HHS payments or transfers of value to physicians and teaching hospitals (”covered recipients”).  Failure to comply will result in Civil Monetary Penalties.  HHS, in turn, must publish this information on a public web site which is searchable, downloadable and able to be aggregated.  Compliance with the SUNSHINE ACT’s reporting requirements does not exempt applicable manufacturers from application of fraud, waste and abuse laws.

Applicable Manufacturer

The proposed rule merges the SUNSHINE ACT definition of “manufacturer of a covered drug, device, biological, or medical supply”[1] with the statutory section clarifying that the entity covered by the SUNSHINE ACT must be “operating in the United States, or in a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States”[2] to define applicable manufacturer as one

(1)    Engaged in the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or conversion of a covered drug, device, biological, or medical supply for sale or distribution in the United States, or in a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States; or

(2)    Under common ownership with an entity in paragraph (1) of this definition, which provides assistance or support to such entity with respect to the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, marketing, promotion, sale, or distribution of a covered drug, device, biological, or medical supply for the sale or distribution in the United States, or in a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.

The operative activity that invokes statutory coverage, then, is sale of a product in the United States, as opposed to where the product is produced, or where the entity is located or incorporated. Pursuant to the rationale that risks inhere in conflicts of interest irrespective of where the manufacturer is located if the product is sold in the United States, any entity under common ownership with the manufacturer that is involved in the production, distribution or sale of at least one covered product in the United States must report all payments and conferral of value upon covered recipients. Further, as proposed, the product sponsor (i.e., the entity that obtained FDA approval) is subject to the reporting requirement, even if the sponsor is not involved in the manufacture of the covered product.  CMS is considering alternative interpretations of the common ownership concept.

Covered Drug, Device, Biological, or Medical Supply (”covered product”)

The SUNSHINE ACT focuses upon those products for which Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP pay.  This is relatively straightforward in many contexts, but CMS seeks to ensure that it captures situations where such products are part of a composite rate payment, such as the inpatient or outpatient hospital reimbursement, or the end-stage renal disease prospective payment system.  As such, CMS proposes to define “covered drug, device, biological, or medical supply” as:

Any drug, device, biological, or medical supply for which payment is available under Title XVIII of the Act or under a State plan under title XIX or XXI (or a waiver of such plan), either separately, as part of a fee schedule payment, or as part of a composite payment rate (for example, the hospital inpatient prospective payment system or the hospital outpatient prospective payment system).  With respect to a drug or biological, this definition is limited to those drug and biological products that, by law, require a prescription to be dispensed.  With respect to a device or medical supply, this definition is limited to those devices (including medical supplies) that, by law, require premarket approval by or premarket notification to the Food and Drug Administration.

CMS seeks comments on its plan to exclude from the scope of regulation those manufacturers who produce and sell only over the counter (OTC) products.  More specifically, this exemption would not extend to a manufacturer who sells even one prescription product who is otherwise subject to the reporting requirements of the SUNSHINE ACT.  Similarly, CMS seeks to interpret the SUNSHINE ACT to cover only those medical devices that require premarket approval, on the theory that this is the segment of the market most likely to have extensive provider relationships.  If a device manufacturer produces a single product that requires pre-market approval, it would have to report all payments and conferrals of value to covered recipients.

Covered Recipients

The SUNSHINE ACT defines “covered recipients” as (1) a physician, other than a physician who is an employee of an applicable manufacturer; or (2) a teaching hospital.   The term physician includes both doctors of medicine and osteopathy as well as podiatrists, optometrists and licensed chiropractors. CMS interprets the statute to include within its scope those who act on behalf of covered recipients.  Teaching hospital is not defined by the statute; CMS seeks comments on its proposal to identify such entities by virtue of their receipt of Medicare graduate medical education funds. CMS will publish this list annually on its website for manufacturers’ reference.

CMS plans to utilize the National Plan & Provider Enumeration System, which it maintains on its website, to collect the data regarding covered recipients required by the SUNSHINE ACT: covered recipient’s name and business address, and, for physicians, the National Provider Identifier and specialty.

Payments or Other Transfers of Value

The report must also include the date, form (i.e., cash, stock, ownership interest), nature (i.e., education, research, consulting fees, food) and amount of payment, and the market name of the product associated with the payment.  CMS continues to consider how to handle payments made to a single covered recipient related to multiple products.  CMS seeks to generate data in a form most easily understood by consumers.

The statutory definition requires such conferrals to be reported irrespective of whether they were requested by the physician or hospital and includes those made by third parties as long as the applicable manufacturer knows the identity of the covered recipient. CMS proposes that payments made through a group practice be reported under the specific recipient physician’s name.  If a physician requests the conferral to be directed to another physician or entity, the manufacturer should report the conferral under the requesting physician’s name as well as the name of the actual recipient.

Charitable contributions by an applicable manufacturer to, at the request of, or on behalf of a covered recipient are reportable.

The SUNSHINE ACT excludes from its reporting requirement the following payments:

• Transfers of value less than $10, unless the aggregated amount exceeds $100 in a calendar year
• Product samples not intended to be sold that are intended for patient use
• Educational materials that directly benefit patients or are intended for patient use
• The loan of a covered device for a period not to exceed 90 days, to permit evaluation
• Items or services provided under a contractual warranty
• A transfer of value or payment to a covered recipient when that person is receiving the conferral in his/her capacity as a patient
• Discounts, including rebates
• In-kind items used for the provision of charity care
• A dividend or profit distribution from ownership or investment interest in a publicly traded security or mutual fund
• Self-insurance payments to covered employees by an applicable manufacturer
• Non-medical services
• Transfers of value made by third parties where the applicable manufacturer is unaware of the identity of the covered individual

CMS will be moving rapidly to respond to comments and finalize these rules, which will likely involve changes from the discussion here.  State laws that pre-date the Act are pre-empted to the extent that they require reporting of the same information, which leaves them the discretion to retain those reporting requirements that are not redundant.  States seeking to impose as much of a burden on manufacturers as possible are likely to retain their individualized reporting requirements, others may find the costs not worth the benefits now that the feds have finally stepped in.

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[1] Section 1128G(e)(9).

[2] Subsection (e)(2) further clarifies that the entity covered by the SUNSHINE ACT must be “operating in the United States, or in a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”

Why Reduce Health Care Costs?

One rare point of elite consensus is that the US needs to reduce health care costs. Frightening graphs expose America as a spendthrift outlier. Before he decamped to Citigroup, the President’s OMB director warned about how important it was to “bend the cost curve.” The President’s opponents are even more passionate about austerity.

Journalists and academics support that political consensus. Andrew Sullivan calls health spending a “giant suck from the rest of the working economy.” Gregg Bloche estimates that “the 30% of health care spending that’s wasted on worthless care” is “about the price of the $700 billion mortgage bailout, squandered every year.” He calls rising health spending an “existential challenge,” menacing other “national priorities.” Perhaps inspired by Children of the Corn, George Mason economist Robin Hanson compares modern medicine to a voracious brat:

King Solomon famously threatened to cut a disputed baby in half, to expose the fake mother who would permit such a thing. The debate over medicine today is like that baby, but with disputants who won’t fall for Solomon’s trick. The left says markets won’t ensure everyone gets enough of the precious medical baby. The right says governments produce a much inferior baby. I say: cut the baby in half, dollar-wise, and throw half away! Our “precious” medical baby is in fact a vast monster filling our great temple, whose feeding starves our people and future. Half a monster is plenty.

But when you scratch the surface of these sentiments, you have to wonder: is the overall level of health care spending really the most important threat facing the country? Is it one of the most important threats? There are many ways to raise revenue to pay for rising health costs. Aspects of the Affordable Care Act, like ACOs and pilot projects, are designed to help root out unnecessary care.

I am happy to join the crusade against waste. But why focus on total health spending as particularly egregious or worrisome? Let’s explore some of the usual rationales.

Terrible Tax Expenditures and Suspect Subsidies?

Employment-based insurance gets favorable tax treatment, and much Medicare and Medicaid spending is drawn from general revenues. So, the story goes, medicine’s big spenders don’t have enough “skin in the game.” Once health and wealth are traded off at the personal level (as the Harvard Business School’s Clayton Christensen advocates), people will be much less likely to demand so much care. Government can attend to other national priorities, or individuals will enjoy higher incomes and will be free to spend more.

I respect these arguments to a point, but I worry they partake of the “nirvana fallacy.” If I could be certain that leviathan would repurpose all those wasted health care dollars on infrastructure, or green energy, or smart defense, or healthier agriculture, I’d be ready to end tax-advantaged health insurance in an instant. But I find it hard to imagine Washington going in any of these directions presently.

Giving tax dollars back to taxpayers also sounds great, until one processes exactly how unequal our income distribution is. In 2004, “the top 0.1% — that’s one-tenth of one percent — had more combined pre-tax income than the poorest 120 million people.” To the extent health-related taxes are cut, very wealthy households may see millions per year in income gains; the median household might enjoy thousands of dollars per year. Sure, middle income families will find important uses for those funds (other than bidding up the price of housing and education). But at what price? What if the insurance systems start collapsing without subsidies, and more physicians (who are already expressing a desire to work less) start seeking out pure cash practices? A few interactions with the the very wealthy may be far more lucrative than dozens of ordinary appointments.

Consider the math: billing a $20,000 retainer from each of 50 millionaires annually may be a lot more attractive to physicians than trying to wrangle up 500 patients paying $2000 each—or, worse, getting the money from their insurers. There are about 10 million millionaires in the US; that’s a lot of buying power. One $10,000 score by a cosmetic dentist from such a client could be worth 400 visits from Medicaid patients seeking diagnostic procedures. Providers are voting with their feet, and a Medicaid card is already on its way to becoming a “useless piece of plastic” for many patients. Given those trends, simply reducing health care “purchasing power” generally risks some very troubling outcomes for the very people the health care cost cutters claim to protect. No one should welcome a health care plutonomy, where the richest 5% consume 35% of services, regardless of how sick they are.

Is Anyone Underpaid in Health Care?

Health commentators rightly draw attention to big insurer CEO paydays. Top layers of management at hospitals and pharma firms are also getting scrutiny. Wonks are up in arms about specialist pay. Read more

The Normative Meets the Practical: Who Should Can Lead ACOs

One of the many $64,000 questions in the accountable care organization (ACO) debate has been who should lead these organizations.  In a policy adopted in November 2010, the American Medical Association (AMA) made clear its view that ACOs must be physician-led.  The American Hospital Association (AHA) refrained (at least in its public letter to CMS) from asserting its entitlement to the ACO helm, based, for example, on its management experience and pools of capital.  Instead, it simply urged CMS to “defer details of the organization, such as leadership and management structure, to each ACO.”

CMS seems to have heeded the AHA’s advice because its recently released proposed rule does not directly take on this normative debate.  (See Summary of CMS Proposed Rule on Accountable Care Organizations recently posted by Jordan T. Cohen for an overview of the proposed rule.)  While “ACO participants must have at least 75 percent control of the ACO’s governing body” to be eligible for participation in the Shared Savings Program (proposed Section 425.5(d)(8)), the definition of “ACO participant” in the proposed rule includes physicians and hospitals, among others (proposed Section 425.4).

Similarly, the proposed rule simply requires that the “ACO’s operations must be managed by an executive, officer, manager, or general partner whose appointment and removal are under the control of the organization’s governing body and whose leadership team has demonstrated the ability to influence or direct clinical practice to improve efficiency processes and outcomes” (proposed Section 425.5(9)(ii)). The proposed rule does not address who or what would make the best such leader.

The proposed rule, however, clearly preserves a role for physicians to form and lead ACOs. For example, it recognizes that ACOs may be comprised of professionals in group practice arrangements and networks of individual practices, independent of hospitals (proposed Section 425.5(b)).

In addition, “[c]linical management and oversight [of the ACO] must be managed by a full-time senior-level medical director . . . who is a board-certified physician . . .,” and “[a] physician-directed quality assurance and process improvement committee must oversee an ongoing action-oriented quality assurance and improvement program” (proposed Sections 425.5(9)(iii) and (iv)).

The proposed rule also builds in a preference for ACOs comprised of all physicians or physician groups with fewer than 10,000 assigned beneficiaries by proposing to exempt them from the 2 percent net savings threshold adjustment under the one-sided model (proposed Section 425.9(c)(4)(i)).  It also proposes to vary confidence intervals, which affect the minimum savings rate, by the size of the ACO in the one-sided model “to improve the opportunity for groups of solo and small practices to participate in the Shared Savings Program” (Preamble to proposed rule at Section II.F.10).

But on a practical level, the specifics of CMS’ proposal may — unintentionally, perhaps — give hospitals the greater chance to take the reins, at least initially.  An apparently leaked CMS internal discussion document reflects some level of concern that physicians may have a hard time taking the lead with ACOs.

The proposed rule’s regulatory impact analysis estimates that the average start-up investment and first year operating expenditures for an ACO in the Shared Savings Program will be $1,755,251.  In addition, the proposed rule uses a 6-months claims run-out (proposed Section 425.7(a)).  Presumably, that means ACOs — assuming they satisfy all program requirements — will not see a dime of shared savings for more than eighteen months.  CMS also proposes to withhold 25 percent of any earned shared savings accrued in a given year to ensure repayment of any losses to the Medicare program in subsequent years of the three-year ACO agreement (proposed Section 425.5(d)(6)(iii)).

Even if private physicians can amass the capital to make these upfront investments, there of course is no guarantee they will regain their outlays. A recent study published online by the New England Journal of Medicine, as reported by the American Medical Association, found that participants in CMS’ Physician Group Practice Demonstration did not recoup, at least in the initial years of the demonstration, all of the money they invested to establish ACOs.  As the AMA summarized:

Early adopters, for the most part, did not recoup their set-up costs in the first three years of operation.  The 10 integrated health systems that were studied spent an average of $1.7 million to take part in the demonstration project.  Eight received no shared savings payments in the first year of the project.  Six got a payment in the second year, and five received a bonus in the third year.

The Everett Clinic in Washington, for example, reportedly spent approximately $1 million on infrastructure for its ACO but recouped only $129,268 in shared savings during the first four years of the demonstration project.

According to a 2007 report from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), in 2003-04, 80.6 percent of office-based medical practices in the United States consisted of one or two practitioners and 94.8 percent had five or fewer practitioners.  The risks associated with forming an ACO are considerable for these smaller practices to absorb, especially when, at best, the ACO will see 75 percent of its portion of any shared savings upwards of eighteen months down the road and could instead be responsible for its share of losses.  It is not clear how many small practices are willing and able to assume these risks without some substantial financial or management support.  Not surprisingly, the AMA’s statement on the proposed ACO rule specifically identifies “the large capital requirements to fund an ACO” as a significant barrier that must be addressed if physicians in all practice sizes and settings will be able to successfully lead and participate in ACOs.

Another aspect of the proposed rule that may present a particular challenge to independent physicians is proposed Section 425.11(b)’s requirement that “[a]t least 50 percent of an ACO’s primary care physicians must be meaningful [Electronic Health Records (EHR)] users, using certified EHR technology as defined in §495.4, in the [Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)] Act and subsequent Medicare regulations by the start of the second performance year in order to continue participating in the Shared Savings Program.”

Physician practices indisputably have increased their use of EHR systems in recent years.  According to the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey conducted by NCHS (reported here), only 17 percent of physicians in 2008 reported that they had a “basic” EHR system (which is defined as having electronic patient demographic information, patient problem lists, patient medication lists, clinical notes, orders for prescriptions, and laboratory and imaging results).  Recent NCHS data (reported here) show that that number has climbed nearly 50 percent to 24.9 percent of office-based physicians.

But basic use of EHRs is not sufficient under the proposed rule, which requires “meaningful use.”  Survey data from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, as reported here, show that only 41.1 percent of office-based physicians plan to apply for billions of federal dollars in EHR incentive payments that are available to Medicare and Medicaid providers under the HITECH Act, compared with 80.8 percent of acute care non-federal hospitals.  Additionally, as reported here, a recent survey from the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) found that only 13.6 percent of medical practices that have adopted EHRs and plan to apply for the EHR Meaningful Use incentives currently are able to satisfy the fifteen core criteria necessary to establish that they are meaningful users.   Medical practices have a long row to hoe.

But the news is not all bad for physicians.  The MGMA survey also found something that suggests this issue is far from resolved on a theoretical or practical level.  As reported here, “almost 20 percent of responding independent medical practices that owned EHRs said that they had optimized their uses of EHRs” whereas “[o]nly 8.8 percent of responding hospitals — or [integrated delivery system (IDS)] — owned practices with EHRs said they had optimized their EHR use.”

Almost certainly, it is not just a coincidence that physicians are devoting their energy to becoming meaningful EHR users just as the first EHR Meaningful Use incentive payments are available. If CMS or private foundations develop additional incentive programs to help smaller practices cover the start-up costs associated with forming an ACO, the individual physician could still be in this game.  Notably, the AMA’s brief statement on the proposed ACO rule reiterates its recommendation to CMS to increase access to loans and grants for small practices as part of this puzzle.  It remains to be seen if any such programs are viable in this fiscal climate.

As promised, future posts will address the normative question of who should lead ACOs.

Balance Billing: The National Conference of Insurance Legislators’ Plan

This past week I found myself (once again) sitting across a big desk from the surgery scheduler who works for my son’s ear nose and throat doctor.  She had a stack of papers for me to sign and as she passed me each one she offered a brief explanation of what it was.  As required by the March 2009 revisions to New Jersey’s Codey Law, one informed me that the surgery center where my son’s ear tubes were to be inserted was “physician-owned,” another that it was “out-of-network.”  Regarding the latter, the scheduler reassured me that, while the center could “balance bill” me for the portion of the facility fee not covered by my insurance, it would not.  I was told the same thing the first time around and nevertheless received a bill from the center for nearly $5,000; after I got over the shock, I called to ask that it be reduced and breathed a sigh of relief when it was, to $100.

So, balance billing was already on my mind when I received an email from Interim Vice Provost & Professor of Law Kathleen M. Boozang, calling my attention to a recent St. Louis Post-Dispatch article reporting that Steven Powell “has sued Washington University in St. Louis, accusing the university’s doctors and other Missouri health care providers of routinely and illegally over-billing for medical services.”  After Mr. Powell was hospitalized in 2008 at Barnes-Jewish Hospital, the hospital’s owner and Washington University, whose doctors staff Barnes-Jewish, sued Mr. Powell to recover fees not covered by his insurance carrier that he would not or could not pay.  Mr. Powell’s prospects for success are not clear, since Missouri, like most states, does not, at least not explicitly, forbid out-of-network health care providers from billing their patients for the portion of the provider’s fee not covered by insurance.

In 2009, two states, Louisiana and Texas, enacted laws that tackle the problems associated with balance billing not by banning the practice but, among other things, by requiring that the practice be made transparent.  The National Conference of Insurance Legislators, the self-described “voice of state legislators in Washington in the face of mounting federal initiatives to preempt state insurance regulation,” has promulgated a draft Balance Billing Disclosure Model Act modeled on the Louisiana and Texas statutes.  NCOIL will consider adoption of the Model Act at its next meeting, to be held in March of this year.

Under NCOIL’s draft Model Act, healthcare facilities would be required to provide “conspicuous written disclosure to a consumer at the time the consumer is first treated on a non-emergency basis at the facility, at pre-admission, or first receives non-emergency or post-stabilization services at the facility,” informing the consumer that the facility is either in- or out-of-network and, if the latter, that “the consumer may be billed for medical services for the amount unpaid by the consumer’s health benefit plan.”  Health benefit plans would also be required to make disclosures about the potential for balance billing, “in conjunction with issuance or renewal of the plan’s insurance policy or evidence of coverage.”  Finally, facility-based healthcare providers  would be required to (1) take steps to include sufficient information in their bills to enable patients to understand why they are being balance billed, (2) provide patients with over-the-phone assistance understanding such bills, and (3) work with patients to implement payment plans.

NCOIL received comments on the draft Model Act from a number of stakeholders.  The American Hospital Assocation wrote that “[a]n approach focused on disclosure sidesteps the key issue here: the adequacy of the insurer’s network with respect to contracts with facility-based physicians.”  Families USA suggested that “[a]s part of requirements that health plans maintain adequate provider networks, health plans should contract with an adequate number of anesthesiologists, emergency room providers, and other facility-based providers to see their members at each in-network facility and should establish reasonable procedures to help both patients and families to identify and locate those participating providers.”

Predictably America’s Health Insurance Plans have a different take, arguing that the most pressing concern is “[p]rotecting consumers from runaway charges billed by some out-of-network providers[.]“  AHIP points out that “[w]hen an individual receives services from a facility and accompanying facility-based practitioners, the consumer rarely has the opportunity to select the radiologist, anesthesiologist or pathologist.  Therefore, the proposed disclosure of charges and participating status of the practitioner would have a very limited practical impact because the consumer generally cannot act on this information.”

Tellingly, everyone agrees that disclosure will not be a magic bullet.

Spinal Fusion Controversy Underscores Extent of Conflicts of Interest

The Wall Street Journal recently published a report that outlines the extensive financial benefits that surgeons are receiving for spinal fusion surgeries. The “bounty” — a term used by the WSJ — comes from Medicare reimbursement as well as royalties for the intellectual property contributed by the surgeons to the spinal fusion procedures. Presumably the surgeons also receive money from speaking and training fees.

In short, spinal fusion is a surgical procedure whereby two or more vertebrae are fused together. The fusion is accomplished by creating a bridge between the vertebrae that is usually constructed out of bone taken from other parts of the body. The bone is inserted between the vertebrae, and is secured by rods, screws, and plates. This reduces the movement of each vertebrae that is connected to the bridge, thereby relieving stress on the injured vertebrae, disks, and nerves. Spinal fusion may be a necessary treatment in the face of trauma or debilitating diseases affecting the spine, such as scoliosis. However, the application of spinal fusion to treat certain types of back pain has been questioned.

In light of the dearth of comparative effectiveness research regarding nearly all surgical procedures, why then is spinal fusion so controversial? There appear to be two factors: the high price of the surgery, and  the strong ties between the surgeons performing the spinal fusions and the medical device manufacturers that produce the hardware used in the procedure.

In particular, the royalty payments are staggering. In the first three quarters of 2010, the WSJ reports that each of five spinal surgeons at Norton Hospital in Louisville Kentucky received more than $1.3 million from Medtronic — the leading manufacturer of spinal fusion devices. Norton Hospital — and its surgeons — are certainly not alone in profiting from the procedures.

Though the device manufacturers like Medtronic pay out large sums to physicians that develop, utilize, and promote spinal fusion treatments, the manufacturers clearly come out ahead after taking into account the price they charge hospitals for the spinal fusion devices. Not surprisingly, this money often comes from Medicare reimbursement.  According to the WSJ’s analysis of Medicare claims, spinal fusion went from costing Medicare $343 million in 1997 to $2.24 billion in 2008.  And as the Journal points out, the screws used in spinal fusion implants can cost between $1,000 to $2,000 a piece for reimbursement but actually turn out to cost less than $100 to make. Spinal surgeon Charles Rosen is quoted as stating that “You can easily put in $30,000 worth of hardware in a person during a fusion surgery.” A Los Angeles Times report in 2010 found that complex spinal fusion surgeries can end up costing $80,888 in hospital charges as compared to $23,724 for spinal decompression surgery — the latter referring to a group of procedures that can relieve painful pressure on the spine, but without the extensive implantation required by spinal fusion.

Nevertheless, it is true that there there are many expensive surgical procedures wherein the value to the patient justifies the high price. But it is more than the wise allocation of resources that is at issue. In the Journal of the American Medical Association’s April 2010 issue, Dr. Eugene Carragee M.D., professor of spinal disease and orthopaedic surgery at Stanford University School of Medicine summarized the clinical difficulties facing complex spinal fusion surgery, especially in older individuals:

…the complex reconstruction of spinal deformity in older patients remains a difficult and dangerous enterprise. Complication rates have declined but remain concerning (30%-40%) and the reoperation rates, in a population for whom there is a high risk of both medical and anesthetic complications with additional surgery, remains at 10% to 20% in the most optimistic reports. Moreover, despite these major interventions, this approach is still not effective in 30% to 40% of patients.

When asked about the need for spinal fusion surgeries, Dr. Steven Glassman — one of the Norton Hospital surgeons that has received millions to implant spinal fusion devices — stated that he and his colleagues were “leaders among spine surgeons nationally in comparative effectiveness research.” This is a troubling statement, precisely because of the significant royalty agreements between Dr. Glassman and Medtronic that are described in the WSJ report. Dr. Glassman is therefore incentivized — at least economically speaking — to interpret research findings in such a way that maximizes the contexts in which spinal fusion surgery can be recommended.

To combat these conflict of interest claims, Medtronic claims that it refrains from paying out royalties to the collaborating surgeons on the devices they personally use in their patients. This would appear to reduce the incentive for Dr. Glassman to personally churn out spinal fusion operations in the hope that he will get royalties for those instances where he implants hardware in which he holds a royalty agreement with Medtronic. This certainly helps to combat violations of the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits Medtronic from inducing surgeons to purchase their devices. But this policy does little to curb the general conflicts of interest of the general spinal surgery community when determining whether to recommend complex spinal fusion surgery. Even if a contributing surgeon does not receive royalty payments for the specific surgeries where his manual contributions are utilized, they still have an incentive to keep Medtronic “happy” by increasing demand for the spinal fusion hardware. And certainly one can envision a scenario in which a surgeon so situated might suggest such a surgery but then refer the procedure itself to a colleague, thereby allowing the royalty payments to flow unencumbered by the guise of propriety.  What does appear certain is that demand for complex spinal fusion operations has increased. Citing a study by Deyo and colleagues in the same JAMA issue, Dr. Carragee points out that:

…the rate of spinal stenosis surgery in the Medicare population has remained more or less stable, but the rate of complex surgery for this disease has increased from negligible levels in 2002 to nearly 15% of all spinal stenosis surgeries in 2007. These more complex surgeries are also reported to be independently associated with increased perioperative mortality, major complications, rehospitalization, and cost.

The findings do not provide explanations for the increase in complex surgery that has occurred during the past 6 years. Ideally, because the complex surgical techniques are used to treat complex deformities, the data should show that patients undergoing these procedures usually have these complex deformities. The diagnoses reported, however, do not support this “ideal” explanation; 50% of these new complex fusion operations were performed in patients with spinal stenosis alone and no deformity. Spinal stenosis with scoliosis by coding, accounted for only 6% of the complex fusions performed.

In other words, there has been an increase in the rate of a complex surgical procedures prone to severe complications, but with no concomitant increase in the rate of the severe conditions that would ostensibly warrant such surgery. Regardless, this demand pays dividends in the royalty agreements that the surgeons receive when the U.S. spinal surgery community implant the hardware that the contributing surgeons developed– and dividends to the manufacturer.

Currently, there appears to be little, if any, countervailing force that militates against the doctors recommending this complex and expensive procedure. By conducting the complex fusion operation, the surgeon and the hospital both make money through the handsome reimbursement from Medicare and private insurance, while Medtronic is handsomely paid by selling more devices. Those hurt, financially speaking, are the taxpayers in terms of Medicare, and those insureds in private plans whose premiums have risen because of the increased costs of this procedure. Private insurance plans are unable to combat this, as any limit on spinal fusion surgery will be framed as corporate greed coming at the expense of treatment. This is precisely what has occurred after Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina announced that it would place tighter restrictions on spinal fusion surgery. In response to the restrictions, Dr. John Wilson, a neurosurgeon at Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center and president of the North Carolina Neurological Society stated that “If this intrusion into the physician-patient relationship goes unchallenged, other insurers will follow suit…It will be a progression of ever-more restrictive policies that will handcuff us as we try to treat patients.” Dr. Wilson was one of nine physicians to write a letter to Blue Cross urging the insurer to alter the new rules. Interestingly, the letter repeatedly supports its position by citing the studies of Dr. Daniel Resnick, a spine surgeon who is listed by the Congress of Neurological Surgeons as receiving grant money from Medtronic.

Reform Rodeo

1. The Health Care Blog has an important piece on the role of HIT in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and whether they will be open networks or walled gardens.

Will ACO (accountable care organization) IT models be walled gardens or open platforms?  i.e., will ACO IT platforms focus on exchanging information within the provider network of the ACO, or will they also be able to exchange information with providers outside the ACO network?

2. Kaiser Health News  discusses rules proposed by the Obama administration that would require health insurers to justify double-digit increases in premium rates.

Under the proposal, the flagged premium increases would be subject to review by the states – or the federal government in some cases – to determine if they are unreasonable.

In following years, the Department of Health and Human Services will adjust the specific percentage threshold for each individual state. Thresholds would vary partly because medical costs vary by state.

3. The New York Times has run a piece on a new antitrust lawsuit filed against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan.

Federal prosecutors contend that Blue Cross in Michigan thwarts competitors by pressuring hospitals to charge rival insurers more to provide care, a practice prosecutors say has made health care extremely expensive in a state that can’t afford it.

4.  Tim Jost provides an overview at Health Affairs of the current state of the argument over the constitutionality of the individual mandate — including the recent decision by a federal judge in Virginia ruling the mandate unconstitutional.

Virginia adopted a statute purporting to nullify the minimum essential coverage requirement even before Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act, and the lawsuit was brought to enforce this statute.  Judge Hudson had earlier this year denied a Justice Department motion to dismiss the Virginia case, holding that the Commonwealth had standing to defend its legislation.  In his earlier decision, Judge Hudson had also held that the Commonwealth had an arguable claim that the minimum coverage requirement was unconstitutional.  Subsequent briefs filed by the Justice Department and by amici (interested parties who file as “friends of the court,” or amici curiae) supporting the reform law apparently failed to change Judge Hudson’s mind.

5. The Wall Street Journal has a story outlining the tremendous pecuniary benefits that certain spine doctors are receiving for conducting spine surgeries that some question as unnecessary.

The five surgeons are also among the largest recipients nationwide of payments from medical-device giant Medtronic Inc. In the first nine months of this year alone, the surgeons—Steven Glassman, Mitchell Campbell, John Johnson, John Dimar and Rolando Puno—received more than $7 million from the Fridley, Minn., company.

CPI Says CMS Got RUC-rolled

Earlier this month, Ian Ayres questioned Medicare’s procurement auction rules. The Center for Public Integrity recently released an article that suggests Medicare’s process for deciding physician payments may also need a second look. Just as critics have charged that HHS relied excessively on a physician-allied group (the Council on Graduate Medical Education) in determining future health care work force needs, the CPI report makes a case that too much responsibility has been devolved from governmental decisionmakers to a private sector group, the American Medical Association/Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC). RUC’s dominant role in suggesting payment levels raises hard questions about price-setting in the health care sector.

Administered pricing can be a important tool of health care cost containment. However, the process of setting prices for various health care services is always at risk of capture by those who would profit from overpayments. By way of background, here is an excerpt on the resource-based relative-value scale [RB-RVS] that gave rise to committees like the RUC:
Read more

A Doctor Speaks About Healthcare, Big Business and Justice

[Ed. Note: We received today's post from Timothy Shaw, M.D. F.A.C.S. as a comment in response to a post, "Health Care and Disparity in a 'Post-Racial' Era."]

Twenty years ago, upon entering private medical practice for the first time it took me about a month to realize that the United States needed “Health Care Reform.” After serving the previous fifteen years in the US Army Medical Corps, I started my first civilian medical job. I was asked to come to a hospital by another surgeon to perform an ear operation on a 3 year old boy at the same time as he would be performing an eye operation. This would save the child from two anesthetics on two different days. Since I had never worked at that hospital, and apparently in order to set me straight from the start, one of the head doctors at this hospital, came up to me in the preoperative holding area, and boldly shoved the child’s chart in my face, pointed to the child’s insurance (Medicaid (Welfare)) and shamelessly told me, “if all you are going to do, is to bring this “****” in here, then we don’t need you to come here.” The poor little guy sitting in the corner with his Mom, was smiling at us with his cute partially toothless grin, and coke-bottle glasses. He didn’t realize what one of his doctors called him because of his health insurance coverage.

Again, several months later I was called to a different hospital (one that I normally did not work at either) in the same city by an operating nurse who asked if I took Medicaid “welfare patients.” She asked me if I would come to their operating room to take a coin out of a 2 year old child’s esophagus. She informed me that their hospital doctors in my specialty did not take welfare patients and they were looking for someone to do the operation as the child had choked on a coin. “Apparently someone forgot to screen this child’s insurance before he came to the operating room.” I canceled my clinic patients and drove across town, performed an esophagoscopy and removed the coin.

Obviously, the doctors in these above scenarios did not support “the Public Option” (Medicaid).

What had happened to our Health Care System? What had changed? Where was the honor that we had in the Army Medical Corps? We treated everyone from Generals to Privates and their families with the same respect. In accordance with Geneva Conventions, we even treated enemy soldiers during the Iraq War in our Combat Support Hospitals with the same care that we treated our own.

In a significant measure the United States Private Health System had changed into “Big Business.” In some measure the humanitarian emphasis had eroded.

Although spurning the pharmaceutical industry as “conflict of interest” entities, not suitable for proper patient care, surprisingly, doctors saw no apparent conflict of interest in merging with the Health Insurance Industry. Doctors and the Health Insurance Business became so closely aligned that their DNA intertwined to form a new species. This powerful new combined-arms team became the forme fruste of our new United States Health Care Industry. Doctors armed with new found business tactics, and the Health Insurance Industry armed with the legitimacy of the Doctor’s legal authority to limit health care to patients became the de facto United States Health Care System.

The business meeting replaced the medical conference to discuss “patient care” issues. To cope with the ever burgeoning bureaucracy, more and more doctors went into administration. More doctors have their MBA’s then carry black bags and make house calls. Mergers, Acquisitions, Expansions, Contracts, Covered Lives, Marketing Strategy, Demographics, Competition Threat Forecasts, Actuarial Science, and Health Insurance became the focus of many doctors. Time was spent on avoiding insurance business risk, trying to avoid the high risk patients, finding the better payer groups, etc. Hospitals became less hospitable. Doctor’s began to discharge patients so rapidly, that in the mid 1980’s the majority of States passed consumer protection laws (”Drive By Delivery Laws”) to protect mothers/newborns from being discharged from the hospital too soon.

Currently, the U.S. health care system is outrageously expensive, yet inadequate. Despite spending more than twice as much as the rest of the industrialized nations ($7,129 per capita), the United States performs poorly in comparison on major health indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality and immunization rates. Read more

Petitioners Ask OSHA to Regulate Resident Physician Work Hours

On September 2, Assistant Secretary David Michaels for Occupational Safety and Health received a petition requesting that OSHA regulate resident physician and subspecialty resident physicians.  “Depending on the type of residency, physicians-in-training can work anywhere from 60 to 100 or more hours a week, sometimes without a day off for two weeks or more.”  The petition requests that OSHA exercise the authority granted under §3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to implement the following federal work-hour standard:

(1)   A limit of 80 hours of work in each and every week, without averaging;

(2)   A limit of 16 consecutive hours worked in one shift for all resident physicians and subspecialty resident physicians;

(3)   At least one 24-hour period of time off work per week and one 48-hour period of time off work per month for a total of five days off work per month, without averaging;

(4)   In-hospital on-call frequency no more than once every three nights, no averaging;

(5)   A minimum of at least 10 hours off work after a day shift, and a minimum of 12 hours off after a night shift;

(6)   A maximum of four consecutive night shifts with a minimum of 48 hours off after a sequence of three or four night shifts.

More information about the petition can be found at the Public Citizen-run website, WakeUpDoctor.org.

Present Accreditation Standards

The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), “[a]s the accrediting body for more than 8,800 medical residency programs,… is charged with setting and enforcing standards for supervision and resident duty hours for graduate medical education.”  In 2002, OSHA denied a petition by Public Citizen, the Committee of Internists and Residents (CIR), and American Medical Student Association, citing the voluntary adoption of standards by ACGME.  In 2003, the ACGME set standards that restricted resident work hours to 80 hours per week when averaged over four weeks and no more than 30 consecutive hours of work.  (A breakdown of the differences between the OSHA petition and ACGME 2003 standards can be found here.)

In 2007, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) evaluated resident work standards pursuant to a request from Congress. The resulting report, “Resident Duty Hours: Enhancing Sleep, Supervision, and Safety” found, among other things, that considerable scientific evidence demonstrates that “30 hours of continuous time awake, as is permitted and common in current resident work schedules, can result in fatigue, and that adjustments to the 2003 rules are needed.”  In response, the ACGME proposed revised standards for resident work hours and supervision.  The comment period ended on August 9 and the changes will be implemented after July 2011.

The Substance of the Petition

According to petitioners, the ACGME revised standards are not sufficient.  A study by Landrigan et al. found that even after implementation of the ACGME’s 2003 standards:

• The average work week was 66.6 hours (95% confidence interval [CI] 66.3-66.9);
• The mean length of an extended shift was 29.9 hours (95% CI, 29.8-30);
• 29% of all work weeks were more than 80 hours in duration, 12.1% were 90 or more, and 3.9% were 100 hours or more;
• 83.6% of all interns reported hours of work in violation of the professional self-regulations that were established and are being monitored by the ACGME. This number far exceeds the rates of violations reported by resident physicians and residency programs to the ACGME, indicating both that widespread under-reporting exists, and that the ACGME’s enforcement has been ineffective.

According to the petition, these numbers of hours are among the highest in the professional world and negatively affect personal health and safety.  Despite the previous rejection of a similar petition in 2002, the petitioners have changed their strategy in appealing to OSHA:  “Whereas previous appeals to limit resident physicians’ work hours have focused on the well-documented risks patients face due to tired physicians, this petition concentrates on the often-overlooked health risks faced by the resident physicians who endure those long hours.”  These risks include:

• Motor Vehicle Accidents — In addition to anecdotal evidence that resident fatigue after long work hours has resulted in physical injury and death, the petition offered the following research:
  • A Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) informal survey found that “[o]f seven surgical residents in our hospitals who we interviewed, six fell asleep while driving to or from work during their internships and three were involved in motor vehicle accidents.”
  • A New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) study found that “risk of a motor vehicle crash was increased significantly following a work shift of 24 hours or greater,” as well as the risk of a near miss.
  • Sleep deprivation researchers at John Hopkins Hospital found that “[f]orty-nine percent of resident physicians [questioned] reported falling asleep at the wheel (not necessarily at a stop light), and 90% of these events occurred after the resident physicians had worked an extended duration (> 24-hour) shift.”
  • An Anesthesiology abstract reported that 17% of survey respondents reported post-call automobile accidents and 72% reported near misses.
• Mental Health

  • 

    Capricho No 43, "The sleep of reason produces monsters." Francisco de Goya (1746–1828)

    One study described “house officer stress syndrome.” Caused in large part by sleep-deprivation and excessive work load, physicians-in-training may suffer from (1) episodic cognitive impairment, (2) chronic low-grade anger with outbursts, (3) pervasive cynicism, (4) family discord, (5) depression, (6) suicidal ideation and suicide, and (7) substance abuse.

  • Four studies demonstrated that residents are unhappy, face high levels of stress, and suffer “major problems” in their personal relationships with others.
  • Three studies demonstrated that on-call residents reported greater mood disturbance and increased negative mood than those who were rested.
  • One study found that as many as 30% of residents experience depression during their residencies.
  • A study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine found that 21% of residents reported depressed scores on the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale and that depressed responses increased with longer work weeks. Two other studies also found increased rates of depression among residents that correlated with high work hours.
• Pregnancy
  • A NEJM study reported that premature labor and preeclampsia or eclampsia was twice as common among pregnant residents as the wives of male residents and that residents working more than 100 hours per week in the third trimester were twice as much at risk for preterm delivery than those that worked fewer than 100 hours.
  • The pre-term labor and preeclampsia risk was validated by a study published in Obstetrics and Gynecology.
  • One study found that infants born during residency significantly more likely to be born with intrauterine growth restriction.
• Percutaneous Injuries (such as needlestick injuries)

  • 

    Saint Sebastian, Carlo Crivelli (1490-91)

    A JAMA study of self-reported percutaneous injuries in residents found that substantially increased risk during day shifts after overnight call as compared with day shifts not preceded by overnight call.

  • “An Annals of Surgery study from 2005 found that 20 to 38% of all procedures in one urban academic teaching hospital involved exposure to HIV, HBV or HCV.”
  • A NEJM study found that 99% of all residents had suffered a needlestick injury by their final year of study. Fatigue was the second most common reason given for the injury.

Additionally, this petition has more public support than the one submitted in 2002.  Petitioners include:

• Public Citizen, a consumer and health advocacy group with 150,000 members and supporters;
• the Committee of Interns and Residents/SEIU Healthcare (CIR/SEIU), a housestaff union, part of SEIU, representing over 13,000 resident physicians;
• the American Medical Student Association (AMSA), a national organization representing over 33,000 physicians-in-training;
• Bertrand Bell, M.D., Professor of Medicine at Albert Einstein College of Medicine and author of New York State Health Code 405 restricting resident physician work hours;
• Charles A. Czeisler, Ph.D., M.D., Baldino Professor of Sleep Medicine, Harvard Medical School;
• Christopher P. Landrigan, M.D., M.P.H., Assistant Professor of Pediatrics and Medicine, Harvard Medical School;
• Plus forty-five health-related organization and over 1,000 individuals.

Response to the Petition

In order to fulfill OSHA’s mission “to send every worker home whole and healthy every day,” the petition argues that OSHA must “act now to address the dangers that extreme work hours pose for resident physicians and subspecialty resident physicians.”

In a statement released the same day, Assistant Secretary Dr. David Michaels recognized the concerns raised by the petition:

We are very concerned about medical residents working extremely long hours, and we know of evidence linking sleep deprivation with an increased risk of needle sticks, puncture wounds, lacerations, medical errors and motor vehicle accidents. We will review and consider the petition on this subject submitted by Public Citizen and others.

The relationship of long hours, worker fatigue and safety is a concern beyond medical residents, since there is extensive evidence linking fatigue with operator error… All employers must recognize and prevent workplace hazards. That is the law. Hospitals and medical training programs are not exempt from ensuring that their employees’ health and safety are protected.

However, ACGME believes that the revised rules under development are adequate.  According to medpagetoday.com, the ACGME said the following in a prepared statement:

As the Occupational Safety and Health Administration reviews a petition from three special interest groups requesting federal regulation of resident duty hours, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education stands ready to share with OSHA the many studies, evidence, and documentation that substantiate the standards proposed by the ACGME Task Force on Quality Care and Professionalism.

PPACA and the Growing Shortage of Pediatric Subspecialists

Over the course of this year, a spate of articles and op eds have highlighted a growing shortage of pediatric subspecialists.  Earlier his month, Amy Mansue, CEO of Children’s Specialized Hospital here in New Jersey, addressed the problem in a very interesting post on the National Association of Children’s Hospitals’ With All Our Might blog.  Ms. Mansue describes a recent visit to Capitol Hill during which she discussed the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, explaining to the staffers that:

[t]he differences between strategies to address the needs of the newly insured children versus strategies to address the needs of adults couldn’t be more different.  Start with the basic fact that there is a critical shortage of specialists in pediatrics, where the biggest issue facing adults is how to access primary care. There can be a utilization of physician extenders in the short run until more primary care physicians are trained; there is no similar ‘quick fix’ in pediatrics.

Pediatric neurologists and developmental-behavioral pediatricians are in especially short supply.  A survey of children’s hospitals conducted by the National Association of Children’s Hospitals and Related Institutions in December 2009 revealed average wait times of 9 weeks for an appointment with a pediatric neurologist and 13 weeks for an appointment with a developmental-behavioral pediatrician.  An earlier study published in Pediatrics found that, in addition to enduring long waits, parents and children also travel long distances to see these specialists–on average 73 miles to see a subspecialist in neurodevelopmental disabilities and 44 miles to see a developmental pediatrician.

This is concerning for a host of reasons, including the importance of early, appropriate intervention to the future success of children with developmental delays.  As I discussed previously here and here, the “right” medical diagnosis can be key to accessing needed services, as can a thorough written evaluation and a doctor willing to advocate on a child’s behalf.  This is true whether a family is fighting for publicly-provided disability benefits or special education services or to get a private insurance plan to pay for medically necessary therapies.

What explains the subspecialist shortage?  As Ms. Mansue puts it, “it is all about math.  There is no incentive to go through an additional decade of training to get paid less than what a pediatric nurse practitioner is now demanding in my home state of New Jersey.”  Congress has tried to change the equation.  PPACA provides for loan forgiveness of up to $35,000 per year for up to three years for pediatric subspecialists who “work for a provider serving in a [Health Professional Shortage Area] or medically underserved area, or among a medically underserved population that has a shortage of the specified pediatric specialty and a sufficient pediatric population, as determined by [HHS], to support the specified pediatric specialty.”  But funding for this measure has not yet been appropriated.  The federal government has also attacked the problem through its Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education Payment Program, which provides funding for specialty training for pediatricians.  According to a recent New York Times op ed, however, this program’s funding is also uncertain, suggesting that an end to the shortage of pediatric subspecialists may not be in sight.

Recommended Reading, “Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Research: The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth”

Jesse Goldner’s Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Research:  The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1211 (2009), is a must-read for anyone who has anything to do with oversight of researchers’ conflicts of interest.  The article reflects an insider’s understanding of academic physicians’ perspectives on this still-contentious topic, provides a terrific survey of the literature, and proposes regulatory fixes by the feds that HHS will hopefully seriously consider.  The article’s timing is perfect, given that HHS is receiving comments until August 19, 2010 on proposed changes to its conflict of interest regulations.  See http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coi/. Even in the short time since the publication of Goldner’s article, HHS OIG has issued yet another report on conflicts of interest management, entitled “How Grantees Manage Financial Conflicts of Interest in Research Funded by the National Institutes of Health,” (Nov. 2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-07-00700.pdf.  Based upon an in-depth audit of 41 grantee institutions that reported conflicts in FY 2006, the OIG found that equity interests represent the most pervasive form of financial conflict of interest. The most popular tool employed by entities managing conflicts is disclosure to publications or at academic presentations; entities only rarely required the reduction or elimination of conflicts.  As important, and unsurprising based upon AAMC surveys, is the unreliability of the conflict reporting mechanisms used by most academic institutions.

The OIG report emphasizes the need for increased oversight of conflicts of interest.  Academic medical centers have had plenty of time and forewarning to address the issue but, as demonstrated by a vignette described by Goldner about his own efforts to accomplish this through the IRB which he chaired, faculty resistance is significant.  Consequently, Goldner is exactly right in calling upon HHS to issue aggressive regulations that accomplish the necessary reforms.  He would require the establishment of conflict of interest committees at every research institution, comprised primarily of independent members, to which faculty would report all financial relationships that create conflicts of interest. Resolution of such conflicts would be a condition precedent to proceeding with proposed research, and violations would result in significant penalties, including debarment from research.

As shall be discussed in a forthcoming Seton Hall White Paper entitled The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, I do not have confidence in benefits accruing from requiring disclosure of conflicts to research participants in consent forms, although research participants do have a right to know of such conflicts.  This is a minor quibble.  Goldner’s article is a great contribution to the literature. 

Possible Repeal of Massachusetts Ban: A Gift to Prescribers, Patients or Industry?

Next month marks the second anniversary of the enactment of the Massachusetts Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Manufacturer Code of Conduct, a law requiring pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturing companies to designate a compliance officer and implement a compliance program reflecting the commonwealth’s regulations on meals, CME sponsorship, use of non-patient identified prescriber data, gifts and other payments, etc.  The law, which went into effect on July 1, 2009, builds upon the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America’s revised Code  on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (”PhRMA Code“) and the Advanced Medical Technology Association’s revised Code of Ethics on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (”AdvaMed Code“), two voluntary codes intended to eliminate any influence — perceived or otherwise — of the industry over healthcare professionals with respect to gifts, entertainment, recreation, educational programs, professional meetings, scholarships, and the like.

The Massachusetts law is more restrictive, however, than its PhRMA and AdvaMed counterparts.  It prohibits companies from sponsoring continuing medical education programs that do not meet Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education guidelines.  The PhRMA and AdvaMed Codes do not.  It prohibits any company employee from providing meals outside of a hospital or office setting.  The PhRMA Code only restricts sales representatives and their immediate supervisors to a hospital or office setting.  The AdvaMed Code does not impose any restrictions on the location of meals.

Furthermore, starting on July 1, 2010, the law requires companies to annually certify their compliance with commonwealth regulations and, among other things, to disclose any gifts or payments valued over $50 and given to anyone who can prescribe, purchase, or dispense drugs or devices.  Effectively, it’s a ban on all gifts to prescribers (and in so doing goes a step further than the PhRMA and AdvaMed Codes which make an exception for educational gifts).  Companies must also submit $2,000, payable to the commonwealth’s Department of Public Health, with each annual disclosure report.  Violations can result in penalties up to $5,000 per occurrence.  The first round of disclosures were due 16 days ago and covered activities for the July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009 period.  Next year companies will be expected to report on their activities for the January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010 period.  Or will they?

The Massachusetts House recently passed an economic development bill that repeals the disclosure requirement/gift ban (the bill also establishes a sales tax holiday and consolidates commonwealth economic agencies).  The Senate version of the bill does not include the repeal.  It’s a wait-and-see as to how the two chambers will work out the final bill through their conference committee.

Opponents of the gift ban claim it has adversely affected pharmaceutical clinical research as well as the restaurant and convention industries.  Almost two years ago, PhRMA Senior Vice President Ken Johnson expressed his disappointment over the law, saying:

[it is] very likely damaging for medical partnerships, clinical research and patients in Massachusetts….

Public disclosure of a pharmaceutical company’s arrangements with principal investigators of its clinical trials also could reveal sensitive, proprietary business information to a company’s competitors.  This could erode the independent decision-making of companies trying to bring science from research facilities to patient care setting….

The disclosure requirements subjects all of the physicians, academic institutions and hospitals involved in such trials to publicity in a form that may be difficult to understand and likely will generate unwanted and unnecessary public scrutiny.  This could make Massachusetts an unattractive place for academic scientists to live and work — and for pharmaceutical research companies to do business.  Such a policy clearly is not in the best interest of public health — and it flies in the face of the ongoing efforts to further cultivate the life sciences industry within Massachusetts.

Indeed, the Wall Street Journal and Boston Herald report that some medical groups either have threatened to take their annual meetings elsewhere or have actually done so in protest of the law.

Supporters of the law say otherwise.  Health Care For All, a Massachusetts-based advocacy organization, views banning gifts as a step in the right direction.  According to the organization:

[t]he pharmaceutical industry gives gifts to promote their drugs and make a higher profit.  Under the guise of promoting welfare for all, the industry maximizes their own revenue….

Experts living within the guidelines of the gift ban find that it is not interfering with their work or professional relationships according to Dr. David Coleman, Boston University School of Medicine.

‘The Massachusetts Gift Ban legislation is an important step in the process of reducing both biases in therapeutic decision-making and healthcare costs.  The Ban has not adversely impacted the important relationships of our physician-faculty with the pharmaceutical and device industries….’

Health Care For All also maintains there is no connection between the decrease in restaurant revenues and the law as:

[t]he Massachusetts Prescription Reform Coalition has researched the decrease in restaurant profits, and found sales are down across the country — including in states without a gift ban.   According to the trade paper, Restaurants & Institutions, sales at the nation’s top 100 independent restaurants were down 10% in 2009….

Massachusetts Senators, who recognize the value of the gift ban legislation, also see that these lost profits mirror similar recession-caused losses in the restaurant industry across the country.

Georgia Maheras, Private Market Policy Manager at the Massachusetts Prescription Reform Coalition, considers the current House bill to be a “significant step backward” in the fight to curb medical costs.

Massachusetts is not alone in attempting to reform pharmaceutical and medical device marketing practices.  Neighboring Vermont has a similar, and in fact more stringent, law which even allows the Attorney General’s office to track free samples given to physicians (though a reporter for the Times Argus, a Vermont newspaper, worries how a repeal in Massachusetts might have a ripple effect).  California, the District of Columbia, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, and West Virginia also have some form of a marketing code.  The federal government’s Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act includes the Physician Payment Sunshine Provision (”Provision”) requiring disclosure of payments made to physicians and teaching hospitals by manufacturers of products covered under Medicaid, Medicare, and SCHIP (click here to read a summary).

So who has it right?  It would seem as though PhRMA and AdvaMed opened the door for state and federal government to codify modified versions of these industry codes.  From a compliance perspective, it must be quite inefficient — and headache inducing — to wade through state marketing disclosure laws that lack uniformity.  Starting January 1, 2012, the Provision will preempt state disclosure laws except for where the state requires additional information.  Maybe this will help, maybe it will add to the headache, or maybe this particular episode will no longer matter.   For now, though, from a patient perspective, a repeal of the Massachusetts disclosure requirement/gift ban, or that of any other state, would feel more like a gift to the industry and prescribers than a service to the “best interest of public health.”

The Center for Health & Pharmacy Law & Policy here at Seton Hall Law has issued two white papers addressing these issues: Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” in which the Center proposes legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationships between industry and doctors that can create unwarranted risks to trial participants and to the scientific integrity of research; and Drug and Device Promotion: Charting a Course for Policy Reform,” in which the Center proposes legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationship of medicine and industry– including the recommendation “that industry funding for continuing medical education should be phased out, and replaced by an educational process driven by physicians.”

The Center has also recommended “the adoption of federal legislation to ban the use of gifts, meals, and other perks to promote drugs and devices. The states have taken the lead to date–Massachusetts, California, Minnesota, and the District of Columbia have passed laws to limit or ban gifts and meals that are now routine in marketing practices. Concluding that industry self-regulation is not sufficient, the Center calls for national legislation to create uniform practices by industry and physicians. As urged by Professor Boozang, ‘the benefits of drugs and devices should drive promotion and physicians’ decision to prescribe, not a marketing model that depends on gifts and meals.’”

Obviously, the adoption of additional federal standards in this regard will lessen the ability of industry to pit one state against another and make compliance easier. The Physician Payment Sunshine Provision is a step in that direction, the Massachusetts development bill is a step back.

Physician Income Relative to Hospital Revenue by Specialty

Wandering through the pages of Health Law Prof Blog, I found this post from a few months ago which looked at a WSJ Health Blog article which examined net hospital revenue derived per physician and compared such revenue generation among various specialties. The average revenue generation per physician amounted to “about $1.54 million based on 114 U.S. hospitals responding to a survey by physician recruiters Merrit Hawkins…. (Revenue here means net inpatient and outpatient dollars derived from referrals, tests and procedures done in the hospital.)”

We’ve looked at physician compensation in relation to physician shortages here at HRW before, noting that “over the course of ten career years, if calculated at a constant rate without regard to future increases in compensation, the median paid “Family Doctor, Branch” will have earned $1,900,182. During those same static 10 years….If that same Family Doctor were to then consult with someone from the lowest paid of the three categories of Radiologist, Not neural, Non-Interventionist, she would be doing so with someone who had made $4,208,580 during that time–which would be $2,308,398 more than she–or more than twice as much.

But this chart below offers a slightly different perspective, showing relative hospital income to specialty and raises some interesting questions regarding hospital finances and chosen areas of focus in relation to return on investment. A focus on kidneys, for instance, would not, it seems, be favored. The ratio of hospital income to physician salary in Nephrology is 2.91 to 1. For Psychiatry it’s 6.45 to 1. For Hematology/Oncology it’s 4.33 to 1. Additionally, in actual income generated, Psychiatry brings in almost 2x as much as Nephrology; Hematology brings in over 2x as much.

One hears often about shortages in dialysis facilities, but mental health clinics and cancer centers barrage the airwaves with their advertisements. Perhaps it is not a coincidence.

Hospital Annual Revenue per Doctor by Specialty Specialty Avg. Revenue Avg. Salary Neurosurgery $2,815,650 $571,000 Cardiology/Invasive $2,240,366 $475,000 Orthopedic Surgery $2,117,764 $481,000 General Surgery $2,112,492 $321,000 Internal Medicine $1,678,341 $186,000 Family Practice $1,622,832 $173,000 Hematology/Oncology $1,485,627 $335,000 Gastroenterology $1,450,540 $393,000 Urology $1,382,704 $401,000 OB/GYN $1,364,131 $266,000 Cardiology/Non-Invasive $1,319,658 $419,000 Psychiatry $1,290,104 $200,000 Pulmonology $1,204,919 $293,000 Neurology $907,317 $258,000 Pediatrics $856,154 $171,000 Ophthalmology $842,711 $282,000 Nephrology $696,888 $240,000

Reform Rodeo: A Sick Wellpoint; Performance; EHRs; and More

1. Really?: Reuters released an exclusive story about Wellpoint’s recent push to rescind contracts for those suffering from breast cancer.

2. Specialists: The New England Journal of Medicine has a piece on the role of specialists in performance-incentive programs.

3. EeeeekHR: In the New York Times, Pauline Chen describes her experiences as a physician attempting to come to grips with the unforeseen changes that EHR-based health care delivery has introduced into the doctor-patient relationship.

4. Myths of Health Reform: On The Health Care Blog, Maggie Mahar discusses the myths of health reform, including the belief that the reform measure was a hand out to industry.

4. When Skepticism Becomes Quackery: Steven Novella at Science-Based Medicine calls attention to the often hyperbolic demonization of the pharmaceutical industry.

5. That’s Just Your Opinion: Kaiser Health News gathers the latest opinions and editorials about health care, including pieces about children’s health care, RomneyCare, and the nursing shortage.

6. Resources: For those studying PPACA, George Washington University has released, among other things, a thorough provision-by-provision comparison of PPACA and subsequent reconciliation.

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