Venture Capitalists Complain of ‘Regulatory Challenges,’ FDA Responds

Writing in this month’s Fortune, Dan Primack is the latest to raise the alarm about indications that venture capital funding of life sciences startups is on the decline.  The decline in funding is cause for concern because venture capital-funded startups are, in the words of Tracy Lefteroff of PricewaterhouseCoopers, “where all the drugs are coming from[.]“  “[L]arge pharma[,]” Lefteroff explains, has “been extremely ineffective at developing pipeline drugs internally.”

While there are still “plenty of venture dollars … going into the [life sciences] sector,” Primack reports, they are going to mature companies.  Startups, on the other hand, “are having a much tougher go of it, with 17% fewer raising venture capital during the first three quarters of 2011 than during the same period in 2010.”  According to Primack, “a number of veteran VC firms are formally ending their pursuit of pharma startups.”

What explains the increasing reluctance to invest in the life sciences sector?  The venture capitalists blame “regulatory challenges,” primarily “the hostile FDA.”   Primack quotes Kate Mitchell, co-founder and Managing Director of Scale Venture Partners, a venture capital firm which recently announced that it will make no new healthcare investments, as follows: “It just takes a lot longer now to get approval than it used to, or to even know what the [Food & Drug Administration] is thinking.  One of our companies, Prestwick Pharmaceuticals, supposedly was put on a ‘fast track,’ but it still took another three years before receiving FDA approval.  It’s incredibly frustrating and means we need to invest more to keep the companies running.”

The Medical Innovation and Competitiveness (MedIC) Coalition, a group of “life science investors, innovators and entrepreneurs,” has been lobbying hard for the FDA to approve more drugs and devices more quickly, that is, without the careful review of efficacy and safety that it currently undertakes.  Specifically, they have prioritized “[r]ebalancing benefit-risk assessments in the drug and device approval processes to appropriately reflect the value of new therapies to patients in need” and “[e]xpanding the accelerated approval pathway into a progressive approval system for drugs, diagnostics and medical devices.”  MedIC also believes that the FDA’s conflict of interest policy threatens to “hinder[] patient access to new treatments.”  It argues for increased “utilization of non-government outside experts to facilitate and strengthen the FDA review and approval process,” presumably experts who would be barred from serving by the FDA’s current conflicts policy.

Not all of MedIC’s priorities are so extreme.  They have also called for more timely, consistent, and transparent decision-making at FDA, while acknowledging that to achieve these ends the agency must be “well resourced and endowed with state-of-the-art scientific tools, clinical input, processes and procedures.”  With this, even the most ardent consumer advocate can agree, and the FDA has recently acted to improve its decision-making in ways that do not risk sacrificing health and safety.  This is a promising development.  The results of a recent survey of venture capitalists suggests that increasing the predictability and speed of the FDA’s decision-making would have a higher impact on their willingness to invest in the life sciences sector than would “rebalancing” the agency’s weighing of safety and efficacy.

Recommended Reading: Recent Scholarship on Drug and Device Regulation

In Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products (forthcoming in the 2011 volume of the Wisconsin Law Review and available on SSRN), Efthimios Parasidis proposes a significant expansion of drug and device companies’ responsibility to engage in “active post-market analysis” of drugs and devices, to be coupled with a new rule that only companies that conducted such analysis would benefit from preemption of state tort claims.  Professor Parasidis’ article includes a nuanced and revealing analysis of the historical and other reasons for the Food and Drug Administration’s heavy focus on pre-market review of drugs at the expense of post-market surveillance, as well as useful updates on both the caselaw regarding the preemption of claims involving branded drugs, generic drugs, devices, and vaccines and the ongoing efforts to use health information technology to glean information about the safety and efficacy of marketed products.  Most notable, though, is the article’s thorough explication of Professor Parasidis’ interesting proposal that “preemption laws, which often are enacted pursuant to industry lobbying efforts [be linked to] protocols that further the public health.”

In Enforcing Integrity (forthcoming in the 2011 volume of the Indiana Law Journal and available on SSRN), Katrice Bridges Copeland makes a strong case for her conclusion that neither the exclusion of pharmaceutical manufacturers from Medicare and Medicaid — a punishment which the government is reluctant to impose because it would spell the end for the company — nor the use of corporate integrity agreements coupled with large fines — which manufacturers agree to in order to avoid exclusion — works to deter illegal marketing activities.  As Professor Copeland notes, numerous companies have learned that “the punishment for multiple offenses is simply another CIA and another fine.”  She recommends that the government consider a number of alternative penalties for repeat offenders, including (1) requiring that manufacturers fund clinical trials studying the off-label uses for which they promoted their products, (2) requiring that they license the product or products at issue to other manufacturers, (3) holding high-level individuals criminally liable under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, and (4) amending the Social Security Act to allow for the exclusion of particular drugs (as opposed to entire companies) from Medicare and Medicaid.

Finally, I recommend Seton Hall Law’s own Jordan Paradise’s fascinating article, Claiming Nanotechnology: Improving USPTO Efforts at Classification of Emerging Nano-Enabled Pharmaceutical Technologies (forthcoming in the 2011 volume of the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property and available on SSRN), in which she argues that the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s system for classifying patents on nanotechnology-related inventions, “[w]hile undoubtedly helpful for internal purposes,” cedes too much to the courts.  Reviewing the facts of the recent case Elan Pharma International v. Abraxis Bioscience, which involved a dispute over two patents describing nano or near-nano scale versions of the same existing cancer-fighting agent and was tried to a jury verdict, Professor Paradise points out several ways in which the patents’ claims potentially overlap.  She argues that the courts are “a clumsy forum” for sorting out the “complex patent law issues that arise based on scale, size, and interactions at the nanoscale that transcend previously envisioned physical and chemical boundaries[,]” and offers concrete recommendations for steps the USPTO can take to improve its classification efforts to reduce the number of patents with potentially overlapping claims thereby making court involvement less necessary.

FDA’s ‘Bad Ad’ Program is in Full Effect

Last spring, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) launched the Truthful Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion Program (known more accessibly as the “Bad Ad Program“). The goal of the program is to enlist the help of health care professionals, consumers, and industry representatives in noting FDA violations and reporting activities and messages that are false or misleading. Common drug marketing violations include omitting or downplaying risk, overstating effectiveness, promoting off-label uses and making misleading drug comparisons. The program is run by the FDA’s Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications (DDMAC), which is responsible for “ensuring truthful advertising and promotion of prescription drugs.”

The FDA published a year-end report in May noting that the program has been successful in raising awareness. DDMAC received 328 reports of potentially untruthful or misleading promotions in one year, with the majority of those submitted by health care professionals (188 reports) and consumers (116 reports). The report notes that prior to the Bad Ad program, the FDA received an average of about 104 reports per year.

And the Bad Ad tips are still coming in. Just at the end of last month, DDMAC issued a reprimand letter to Pfizer’s Vice President of US Regulatory Affairs regarding misleading advertising of drugs on the company’s Lipitor website. A complaint to the Bad Ad program observed that the links from the Lipitor site led to pages for the drugs Caduet (for high cholesterol and blood pressure), Norvasc (for high blood pressure), and Chantix (for smoking cessation). But each of those pages failed to note any of the risk information associated with the drugs, which is a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

The FDA states that “by omitting the most serious and frequently occurring risks associated with Caduet, Chantix, and Norvasc, the webpage misleadingly suggests that these drugs are safer than have been demonstrated.” The letter ends with a request that Pfizer immediately stop the dissemination of violative promotional materials for the drugs. The company was to have submitted a written response to the complaint by September 14^th that states how they will comply with the request.

While the Bad Ad program may be working to raise awareness among health professionals and consumers, one violation may not be enough to induce compliance from pharmaceutical companies. In fact, DDMAC already chided Pfizer in March of 2009 for omitting risk information for Caduet and Chantix. In that case, Pfizer sponsored links for the drugs on Internet search engines. The sites linked to did not mention any risk information and therefore, presumably,  can be said to have also represented the products in a manner which, as above, suggests that these drugs are safer than have been demonstrated.” The most recent letter states that “DDMAC is concerned that Pfizer is continuing to promote its products in a similarly violative manner.” A citizen’s task force is a good way for the FDA to multiply their eyes and ears to keep tabs on misleading and/or violative advertisement. We’ll see what further successes the next year-end report for the Bad Ad program can show. Or, perhaps, success might also be measured in the absence of violations.

Generic Drugs, Cost-Effectiveness, and Confidence

Smarter prescribing and better medication management are linchpins of current efforts to care for those with chronic medical conditions in a more consistent, coordinated, and, it is hoped, affordable manner.  A study reported in last month’s Health Affairs found that using medication to control patients’ blood sugar levels and lower their blood pressure and cholesterol is not just cost-effective, it can actually save money by reducing “downstream complications and the use of health services that outweigh the cost of the medications themselves.”  Notably, these cost savings can only be achieved if the medications in question are generics.  The authors conclude that “in a health care system strapped for resources, physicians will increasingly use generics, and patients will have to expect that most of their medications will be generic.”

As the authors also note, resistance to generics, on the part of both patients and their doctors, is longstanding and persistent.  Some of this can be chalked up to the intense and wide-ranging marketing campaigns that innovator companies mount on behalf of branded drugs.  Branded medications used to treat chronic conditions are especially heavily marketed, including through the use of free samples.  Numerous studies (here’s a recent one out of Vermont) show that physicians with sample closets in their offices are less likely than those without sample closets to prescribe generics where appropriate.

Interestingly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services announced earlier this year that Medicaid Part D prescription drug plans “may incur expenses related to distribution of and reporting on generic drug samples, provided to members within a physician’s office setting, under the plan’s administrative cost structure if doing so is consistent with a cost effective drug utilization management program.”  CMS explained that generic samples have the potential to reduce the government’s overall costs and to promote compliance with drug therapies by reducing enrollees’ current and future cost sharing expenses.  (George Van Antwerp argues here that CMS overstates the benefits of generic samples, but only because generic fill rates are rising so fast without them.)

Marketing is not the whole story behind lingering resistance to generics, though.  As the New York Times recently reported, most generic drugs are manufactured in “a shadowy network of facilities in China and India that are rarely visited by government inspectors, who sometimes cannot even find the plants.”  While plants in the United States are inspected at least once every two years, the Food and Drug Administration has historically lacked the resources to provide the same level of oversight to foreign facilities.  An “epoch-making” agreement between the FDA and generic drug manufacturers will, assuming it is approved by Congress, change this.  The manufacturers have agreed to pay $299 million in annual fees to, among other things, fund inspections of foreign plants on the same schedule that applies to domestic plants.  As the Times notes: “[T]he generic drug industry is no longer a motley collection of struggling mom-and-pop companies.  Years of consolidation have created giants like Israel-based Teva Pharmaceuticals that understand that their businesses depend on winning the confidence of patients and regulators alike, and they can afford to pay the fees needed to achieve that confidence.”

Auditing Studies of Anti-Depressants

Marcia Angell has kicked off another set of controversies for the pharmaceutical sector in two recent review essays in the New York Review of Books. She favorably reviews meta-research that calls into question the effectiveness of many antidepressant drugs:

Kirsch and his colleagues used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain FDA reviews of all placebo-controlled clinical trials, whether positive or negative, submitted for the initial approval of the six most widely used antidepressant drugs approved between 1987 and 1999—Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, Celexa, Serzone, and Effexor. . . .Altogether, there were forty-two trials of the six drugs. Most of them were negative. Overall, placebos were 82 percent as effective as the drugs, as measured by the Hamilton Depression Scale (HAM-D), a widely used score of symptoms of depression. The average difference between drug and placebo was only 1.8 points on the HAM-D, a difference that, while statistically significant, was clinically meaningless. The results were much the same for all six drugs: they were all equally unimpressive. Yet because the positive studies were extensively publicized, while the negative ones were hidden, the public and the medical profession came to believe that these drugs were highly effective antidepressants.

Angell discusses other research that indicates that placebos can often be nearly as effective as drugs for conditions like depression. Psychiatrist Peter Kramer, a long-time advocate of anti-depressant therapy, responded to her last Sunday. He admits that “placebo responses . . . have been steadily on the rise” in FDA data; “in some studies, 40 percent of subjects not receiving medication get better.” But he believes that is only because the studies focus on the mildly depressed:

The problem is so big that entrepreneurs have founded businesses promising to identify genuinely ill research subjects. The companies use video links to screen patients at central locations where (contrary to the practice at centers where trials are run) reviewers have no incentives for enrolling subjects. In early comparisons, off-site raters rejected about 40 percent of subjects who had been accepted locally — on the ground that those subjects did not have severe enough symptoms to qualify for treatment. If this result is typical, many subjects labeled mildly depressed in the F.D.A. data don’t have depression and might well respond to placebos as readily as to antidepressants.

Yves Smith finds Kramer’s response unconvincing:

The research is clear: the efficacy of antidepressants is (contrary to what [Kramer's] article suggests) lower than most drugs (70% is a typical efficacy rate; for antidepressants, it’s about 50%. The placebo rate is 20% to 30% for antidepressants). And since most antidepressants produce side effects, patients in trials can often guess successfully as to whether they are getting real drugs. If a placebo is chosen that produces a symptom, say dry mouth, the efficacy of antidepressants v. placebos is almost indistinguishable. The argument made in [Kramer's] article to try to deal with this inconvenient fact, that many of the people chosen for clinical trials really weren’t depressed (thus contending that the placebo effect was simply bad sampling) is utter[ly wrong]. You’d see the mildly/short-term depressed people getting both placebos and real drugs. You would therefore expect to see the efficacy rate of both the placebo and the real drug boosted by the inclusion of people who just happened to get better anyhow.

Felix Salmon also challenges Kramer’s logic:

[Kramer's view is that] lots of people were diagnosed with depression and put onto a trial of antidepressant drugs, even when they were perfectly healthy. Which sounds very much like the kind of thing that Angell is complaining about: the way in which, for instance, the number of children so disabled by mental disorders that they qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) was 35 times higher in 2007 than it was in 1987. And it’s getting worse: the editors of DSM-V, to be published in 2013, have written that “in primary care settings, approximately 30 percent to 50 percent of patients have prominent mental health symptoms or identifiable mental disorders, which have significant adverse consequences if left untreated.”

Those who would defend psychopharmacology, then, seem to want to have their cake and eat it: on the one hand it seems that serious mental health disorders have reached pandemic proportions, but on the other hand we’re told that a lot of people diagnosed with those disorders never really had them in the first place.

That is a very challenging point for the industry to consider as it responds to concerns like Angell’s. The diagnosis of mental illness will always have ineradicably economic dimensions and politically contestable aims. But doctors and researchers should insulate professional expertise and the interpretation of maladies as much as possible from inappropriate pressures.

How can they maintain that kind of independent clinical judgment? I think one key is to assure that data from all trials is open to all researchers. Consider, for instance, these findings from a NEJM study on “selective publication:”

We obtained reviews from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for studies of 12 antidepressant agents involving 12,564 patients. . . . Among 74 FDA-registered studies, 31%, accounting for 3449 study participants, were not published. Whether and how the studies were published were associated with the study outcome. A total of 37 studies viewed by the FDA as having positive results were published; 1 study viewed as positive was not published. Studies viewed by the FDA as having negative or questionable results were, with 3 exceptions, either not published (22 studies) or published in a way that, in our opinion, conveyed a positive outcome (11 studies). According to the published literature, it appeared that 94% of the trials conducted were positive. By contrast, the FDA analysis showed that 51% were positive. Separate meta-analyses of the FDA and journal data sets showed that the increase in effect size ranged from 11 to 69% for individual drugs and was 32% overall. (emphasis added).

Melander, et al. also worried (in 2003) that, since “The degree of multiple publication, selective publication, and selective reporting differed between products,” “any attempt to recommend a specific selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor from the publicly available data only is likely to be based on biased evidence.” Without clearer “best practices” for data publication, clinical judgment may be impaired.

Full disclosure of study funding should also be mandatory and conspicuous, wherever results are published. Ernest R. House has reported that, “In a study of 370 ‘randomized’ drug trials, studies recommended the experimental drug as the ‘treatment of choice’ in 51% of trials sponsored by for-profit organizations compared to 16% sponsored by nonprofits.” The commodification of research has made it too easy to manipulate results, as Bartlett & Steele have argued:

One big factor in the shift of clinical trials to foreign countries is a loophole in F.D.A. regulations: if studies in the United States suggest that a drug has no benefit, trials from abroad can often be used in their stead to secure F.D.A. approval. There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be especially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called “rescue countries.” Rescue countries came to the aid of Ketek, the first of a new generation of widely heralded antibiotics to treat respiratory-tract infections. Ketek was developed in the 1990s by Aventis Pharmaceuticals, now Sanofi-Aventis. In 2004 . . . the F.D.A. certified Ketek as safe and effective. The F.D.A.’s decision was based heavily on the results of studies in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The approval came less than one month after a researcher in the United States was sentenced to 57 months in prison for falsifying her own Ketek data. . . . As the months ticked by, and the number of people taking the drug climbed steadily, the F.D.A. began to get reports of adverse reactions, including serious liver damage that sometimes led to death. . . . [C]ritics were especially concerned about an ongoing trial in which 4,000 infants and children, some as young as six months, were recruited in more than a dozen countries for an experiment to assess Ketek’s effectiveness in treating ear infections and tonsillitis. The trial had been sanctioned over the objections of the F.D.A.’s own reviewers. . . . In 2006, after inquiries from Congress, the F.D.A. asked Sanofi-Aventis to halt the trial. Less than a year later, one day before the start of a congressional hearing on the F.D.A.’s approval of the drug, the agency suddenly slapped a so-called black-box warning on the label of Ketek, restricting its use. (A black-box warning is the most serious step the F.D.A. can take short of removing a drug from the market.) By then the F.D.A. had received 93 reports of severe adverse reactions to Ketek, resulting in 12 deaths.

The great anti-depressant debate is part of a much larger “re-think” of the validity of data. Medical claims can spread virally without much evidence. According to a notable meta-researcher, “much of what medical researchers conclude in their studies is misleading, exaggerated, or flat-out wrong.” The “decline effect” dogs science generally. Statisticians are also debunking ballyhooed efforts to target cancer treatments.

Max Weber once said that “radical doubt is the father of knowledge.” Perhaps DSM-VI will include a diagnosis for such debilitating skepticism. But I think there’s much to be learned from an insistence that true science is open, inspectable, and replicable. Harvard’s program on “Digital Scholarship” and the Yale Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing* have taken up this cause, as has the work of Victoria Stodden.

We often hear that the academic sector has to become more “corporate” if it is to survive and thrive. At least when it comes to health data, the reverse is true: corporations must become much more open about the sources and limits of the studies they conduct. We can’t resolve the “great anti-depressant debate,” or prevent future questioning of pharma’s bona fides, without such commitments.

*In the spirit of full disclosure: I did participate in this roundtable.

Power, Knowledge, and Big Pharma: Preliminary Reflections on the Sorrell Vacuum

I have previously commented on Sorrell v. IMS Health, as a co-author of an amicus brief, a Pharma FaceOff panelist, and a blogger. I’m disappointed by the Sorrell ruling, for reasons largely elaborated in Justice Breyer’s dissent. As he observes, the majority opinion “reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decision-making where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.” But I’m not surprised at the Lochner revival, given the First Amendment maximalism of the Citizens United Court. For this Court, “free expression” will have to do in the information age what “freedom of contract” did for the early decades of the 20th century: erase even small and incremental steps toward a fairer social order.

Bill McGeveran has characterized Kennedy’s majority opinion in the case as relatively limited, a surgical strike against an overreaching and incompetent state legislature. I want to respond to his interpretation in a future post, after I’ve digested the opinion a bit more. But for now, I’d like to focus a bit of attention on the types of problems Vermont was addressing, to give the case more of a human face. For behind all the familiar Kennedy rhetoric about sacred speech, deeply disturbing industry practices motivated Vermont’s law.

Both PhRMA and IMS Health want us to believe that the case is about the life-saving power of a marketer to recommend drugs to oblivious doctors once it has access to their prescribing records. Never mind that, as Dr. David Orentlicher notes, “For $98 a year . . . physicians can subscribe to The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics, a respected and independent, biweekly newsletter that provides evaluations of prescription (and over-the-counter) drugs.” Maybe detailing, on occasion, saves lives. But, as the dissent observes, Vermont’s law allowed doctors to permit distribution of their prescribing records in order to receive personalized solicitations. They only needed to opt in.

Now why did Vermont doctors petition the state to limit access to prescriber records? And why might a rational physician choose not to opt in? Hundreds of pages of empirical studies show the problems caused by detailing; many are cited in Breyer’s dissent. But to make the situation a little more concrete, consider some of the literature a physician who rarely prescribes, say, pscyhotropic drugs, may now be reading. These examples are all drawn from two recent pieces by Marcia Angell in the NYRB:

A large survey of randomly selected adults, sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and conducted between 2001 and 2003, found that an astonishing 46 percent met criteria established by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) for having had at least one mental illness within four broad categories at some time in their lives. . . . The new generation of antipsychotics, such as Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel, has replaced cholesterol-lowering agents as the top-selling class of drugs in the US. . . . [Author Robert Whitaker] is outraged by what he sees as an iatrogenic (i.e., inadvertent and medically introduced) epidemic of brain dysfunction, particularly that caused by the widespread use of the newer (“atypical”) antipsychotics.

***

The pharmaceutical industry influences psychiatrists to prescribe psychoactive drugs even for categories of patients in whom the drugs have not been found safe and effective. [There has been an] astonishing rise in the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness in children, sometimes as young as two years old.

The FDA approves drugs only for specified uses, and it is illegal for companies to market them for any other purpose—that is, “off-label.” Nevertheless, physicians are permitted to prescribe drugs for any reason they choose, and one of the most lucrative things drug companies can do is persuade physicians to prescribe drugs off-label, despite the law against it. In just the past four years, five firms have admitted to federal charges of illegally marketing psychoactive drugs. AstraZeneca marketed Seroquel off-label for children and the elderly (another vulnerable population, often administered antipsychotics in nursing homes); Pfizer faced similar charges for Geodon (an antipsychotic); Eli Lilly for Zyprexa (an antipsychotic); Bristol-Myers Squibb for Abilify (another antipsychotic); and Forest Labs for Celexa (an antidepressant).

Despite having to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to settle the charges, the companies have probably come out well ahead.

Whereas IMS Health’s counsel described detailing in oral arguments as “information about lifesaving medications where the detailer goes in and talks about double blind scientific studies that are responsible for the development of drugs that have caused 40 percent of the increase in the lifespan of the American public,” Angell marshals an impressive array of evidence on the unreliability of pharma marketing, and even the underlying studies some of it is based on. Angell also compiles surprising details about the pervasive role of pharmaceutical firm influence over the social construction of mental illness. When you consider the industry’s targeting of “key opinion leaders” (professors and practitioners at elite medical centers), civil society groups, and the DSM, Vermont’s law seems an almost trivial response to a juggernaut of profit-driven promotions for mind cures. And yet even that small step (toward allowing physicians more control over how they are approached by detailers) offended the delicate sensibilities of the majority.

The Breyer dissent’s litany of regulated industry information practices should have dampened Kennedy’s abstracted enthusiasm for a “commercial marketplace” that “provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.” But in the vacuum of First Amendment fundamentalist thought, the complex ecology of fair information practices and calibrated disclosure cannot survive. It’s all-or-nothing: as soon as some parties gain access to prescriber data, everybody has to have it. Doctors can’t choose to structure their interactions with detailers based on profiling of their practices; rather, they face the stark choice of letting in marketers with access to all the prescribing practice data the state requires pharmacies to maintain, or not to talk to them at all.

In Sorrell, privacy and free expression become clashing rights, rather than social values that have long been reconciled (and occasionally reinforced one another) in complex regulatory schemes. We need to maintain that tradition of nuance in information law. Sadly, Sorrell turns its back on it.

Discussion on Pharma Face-Off

I was recently invited to debate issues in the Vermont data mining case on the program Pharma Face-Off. We’ve had some pro-PhRMA and anti-PhRMA perspectives here over the past year, and the program continues the conversation. I’ve been a bit tied up giving 6 talks in four cities over the past 8 days, but I’ll have some thoughts on it next week. One preview of my counterintuitive take: I think IMS Health (and its ally, PhRMA) are likely to win this case, but it could prove a Pyrrhic victory. The less doctors can constructively structure their encounters with detailers and reps, the more likely they are to shut them out altogether (a “solution” to the excessive influence problem that both Justice Scalia and IMS Health’s counsel, Tom Goldstein, repeatedly mentioned in oral arguments). Be careful what you wish for.

The Disturbing Rise in Drug Shortages: A “Multifactorial” Problem

With the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology this past week came a wave of news stories about cancer and cancer treatment.  Frank Pasquale highlights a disturbing warning issued by oncologists at the meeting, that “cancer medicines desperately needed by sick children and adults are in short supply, undermining the ability of U.S. doctors to administer treatments.”  Supplies of other medicines are running short, too, including treatments for anaphylactic shock, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, cardiac arrest, cystic fibrosis, and infertility.

Writing for the AP, Lauran Neergaard reports that “[t]he problem of scarce supplies or even completely unavailable medications isn’t a new one but it’s getting markedly worse.”  According to Lancet Oncology, there were a record 211 drug shortages in 2011, up from 166 in 2009, 149 in 2008, 129 in 2007, and 70 in 2006.  Neergard adds that “another 89 drug shortages have occurred in the first three months of this year[.]”

Most of the medicines that have run short are sterile injectable drugs, which are complex and time-consuming to manufacture.  (The anesthesia drug sodium thiopental which I blogged about here falls into this category.)  And, most, or even all, of the shortfall drugs are no longer subject to protection from a patent or Food & Drug Administration-administered exclusivity period, so the innovator firms that developed them are subject to competition from generic manufacturers.  The resultant lower prices and slimmer profit margins mean that, in the words of leading oncologist Dr. Richard Schilsky, the manufacturers’ return on investment is “pretty low.”

Among the reasons cited for the rise in drug shortages are the inherent challenges of manufacturing sterile injectable drugs, the low return on investment facing generic manufacturers, which has led the number of manufacturers of any given generic drug to dwindle, drug company mergers, which can result in the discontinuation of one of two similar products, the time it takes the FDA to approve applications to make manufacturing changes, for example a change in the source of a drug’s active ingredient, and the failure of the FDA to act expeditiously in investigating manufacturing problems and clearing plants to resume production once the problems have been resolved.

The Preserving Access to Lifesaving Medications Act, introduced in February by Senators Robert Casey and Amy Klobuchar, would require manufacturers to notify FDA “of a discontinuance, interruption, or other adjustment of the manufacture of the drug that would likely result in a shortage of such drug[.]“  Per Lauran Neergard, the FDA “was able to prevent 38 close calls from turning into shortages last year by speeding approval of manufacturing changes or urging competing companies to get ready to meet a shortfall.”  The FDA has even permitted (temporarily) the import of medicines approved outside the United States when necessary to mitigate shortages.

Participants in a Drug Shortages Summit convened late last year by the American Society of Clinical Oncology and others recommended that additional legislative and regulatory reforms be explored, ranging from providing incentives to manufacturers in exchange for a guarantee that they continue producing critical drugs, to charging manufacturers fees to fund expedited FDA review of applications for permission to manufacture generic drugs, to requiring manufacturing redundancies (e.g. that more than one source for a drug’s active ingredient be identified) as a condition of approval.  Interestingly, while some participants in the Drug Shortages Summit argued that products liability exposure could cause companies to withdraw drugs from the market, the manufacturers who attended denied this, calling the decision “multifactorial.”  There is evidence to support the manufacturers’ claim.  As I discussed here, in late 2004, after Chiron Corporation announced that it would not be able to provide flu vaccine for the United States market that year due to manufacturing issues, Congress brought the flu vaccine into the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program fold.  Unfortunately, liability relief did not result in an increase in the number of manufacturers in the flu vaccine market.  Targeted reforms like those that the Summit participants recommend be explored seem more likely to be effective at ensuring a steady, reliable supply of vital medicines.

The Identity Theft Smoke Screen: Data Mining of Prescription Drug Records and Personal Data Privacy

[Ed Note: We are pleased to welcome a guest article from Christopher J. Asakiewicz, J.D. He graduated from Seton Hall Law in 2011 with a concentration in Health Law, recently passed the New York Bar Exam (congratulations!) and works for ImClone Systems Corporation, an affiliate of Eli Lilly and Company, drafting and negotiating various clinical documents and patient disclosures with both US and ex-US institutions as well as central and local investigational review boards (IRBs). During law school he worked  at Saint Vincents Catholic Medical Centers of New York (SVCMC) in the department of legal affairs, and prior to pursuing a legal education, managed phase IIIB/IV international clinical trials for Pfizer Inc. in the areas of neurology and neurodegenerative diseases.]

Personal data privacy once again has taken front stage in Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc.[1] Vermont passed the Vermont Confidentiality of Prescription Information Law that allows doctors which prescribe drugs to patients, to decide whether pharmacies can sell their prescription drug prescription records.[2] IMS Health as well as other health information companies contested the law, arguing that the law poses a restriction on commercial speech as access to such information helps pharmaceutical companies market their drugs effectively to doctors. The Supreme Court is now tasked with determining the constitutionality of the restriction on access to prescription information with regards to our First Amendment. [3]

However, this post is focused on the secondary effects asserted in amici curiae briefs supporting the petitioners of allowing companies to purchase such information, specifically the concern of data privacy and patient re-identification. [4] Under the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), personal health information is de-identified by your local pharmacy prior to such information being shared with any third party. By de-identifying the data, your personal data cannot, it is believed, be linked or traced back to you. De-identifying your health information is a way for covered entities to share your information without your consent or authorization and in accordance with the law. The information once shared is completely anonymized. After the transfer to a third party, like IMS Health, your information is solely data of zeros and ones that translate to dates of dispensing and drug names. No longer does your prescription record list your name or month or day of birth. [5]

Briefs in the case assert that data mining firms could, hypothetically, create profiles based on these de-identified prescription records. Such prescription profiles would constitute certain patient’s prescription habits, including an individual’s medication types, pharmacies visited and dates dispensed. The briefs argue that linking and mining further public information to these drug profiles could result in patient re-identification.

IMS Health, Inc., of course, asserts that it has no knowledge of any patient re-identification and it protects such records with all the security privacy measures set forth under HIPAA and as strengthened by Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). So what is the issue, I ask?

A pharmaceutical company does not need nor want to know who you are. Aggregate data is more beneficial to a marketing company, rather than just one record with your name on it. What benefit would a company get from a record that says, John Doe, DOB: 01-Jan-1984? The company could send you a mailer, but under the current regulations, you can opt out of the marketing material and it stops there. However, what helps a pharmaceutical company is aggregate datasets that say Dr. Jane Doe, MD writes 100 scripts for Lipitor ® a month. No one cares if the patients are unidentifiable, and most likely, the pharmaceutical company wants to keep it that way. Not only will the de-identified data be cheaper to buy, but it also assures the third party purchasing the data that it is not aiding a HIPAA violation.

Last, it is also asserted that there is no penalty for re-identification of personal health data, but there are stark penalties under HIPAA for “a person who knowingly … (1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; (2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individual; or (3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person.” [6] If the offense is committed with the intent to sell, transfer or use the individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, the penalty could be up to $250,000 and 10 years imprisonment. [7] If claims are brought against companies, like IMS Health, the companies will surely argue they are not covered entities subject to the penalties under HIPAA; however, this does not prevent civil lawsuits against them.

What will happen if a breach occurs due to patient re-identification? Most likely, the current healthcare environment where many companies are acting under corporate integrity agreements or deferred prosecution agreements, promotes reporting, if not out of altruistic purpose at least a compliance purpose. With this said, once reported to both the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Civil Rights, as well as, in most states, the Secretary of state, privacy and confidentiality laws require notification to be provided to the patient that has been re-identified. This patient whose privacy rights have been infringed can then bring an individual civil claim against the organization responsible for the disclosure of their health information as well as the collateral damages caused by the unauthorized disclosure. Now, what company today wants to get involved with this type of bad publicity?

In conclusion, just because the possibility exists that a patient can be re-identified with data mining practices, does not mean that our current environment will foster such. The nine Justices of the Supreme Court need to be more concerned with the First Amendment and the commercial speech implications of their ruling, rather than amici curiae briefs supporting public policy positions based on unwarranted fears of patient information disclosure.[8]

I therefore urge you to put yourself in the role of your favorite Justice and consider if you should be more concerned that a company is going to buy your prescription records and try to determine that you took amoxicillin for a sinus infection when you were five years old, or if that company would rather purchase all the information you posted on Facebook ® or other social networking sites, including all the locations you have checked in. Which do you think is more useful to market its products? It is with this mindset that you must consider if the regulation directly advances the governmental interest “in protecting the public health of Vermonters, … the privacy of prescribers and prescribing information” and is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. [9]

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[1] Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 857, No. 10-779, Dec. 13, 2010.

[2] Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631 (2010).

[3] See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

[4] Brief of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et. al. as Amici curiae supporting Petitioners, Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 857, (2011) (No. 10-779), 24-9, available at, http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/10-779%20EPIC%20amicus%20Sorrell.pdf; Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely (Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at, http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf.

[5] Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996), 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.312(e)(2)(ii), 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010).

[6] 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(1)-(3).

[7] Id. § 1320d-6(b).

[8] Brief of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et. al. as Amici curiae supporting petitioners, Sorrel, 131 S. Ct. 857, (No. 10-779).

[9] See Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 17 (2007) (Confidentiality of Prescription Information); Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 89, § 3 (2008) (amending Act 80).

Discount Prescription Program Available To Some Locals

Listen up, Hoboken, Newark, and Orange residents.  There’s a new prescription discount program in town: Coast2Coast Rx Card.  Well, the program isn’t all that new to the area: Newark launched it last year and Hoboken launched it in January.  However, I didn’t learn about Coast2Coast Rx Card until I filled a prescription at my local CVS last month.  Since my prescription wasn’t covered by my health insurance (I always joke to the pharmacist that it kind of defeats the purpose of having health insurance, but I never get any laughs), I was bracing myself for the out-of-pocket cost.  So imagine my surprise when the pharmacist said that I owed $35 instead of $50.  When I pointed out the “mistake,” I was handed a Coast2Coast Rx Card.

While it isn’t a substitute for health insurance, the free Card does offer discounts on prescription drugs, laboratory tests, and imaging tests.  Specifically, the Card boasts such features as:

• 59,000+ participating pharmacies including all major chains and most independents
• Over 60,000 drugs included in formulary
• Save up to 65% on a brand name or generic drugs
• Overall annual savings range from 30% to 45%
• Card is good for an entire family
• Cardholder pays no fees for the card
• No paperwork to fill out — card is ready to use
• There are no health, age or income restrictions; everyone qualifies
• Card has no expiration date and can be used as often as needed
• Card can be used to fill pet prescriptions at participating pharmacies
• Card is primarily for uninsured although insureds can use the card if they have a high deductible
• Insureds can use the card if their drug isn’t covered by their insurance
• In some instances the card can be used during the Medicare Part D “donut hole.”
• Cardholder information is held confidential and is not used for any other purpose.
• The card includes 50%-80% discounts on lab and imaging tests

According to The Florida Times-Union, Financial Marketing Concepts, Inc. (FMC), a Florida-based company, issues the Card on behalf of WellDyneRx, a national pharmacy benefit management company.  In the past three years, FMC has secured agreements with 57 cities and counties in Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas (which may or may not look something like this.)  These agreements give FMC a small fee for each prescription filled through the program.  FMC in turn passes along a royalty to the city or county.

If you’re like me, you may already be in the habit of calling pharmacies and comparing the cost of prescriptions, regardless of whether or not your health insurance covers them — and it’s surprising how the cost can vary.  So if you live in Hoboken, Newark, or Orange, be sure to check out whether the Card gives you any discounts.  Can’t hurt.

Antibiotic Resistance on the Rise, Thanks to Capital Misallocation on a Grand Scale

A Hollywood Ending for Pharma?

There is an interesting article at Xconomy San Diego on the growing tensions between venture capitalists, biotech startups, and pharmaceutical companies. Many entrepreneurs feel like they’re getting a raw deal from big pharma firms. One source alleges that dealmakers are about to kill the geese that lay the golden eggs.

In an earlier post, I worried that big pharma firms were becoming virtual to the point of ghostliness, mere nexuses of certifications, patent and trademark portfolios, tax dodges, and contractual obligations. If these trends continue, what types of controversies are likely to develop?

Gains from Gatekeeping

The just-in-time, ad hoc nature of movie production has led many economists to see in it a model for collaboration in other industries. As Marty Neumaier puts it, “By switching to a network model, the studios . . . avail themselves of the best talent for each project, thereby creating unique products and shedding unnecessary overhead.” But one-off, one-sided contracts can lead to epic conflicts. Consider, for instance, the recent rash of news about Hollywood accounting:

Michael Moore . . . claims $2.7m in unpaid royalties from Fahrenheit 9/11 [from his studio]. . . At the heart of the lawsuit is a dispute about Hollywood accounting practices that have for decades been a source of contention between the studios that release movies and “the talent” . . . Moore alleges the Weinsteins improperly deducted expenses from his share of the film’s profits – including the cost of a private jet to fly Weinstein from the US to Europe.

When an intermediary has access to extraordinary distribution networks, it has enormous leverage vis a vis “the talent.” Studios might respond that it’s a lot more fun to be Michael Moore than it is to be Harvey Weinstein: one gets to express his ideas, the other has to meet a payroll. But the enormous amounts of money generated by the film (between $228 and $500 million, according to Moore’s lawyer), and the frequency of complaints like Moore’s, lead to concerns about transparency and bargaining power in the industry.

Terry Fisher has written compellingly on the economics of Hollywood and pharmaceutical research (with Talha Syed). Intellectual property is key to both industries, and that’s one natural point of connection. Another is the economic role of middlemen, a topic that’s becoming increasingly important as certain dominant companies aim to own the “celestial jukebox,” “master switch,” or “Digital WalMart” of content connectivity.

Consider Apple’s demand for 30% of revenue from publications delivered via the iPad–and its refusal to share key customer data (for example, ads clicked on, time spent per page, etc.) with publishers. Seth Godin does not approve of this move:

The web has been a hotbed of siloed content, of deep dives for small audiences. The large scale stuff, though, has tended to be mostly about gossip and other quick reads that’s cheap to produce. Tablets offer a new chance to create content worth paying for.

[But] Apple has announced that they want to tax each subscription made via the iPad at 30%. Yes, it’s a tax, because what it does is dramatically decrease the incremental revenue from each subscriber.

These debates are very old in the tech world: when the VCR was introduced, Hollywood said its makers should pay for all the copyright infringement it enabled. Sony eventually retorted that the studios should be glad to see all the new customers that electronics would bring them.

Health Care’s Middlemen

Moore, the disgruntled biotech firms, and Godin each in their own way bring up issues that are going to be very big in health care over the next decade. Private insurers were supposed to be the magical mediators between providers and consumers in health care, demanding value and driving down prices. But, as Joseph White has shown, it was far easier for insurers to “stick it to” their customers than to constrain prices of “must-have” providers:

Remembering the pain of the late 1990s, [by 2001] managers of health care providers and insurance companies were determined to keep prices up through “pricing discipline.” “I’ve never seen discipline in the industry from a pricing standpoint like I’ve seen now” (HSChange 2004, p. 2), said one insurance industry consultant, providing part of the answer to why the underwriting cycle had yet to turn back toward lower margins. . . .

One might wonder why consolidation among insurers did not allow them to resist the providers’ demand for increased payments. The simple answer is that there were two concentrated parts of the market and one fragmented part. The insurers had to choose between fighting a full-pitched battle with the providers or exploiting their own market power vis-à-vis the employers. Raising premiums to employers was a lot easier. In theory, employers could have demanded restrictive networks (at lower prices). But since everyone had agreed that employees did not like restrictive networks, and providers (especially hospitals) were not willing to discount much to get into such networks, there were not many available for purchase. Individual employers could not invent such a product; they could only shop around and find the relatively best deal by customizing other contract terms, such as cost sharing.

Just as insurers began to align more with the interests of concentrated providers than with fragmented, disorganized consumers, so too do many Group Purchasing Organizations appear to be failing to fulfill their promise as cost-constraining intermediaries. As one analyst testified before the DOJ and FTC, “the compensation of most GPO management is almost always based on . . . fee income [from suppliers] rather than on the real savings to hospital members.” Again, the ostensible “protector” of one side of the health care equation ends up aiding one side of the deal.

Of course, the masters of all such deals work in finance. As Karen Ho suggested in her excellent ethnography, Liquidated, their values inform all the tough and opportunistic dealmaking mentioned above. As I taught health care finance over the past few years, I continually felt the topic stood in relation to finance proper as chemistry might stand in relation to physics: a discipline in its own right, but ultimately reducible to a more fundamental science. (I’m not saying I endorse this reductionism, just that it is an intuitively plausible model for what’s really driving developments in health care.)

Are there any policy lessons for health care? As Louis Uchitelle has suggested, we might want to question an economic system that delivers risk-free riches to those who invest or market future cures and little but anxiety (with limited or very unlikely upside) to many of those who create them. If we hesitate at awarding Apple a perpetual 30% bite of publisher profits merely for becoming the hippest platform, or question a finance sector that grabs 30% of all corporate profits, we might also want to articulate some decent maximum multiple of dealmakers’ over researchers’ compensation.

Reflecting on his book “The Great Stagnation” a few weeks ago, Tyler Cowen noted that many of the biggest winners in today’s economy are structuring “heads I win, tails you lose” deals. Wall Street has mastered the concentration and privatization of gain and socialization of loss. Will key players in pharma and the rest of the health care sector scramble to follow its lead?

Professor Emeritus Margaret Gilhooley: “Drug User Fees, Health Priorities, Politics, the Deficit and Reform Directions”

Professor Emeritus Margaret Gilhooley of Seton Hall Law has posted “Drug User Fees, Health Priorities, Politics, the Deficit and Reform Directions” to SSRN. The paper examines the FDA’s funding mechanism in relationship to industry and raises questions as to the appropriateness of the arrangement as presently configured. The abstract alone is telling:

Abstract:
The Food and Drug Administration now depends on user fees paid by drug companies to support more than half the salaries of the medical reviewers who advise the agency on the appropriateness of approving a drug. The funding creates a substantial risk of “capture” of the agency by the industry. Under the program, which started in 1992, drug companies pay a fee that permits the agency to hire additional reviewers to make more timely reviews on whether a drug can be approved. Under the law, the agency seeks to meet performance goals for the timing of reviews, giving the program the appearance of having a fee-for-service basis.

The legislative authorization for the fees expires every five years, and the agency and the industry negotiate behind closed doors on the renewal and the performance goals for the reviews. The need for renewal creates an opportunity for the passage of laws that might not have been enacted separately. Some believe the Administration may accept measures of debatable merit to avoid having to layoff needed reviewers. Limiting the user fee support to half the Government appropriation for the program, and making the program permanent can alleviate the capture and linkage problems.

This paper maintains that reforms and changes in the policy rationale for the program are needed before locking-in a permanent funding commitment at a time of debate about growing budget shortfalls. Instead of a fee-for-service rationale, the program should be based on a health review rationale. A study is needed to identify better priority rankings and goals for drug reviews, rather than the simple categories and negotiations that now exist. To avoid the risk of capture, the revenues from the fees should not exceed the Government funding for the program. Making the fee program permanent would address the linkage problem but providing permanent funding can undercut Congress’ responsibility to determine important budget allocations in a time of concern about deficits. If the program is made permanent, the law should make clear that Congress can reduce the funding level for the fees to deal equitably with funding cutbacks in other programs made in light deficit considerations. Congress should also have to approve any major increases in the fee levels. The significance of the user fee program and the reforms needed, before it is made permanent, warrant wide attention.

Pharmaceutical Promotion, Prescriptions, Payors: Chain, Chain, Chain?

On February 16, 2011, Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes issued a Report & Recommendation in Sergeants Benevolent Assn. Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP, Case No. 1:08-cv-00179-SLT-RER (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), recommending that the district court not certify a class of union health and welfare funds and other third-party payors claiming that they paid for prescriptions for the antibiotic Ketek that doctors would not have written but for the defendant Sanofi-Aventis’ fraudulent marketing.  Jim Edwards at Placebo Net summarizes the plaintiffs’ fraud allegations as follows:  “Basically, Sanofi knew in October 2001 that one of its main researchers on the drug was probably faking her data. That researcher was indicted for research fraud in April 2003. Yet in April 2004, the FDA approved Ketek for sale even though both it and Sanofi knew the data on which the approval was based was entirely bogus. In 2007, after 53 cases of liver failure including four deaths, the FDA all but withdrew Ketek from the market.”

Judge Reyes’ R & R is just the latest in a string of decisions rejecting plaintiffs’ attempts to fit the peg of fraudulent or illegal promotion of drugs and devices into the hole of a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) class action.  Writing in Defense Counsel Journal in April of 2010, J. Gordon Cooney, John P. Lavelle, and Bahar Shariati explain the reasons why civil RICO is attractive to class action plaintiffs.  The Food Drug & Cosmetic Act does not have a private right of action, so those harmed when a drug is promoted fraudulently or illegally (for an off-label use, for example) cannot simply allege a violation of the FDCA.  Frequently, they claim instead that the promotion at issue constituted mail or wire fraud, both of which count as racketeering activity under the RICO statute, and that the defendant was guilty of conducting a RICO enterprise.  The civil RICO vehicle has several advantages for plaintiffs, including the possibility of treble damages, broad choice of venues, and “[p]erhaps most importantly in the class action context, civil RICO claims conceivably allow plaintiffs to sidestep the predominating choice-of-law issues that typically prevent nationwide class actions based on fraud or deceptive practice law[.]”

As the authors of the defense-oriented blog Drug and Device Law explain, however, third-party payors like the union health and welfare funds who brought the Ketek case have encountered difficulty at the class certification stage.  This is because they have been unable to convince courts that the members of the class could rely on common evidence to prove their claims.  In particular, courts have held that class certification is not appropriate because each plaintiff would have to put on individualized prescription-by-prescription evidence to establish that the promotion in question caused it to pay for prescriptions that would not otherwise have been written.

As Jim Edwards puts it, Judge Reyes held that “[t]he doctor’s decision to write a Ketek prescription removes the ‘proximate cause’ necessary to establish that the plaintiffs paid for the drug based on fraud — even though the only reason the drug was on the market was because of Sanofi’s fraud, and individual doctors are in no position to know whether drugs are backed by fraudulent data or not.”  Edwards suggest that “[i]f Congress wanted to find a cost-free way of reducing government spending on medical bills, then loosening the legal definitions of fraud, kickbacks and false statements to include common sense interpretations of bad behavior would be one way to do it.”

A “Sputnik Moment”? Hopes for Renewed Drug Development With A Little Help From Our NIH Friends

In his State of the Union Address, President Obama tried to spark the “creativity and imagination” of the American people when he proclaimed

[t]his is our generation’s Sputnik moment.  Two years ago, I said that we needed to reach a level of research and development we haven’t seen since the height of the Space Race.  And in a few weeks, I will be sending a budget to Congress that helps us meet that goal.  We’ll invest in biomedical research, information technology, and especially clean energy technology… an investment that will strengthen our security, protect our planet, and create countless new jobs for our people.

Now I don’t know what came first — the chicken or the egg — but President Obama’s speech about investing in biomedical research and technological innovation follows National Institutes of Health (NIH) Director Francis Collins’ proposal to create a National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) to encourage drug discoveries and facilitate translational research in compounds overlooked by or abandoned by pharmaceutical manufacturers.  So does Dr. Collins’ proposal qualify as a “Sputnik moment”?

You might not have realized it, given those never-ending TV and magazine advertisements for prescription products (whose side effects sometimes sound worse than their benefits, but that’s another blog post), but pharmaceutical manufacturers have reduced their investment in researching and developing drugs.  According to the New York Times, pharmaceutical manufacturers spend over $1 billion developing a drug, with some “typically spend[ing] twice as much on marketing as on research” though that’s “a business model that is increasingly suspect.”  (For a brief overview of the research and development process, click here.)  The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) estimates that its members spent $45.8 billion in 2009 in research alone.

Even so, the number of drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has dropped over the last 15 years and that’s not due to a lack of scientific information or higher FDA standards.  In November 2010, Forbes health blogger Matthew Herper reported on  the annual meeting of the American Society of Human Genetics at which Dr. Collins

implored his colleagues in genetics to work to develop new treatments for rare diseases. His point was that the NIH and the Food and Drug Administration are increasingly able to handle preclinical and early clinical drug development, and that with these first steps taken medicines are more likely to be brought to market by large pharmaceutical companies.

Mr. Herper also noted that a few organizations, such as the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and the Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation, have taken a similar route in pushing along research  until a pharmaceutical manufacturer picks up the slack.  Then a month later, Arthur H. Rubenstein, dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and chair of the NIH Translational Medicine and Therapeutics Working Group, told the Wall Street Journal Health Blog, “[b]asic science has exploded but it has not translated into benefit for the public.  The question was what to do about it.”

In stepped NIH to ease, in the words of the WSJ Health Blog, the “mounting frustration that a wealth of new information about the molecular basis of diseases hasn’t produced more new therapies.”  On December 7, 2010, NIH’s Scientific Management Review Board (SMRB) voted 12-1 in favor of adding NCATS to NIH.  Dr. Collins notified Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius of the decision.  Then on January 14, 2011, Secretary Sebelius sent a letter to Congress.  However, the decision to add NCATS  meant dismantling one of the 27 NIH centers and institutes, per the requirements of a 2006 law (”27″ is the “magic number”).  The lone SMRB dissenter, Jeremy Berg, director of the National Institute of General Medical Sciences, said he was “concerned that the implications for the rest of NIH hadn’t been adequately discussed.”

And therein lies some of the controversy.  NIH envisions NCATS as a link between basic discovery research and therapeutics care by:

• providing a visible, central locus for access to resources, tools, and expertise related to translational medicine;
• streamlining and improving the process of therapeutics development;
• serving as a catalyst, resource, and convener for collaborative interactions by supporting novel and innovative partnerships between multiple key stakeholders, including academia, government, industry, venture capitalists, and non-profit organizations;
• expanding the pre-competitive space by, among other things, enabling and providing incentives for greater sharing of scientific information and publication of negative results;
• supporting and strengthening translational medicine and therapeutics research, including providing access to services and resources for high-throughput screening, assay development, medicinal chemistry, and preclinical modeling;
• training translational research investigators; and
• enhancing communication among all stakeholders.

PhRMA Senior Vice President David E. Wheadon supports NCATS because

[c]ollaboration — including industry, NIH and academia — is one element driving innovation in drug development, particularly early stage — and ‘bold and ambitious’ proposals, such as Dr. Collins’, will be key to how we collectively progress in discovering novel compounds for addressing patients’ unmet medical needs….

The fact remains that biopharmaceutical research companies today and in the future will play a pivotal role: Our companies create the vast majority of new medicines from start to finish and, for the remainder, in close collaboration with academia and NIH, fulfill the critical final phase that transforms promising molecules into actual medicines for patients.

The WSJ Health Blog notes that NCATS isn’t NIH’s first foray into developing drugs.  In 2009, NIH created the Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases (TRND) program for basic research on rare diseases.  This early stage of drug development, WSJ Health Blog notes, is “expensive, time-consuming… prone to failure” and often not worth the effort for pharmaceutical manufacturers since the related market is small.

However, this time NIH must restructure several programs to accommodate NCATS, including the Molecular Libraries screening program, TRND, and the National Center for Research Resource’s (NCRR) Clinical and Translational Science Awards.  NCATS would house all three programs, along with the in-the-works Cures Acceleration Network (a drug-development program created by the Patient Protected and Affordable Care Act).

Staff members and researchers connected with the NIH community aren’t too thrilled over the restructuring, particularly with respect to NCRR.  If you visit Feedback NIH, the online forum for public commentary on NIH initiatives, you can read through the 1,100+ lengthy NCATS-related comments.  You’ll also see the “Separating Fact & Fiction” post by Dr. Francis Collins, which begins:

[b]y now, many of you have read the recent New York Times article or related news coverage, about NIH’s plan to establish the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS).

While we are pleased that the news media have recognized NIH’s efforts as a significant development for translational research, the Times article contains some misleading statements that we would like to clarify. Those statements suggest that a much larger shakeup of NIH is underway than is actually contemplated.

So, to set the record straight, we want to share with you what we know at this point in time…

(internal links removed).  The “we” includes Members of the Institute and Center Directors NCATS Working Group.  The post attempts to clear up concerns about budget cuts (House Republicans have already promised to cut the discretionary spending that supports NIH), the security of existing programs, and the misconception that NCATS will be a drug company.

Despite the negative responses, Dr. Collins remains optimistic.  In an interview with ScienceInsider, he emphasized that

the NIH director is called upon to look for scientific opportunities that aren’t being met and to figure out how to make them happen, and that sometimes requires moving things forward at a rapid pace, and that affects a lot of people.

And of course change is always distressing, especially if people aren’t quite sure where it’s going. So I understand the anxiety that currently exists.

But let’s wait a year and see when this has all taken shape how people feel at that point. Will they say at that point that projects or programs at NCRR got dealt a bad deal? I bet they won’t. Will they say they’re excited about the translational science opportunities that are taking shape in the form of this new center? I bet they will.

Perhaps if purse strings weren’t so tight and the healthcare reform debate was settled — or if NIH wasn’t limited to 27 centers and institutes — the creation of NCATS might not upset so many people.  Yet has Dr. Collins displayed a little of that “Sputnik moment” spirit by accelerating the development of drugs for diseases and other areas overlooked by pharmaceutical manufacturers?  Sure.  Just don’t expect him to take us to the moon.

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