Recommended Reading: Recent Scholarship on Drug and Device Regulation

In Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products (forthcoming in the 2011 volume of the Wisconsin Law Review and available on SSRN), Efthimios Parasidis proposes a significant expansion of drug and device companies’ responsibility to engage in “active post-market analysis” of drugs and devices, to be coupled with a new rule that only companies that conducted such analysis would benefit from preemption of state tort claims.  Professor Parasidis’ article includes a nuanced and revealing analysis of the historical and other reasons for the Food and Drug Administration’s heavy focus on pre-market review of drugs at the expense of post-market surveillance, as well as useful updates on both the caselaw regarding the preemption of claims involving branded drugs, generic drugs, devices, and vaccines and the ongoing efforts to use health information technology to glean information about the safety and efficacy of marketed products.  Most notable, though, is the article’s thorough explication of Professor Parasidis’ interesting proposal that “preemption laws, which often are enacted pursuant to industry lobbying efforts [be linked to] protocols that further the public health.”

In Enforcing Integrity (forthcoming in the 2011 volume of the Indiana Law Journal and available on SSRN), Katrice Bridges Copeland makes a strong case for her conclusion that neither the exclusion of pharmaceutical manufacturers from Medicare and Medicaid — a punishment which the government is reluctant to impose because it would spell the end for the company — nor the use of corporate integrity agreements coupled with large fines — which manufacturers agree to in order to avoid exclusion — works to deter illegal marketing activities.  As Professor Copeland notes, numerous companies have learned that “the punishment for multiple offenses is simply another CIA and another fine.”  She recommends that the government consider a number of alternative penalties for repeat offenders, including (1) requiring that manufacturers fund clinical trials studying the off-label uses for which they promoted their products, (2) requiring that they license the product or products at issue to other manufacturers, (3) holding high-level individuals criminally liable under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, and (4) amending the Social Security Act to allow for the exclusion of particular drugs (as opposed to entire companies) from Medicare and Medicaid.

Finally, I recommend Seton Hall Law’s own Jordan Paradise’s fascinating article, Claiming Nanotechnology: Improving USPTO Efforts at Classification of Emerging Nano-Enabled Pharmaceutical Technologies (forthcoming in the 2011 volume of the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property and available on SSRN), in which she argues that the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s system for classifying patents on nanotechnology-related inventions, “[w]hile undoubtedly helpful for internal purposes,” cedes too much to the courts.  Reviewing the facts of the recent case Elan Pharma International v. Abraxis Bioscience, which involved a dispute over two patents describing nano or near-nano scale versions of the same existing cancer-fighting agent and was tried to a jury verdict, Professor Paradise points out several ways in which the patents’ claims potentially overlap.  She argues that the courts are “a clumsy forum” for sorting out the “complex patent law issues that arise based on scale, size, and interactions at the nanoscale that transcend previously envisioned physical and chemical boundaries[,]” and offers concrete recommendations for steps the USPTO can take to improve its classification efforts to reduce the number of patents with potentially overlapping claims thereby making court involvement less necessary.

Symposium on Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property

There will be an online symposium on the new book Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property at Concurring Opinions this Tuesday to Thursday (Feb. 1 to Feb. 3, 2011). This book, edited by Gaëlle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski, is available for free download here, and can also be purchased here. Here is a quote from the introduction that gives a sense of the book’s themes:

In a hospital in South Korea, leukemia patients are expelled as untreatable because a multinational drug company refuses to lower the price of a life-saving drug. Thousands of miles away, a U.S. group called the Rational Response Squad is forced by the threat of a copyright lawsuit to take down a YouTube video criticizing the paranormalist Uri Geller. Could we—should we—see these two events, so seemingly remote from one another, as related? Yes—or such is the premise of a new political formation on the global stage, one that goes under the name of the “access to knowledge movement”—or more simply, A2K.

A2K is an emerging mobilization that includes software programmers who took to the streets to defeat software patents in Europe, AIDS activists who forced multinational pharmaceutical companies to permit copies of their medicines to be sold in South Africa, and college students who have created a new “free culture” movement to “defend the digital commons”—to select just a few. A2K can also be seen as an emerging set of theoretical commitments that both respond to and reject the key justifications for “intellectual property” law and that seek to develop an alternative account of the operation and importance of information and knowledge, creativity and innovation in the contemporary world.

Krikorian and Kapczynski have assembled a top-notch group of contributors, and we welcome comments from across the blogosphere.

Podcast: Gibbons Institute Hosts Panel on Pay for Delay in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation

Seton Hall Law’s Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology and the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association presented a panel discussion entitled, “Pay for Delay: Views from the FTC, Industry and Legal Economists on Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation.”

The pay for delay debate essentially rests on two competing public interests: scientific innovation and access to medicines.  Reverse settlements, which are sometimes referred to as “pay for delay,” involve the practice of name-brand pharmaceutical companies paying would-be generic competitors to delay the entry into the market of a particular generic drug. The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice decry the practice because they claim it results in higher prices for consumers who do not have access to cheaper generics. Many in the brand-name pharmaceutical industry defend the practice because, they argue, extending the patent exclusivity period of an innovator drug better allows innovator companies to improve their return on investment and thus underwrite further research and innovation.

Panelists included Michael Kades, Attorney Advisor, Federal Trade Commission; Charles A. Gallia, Counsel, Gibbons P.C.; Anastasia Winslow, Assistant General Counsel, Bristol-Myers Squibb; and David Opderbeck, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology. You can listen to their discussion here.

Hatch-Waxman “Pay for Delay Audio

Recommended Reading: Recent Legal Scholarship on Issues in Global Public Health

Redressing the Unconscionable Health Gap: A Global Plan for Justice (published in the Harvard Law & Policy Review). In this article Lawrence Gostin brings a big picture issue — the vast global health gap between rich and poor — into perfect focus. Professor Gostin reminds us of an “uncomfortable truth” — “that closing the health gap is well within the means of the international community” — and he proposes a simple (in concept if not execution) plan to do just that.  No international treaty would be required; Professor Gostin’s Global Plan for Justice would take the form of a World Health Assembly resolution.  No new organization or governance structure would be required either; rather, the World Health Organization would “assume its place as the global health leader.”  States would be asked to contribute a small percentage — Professor Gostin suggests 0.25% — of their Gross National Income each year to a Global Health Fund.  The WHO would then allocate the Fund’s resources based on “the health needs of developing countries measured by poverty, morbidity, and premature mortality.”  Professor Gostin suggests that the mission of the Fund be threefold: “(1) ensure the fair allocation of essential vaccines and medicines, with particular attention to low- and middle-income countries in a public health emergency; (2) meet basic survival needs [e.g. food, water, sanitation, and vector controls] and create the conditions in which people can be healthy; and (3) help countries that will suffer most to adapt to the health impacts of climate change.”  Existing efforts, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, demonstrate the power of voluntary collective action; unlike the proposed Global Health Fund, however, they are too narrowly-targeted and inconsistent to close the global health gap.  Professor Gostin’s article is short (it’s based on the text of a speech), straightforward, and provocative in the best sense of the word.  I highly recommend it.

I also highly recommend Kevin Outterson’s The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation (published in the Cardozo Law Review) in which he uses proprietary sales and volume data for the important hospital antibiotic vancomycin to test a number of widely-propounded theories about the interplay between antibiotic resistance and intellectual property law.  The vancomycin case study fails to support the hypothesis that a patent holder is likely to zealously market an antibiotic with an eye to the drug’s dwindling patent term, without regard for the risk that increased uptake could accelerate the evolution of antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  It also fails to support the hypothesis that if patent terms for antibiotics were extended, patent holders would better manage the sales and use of their drugs to forestall the development of resistance.  By contrast, the story of vancomycin is consistent with the hypothesis that antibiotic resistance stimulates innovation — as bacteria evolve that are resistant to an existing antibiotic a market for a new antibiotic arises.  All of this suggests that “tinker[ing] with the patent system” is unnecessary and could even backfire.  Professor Outterson concludes that a more direct and potentially more effective approach to preserving the antibacterial effectiveness of our antibiotics would be to fix our broken health care reimbursement system, under which infection control is an unreimbursed cost and “hospitals and doctors have generally gained revenues from additional infections[.]“

Reform Rodeo

1. Kaiser Health News discusses the details of the House’s latest iteration of their Health bill.

2.  Ezra Klein analyzes whether the public plan will cost insureds more than private insurance.

3.  The New England Journal of Medicine circles back to a reform issue that is often overlooked: primary care and accountable care.

4. Jonathan Cohn at The New Republic looks at how two of the biggest players in the U.S. health care system–the medical device industry and the pharmaceutical industry–are affected by the House bill.

5.  The Healthcare Economist reports on a study released by the Urban Institute that breaks down how the House Bill will affect the number of uninsured.

6.  Wild Card: Eugene Volokh highlights on a case involving one company’s desire to patent a physician’s thought process.

7. In Case You Missed It: The Cost of (Not) Implementing Chronic Care Management by Professor John V. Jacobi.

The Biosimilars Debate: Is it Over?

Two months ago, I discussed possible federal legislation intended to balance the competing need for scientific and medical innovation with the costs to patients for biosimilars.  So where does the debate stand now?

Current proposals couple a regulatory approval pathway for biosimilars with exclusivity periods for pioneer biologics.  As part of its July 15, 2009 health reform bill, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee adopted an amendment proposed by Senators Kay Hagan (D-NC), Michael Enzi (R-WY), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) that provides for a 12-year exclusivity period for pioneer biologics.   On July 31, despite protestations from Rep. chairman Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.) that the amendment is “exactly the wrong way” to create a pathway for approval of biologics, the House Energy and Commerce Committee approved H.R. 3200, which also includes a 12-year exclusivity period.

On September 29, ten governors wrote a letter in support of the exclusivity period to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio), Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), stating, “[i]nnovator companies must be provided with at least 12 years of non-patent data exclusivity to allow for recovery of their original investment and to ensure licensing payments to our research institutions.” Read more

Biologics, How Long Exclusive? What Cost?

Biologics — products such as vaccines, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins that are isolated from natural sources and may be produced by biotechnology methods and other technologies — are at the center of a national debate regarding access to cutting-edge therapies and protection of biotech’s ability to create products that may require millions of dollars to develop. As always, Mintz Levin, Health Law Washington Beat (link also in the “Resources” section of this blog) has offered great coverage of the issue– articles here and here.

For months now, the federal government has been considering legislation to balance the competing need for scientific and medical innovation with the costs to patients for biosimilars (generic versions of innovator pioneer biologics, also referred to as follow-on biologics).  Unlike its approval pathway for generic small-molecule, chemically synthesized drugs, the FDA currently has no process for the approval of biosimilars.  All regulatory proposals by both the Senate and the House have included an exclusivity period for pioneer biologics before a generic biologic may be introduced in the market, as well as patent protections for the pioneer biologic.

As part of its July 15, 2009 health reform bill, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee adopted an amendment proposed by Senators Kay Hagan (D-NC), Michael Enzi (R-WY), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) that provides for a 12-year exclusivity period for pioneer biologics.  Among the Senate’s other biosimilar proposals, all introduced in June 2009, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH)’s bill allows for seven years of exclusivity, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY)’s bill provides for a 5 year exclusivity period, and the proposal by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) calls for a nine-year exclusivity period.  In the House, Reps. Henry A. Waxman (D-CA)’s proposed bill limits the exclusion period to five years, while Anna Eshoo (D-CA)’s bill proposes an initial exclusivity period of 12 years, with a possible additional two-and-a-half years for new indications and pediatric populations.

In June 2009, the FTC released a report that determined that innovation and investment will be sustained even without the exclusivity recommended by even the least restrictive of the proposed bills.  The report states that the competition between pioneer and follow-on biologics will more closely resemble the competition between different brands of drugs — with the pioneer biologic retaining 70-90% of the market share — rather than the competition between small-molecule branded pharmaceuticals and their comparable generics — where entry of the generic drug on the market leads to loss of market share and drop in the price of the drug.  The FTC found that due to the complexities in the development and use of biologics and the absence of therapeutic equivalence between pioneer and follow–on biologics, biosimilars are unlikely to be direct substitutes for the pioneer biologics on which they were based.

Relying on the FTC’s conclusion that the introduction of follow-on biologics will lower prices and increase access, Read more