Does the Ban on Off-Label Promotion Bar On-Label Promotion?: The Case of Call Plans

As predicted, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health pharmaceutical companies have raised First Amendment challenges to the ban on off-label promotion on a number of fronts.  Most recently, Par Pharmaceutical sued to invalidate the ban to the extent that it “criminalize[s] Par’s truthful and non-misleading speech to healthcare professionals concerning the FDA-approved use of its FDA-approved prescription drug.”  How is it that the ban on off-label promotion could be interpreted to bar the on-label promotion in which Par wishes to engage?  At the heart of Par’s dispute with the government are the “call plans” that pharmaceutical companies develop using the prescriber-specific prescription data at issue in Sorrell.

Call plans set forth which physicians pharmaceutical sales representatives should visit and how often.  In an article in the current issue of Next Generation Pharmaceutical magazine, Matthew Linkewich and Jay Margolis of IMS Health explain that a “properly conceived and configured … call plan directs reps to those physicians whose practice characteristics, constellation of prescribing behaviors and attitudes are conducive to supporting the brand goals.”  Because call plans embody “brand goals,” the government has focused on them as evidencing companies’ intent to engage in off-label promotion.

For example, in a December 15, 2010 press release announcing a $214.5 million settlement with Elan Corporation, the Department of Justice highlighted the fact that Elan’s “off-label marketing efforts” for its anti-epilepsy drug Zonegran “targeted non-epilepsy prescribers.”   A January 28, 2011 press release announcing the formal sentencing of Novartis in a case involving off-label promotion of its anti-epilepsy drug, Trileptal, similarly noted that the company “decided to market and promote Trileptal as a treatment for [two off-label indications, bipolar disease and neuropathic disease] and directed its sales force to visit doctors who would not normally prescribe Trileptal due to the nature of their practice.” Novartis’ plea agreement explains that while epilepsy is treated by epileptologists and neurologists, the company’s call plan included psychiatrists and pain doctors.

The corporate integrity agreement that Novartis entered into as part of the settlement of the Trileptal-related claims against it provides for independent review of “the bases upon which [health care providers] and [health care institutions] belonging to specified medical specialties are included in, or excluded from, the Call Plans based on, among other factors, expected utilization of Government Reimbursed Products for FDA-approved uses or non-FDA-approved uses[.]“  The corporate integrity agreement requires a similar review of the company’s sampling strategy and goes so far as to bar the company from delivering samples to health care providers identified by the company as “belong[ing] to a specialty group that is unlikely to prescribe” the sampled product on-label.

Currently, Par Pharmaceutical’s call plan for its appetite stimulant Megace, which is FDA-approved for the treatment of AIDS-related wasting, does not include oncology practices or long-term care facilities.  With the help of an outside consultant, Par determined that physicians in those settings “reasonably may encounter patients suffering from AIDS-related wasting, and thus may have occasion to prescribe [Megace] for its on-label use,” but all agree that they would be much more likely to prescribe the drug off-label to treat wasting in cancer and geriatric patients.  In the concluding paragraphs of Par’s complaint, it explains that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, which is investigating the company’s marketing practices, has informed the company that before it promotes a drug for its on-label use to doctors who prescribe the drug off-label it must “confirm that there are presently a sufficient number of patients being treated for whom the drug could be prescribed on-label.”

As Par points out, the government has offered no guidance regarding the number of on-label patients that a doctor must treat before he or she can be included in a company’s call plan.  On the one hand, this is to be expected because the call plan is only one factor that the government considers in determining a company’s intent.  On the other hand, it leaves companies like Par without a clear course to follow and, after Sorrell, likely to sue.

Distribution Controls: A Potentially Powerful Weapon Against Inappropriate or Dangerous Off-Label Use

When supplies of sodium thiopental dried up earlier this year, states turned to other drugs to carry out executions by lethal injection.  The anti-seizure drug pentobarbital, marketed as Nembutal, is one such drug.  An estimated two-thirds of the thirty-four states with the death penalty have switched or considered switching to Nembutal; states that have made the switch include Georgia, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.  As of earlier this month, Nembutal had been used in eighteen executions this year.

Like sodium thiopental, Nembutal is an off-patent drug that serves a relatively small market.  The sole company licensed to manufacture Nembutal in the United States, the Danish firm Lundbeck Inc., has been the target of a public relations and investment campaign by human rights activists calling for the end to the use of the drug in executions.  Lundbeck has never sold Nembutal directly to prisons, however, and initially the company said that there was nothing it could do to control the drug’s re-sale.  As a spokesperson explained:

We can’t withdraw the product because it is used for treating severe epilepsy and sometimes it’s the only treatment option.  All we can do is write to the prisons urging them to stop misusing using our product which was designed to help sick people.  It’s a really unfortunate situation.

Earlier this month, Lundbeck announced that it had determined that there were steps it could take beyond letter writing.  The company considered ceasing production of the drug altogether–it represents less than one percent of the company’s sales and is, in the company’s words, “economically insignificant”–but decided against doing so in light of survey evidence that the fifty million doses of the drug it sells in the United States each year are important for treating epilepsy that is severe and refractory (that is, unresponsive to other drugs).

Lundbeck decided instead to distribute Nembutal through Cardinal Health’s Specialty Pharmaceutical Services on a “drop-ship” basis, directly to hospitals.  Less than ten percent of drugs are distributed directly to end-user customers in this way, typically “cancer treatments that are expensive, difficult to make, or not in high demand.”  Lundbeck will review each Nembutal order and deny those from “from prisons in states currently active in carrying out death penalty sentences.”  Every purchaser will be required to represent in writing “that the purchase of [Nembutal] is for its own use and that it will not redistribute any purchased product without the express written authorization of Lundbeck.”  Lundbeck’s CEO has warned that the company will take unspecified “legal action” against any purchaser who violates these terms.

Lundbeck’s decision to use a drop-ship program and purchaser agreements to take responsibility for the off-label uses to which its product is put once it leaves the company’s control raises the question whether other companies could or should be asked to do the same.  In some cases, issues of scale will foreclose such an approach.  In other cases, a company and/or regulators may have concerns about inappropriate or dangerous off-label use but not be able to link it to an easily identified class of would-be purchasers like “prisons in states currently active in carrying out death penalty sentences.”  (Note that even in Lundbeck’s case the agreements are overbroad to the extent that they deny access to Nembutal to prisoners in death penalty states who need the drug to treat severe, refractory epilepsy.)  In still other cases, however, taking control of distribution will be a feasible, and powerful, compliance tool.  The Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Lazanda (fentanyl) Nasal Spray, recently posted to the Food and Drug Administration website, which provides that would-be distributors enroll in the REMS program and agree to limit their distribution to specially-certified pharmacies which are also enrolled in the program, is just one example.

Limit Physicians’ Off Label Prescribing Practices?

Off label prescribing has become fairly common practice for many medical professionals.  Once a drug has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a specific purpose, physicians are given the freedom to prescribe the approved drug “off label” for other beneficial uses of the drug.  There is a great interest for physicians to retain this autonomy of  prescribing drugs off label as the practice expands treatment options.  Both the American Medical Association and the FDA have recognized that physicians are in the best position to determine the method of treatment for their patients.

However, the practice of off label prescribing has not been without controversy.  Many politicians and regulators view off label prescribing as a way to avoid clinical testing and FDA approval process.  In addition, studies have shown that many physicians prescribe off label with little or no scientific rationale.  According to the Daily News Central, an example can be found in a particular study: “in all, the study estimated that 1 in 7 prescriptions were written [by doctors] without good medical evidence that they would work.”

A LA Times article has recently highlighted the problems of off label prescriptions.  In the article, it has come to light that the off label use of statins, one of the world’s most prescribed medication, may not have the efficacy that many doctors had previously thought.  The LA Times reports,

Statins were initially approved by the Food and Drug Administration for the prevention of repeat heart attacks and strokes in patients with high cholesterol who had already had a heart attack. And used for that purpose — called “secondary prevention” — the drugs are powerful and effective medications, driving down patients’ risk of another heart attack or stroke by lowering their levels of LDL (or “bad”) cholesterol.

Then physicians came to believe statins could also reduce the risk of a first heart attack in people who have high LDL cholesterol but are nonetheless healthy. This use of statins — called “primary prevention” — has driven the growth in the market for statins over the last decade.

Statins certainly decrease rates of heart attack in people who have clear signs of cardiovascular disease but it’s not so clear they work that way in people who are healthy. In spite of that uncertainty, statins’ use for primary prevention has sky rocketed.

One wonders how so many physicians came to believe that statins could also reduce the risk first time heart attacks.  Dr. John Abramson, from Harvard Medical School, attributes statins’ off label growth to a “conspiracy of false hope.”  He states, “[t]he public wants an easy way to prevent heart disease, doctors want to reduce their patients’ risk of heart disease and drug companies want to maximize the number of people taking their pills to boost their sales and profits.”

So, with all these interests pushing for statins’ off label use, it should not be a great surprise that extensive research has not been performed regarding statins’ primary preventive effects– and conflicting results have emerged.  The LA Times reports,

In the first of three studies published in the Archives last month, medical researchers found that, contrary to widely held belief, statins do not drive down death rates among those who take them to prevent a first heart attack. A second article cast significant doubt on the influential findings of a 2006 study, called JUPITER, that has driven the expansion of statins’ use by healthy people with elevated blood levels of C-reactive protein, a measure of inflammation. A third article suggested potential ethical, clinical and financial conflicts of interest at work in the execution of the JUPITER study and concluded the widely hailed trial was “flawed” and raises “troubling questions concerning the role of commercial sponsors.”

Potentially, new findings regarding the efficacy (or lack thereof) of statins can have seismic effects.  If it is found that statins’ primary preventative effects are overstated or  nonexistent, this would amount to what has been a tremendous amount of healthcare waste (time, money, and effort) due to the popularity of the drug.  According to IMS Health, U.S. patients filled 201.4 million prescriptions for statins last year alone.

While there is a strong interest for physicians to retain their autonomy when assessing the best treatment for the patient, due to the potential of healthcare waste, there may be an equal or if not stronger interest for some regulation regarding the practice of prescribing off label drugs. As to industry funding of research, there seems little incentive for a pharmaceutical company with a blockbuster off label hit to do anything which would upset the apple cart– or should I say money cart?

Allergan v. FDA: Where Does Disseminating Safety Information End and Promotion Begin?

In the Fall of 2009, the drugmaker Allergan made waves when it sued the FDA alleging that the ban on off-label promotion was chilling its “First Amendment right to share truthful medical information with physicians about how to safely use Botox off-label [to treat muscle spasticity] to achieve a benefit while minimizing risk of serious adverse events.”  Allergan was back in the news last week when the LA Times reported that trial was set to begin in a case brought against Allergan by the mother of Kristen Spears, a seven-year-old girl with cerebral palsy who died after being injected with Botox to treat muscle spasticity in her legs.

Allergan manufactures two FDA-approved botulinum toxin products, Botox Cosmetic, the well-known anti-wrinkle treatment, and Botox, which is approved to treat, among other conditions, cervical dystonia, “a movement disorder that causes [the muscles of the neck and shoulders] to contract and spasm involuntarily.”  Botox is also frequently used “off-label” for conditions it is not approved to treat, including muscle spasticity.  Per the NIH,  locally-injected Botox “has become a standard treatment for overactive muscles in children with spastic movement disorders such as cerebral palsy.”  The FDA agrees.  An agency physician describes Botox as a “commonly used” and “very effective” treatment for spasticity, which he characterizes as a “significant disability[y.]“  Per the LA Times, Botox can “sometimes help young patients walk without surgery.”

While the NIH’s website states that the undesirable side effects of Botox are “mild and short-lived,” the FDA’s informs physicians that “a Boxed Warning has been added to the prescribing information to highlight that botulinum toxin may spread from the area of injection to produce symptoms consistent with botulism,” “that swallowing and breathing difficulties can be life-threatening and there have been reports of deaths related to the effects of spread of botulinum toxin,” and “that children treated for spasticity are at greatest risk for these symptoms[.]”

In addition to requiring the addition of the black box warning to the Botox label, the FDA has ordered Allergan and other manufacturers of botulinum toxin products to adopt a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) which includes “a Medication Guide [for patients] and Communication Plan, including a Dear Health Care Provider letter, and a timetable for submission of assessments.”

In its complaint against the FDA, Allergan alleges that while “the boxed warning and REMS materials identify the risk of potential distant spread of toxin effect, … they do not give physicians using Botox for spasticity specific guidance about how to further minimize that risk while still obtaining an acceptable therapeutic effect.”  Allergan wants to provide physicians with specific information about treating spasticity including “proper dosing, patient selection, and injection technique.”  Allergan argues, with good reason I believe, that if it were to, say, develop a slide deck about dosing, patient selection, and injection technique in treating spasticity and present it to physicians it would be exposing itself to criminal liability for promoting an off-label use.  In its brief in opposition, the FDA disagrees — sort of — arguing that disseminating safety information about unapproved uses is “not necessarily” promotion and that Allergan has “ample room” “to disseminate truthful, non-promotional information about dangers associated with unapproved uses of Botox.”  (I will have more to say about the parties’ legal arguments in a subsequent post.)

In an interesting twist, the LA Times reports that Kristen Spears’ pediatrician and his nurse practitioner wife testified in depositions that they “learned to use Botox on children with cerebral palsy at Allergan-sponsored seminars in 2000 and 2001″ and that “Allergan’s sales agents discussed the use of Botox for juvenile cerebral palsy patients … repeatedly, visiting the practice about 50 times over several years.”  They also claimed that they were told by sales representatives that other doctors were using “in range of 10 to 15 units” of Botox per kilogram to treat their pediatric patients.  Dr. Mitchell Brin, Allergan’s Chief Scientific Officer for Botox, testified that fifteen units per kilogram, which is the dose given Kristen Spears, is nearly twice the maximum dose that the company considers safe for children.  He also testified that, because of the ban on off-label promotion, Allergan did not disseminate its maximum dosage information to physicians.  If it is true that Allergan’s sales force was providing doctors with dosing information gleaned from anecdotal reports from other doctors they called on while the experts in the company’s medical department kept their dosing knowledge to themselves, it is an example of an all-too-common disconnect between the field and headquarters that in this case may have had tragic consequences.

Bipartisan Effort to Amend the False Claims Act

American Health Lawyers Association reports that Senators are seeking to amend the False Claims Act:

Senators Charles Grassley (R-IA), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Arlen Specter (R-PA), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) introduced recently the False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009 (S. 458), which would amend the False Claims Act (FCA) to strengthen a whistleblower’s ability to bring a qui tam action on behalf of the government, among other things.

This amendment would also clarify some of the ambiguity surrounding the FCA.  The AHLA stated:

The bill includes a provision clarifying that the FCA was intended to extend to any false or fraudulent claim for government money or property, whether or not the claim is presented to a government official or employee, whether or not the government has physical custody of the money, and whether or not the defendant specifically intended to defraud the government.

This clarifying amendment may have a significant impact on two areas of health care litigation.  First, the amendment would strengthen qui tam actions against pharmaceutical companies where the pharmaceutical companies do not actually present a claim to the government, such as with off-label drug marketing cases.  Second, the amendment may strengthen “bootstrapped” qui tam actions, where the qui tam relator brings a FCA action for Anti-Kickback Statute and/or Stark Law violations (physician “self-referral” cases), despite the lack of  any specific FCA violation, and because the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark Law themselves lack a private right of action.

At the very least, the proposed amendment, which would facilitate the use of qui tam actions, is further evidence of the federal government’s increased reliance, and an intention to continue in such reliance, upon qui tam actions as a means of both regulatory and punitive enforcement.

The DOJ Sets Its Sights On Forest Laboratories

Forbes reports in its article, “Forest says 11 states will join fraud lawsuit,” and the New York Times reports in its article, “Drug Maker Is Accused of Fraud,” that a civil claim was filed against Forest Laboratories Inc. under the False Claims Act. The claim relates to the advertisement of the  “off-label” use of certain drugs.

Forbes reports:

The Justice Department said Forest promoted Lexapro and Celexa for use by children even though it is not allowed to do so. While doctors are allowed to prescribe drugs for uses not listed on the labels, companies are not allowed to actively promote the drugs for that kind of “off-label” use.

This suit is similar to the qui tam actions against Scios.  Both the cases against Scios and the suits against Forest Laboratories involve the off-label marketing of the unapproved uses of certain prescription drugs.  And like the claims against Scios, it appears that the case against Forrest Laboratories began as a qui tam action.

The NY Times reports:

The filing follows a long-running federal investigation that began with complaints filed by two former company officials. Under the civil charges brought against Forest, the government is seeking to recover up to three times the amount of money spent by federal programs to pay for pediatric prescriptions of Celexa and Lexapro, but did not specify a figure.

This case is consistent with the DOJ’s heightened investigation of the pharmaceutical industry and shows the federal government’s reliance on qui tam actions.  As the number of cases against pharmaceutical companies for the off-label advertising of the unapproved uses of drugs increases, the gap between the FDA approval of the use of drugs and the actions of pharmaceutical companies is becoming more apparent.

To some extent, the Civil False Claims Act is bridging this compliance gap by functioning as a mechanism to enforce FDA decisions on the uses of drugs. But perhaps a legitimate question to ask is whether this increasing reliance upon an “outsourcing” of regulatory compliance is the appropriate mechanism by which to fix this inefficiency. Or, might we consider, as recommended by the recent Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy whitepaper, being that “estimates suggest that as many as 40% of all prescriptions are for off-label uses,” that we give the “FDA the authority to mandate scientific studies for off-label medications and devices that have high sales volumes or large profits but lack needed evidence of efficacy or safety?”

As the Center stated, “this would protect the interests of patients and advance sound choices about the risks, benefits, and economic value of off-label uses.”

New Bill to Create Prescription Drug Benefit Through Original Medicare as CMS Expansion of Off-Label Drugs for Cancer Treatment Draws Criticism

Yesterday, Congressional Democrats introduced legislation (HR 684, S 330) that would allow Original Medicare to establish one or more plans to compete with private plans under the Part D prescription drug benefit, according to CQ HealthBeat. The legislation would also require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate directly with pharmaceutical companies for the prices of medications under Part D.

Additionally, it would strengthen the ability of Medicare beneficiaries to appeal denials of coverage for medically necessary medications under all Medicare Part D plans.

The bill was sponsored by Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) and Reps. Marion Berry (D-Ark.) and Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.). According to Berry, the plans established by Medicare would have the ability to obtain discounts on medications that private plans could not match.

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