Cuts in Mental Health Funding Continue; Supreme Court to Rule

As America waits for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear oral arguments in, and decide on, the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) in March, state cuts in mental health funding continue unabated in many states throughout the country.  As previously mentioned here, the PPACA review undertaken by the Court will not only focus on the constitutionality of the individual mandate but will also examine PPACA’s Medicaid expansion.  By expanding Medicaid, PPACA will provide coverage to millions of those living with serious mental illness.  PPACA also provides for increased community-based outreach, from changing the waiver laws to awarding grants for new programs, in order to further improve essential services for those living with mental illness.

While many fixate on late March, local governments continue a practice that started a few years ago:  slashing funding for mental health services.  Just last week, Chicago’s Department of Public Health announced they were closing half of their mental health clinics — disproportionately affecting the city’s African-American and Hispanic populations, according to advocates.  Over the last fiscal year, New York has cut its mental health budget by $95 million, and California has by $177 million.  According to a new NAMI study released late last year, from 2009 to 2012, four states have slashed their mental health expenditures by more than 30 percent; South Carolina, at the top of the list, has cut funding by nearly 40 percent.  Alaska and Nevada — the two states with the highest suicide rates in the country — are both in the top five.  In total, “general funds for mental health” are down $1.6 billion overall between 2009 and 2012.

Besides painful, the cuts are likely to be counterproductive:  advocates argue that they will actually cost states more in the long run.  Ronald Hornberg, director of legal and policy affairs at NAMI recently told ABC news that the cuts are resulting in those in need of services showing up in emergency rooms or prisons, where they are expensively boarded because there is nowhere else for them to go.   Eric Lindquist, a clinical therapist at the Chicago Department of Public Health, called the mental health clinics that Chicago has decided to cut, when compared to hospitalizations or incarcerations, “one of the taxpayer’s best bargains.”

At the same time, headlines late last week brought news that 20 percent of Americans were diagnosed with mental illness in 2010 — nearly one in four women and about one in six men.  Among other findings, nearly nine million Americans “thought seriously” about suicide in 2010, with over one million attempting to kill themselves.  Almost two million teenagers “experienced a major depressive episode.”  Those aged 18 to 25 had the highest incidence of illness:  nearly 30 percent.

Obviously, the incidence of illness and prevalence of spending cuts nationwide does not bode well for the future of mental health care in this country.  Those that depended on the services being cut are left to try and make it on their own, and those who worked for gutted agencies are looking for jobs.  And this is why advocates look toward March.  The Court’s decision later this year will shape the future of mental health services in this country for years to come — services that, right now, are increasingly endangered nationwide.

School-based Health Centers, Mental Health Care and the ACA

On October 20, 2010, Jamarcus Bell, a freshman at Hamilton Southeastern High School in suburban Indianapolis, hung himself.  He was 14.

In a lawsuit filed last week, his mother, Natalie Moore, alleged that Bell was repeatedly bullied by other students because of his race, “perceived homosexuality,” and “emotional disability,” and that the school corporation was aware of the bullying and did nothing to stop it and prevent his death.  Brian Smith, the district’s superintendent, responded this week, denying Moore’s allegations, and argued that “teachers and administrators took multiple steps to assist the student and his family.”  Notwithstanding the merit of the lawsuit, this is yet another headline in what has clearly become a nationwide epidemic of bullying.  Parents are concerned, schools are scrambling, and state legislatures are eyeing changing the laws:  Michigan’s legislature just approved an anti-bullying bill which will likely be signed into law by the governor in the near future.

Mental health services are at the heart of the debate:  are schools doing enough to not only prevent bullying, but also to ensure that students have an adequate support system?

Just 125 miles southeast of the Hamilton Southeastern School District, in Hamilton County, Ohio, Oyler School is also receiving public attention.  But not because it is the latest in a string of schools marred by alleged bullying incidents; rather, the school on the west side of Cincinnati is a school that has instituted an innovative system that may represent the future.

Just more than a decade ago, Oyler represented much of what was wrong with schools located in impoverished urban areas:  more than 80 percent of its students did not reach tenth grade, it had declared an academic emergency, and was the lowest performing school in Cincinnati.  Last year, the high school graduation rate was 82 percent, and the attendance rate is now 94 percent.  So how did the school turn its fate around so quickly?

Oyler adopted a community-based approach, in which the school persuaded various health care providers to relocate their offices directly at the school.  Today, the providers are housed in a full-blown health center, complete with a full-time nurse practitioner and a part-time pediatrician.  There is a vision clinic, a dental clinic, and six mental health counselors — including three full-time psychologists.  The clinic offers more than just healthcare services:  preschool, daycare, and afterschool programs are available.  It also assists families in applying for Medicare, attaining bus passes, and even provides dinner to families.  Taxpayers do not foot the bill for the services; the school simply reorganizes resources to keep costs down.  Of course, poverty still grips the school — 92 percent of children are on subsidized lunches and 112 students are homeless — but the students are having their health needs fully addressed.  As a result, Oyler has become a model for other schools in Cincinnati, and officials from Tennessee and New York City have recently visited.

The federal government has picked up on the school-based health center idea.  Under the Affordable Care Act, the federal government offered grants to schools to assist in creating and updating school-based health centers like the one at Oyler:  these centers bring the services to the students, relocating health services, including mental health services, into schools.  After receiving over 350 applications in 2010, the U.S. government awarded $95 million in grant money this past summer to 278 school districts and programs to expand such clinics.

This will build on the amount of school-based clinics that existed nationwide prior to the passage of the ACA.  According to the National Assembly on School-Based Health Care, prior to the awards this summer, there were 1900 school-based health centers providing a spectrum of health care services to nearly two million children and adolescents in 44 states and the District of Columbia.  School-based health centers offer everything:  prescriptions, treatment, education, and screenings.

Additionally, for those wondering how to combat the nation’s growing problem of bullying, three-fourths of the school-based health centers offer mental health services:  from completing assessments to crisis intervention to offering therapy.  And, with more and more stories like those of Jamarcus Bell dominating national headlines, placing mental health services where they are most needed – our nation’s schools – could be a vital tool in the fight against bullying.

Sources:

Affordable Care Act (ACA) Grants for School-Based Health Centers Capital (SBHCC) Program, grants.gov.

Chris Kenning, Cincinnati’s Oyler Elementary Finds Winning Formula to Fight Poverty, Louisville Courier-Journal, Apr. 23, 2011.

Chris Sikich, Superintendent Says HSE Acted to Prevent Bullying, Indianapolis Star, Dec. 1, 2011.

Dan McFeely, Hamilton Southeastern Sued Over Bullying After Student’s Death, Indianapolis Star, Nov. 29, 2011.

Joy Resmovits, School-Based Health Care Programs Receive $95 Million From Affordable Care Act, Huffington Post, July 14, 2011.

Oyler’s School Based Health Attracts National Attention, Local 12, WKRC Cincinnati, Nov. 29, 2011.

School District Releases Letter Regarding Lawsuit Over Student’s Suicide, Fox 59 News, Nov. 30, 2011.

Suit Links Suicide to School Bullying, Nov. 30, 2011.

The Facts:  Funding for School-Based Health Centers Under the Affordable Care Act, National Assembly on School-Based Health Care.

ACA Litigation, Implications for Medicaid and Mental Health Care

Receiving most of the attention and coverage following the passage of ACA has been the debate over the constitutionality of the individual mandate, in which Congress has required individuals to purchase health insurance.  This discussion has grown louder in the wake of the Eleventh Circuit’s Florida v. Health and Human Services decision, which invalidated the individual mandate as exceeding Congressional power under both the Commerce Clause and Taxing and Spending Clause.  As mentioned on this blog, that decision, along with the parties’ responses to it, has paved the road to Supreme Court review, likely early in 2012.

But also in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision — and a clear focus of the petitioners’ reply brief filed last week — is a discussion of whether, by expanding Medicaid under ACA, Congress exceeded its spending power.  This assertion was rejected by Judge Vinson in the Northern District of Florida, see Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1269 (N.D. Fla. 2011), as well as the Eleventh Circuit, see 648 F.3d 1235, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011).  The Eleventh Circuit relied on a few determinative factors to reject the argument:  (1) Congress has reserved the right to make changes to Medicaid, and the participating states were aware of this possibility; (2) the federal government will pay for nearly all costs of the Medicaid expansion; (3) states have “plenty of notice” to decide whether they want to continue to participate in Medicaid before the changes go into effect; and (4) it is not conclusive that states who do not participate in the new Medicaid lose their funding. Id. at 1267-68.

Putting constitutional concerns aside, petitioners’ argument, if adopted by the Supreme Court early next year, can work to undo much of the good the ACA accomplishes on the ground level, including the ACA’s positive effect on those living with mental illness.  Today, according to CMS, Medicaid pays for the mental health services of 58 million Americans. See Mental Health Services Overview, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, available at https://www.cms.gov/MHS/ (last modified Sept. 6, 2011).  But according to an interesting Perspective piece in September’s issue of the New England Journal of American Medicine, the ACA would likely result in coverage for at least an additional “3.7 million currently uninsured people with severe mental illnesses and many more with less severe needs for mental health and addiction treatment.”  Colleen L. Barry and Haiden A. Huskamp, Moving Beyond Parity - Mental Health and Addiction Care under the ACA, 365 N. Engl. J. Med. 973-975 (Sept. 15, 2011).  Further, in addition to mandating that Medicaid benchmark plans and state-based insurance exchanges cover mental health services as part of an essential benefits package, the ACA assists in the coordination and implementation of more community-based services, from changing the waiver laws to assist the states in administering behavioral health services to establishing grants for further community outreach.  Id.

So instead of focusing on the individual mandate debate, those in the mental health field should note the Florida petitioners’ other target of attack — Medicaid expansion.  Already rejected twice, the ultimate resolution early next year will affect millions of mental health providers as well as those who use their services and will have a profound effect on the administration of mental health services in this country.

Recommended Reading: “Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder”

In her fascinating article Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (forthcoming in the Temple Law Review and available on SSRN), Deirdre Smith describes the role that legal considerations–of eligibility for benefits and liability for harm–played in the development of the posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis, from its earliest roots in the mid-1800s, when the term “railway spine” was coined to describe post-traumatic symptoms in survivors of train accidents, to its eventual inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980.  Concluding that “[t]he line between law and medicine is not merely blurred in PTSD; it is absent,” Professor Smith contends that courts should consider “PTSD’s development and long-standing association with assigning legal responsibility” when determining whether to admit evidence that a criminal complainant or civil plaintiff was so diagnosed.

As Professor Smith explains, when veterans of the Vietnam War “began to seek treatment and compensation for their persistent psychiatric difficulties, there was no diagnosis that clearly captured their symptomatology.”  They were diagnosed with “‘character disorders’ or schizophrenia, either of which would rule out any ’service-connected’ disability compensation.”  It was at least in part a desire to eliminate barriers to care and compensation for these veterans that persuaded the American Psychiatric Association to include the PTSD diagnosis in the DSM-III.   And, it worked.  “With a diagnosis built around their experiences, veterans [of the Vietnam War] were indeed more successful in obtaining, not only health coverage and disability benefits, but also validation from the United States government itself that they had endured an experience that transformed a ‘normal’ person into one who was ill and in need of care and compassion.”  (This history provides an interesting context for the current controversy over the diagnosis of mild traumatic brain injury in veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which I discussed here.)

To be diagnosed with PTSD, individuals must meet a number of criteria.  The “A” or “stressor” criterion requires that the person being evaluated have been exposed to a traumatic event.  The remaining criteria relate to the existence, duration, and functional significance of symptoms experienced in the wake of, and presumably as a result of, the trauma.   Professor Smith focuses on “two contexts in which courts have permitted PTSD, and particularly the A criterion, to take a critical role in establishing liability: (1) to prove that a criminal complainant or civil plaintiff was subjected to a traumatic event, such as child sexual abuse; and (2) in tort cases, to establish liability for [emotional distress in the absence of physical injury].”  She argues persuasively against using the diagnosis in these ways.  To do so creates a “problem of circularity” because “[c]linicians cannot apply the PTSD diagnostic criteria without opining about the nature, extent, or even the existence of a reported or purported stressor event.”  Judicial findings that suggest otherwise notwithstanding, one cannot determine based on a given cluster or presentation of symptoms that an individual has been exposed to a particular traumatic event.

Professor Smith’s article brings to mind the important work that Joan Kaufman and colleagues have done documenting the underdiagnosis of PTSD in the child welfare system.  Dr. Kaufman’s data demonstrate the limits of a number of potential sources of information about a child’s trauma history, including the children themselves, their parents, their protective service workers, and their protective service case records.  She argues that mental health professionals should use multiple sources to build the complete trauma histories that are key to both accurate diagnosis and effective treatment.  Notably, Dr. Kaufman does not suggest that a child’s symptoms be used to divine his or her history.  To the contrary, she observes that “[w]ithout knowledge of children’s trauma experiences, trauma-related symptoms can appear to reflect manifestations of other diagnoses.”

Hastings Center Releases Special Report on Psychiatric Illness in Children

Earlier this month, The Hastings Center released a special report “Troubled Children: Diagnosing, Treating, and Attending to Context” that is well-worth reading.  Co-authored by Erik Parens and Josephine Johnston, the report carefully and thoroughly addresses the “intense debates” about the increasing number of children in the United States who receive psychiatric diagnoses and psychotropic medications.

The first section of “Troubled Children” discusses the complexities involved in both defining psychiatric disorders and matching individual children to diagnostic categories; the second section discusses available treatments and the evidence base that supports their use.  The third and final section of the report, in which the authors suggest reasons “why many children do not receive careful diagnoses, why evidence-based treatments are often not available, and why promising changes to children’s environments are not made,” is the most directly relevant to students and teachers of health law.

Among the reasons discussed are the “imbalance between investments in the development of new pharmacological compared with psychosocial treatments,” that physician visits are brief and often “less frequent than is necessary for optimal treatment management,” that insurance “coverage for psychosocial treatments is often more limited than for medication treatments,” and that “the system is fragmented among primary care physicians, hospitals, and various other mental health providers, with little cross-communication or coordination following referrals and limited interaction with other systems that care for children, including child protective services, juvenile justice, and schools.” Expanding on the fragmentation concern, the authors tell an all-too-familiar story, explaining that “payers are not willing to reimburse professionals for consulting with one another or developing systems that streamline communication and coordinate care. … This leaves families who are committed to psychosocial treatments to identify, access, and navigate them alone.”

In addition to its central text, which is neutral and scholarly in tone, “Troubled Children” includes ten “sidebars,” each written by a different author with an overt advocacy position.  One sidebar raises the possibility of “overmedicalization,” a negative consequence of which is that “everything becomes pathologized, turning all human difference into medical problems.”  The author of another sidebar objects that “[t]he theory of ‘medicalization’ … makes parents into scapegoats instead of grasping the real problem.”  This author notes that she “can’t imagine anyone seriously discussing the role that ‘values’ play in diagnosing cancer or suggesting that medications that shrink cancers are just tools to force people who are different to be like everyone else.”

A third sidebar discusses the correlation between adverse childhood experiences–such as parental mental illness, substance abuse, or criminality, family violence, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect–and adult mental health and function and suggests that “the question whether medications are overused can actually distract us from the other important question: how do we alleviate stress in families?”  (Also recommended, this fascinating article from this week’s issue of The New Yorker profiling a pediatrician in San Francisco who hopes to use insights about the relationship between poverty, child development, and health to transform the treatment of survivors of childhood trauma.)  The authors of “Troubled Children” make reference to the “other important question” in the conclusion to their report.  They write that “[o]ur ethical obligations to children require that we–including policy-makers, educators, medical professionals, and parents–remember that in addition to changing children (by pharmacological or psychosocial means), we have the power to change the contexts in which children are embedded, which can be key to lasting improvements in their mental health.”

The Pediatric Accountable Care Organization: Incentivizing a Family-Centered Approach

Late last year, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) issued a report recommending that pediatricians screen new mothers for postpartum depression during the 1-, 2-, 4-, and 6-month well baby visits.  Most pediatricians believe that screening for postpartum depression is within the scope of pediatric practice, because “[a]ddressing maternal depression in a timely and proactive fashion is essential to ensure healthy early brain and child development and readiness to succeed.”

There has been some debate about whether such screening is reimbursable.  The AAP believes that it is (or should be) and recommends that pediatricians seek reimbursement using “[t]he Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code 99420 [for "Administration and interpretation of a health risk assessment instrument"] … recognizing the [Edinburgh Postpartum Depression Scale (a 10-question screen completed by the mother)] as a measure for risk in the infant’s environment, to be appropriately billed at the infant’s visit.”

Because it would be integrated into a reimbursable well visit, and because of the limited amount of time it takes, reimbursement concerns may not be an insurmountable barrier to postpartum depression screening.  (Even more streamlined than the Edinburgh Scale is a two-question screening tool that, while not specifically designed for use with new mothers, has proved effective at identifying postpartum depression.  The two questions are as follows: “Over the past 2 weeks: 1. Have you ever felt down, depressed, or hopeless? 2. Have you felt little interest or pleasure in doing things?”  Answering yes to one or both of these questions is a positive screening result.)

When the screening identifies a potential problem, though, reimbursement concerns likely are a formidable barrier to treatment delivery.  The AAP acknowledges that pediatricians are not qualified to treat postpartum depression (and many mothers might not want them to in any event) and recommends that pediatricians refer new mothers with positive screening results to qualified providers and other resources in their community.  This recommendation is a good one, as far as it goes, and probably all that can be expected in our current fragmented healthcare system, but it is a long way from ideal, whether you put yourself in the shoes of the provider– or the family.

Might the much-talked-about accountable care organization be a means to the end of fairly compensating pediatricians and their staff for the hard work entailed in quickly and seamlessly moving mothers into care?  Just as Section 3022 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act allows adult medical providers to form ACOs for the purpose of receiving incentive payments tied to savings to Medicare, under Section 2706 states can allow pediatric medical providers to form ACOs to receive payments tied to savings to Medicaid.  While the AAP claims that “[g]reater savings are found in managing care for adults and not children[,]“ Nationwide Children’s Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, the “largest pediatric accountable care organization in America,” disagrees, claiming that “[p]ediatrics offers perhaps the biggest opportunity to bend the long-term cost curve in health care.  While the savings may be less immediate, there is evidence that many of the pervasive, and costly, chronic diseases of adulthood can be successfully prevented in childhood, for example obesity.”

Providers establishing pediatric ACOs will need to confront a number of pediatric-specific structural issues.  As Mark Waxman and Larry Vernaglia point out in a recent Health Law Reporter article, while “children grow out of childhood and, therefore, potentially the [pediatric ACO] structure[,]” many conditions are “best treated by the same team over the life of the individual.”  In addition, “pediatric populations do not exist in vacuums; generally, they live in families and these families also receive medical care.  A [pediatric ACO] may need to coordinate closely with an ACO that provides care to the entire family.  … For example, if wellness programs were targeted at the whole family (e.g. nutrition, exercise, environmental, etc.) they likely would be more effective than if they address the child in isolation.”  Postpartum depression is just one of many conditions that call for care coordination not just on the patient’s behalf but also on the patient’s family’s behalf– and pediatric ACOs should be structured with this in mind.

Getting Mental Health Coverage Wrong

Thanks to Frank for inviting me to review Barak Richman, Daniel Grossman, and Frank Sloan’s chapter,  Fragmentation in Mental Health Benefits and Services, in Our Fragmented Health Care System: Causes and Solutions (Einer Elhauge, ed. 2010).  The book is important and provocative.  The chapter on the fragmentation of mental health care couldn’t address a more timely issue.

People with serious mental illness, more than most other patients, struggle with health system fragmentation. As the Institute of Medicine described it,

Mental and substance-use (M/SU) problems and illnesses seldom occur in isolation. They frequently accompany each other, as well as a substantial number of general medical illnesses such as heart disease, cancers, diabetes, and neurological illnesses. *** Improving the quality of M/SU health care-and general health care-depends upon the effective collaboration of all mental, substance-use, general health care, and other human service providers in coordinating the care of their patients. *** However, these diverse providers often fail to detect and treat (or refer to other providers to treat) these co-occurring problems and also fail to collaborate in the care of these multiple health conditions-placing their patients’ health and recovery in jeopardy.

By some estimates, formerly institutionalized people with serious mental illness experience about 25 fewer years of life, mostly due to the effects of treatable physical illnesses such as cardiovascular, pulmonary and infectious diseases.  The effects of this health system fragmentation are experienced notwithstanding parity legislation, and they are felt also by people in the community with less serious mental illness, often because their primary care providers can’t find mental health providers to whom they can refer.

In Fragmentation in Mental Health Benefits and Services, the authors approach mental health system fragmentation by telling a story of the relationship between health insurance structure and income redistribution. The authors address the interrelationship between insurance “carve-outs” for mental health care and the growth of mental health parity laws. They assert that the carve out of behavioral health coverage from medical insurance provokes states to pass mental health parity laws. According to the authors, these parity laws fail to help their “intended” beneficiaries, and instead serve to redistribute resources away from low income and non-White employees.

To make their case, they mine a database of claims data for privately insured North Carolina patients. These claims data allow them to track employees’ (and, presumably, their dependents’) use of mental health services. Along the way, they raise several important issues. For example, they suggest that care provided by mental health providers may not be particularly efficacious. (299) Few would disagree that in most areas of health care — including mental health care — comparative effectiveness research is essential.   In addition, they suggest that access to and benefit from covered services varies by income and race. (298-99) It is undoubtedly true that there are class-based and race-based disparities in access to health care; this is so much discussed, in fact, that it somewhat puzzling that the authors would characterize as a “regularly overlooked question” the fact that “equal insurance and access does not translate into equitable consumption.” (279)

On some points, the authors seem to go a bit beyond their data. First, the authors assert (without citation) that mental health parity is “often” pursued “to benefit low-income and traditionally vulnerable populations.” (284) Many advocates (myself included) have argued for parity as a civil rights matter: as people with physical illness have access to insurance coverage, so should people with mental illness.  Certainly, insurance coverage is most valuable for those without the means to pay for care out of pocket, but that is as true for cardiac care as for mental health care. From this perspective, parity legislation seems no more a redistributive move than any other form of health insurance.

Second, and to distinguish parity legislation from other forms of insurance, the authors establish that the people of color and low-income insureds are less likely than others to take advantage of access to mental health practitioners. (298) Other researchers have pointed out the difficulty vulnerable populations have had gaining access to covered mental health outpatient care, even when their physicians attempt a referral, so this finding is uncontroversial. Does it follow from a finding that low-income people and people of color experience unequal use of and benefit from a covered service, that the coverage is illegitimate and should be curtailed? The logic of this assertion would call into question the continued coverage of cardiac services.  It might, rather, be wise to address the observed shortcomings in access to outpatient services for non-White and low-income patients and to seek the elimination of disparities here as elsewhere in the health finance and delivery system.

Third, the authors examine whether outpatient mental health treatment (as opposed to mental health treatment by primary physicians) is associated with a reduction in the rate of hospitalization for mental health services. They conclude that care from outpatient mental health providers does not reduce the rate of hospitalization for mental health care. (294) The authors here seem to argue that it would be unwise to “fix” the observed inequalities in access for the disadvantaged group, as the lack of association between outpatient mental health care and reduced hospitalization is weak. The authors, however, candidly acknowledge the limitations on using claims data to draw clinical conclusions, noting “unobservable heterogeneity of underlying health status” (294) and the possible “problem of unobserved severity.” (297) That being the case, it might be that the race and income disparities observed in access to outpatient mental health providers has carried though to other aspects of the mental health care system. For example, vulnerable low-income patients and patients of color might be unengaged in care, and therefore suffering with untreated mental health symptoms. Some employees or their dependents might be treated by the parallel public mental health system. It may be, in other words, that low-income people and people of color are poorly served by the mental health care system for reasons that have little to do with the efficacy of outpatient mental health care, notwithstanding their location in a university town.

The fragmentation of care for people with mental illness is an enormous public health and health finance problem. Much research needs to be done to approach the problem from all angles. The authors have done substantial work with an interesting set of claims data, and have creatively drawn links between patterns of usage and mental health outcomes.  As can be said of many forms of mental health treatment, their analysis fails to address the core issues.  But in such a difficult area of research, any advances are welcome.

Cross Posted at Concurring Opinions

Contesting Depression

Social disagreement about the medicalization of experience is intensifying. Psychiatrist Allen Frances complains that the draft DSM is too quick to pathologize grief:

A startling suggestion is buried in the fine print describing proposed changes for the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders — perhaps better known as the D.S.M. 5, the book that will set the new boundary between mental disorder and normality. If this suggestion is adopted, many people who experience completely normal grief could be mislabeled as having a psychiatric problem.

Suppose your spouse or child died two weeks ago and now you feel sad, take less interest and pleasure in things, have little appetite or energy, can’t sleep well and don’t feel like going to work. In the proposal for the D.S.M. 5, your condition would be diagnosed as a major depressive disorder. . . .[This change] would give mentally healthy people the ominous-sounding diagnosis of a major depressive disorder, which in turn could make it harder for them to get a job or health insurance. . . .

Grieving is an unavoidable part of life — the necessary price we all pay for having the ability to love other people. Our lives consist of a series of attachments and inevitable losses, and evolution has given us the emotional tools to handle both.

Moving from the end of life to the beginning, another commentary mentions worries that quiet and listless preschoolers may be pigeonholed as depressed:

Today a number of child psychiatrists and developmental psychologists say depression can surface in children as young as 2 or 3. . . . [But c]lassifying preschool depression as a medical disorder carries a risk of disease-mongering. “Given the influence of Big Pharma, we have to be sure that every time a child’s ice cream falls off the cone and he cries, we don’t label him depressed,” cautions Rahil Briggs, an infant-toddler psychologist at Children’s Hospital at Montefiore in New York.

Though research does not support the use of antidepressants in children this young, medication of preschoolers, often off label, is on the rise. One child psychologist told me about a conference he attended where he met frustrated drug-industry representatives. “They want to give these kids medicines, but we can’t figure out the diagnoses.” As Daniel Klein warns, “Right now the problem may be underdiagnosis, but these things can flip completely.”

Both stories foreshadow larger struggles over the meaning of “health” in risk societies where there is less margin for error or “underperformance” at work or school. Virtually any wealthy New Yorker with small children has a story about the crucial “pre-school interviewing process,” where elite schools can use an hour-long interaction with a child to decide whether or not to accept him or her as a student. On the other end of the income scale, high unemployment means that at-will employees who can’t keep up an adequate reserve of chipper and helpful “can-do” spirit are always at risk of being sacrificed in favor of some member of the reserve corps of unemployed. Business can’t survive if it’s culture is “too nice.” And hiring may end up being driven by whether an “analysis by an organizational psychologist can tell the hirer whether an applicant will have a problem with the manager or team.”

Larger social currents are feeding anxieties about these trends. Some corporate mottos appear to be “get healthy, or else:”

“We have this notion that you can gorge on hot dogs, be in a pie-eating contest, and drink every day, and society will take care of you,” says Harvard Business School Professor Michael E. Porter, who co-authored Redefining Health Care. “We can’t afford to let individuals drive up costs because they’re not willing to address their health problems.”

Hence the wellness fixation at companies as varied as IBM, Microsoft, Harrah’s Entertainment, and Scotts. Employees who voluntarily sign up for such programs often receive discounts on health-care premiums, free weight-loss and smoking-cessation programs, gratis gym memberships, counseling for emotional problems, and prizes like vacations or points that can be redeemed for gift cards.

M. Todd Henderson assures us that “corporate nannies are superior to their state analogs in some cases,” in part because “corporate policies are subjected to more instantaneous feedback from labor markets, which reduces overreaching.” As unemployment climbs and benefits end, that “feedback from labor markets” gets weaker and weaker: employees take whatever job they can find.

What’s the end result of these trends? I can’t predict, but I think Gary Shteyngart’s recent satirical novel provides one template for the workplace of the future. His protagonist, Lenny Abramov, finds that his employer has placed “five gigantic Solari schedule boards” in the office. The boards:

[D]isplayed the names of . . . employees, along with the results of our latest physicals . . . our fasting insulin and triglycerides, and, most important, our ‘mood + stress indicators,’ which were always supposed to read ‘positive/playful/ready to contribute,’ but which, with enough input from competitive co-workers, could be changed to ‘one moody betch today” or ‘not a team playa this month.’ On this particular day . . . one unfortunate Aiden M. was lowered from ‘overcoming the loss of loved one’ to ‘letting personal life interfere with job.’ (57-58)

Ultimately, moods become health problems when they seriously interfere with activities of daily living, including family, work, spirituality, and play. What Shteyngart reminds us is that the demands of work are quite flexible, and always-evolving. Without a robust societal sense of the proper claims of grief and other emotions, economic imperatives are likely to shrink them inexorably. Unlike the film Gattaca, where extant social structures somehow persist in the wake of massive changes in enhancement technology, Shteyngart’s novel describes a world where relatively small changes in self-concept, media use, and aspiration in an elite can fundamentally destabilize societal expectations.

Given the current balance of power between labor and employers, the disciplinary impact of new technology is likely to rise. As Hannah Pitkin puts it, if we are not careful, the very tools invented to reduce suffering may end up increasing it, by making authorities less tolerant of human need:

We have developed astonishing techniques of communication, persuasion, indoctrination, organization. . . . Yet these extraordinary capacities somehow have not made people happy or free or even powerful. . . . We do not direct these, our alleged powers; if anything, they direct us and determine the conditions of our lives, developing with a momentum of their own in ways we cannot foresee and that are often obviously harmful to human life and civilization

The contestation of pre-school and post-death depression concerns fundamental questions about what it means to be human. Circumstances need to be better engineered to accommodate the normal range of human experience. Otherwise a Procrustean drift will result in humans better engineered to to accommodate their circumstances. As Jaron Lanier has written, “When people are told that a computer is intelligent, they become prone to changing themselves in order to make the computer appear to work better, instead of demanding that the computer be changed to become more useful” (36). Perhaps employers without “grief leave” policies should be changed more quickly than employees in search of non-medical solace.

Professor Gaia Bernstein on ‘Intensive Parenting’ and the Law

According to Health Law Prof Blog, Seton Hall Law’s own Professor Gaia Bernstein and co-author Zvi Triger  led in SSRN Health Law Paper downloads last month for their paper, “Over Parenting,” forthcoming in U.C. Davis Law Review. In addition to taking the number one spot at SSRN, Professor Bernstein appeared in the New York Times, Forbes Magazine and Canada’s leading newspaper, The Globe and Mail, concerning her recent scholarship on “Intensive Parenting” and the Law. These articles follow on the heels of another recent article in the ABA Journal. (See all below).

Regarding the general perception that “Intensive Parenting” or “Helicopter Parenting” is a norm appropriate for unmitigated aspiration, The Times writes:

Bernstein and Triger are not so sure. They cite studies that suggest what we have discussed on Motherlode before, that what they call intensive parenting (which others dub helicopter parenting or smothering mothering) can cause more harm than good. It is creating an anxious, dependent generation, they write, and it can “seriously undermine one of the most important roles of parents, namely, nurturing a sense of independence and separation from the parent.”

They fear that the trend is already being codified into law. In custody cases, lawyers advise parents, particularly the one who might have had less day-to-day participation in the children’s lives, to enter what Bernstein calls “the race for involvement.”

“It becomes a strategy, to know all the teachers, coach little league, text your children 20, 30 times a day,” she said in an interview.

Professor Bernstein and her co-author have also cautioned that “the law repeatedly incorporates child-rearing practices into mandatory legal standards and that we should expect to see pressure on legislatures and courts to turn sophisticated child rearing practices used by Intensive Parenting adherents into legal standards. ‘Some child rearing practices are desirable social norms but not desirable legal standards,’ Professor Bernstein explained. “For example, some states now place women who consume alcohol during pregnancy under civil confinement. Would we want to see pregnant women who do not to take folic acid vitamins–which reduce the probability of birth defects– similarly placed under civil confinement?”

“The authors warn against use of the law to enforce Intensive Parenting. Although research has shown that Intensive Parenting has important advantages, a rising body of research has shown that Intensive Parenting can seriously undermine one of the most important roles of parents, namely, nurturing a sense of independence and separation from the parent.  Disconcertingly, this research also shows that deficiencies correlated with Intensive Parenting place this generation at a higher risk for anxiety disorders and making poor choices regarding alcohol and drug abuse and sexual relationships.”

“Intensive Parenting is largely a socio-economic construct. It is class, race, ethnicity and culturally dependent and tends to place its weight squarely upon the shoulders of women-who are still overwhelmingly responsible for the raising of children. A hasty and uncritical incorporation of such standards in a multicultural society would increase existing biases and force Intensive Parenting on those who may be financially unable or ideologically unwilling to adopt it.”

Read the New York Times article, Defining a Successful Parent.

Read the Forbes article, Custody Goes To The Craziest Parent.

Read the Globe and Mail article, Give Helicopter Parents a Break

Read the ABA Journal article, Courts Reward Helicopter Parents, Two Law Profs Say

Read more about Professor Bernstein’s “Over Parenting,” forthcoming in the U.C. Davis Law Review, here.

Coping with Commodified Caregiving

Roger Scruton has complained that, in our society, “too many goods have a price.” He makes a Walzerian argument that certain experiences cannot be bought and sold without doing violence to their ultimate social meaning:

A century and a half ago John Muir in America and John Ruskin in England initiated the movement to save our world from spoliation. They rightly understood that nothing would  be saved if we simply defend it on economic grounds. A valley might be useful as farmland, but it might be even more useful as a reservoir or an opencast mine. Only if we recognize the intrinsic value of nature will it be proof against our predations; hence we should esteem landscapes and forests for their beauty, for their sacred quality, for the part they play in defining us and ennobling our settlements, rather than for their use. Only this will keep the market at bay and prevent us from consuming our world. . . .

Love is priceless, not because its price is higher than we can pay, but because it cannot be purchased but only earned. Of course, you can purchase the simulacrum of love, and there are people who are accomplished providers. But love that is purchased is only a pretense. Goods like love, beauty, consolation, and the sacred are spiritual goods: they have a value, but no price.

Economists don’t like spiritual goods. Such goods are connected to us not as things to be used, consumed, and exchanged but as parts of what we are. To lose them is to lose ourselves.

Perhaps the ultimate revenge of the economic mindset on commitments like Scruton’s is the rise of the caring industry, which Ronald W. Dworkin incisively examines in a recent article:

Read more

Mental Health Parity and Health Reform

The Interim Final Rules on mental health parity were issued last Friday by the various agencies responsible for the administration of the  Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA).  The rules provide interim permanent answers to some of the interpretive questions raised by the MHPAEA.  I’ll provide a couple of early reactions to the rules, and briefly describe why the parity rules in no way lessen the need for broader reform for the benefit of people with serious mental illness.

MHPAEA, effective for large (over 50) public and private health coverage for plan years beginning after October 3, 2009, adds substantial protections for mental health and substance abuse (MH/SA) coverage.  For example, it:

• Prohibits covered plans from imposing deductibles, copayments, and out-of-pocket limits on MH/SA coverage higher than those imposed for medical/surgical coverage;
• Prohibits restrictions on days of hospital coverage and duration/scope of MH/SA treatment beyond limits imposed for medical/surgical coverage; and
• Prohibits exclusion of out-of-network coverage for MH/SA treatment if such exclusions do not apply to medical/surgical coverage.

Advocates have been looking to the rules for clarification of a number of ambiguities in MPAEA.  Two clarifications in the published rules are encouraging.

• Should insurers be permitted to set deductible amounts separately for MH/SA? Some insurers require their members to meet two different deductibles — one for MH/SA, and one for other treatments. The effect is to permit members without behavioral health needs to experience, say, a $500 deductible, while people with behavioral and other health needs experience two such deductibles, for a total of $1,000. These rules forbid this double hit. The agencies acknowledged the lack of guidance in MHPAEA on this question, and the power of arguments on both sides, but explain their determination to enforce a unitary deductible:

Given that the statutory language does not preclude either interpretation, the Departments’ view is that prohibiting separately accumulating financial restrictions and quantitative treatment limitations is more consistent with the policy goals that led to the enactment of MHPAEA.

Translation: the act did not dictate a result, but unitary deductibles advance parity, and dual deductibles continue inequitable treatment.

• How will plans be prevented from continuing disparate treatment through less obvious means such as medical management decisions? Advocates have long been concerned that coverage inequities between behavioral and other health care could persist if aggressively restrictive utilization review systematically restricted MH/SA services under the guise of “medical necessity” or “medical management.” It is relatively easy to prohibit differential copayments and deductibles. It is harder — and more controversial — to attempt to monitor the relative equity of medical management techniques. The agencies have spoken pretty clearly on this issue in requiring equitable use of “nonquantitative” management strategies:

Any processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in applying the nonquantitative treatment limitation to mental health or substance use disorder benefits in a classification must be comparable to, and applied no more stringently than [those] used . . . with respect to medical/surgical benefits in the classification.

The tools must be comparable both facially and in application:

Thus, for example, assume a claims administrator has discretion to approve benefits for treatment based on medical necessity.  If that discretion is routinely used to approve medical/surgical benefits while denying mental health or substance use disorder benefits and recognized clinically appropriate standards of care do not permit such a difference, the processes used in applying the medical necessity standard are considered to be applied more stringently. . ..  The use of discretion in this manner violates the parity requirements for nonquantitative limitations.

Translation: the parity requirement for medical management is not one merely of form, but also of substance.  While the enforcement of this substantive even-handedness may be messy, it furthers the principle of parity in a powerful way.

The parity rule, then, takes some strides toward the enforcement of true parity in health insurance for people with behavioral health needs.   But people with such needs are desperately in need of further health reform for many reasons, a few of which are outlined below:

• Most obviously, people with serious mental illness are often unemployed or underemployed, and therefore are less likely to have employment-based health coverage. If they do not qualify for Medicaid or Medicare, they are often uninsured. Health reform extending coverage to the uninsured is therefore a pressing need for people with MH/SA needs.
• People with severe mental illness also suffer disproportionately from the effects of physical illness. As I’ve previously described, a 2006 National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors report titled Morbidity and Mortality in People with Serious Mental Illness revealed that people with serious mental illness die 25 years earlier than peers without mental illness, and suffer from a great deal of excess illness while alive. Most of the excess mortality and morbidity is due to preventable physical illness, and their poor medical condition is often traceable to poor coordination of their mental and physical care. The care coordination provisions in pending reform bills would go some distance in addressing these coordination and coverage concerns.
• The reform bills, in addition to mandating and facilitating the expansion of insurance, would channel at least much of the expansion through insurance exchanges. Although the proposals vary, exchanges could, as Tim Jost has described be a force for regularizing health plan design, and for promoting transparency in plan offerings for the benefit of all consumers, including those with MH/SA needs.

Our current health insurance system serves people with behavioral health needs rather poorly.  The MHPAEA took beneficial steps for insured people with MH/SA needs, and the interim rules in at least some sections interpret the act rather robustly.  This good news should not blind us to the fact that more comprehensive health reform is absolutely necessary to provide for the broad range of health needs of people with mental illness or substance use disorders.

Reforming Medical Treatment for People with Serious Mental Illness

What group could health reform help most?  The obvious choice (maybe the right one) would be people with no insurance, or lousy insurance.  It is clear that un- or underinsurance is bad for your physical and fiscal health.  How about people in need of skilled nursing care and assistance with activities of daily living?  Some provisions of pending bills would allow these folks to avoid the Hobson’s choice of institutional care or too little care.  But the cohort that might stand to gain the most from reform is the population of people with serious mental illness.

People with serious mental illness have long been known to have excess morbidity and mortality as compared to people without serious mental illness.  Although much of this excess is attributable to “unnatural causes” - e.g., suicide – studies have identified in this population substantially elevated natural causes of illness and early death from conditions such as cardiovascular and respiratory disease.    Some of these conditions are caused or exacerbated by side effects of newer atypical antipsychotics.    Much of this excess morbidity and mortality is preventable, and some causes (e.g., poorly controlled diabetes) could be addressed through sound chronic care management techniques I’ve described in an earlier post.    Inadequate attention to the management of the medical concerns of people with severe mental illness could be a particularly attractive goal of health delivery reform.

The National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors issued a Technical Report last year on this issue.  Its literature review rendered the following judgment:

Recent data indicates that, on average, persons with serious mental illness die 25 years earlier than the general population.  Eighty-seven percent of years of life lost to premature death are due to chronic disease, especially infectious, pulmonary, and cardiovascular diseases, and diabetes.  Cardiac events alone account for more deaths than suicide.

The data are emerging; more work needs to be done to evaluate comprehensively the connection between incidence of severe mental illness and lack of appropriate, coordinated medical care.  Whatever exact relationship is revealed, the situation is clearly dire: the fragmentation of our health care system causes particularly severe problems for people with serious mental illness.  The Association noted that emerging chronic care management techniques offer a way out of this unconscionable mess.  It advocates the adoption and application of patient-centered medical home programs that bring together primary care, mental health care, and care for chronic medical conditions in a patient- and community-centered environment.

The current bills offer some funding for such measures, at least as pilots.  The House bill, for example, contains language supporting Medicaid medical home demonstrations with initial funding tilted to the federal, in order to encourage states to try these programs out.  Let’s hope these and similar measures, which offer hope for the correction of terrible health disparities in a cost effective manner, survive the production of final legislation.