An “Unknowable” Number of Bureaucrats

Perhaps I’ve just read too much Kafka for this to be a comfortable paragraph, but I’ll let you decide. From Politico, in “Health reform’s bureaucratic spawn“:

Don’t bother trying to count up the number of agencies, boards and commissions created under the new health care law. Estimating the number is “impossible,” a recent Congressional Research Service report says, and a true count “unknowable.”

The modern course of the law is administrative. In the end, the appropriate scope of the Congressional delegation of power falls to the Supreme Court’s “intelligible principle” doctrine and the acknowledged need for technical expertise in complex areas that require rules–such as Health Law and Health Law Finance. But that doesn’t make it all that much less scary.

The rest of the Politico article is worth a quick read. And if you’re an aspiring attorney, you might want to consider taking Administrative Law. And, of course, Health Law.

“The alternate approach to medical marijuana distribution,” an op-ed by Kate Greenwood featured in The Record

[Ed. Note: This op-ed piece was featured in The Record's Sunday Editorial Page and on North Jersey.com. It was written by Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy Research Fellow and regular Health Reform Watch blogger, Kate Greenwood]

WE FEEL there is no question about it: The careful, legal distribution of medicinal marijuana to those in need is a good thing. The New Jersey Legislature agreed and passed legislation permitting distribution last January. Then-Gov. Jon Corzine signed the measure before leaving office.

But Governor Christie has requested a delay in its implementation, and a proposal to modify the system of distribution is cause for concern.

More than a year ago, Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health and Pharmaceutical Law and Policy distributed a position paper to New Jersey lawmakers urging passage of the marijuana measure, called the “New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act.” The center did so citing the inclusion of “multiple measures designed to reduce the risk of abuse or diversion” and noting that “the medical literature supports the conclusion that smoked marijuana can provide relief to patients suffering from debilitating medical conditions for whom conventional treatments have failed.”

Implementation delayed

The act was to have taken effect this month, but, in response to a request from Christie, the Legislature pushed back the effective date to October.

As passed, the act provides that medical marijuana be grown and distributed by six not-for-profit “alternative treatment centers.”

But now, the New Jersey Council of Teaching Hospitals has proposed that the act be amended — before it is even implemented to provide that medical marijuana instead be grown by Rutgers University and distributed by the state’s teaching hospitals.

While hospitals are, as the Council of Teaching Hospitals points out, experienced dispensers of medicine, the act should not be rewritten to require them to dispense medical marijuana.

The passage of the act affects the rights and responsibilities of patients and providers of medical marijuana under New Jersey law; it does not change the fact that distribution and use of marijuana are illegal under federal law.

Although Attorney General Eric Holder has pledged not to prosecute patients and providers who comply with applicable state laws, and hospitals could thus dispense medical marijuana without fear of criminal prosecution, they would still be violating federal law.

Condition of participation

This is a problem because compliance with federal law is a condition of participation in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Hospitals depend heavily on Medicaid and Medicare funding; the Compassionate Use Act’s alternative treatment centers would not.

Read More

Better Hospital Discharges = Lower Healthcare Costs?

[Ed. Note: We are pleased to welcome Jae W. Joo to HRW. Jae is a third year student at Seton Hall Law.  He graduated from Rutgers College in 2006 with a B.A. in Psychology and a minor in Philosophy.  In 2009, he interned for the Honorable Denise A. Cobham in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Currently, he is a summer intern at the New Jersey Attorney General's Tobacco and Securities Litigation Section, and also a research assistant for the Healthcare Compliance Certification Program at Seton Hall Law.]

With healthcare reform fresh out of the congressional oven, many changes are taking place in the field of healthcare and a myriad of new challenges will undoubtedly arise.  However, one of the perpetual challenges in the midst of all these changes has been the substantial amount of money needed to fund Medicare.  The Patient Protection Affordable Care Act is laden with economically efficient methods and plans to reduce costs.  However, as Lesley Alderman suggests in her NY Times article, a drastic cost saving measure may be implemented with a simple change in hospital procedure.

According to the article,

[In] a study published last year in The New England Journal of Medicine, one in five Medicare patients returns to the hospital within 30 days of being discharged. The problem is an expensive one: in 2004 these readmissions cost Medicare $17.4 billion dollars, the researchers also found.

As the study shows, readmission within 30 days of discharge has been costly and remains a substantial contributing source to the Medicare deficit.  However, discharge procedures rarely get the same level of attention as admission procedures to a hospital.

At discharge, the assumption is that the patient is better and all will be fine, said Dr. Eric A. Coleman, a geriatrician and professor of medicine at the University of Colorado Denver. But many patients, especially older ones, leave the hospital with a host of issues to manage. They may have additional medications to take, new symptoms to monitor and follow up appointments to keep, all of which require focused attention at a time when patients may not be at their sharpest.

What’s more, while insurers will pay for limited hospital stays, there’s no financial incentive for hospitals to insure that patients get and stay out. ‘A hospital may actually be financially rewarded for mishandled discharge,’ said Dr. Williams, chief of hospital medicine at Northwestern University. ‘If the patient is readmitted, they get paid again.’

While there may be a general lack of concern or awareness to improve conditions of patient discharge, Alderman’s article mentions some initiatives that have been taken to improve the discharge process.  Care Transition Intervention is a hospital-based program that helps reduce readmissions by coaching older adults on how to manage their health and take better care.  Project Boost provides hospitals guidelines to help standardize and enhance the discharge process.  Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid has a program to improve hospital hand-offs for high risk patients and has also been developing a program to incentivize hospitals to lower their readmission rates.

Whether or not hospitals decide to implement new discharge protocols and procedures, individual patients can help alleviate the financial burdens placed on the system by taking an active role in managing their health.  Alderman’s article points out a few tips to follow if a hospital does not have an up to date discharge procedure in place.  Following these simple tips can, it seems, make a big difference.

Community Health Law Project to Assist New Jersey’s Elderly and Disabled Save Money on Their Healthcare Costs

The Community Health Law Project (CHLP) has been awarded a grant to help seniors and individuals with disabilities save money on their healthcare costs. Founded in 1976, the Community Health Law Project (CHLP) is a non-profit advocacy and legal services organization with 10 offices located throughout New Jersey. CHLP President/ Executive Director, Harold Garwin said, “We are pleased to spearhead this initiative. It augments the Law Project’s mission to provide services to the elderly and disabled throughout the State of NJ, where so many people are eligible for benefits, but so few apply.”

The grant, made possible by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), will be used to conduct community outreach activities and help eligible individuals apply for programs that can help them save money on their Medicare premiums, deductibles, coinsurance and/or co-pay costs.

Seton Hall Law Professor and CHLP Chairperson of the Board, Paula Franzese said “Like so many government programs, the eligibility and paperwork can be a little confusing. Fortunately this grant will allow us to get seniors and the disabled the help they need and are entitled to. The benefits can literally add up to hundreds of dollars per month.”

The programs promoted by the grant include the Medicare Savings Programs known as QMB, SLMB and QI-1; the Medicare prescription drug program’s Low Income Subsidy(LIS) (also known as Extra Help), and the state’s Pharmaceutical Assistance to the Aged and Disabled Program (PAAD).

It is estimated that only 33% of individuals eligible for QMB and 13% of those eligible for SLMB or QI-1 have actually signed up for benefits. Likewise only 53% of those eligible for LIS who are not automatically enrolled through their participation in Medicaid or SSI are believed to receive the subsidy.

Seniors and people with disabilities, especially those who now receive Medicare are encouraged to call the CHLP Hotline at 1-888-838-3180 to see if they might be eligible. Advocates are available 5 days each week from 9-5 to answer questions and provide assistance in applying. Staff is also available to make presentations to community groups and organizations who are interested in learning more about these cost saving benefit programs.

First Step in the Expansion of Medicare? Feds Assist Employer Health Plans for Retirees Age 55 +

During the Health Care reform debate, one of the many plans promulgated was to expand Medicare availability to persons aged 55 and up who are not otherwise insured. The argument on behalf of the initiative was simply that Medicare works, people like it, and it would not require the reinvention of the wheel. The system is already in place, we would just need to expand what is already there. In addition, even people who rail against “socialized medicine” seem to have an ideological (if not personal) soft spot for Medicare.

The initiative did not gain sufficient traction. There is, however, more than one way to skin a cat. The White House announced the other day that it would commence in helping to pay the medical bills for early retirees (55 and up) who have medical insurance through their former employers and are not yet eligible for Medicare.

The New York Times reports:

Under the program, the federal government can reimburse employers for 80 percent of the cost of claims from $15,000 to $90,000 a year for a retired worker who is 55 or older and not eligible for Medicare.

The primary goal it seems is to incentivize private employers to continue insuring retirees.  The Times quotes Valerie Jarrett, a senior advisor to President Obama:

“In 1988,” Ms. Jarrett said, “66 percent of large firms provided health care coverage to their retirees. Twenty years later, in 2008, the percent of firms offering coverage to retirees plummeted to 31 percent.”

Obviously, if one can indirectly continue private coverage for those over 55, one need not expand Medicare coverage to do so. But of course there remains those over 55 who are not fortunate enough, at present, to be covered by an employer retiree plan.

80 per cent of up to $90,000 is a large subsidy–by anyone’s standards. But the money will go to business which, for some reason, attenuates the subsidy sufficiently for the largesse to not be “socialism.” And businesses which benefit from such subsidies are not likely to complain–having now cultivated a personal, and thus ideological, soft spot for the program. Like Medicare.

State Long-Term Care Partnership Programs

By Brian Seguin

Long-term care refers to end of life care where a person can no longer take care of themselves. These people require either the assistance of a trained professional, such as a home health aide, to help them care for themselves in their home, or they need to be housed in a nursing home and cared for there. Since Medicare does not cover long-term care, people who require it need to either pay for it themselves, or if they have almost no savings and get a low enough monthly income that they qualify, they can apply for Medicaid which does cover it. If someone pays for it themselves and winds up spending all of their savings and still needs care, they can then apply for Medicaid to cover it if their monthly income is under the threshold set by their state in order to qualify for the program.

In the early 1980’s, states began to worry that as the baby boomer generation got closer to retirement age and might start requiring long-term care, it could cause increases in their Medicaid expenditures and thus budget deficits. One possible solution forwarded for this impending problem, and eventually implemented by four states in 1993, was the idea of state long-term care partnership programs. Under these programs states would incentivize their citizens to purchase private health insurance to cover at least part of the long-term care they may eventually require and thus spare Medicaid from covering some of the costs. Insurance companies who participated in the programs had to meet certain regulations of what type of care was provided and had to report certain data back to the states so they could effectively monitor the impact the programs were having.

Proponents hoped these plans would cause people to buy their own long-term care insurance coverage and hopefully never need to turn to Medicaid to pay for it. They also hoped this would stop the perceived threat of people transferring their assets (savings) to family members early in order to appear qualified for Medicaid. Of the four original states, California and Connecticut incentivized their citizens by allowing them to disregard assets they had above the threshold allowed to qualify for Medicaid in the amount that the partnership plan had paid towards their long-term care. In other words if a person purchased a partnership plan and it paid out $200,000 towards their long-term care, that person would still qualify for Medicaid even if they had up to $200,000 in assets over the amount usually allowed to qualify. This was called the “dollar for dollar approach.” New York required citizens to purchase more comprehensive plans that had higher lifetime benefits, and if they did they could disregard all of their assets in determining if they qualified for Medicaid, known as the “total assets approach.” Indiana allowed a “dollar for dollar” disregard if the person purchased a plan covering less than four years of care and a “total asset” disregard if they purchased a plan covering more than four years.

Opponents of this idea worried that these public partnerships would inappropriately promote private plans with limited values, and that they could lead to increases in Medicaid expenditures by allowing wealthier people who would purchase private long-term care plans anyway keep their assets and now have access to Medicaid that they wouldn’t have otherwise had. As a result of these fears part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) required any state that started a partnership program after 1993 to recover any disregarded assets of a deceased Medicaid recipient from their estate. Although this Federal law did not apply to the four states already operating partnership programs and did not ban other states from starting their own programs, it effectively eliminated any other states from trying to start their own programs by removing the incentives for citizens to join. This is because although a person could keep some of their assets while still alive, and still qualify for Medicaid, the state would now have to take those assets from their estate. So there was no longer any incentive for a person to purchase a partnership plan which they may never need, and thus shift some of the potential costs of long-term care on private insurers rather than Medicaid.

The Federal government finally decided to give long-term care partnership programs another chance in 2005 with the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA). Parts of that bill removed the estate recovery requirement of OBRA and allowed states (other than the original four who have continued their programs and are again not subject to this bill) to start their own partnership programs provided they use the “dollar for dollar” approach. Insurance companies participating in these new programs will have to be certified by the state, using new federal guidelines, and will have specific data reporting requirements. The “dollar for dollar” approach is mandated to avoid the grant of Medicaid benefits to those who do not need or deserve them. This approach only allows beneficiaries to keep the amount of assets they would have presumably spent for long-term care themselves and then qualified for Medicaid anyway, had their partnership plans not paid that amount. The federal government has finalized its rule of what data needs to be submitted by partnership insurers after consulting with the National Association of Insurance Companies, insurance companies who issue long-term care plans, the four original states with programs, and consumers who purchase long-term care plans. The data collected is meant to cost insurers as little as possible while still allowing the federal government to accurately track the effectiveness of these programs. While no states or private insurers are required to participate in these partnership programs, as of August 2008, 13 states (in addition to the original four) are now offering partnership plans and 12 more are in the process of implementing them.

Comment on Medicare Advantage and Prescription Drug Benefit Programs: Final Marketing Provisions (Parts III & IV)

[Ed. Note: This post is a continuation of a post we published the other day regarding "modifications and additions to initial marketing regulations implementing The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ("MMA"), which "established the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program (Part D) and made revisions to [] provisions” of the Medicare Advantage Program.” The initial post, detailing the modifications, can be found here.]

By Michael Rabasca

PART III

The strongest argument against these final regulations is that they prevent eligible enrollees “from learning about their full range of healthcare options” and, thus, unduly hinder the market for Part C and Part D plans. (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54214). In order for consumers to make informed healthcare decisions, they need to have ready access to information. Marketing is all about the strategic distribution of information, and placing restrictions on plan marketing activities limits the information available to potential enrollees. Thus, regulating the marketing activities of Part C and Part D plans could lead to consumer ignorance and severely limit the choices of Medicare eligible individuals.

These new rules significantly hinder the ability of potential Part C and Part D plan participants to both obtain plan information and enroll in plans. Many individuals who are eligible for Medicare are hospitalized or living in nursing homes where healthcare is delivered. Under these rules, Part C and Part D plans would be unable to make marketing presentations, distribute enrollments applications, or collect completed applications from these individuals. Unfortunately, these potential enrollees are often the people who would benefit the most from enrolling in these plans and these regulations severely limit their ability to do so.

PART IV

I think that government oversight of Part C and Part D plans’ marketing activities provides vital protection to the individuals who are eligible to participate in these plans. I feel that Medicare participants are particularly vulnerable to questionable marketing practices, and these final regulations provide important modifications and additions and to CMS’s marketing regulatory scheme. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that these rules do enough to deter Part C and Part D plans from engaging in impermissible marketing activities. Although CMS may impose civil monetary penalties or marketing/ enrollment sanctions on plans that violate its marketing regulations, these penalties are merely discretionary. I agree with one commenter who suggested that CMS should mandate civil monetary penalties for plans that violate the marketing rules in order to ensure that violators are punished. (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54211). Additionally, I feel that CMS should provide some sort of financial incentive for both individuals and competing plans who report marketing violations in order to increase the likelihood that violations are discovered and reported. These additional enforcement tools would help to ensure that the new final marketing regulations serve their purpose by effectively protecting individuals who are eligible to participate in Part C and Part D plans from inappropriate marketing tactics.

Comment on Medicare Advantage and Prescription Drug Benefit Programs: Final Marketing Provisions (Parts I & II)

By Michael Rabasca

Part I

These rules represent modifications and additions to initial marketing regulations implementing The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (”MMA”), which “established the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program (Part D) and made revisions to [] provisions” of the Medicare Advantage Program (Part C). (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54208). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (”CMS”) enacted these final regulations pursuant to §§ 1851(h) and 1860D-1(b)(1)(B)(vi) of the Social Security Act, which empower the CMS to “implement standards consistent with ‘fair marketing.’” (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54210).

The most significant aspect of these final regulations is the new restrictions they place on Part C and Part D plans’ marketing activities. Specifically, these rules prohibit the following:

(1) unsolicited direct contact with potential enrollees, including telemarketing (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2268(d), 423.2268(d));

(2) selling non-healthcare related products during a plan marketing event or presentation (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2268(f), 423.2268(f));

(3) conducting marketing presentations or distributing and/or collecting enrollment applications “in provider offices or other areas where healthcare is delivered to individuals, except . . . where such activities are conducted in common areas in healthcare settings” (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2268(k), 423.2268(k));

(4) conducting marketing presentations or distributing and/or collecting enrollment applications at “educational events”  (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2268(l), 423.2268(l)); and

(5) offering meals to potential plan enrollees at marketing events (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2268(p), 423.2268(p)).

These regulations also implement new rules regarding CMS’s procedure for reviewing Part C and Part D plan marketing materials. Generally, Part C and Part D plans must submit all marketing materials to CMS at least forty-five days before distribution. (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2262(a), 423.2262(a)). However, the regulations provide for an abbreviated “file and use” procedure, under which CMS deems certain materials approved five days after submission. (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 5410). Previously, Part C plans could use the “file and use” procedure to obtain approval of marketing materials if: 1) the plan had a record of continued exemplary performance in CMS reviews of its marketing materials; or 2) the plan certified that the marketing materials in question did not contain “substantive content” or, alternatively, only used “model language already reviewed and approved by CMS.” (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54210).  Part D plans, on the other hand, could only obtain “file and use” approval through plan certification. (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54210). However, these final regulations “eliminate file and use status based on an organization’s track record” for Part C plans, and implement “a uniform policy of applying the file an use policy to marketing materials that either use model language without substantive modification, or materials identified by CMS as not containing substantive content warranting CMS review” for both Part C and Part D plans. (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54210-54211).

Additionally, these final regulations implement licensure requirements for plan marketing representatives. Specifically, the rules require Part C and Part D plans to exclusively use State licensed marketing representatives to conduct direct marketing activities targeted at potential plan enrollees. (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2272(c), 423.2272(c)). Plans must also notify states that they are using licensed representatives in a manner that is “consistent with the appointment process provided for under State law.” (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2272(c), 423.2272(c)).

Finally, these rules mandate that Part C and Part D plans make certain disclosures to plan participants. Under these final regualtions, plans must now disclose the information specified in §§ 422.111(b) and 423.128(b) to all plan participants both “[a]t the time of enrollment and at least annually thereafter, 15 days before the annual coordinated election period.” (42 C.F.R. §§ 422.111(a)(3), 423.128(a)(3)).

PART II

The best argument in support of these final regulations is that they provide necessary consumer protections. Generally, individuals age sixty-five and older, and people with disabilities are eligible for Medicare programs. This group of potential enrollees is particularly vulnerable to dubious marketing tactics. Allowing insurers to market their Part C and Part D plans unchecked could be harmful potential participants. Indeed, permitting plans to distribute information and solicit enrollment applications at any place and in any manner they chose has the potential to confuse potential enrollees and, in some cases, could result in plans coercing individuals into participating. Thus, a free market philosophy as to plan marketing practices is inappropriate in the Part C and Part D setting, and strict regulation is required.

These new rules protect consumers by: 1) prohibiting certain problematic marketing activities; and 2) limiting the places where plans may conduct marketing activities. Indeed, prohibiting Part C and Part D plans from offering meals or selling non-healthcare related products to potential participants prevents hurried “enrollments without personal attention to the appropriateness of the plan.” (Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 182 at p. 54215). Additionally, prohibiting plans from conducting marketing activities and soliciting enrollments at educational events and anywhere healthcare is delivered prevents plans from targeting individuals for enrollment when they are vulnerable to suggestion, and avoids the appearance that individual providers and facilities recommend or support specific plans.

CMS Protects Seniors from Renegade Marketers

By Samantha B. Lansdowne, MSJ, CCMEP

On December 8, 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) was enacted creating the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program, better known as Part D, while revising the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, or Part C.  Since Medicare’s establishment by the Social Security Act of 1965, the creation of Part D is considered to be the most significant change to Medicare.  With the new regulations also came new rules relating to contracts, applications, bidding processes, and marketing.  The initial set of rules became effective March 22, 2005, and as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) gained more experience with the Part D program, a necessary revision was made to some existing marketing policies utilized by plans and their representatives in attracting seniors to their program.  On May 16, 2008, by way of its authority to establish marketing rules through rulemaking, CMS proposed new marketing regulations.

Subsequently, Congress passed the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) on July 15, 2008, establishing new statutory marketing regulations for both the MA and Part D plans, which were similar or in some cases identical to the CMS regulations of May 16, 2008.  The MIPPA provisions enacted into statute the provisions that CMS had previously proposed, superseding the CMS regulatory proposals.  The new MIPPA regulations were to begin on January 1, 2009; however, CMS felt that some of the rules provided important protections for Medicare beneficiaries and should instead be in effect before the 2009 plan year marketing campaign began on October 1, 2008.  So in its authority to establish rules, CMS finalized on September 18, 2008 six new marketing provisions, in addition to modifying the disclosure and dissemination of Part D information provisions, and the file and use provision.

At the same time each year, senior citizens are barraged with information on which Medicare program they should enroll in.  They have several options to choose from: 1) the Original Medicare — a fee-for-service plan managed by the Federal Government, 2) Medicare Health Plans — health plan options that are approved by Medicare but run by private companies, 3) Medicare Prescription Drug Plans — plans that add prescription drug coverage to Original Medicare, some Medicare Cost Plans, some Medicare Private Fee-for-Service Plans, and Medicare Medical Savings Account Plans, and 4) Medigap (Medicare Supplement Insurance) Policies — health insurance policies sold by private insurance companies to fill “gaps” in Original Medicare coverage.  All of these options are “sold” through representatives of the various Medicare health plans.

During Senate hearings held in February 2008 on the topic “Selling to Seniors: The Need for Accountability and Oversight of Marketing and Sales by Medicare Private Plans,” state and federal regulators, plan sponsors, and consumers testified to “overly-aggressive, inappropriate, and sometimes deceptive practices used to market, sell, and enroll seniors into Medicare private plans.”  Therefore, CMS was concerned that plan representatives were engaging in sales and marketing activities that pressured beneficiaries to make plan selections for reasons other than those that best meet their healthcare needs.

The September 18, 2008 rule (CMS-4131-F) prohibited plans and their representatives from using the following “pressure techniques”: 1) contacting potential enrollees directly without the potential enrollee first initiating contact (examples include door to door solicitation, outbound telemarketing, or approaching an individual in a parking lot); 2) cross-selling of non-healthcare related products during Medicare sales or marketing activities; 3) providing of meals to prospective enrollees at promotional and sales events; 4) conducting sales presentations or distributing and accepting plan applications in provider offices or other places where healthcare is delivered, except in the case where such activities are conducted in common areas such as a conference room or cafeteria, and 5) conducting sales presentations or distributing and accepting plan applications at educational events, such as health information fairs or state or community-sponsored events.

In addition to the above changes in marketing, plans were now to hire and use only state-licensed representatives to conduct marketing activities in accordance with applicable State appointment laws.  This requirement helps to ensure that beneficiaries do not fall prey to under-educated, unscrupulous and or otherwise substandard representatives.  Further, plans are now to disclose certain beneficiary information at the time of enrollment, and fifteen days before the annual coordinated election period.  Disclosure of plan information continues to be an important feature that gives beneficiaries the necessary information in order for them to make an informed decision about their healthcare plan.

Lastly, CMS would no longer allow plans to file and use marketing materials within 5 days of submission (instead of the normally required 45 day period) based on their previous track record of consistently meeting all of the marketing standards set forth by CMS.  Instead, a uniform file and use policy will be applied to marketing materials that either use model language without substantive modification, or materials that are indentified by CMS as not containing substantive content warranting CMS review.  This will allow CMS to focus resources on materials that contain content that warrants further scrutiny.

As part of the rulemaking process, CMS received comments from managed care organizations and other insurance industry representatives, members of Congress, representatives of health care providers, beneficiaries, and many others.  While most comments were supportive, some of the proposed rulemaking was greeted with great opposition.  One concern was the time frame for implementation of certain provisions prior to the 2009 open enrollment period.  Critics wanted the new rules to go into effect after the 2009 period and others even argued for no sooner than 2010.  Another area that drew concern was the new uniform application of the file and use policy.  Opponents asked for additional clarification and even commented that there would be additional burden on CMS.  The new marketing rules attracted the most resistance.  CMS received many comments that the rules were overly restrictive, would prevent beneficiaries from learning about the full range of healthcare options available to them, and that further clarification was needed.  It is clear from reading the final rule though that CMS put a lot of thought into the changes being made.  Plans and their representatives will have no choice but to comply with the new regulations as both Congress and CMS favor the change.

Low Income Benchmark Methodology for Drug Plans Under Medicare

By Jason Halpin

Each year, Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) and Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug (MA-PD) plans submit bids to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to determine what their beneficiary premia will be. And each year, Medicare calculates the Part D premium low-income subsidy (LIS or the “benchmark premium”) for low-income beneficiaries based on the new premiums.

The upshot of the annual change in both the beneficiary premium and the LIS is that one year, the subsidy could pay for a low-income beneficiary’s premium in its entirety, but the next year, the premium could increase or the subsidy could decrease, leaving the beneficiary with the possibility they could have to pay a monthly premium equal to the difference between the premium and the subsidy.

Fortunately for low-income beneficiaries, Medicare seeks to avoid this scenario. If full-benefit dual eligible beneficiaries do not actively choose a plan when they first enroll in Medicare, they are enrolled into a PDP plan where they would not pay a premium. If, in the following year, they would have to pay a premium, LIS-eligible beneficiaries may “elect,” by doing nothing, to be reassigned to a PDP with no premium. LIS-eligible beneficiaries can also choose to stay in their plan and pay a premium or pick another plan with or without a premium.

Unfortunately for low-income beneficiaries, those who are subject to reassignment may also be subject to the complexity and hassle of having to change their pharmacy and their medications, and perhaps having to get new prescriptions from their doctors. Congress and CMS, therefore, have adopted a policy of seeking mechanisms to avoid reassignment.

When establishing the guidelines for determining the LIS, Congress mandated, in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-114(b), that weighted averages should be used, presumably to ensure that the benchmark premium accurately reflects the actual average premium for an individual PDP or MA-PD beneficiary in the region and is not skewed by outliers, such as a comparatively lightly subscribed PDP with abnormally low premiums. Maintaining stability in the benchmark premium helps to promote continuity for beneficiaries and cost predictability for the government.

Figuring out the precise formula for the benchmark premium is in the hands of CMS, pursuant to its authority to administer the Medicare program under 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh. Accordingly, on April 3, 2008, CMS issued a final rule, Modification to the Weighting Methodology Used to Calculate the Low-Income Benchmark Amount.

While 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-114(b) states that Part D premium amounts must be “weighted,” to calculate the benchmark premiums, it says nothing about what that weight should be. Prior to the promulgation of the rule the weight given a particular PDP or MA-PD plan equaled a percentage, with the numerator being the number of Part D eligible beneficiaries enrolled in the plan and the denominator being the number of Part D eligible beneficiaries enrolled in all PDP and MA-PD plans in the PDP region.

The new regulations change the formula such that the weight given a particular PDP or MA-PD plan now equals a percentage, with the numerator being the number of Part D LIS-eligible beneficiaries enrolled in the plan and the denominator being the number of Part D LIS-eligible beneficiaries enrolled in all PDP and MA-PD plans in the PDP region.

By changing the formula to reference only LIS-eligible beneficiaries, the rule gives more weight to the premiums of plans that serve more low-income beneficiaries. Proponents of this formulation argue that it stabilizes and, in general, increases the benchmark premium, thereby reducing the risk of reassignment.

As CMS suggested in its response to comments on the rule, PDPs typically support a greater share of LIS enrollment, thanks to auto and facilitated enrollment. PDPs also typically have higher premiums than MA-PDs because MA-PDs can apply Part A and B rebates to lower their Part D premiums. The rule’s proponents argued that giving more weight to the higher PDP premiums–due to their higher LIS enrollment–would push the benchmark higher, bring more plans under the line, and protect more beneficiaries from reassignment. CMS estimated that if  LIS-enrollment weighting were used in 2008, reassignments would have been reduced by 850,000 from 2.1 million.

Critics still cried foul. Because the rule, and its predecessor regulations, dictated that MA-PD post-rebate premiums (which are about $20 less than PDP premiums on average) be factored into the benchmark formula, MA-PD premiums exerted downward pressure on the benchmark regardless of the weight given PDPs, leaving more PDP plans than necessary above the line and forcing more reassignments than the critics would tolerate.

In 2009, the critics’ views were largely borne out. The predicted benchmark increases were less dramatic than anticipated; though 28 out of 34 regions experienced increases (CMS predicted 27 out of 34), the increases in six of these regions were negligible (50 cents or less). Six regions saw decreased benchmarks. In addition, 1.6 million LIS-eligible beneficiaries were reassigned to new PDPs, and 620,000 were notified they would need to either pick a new plan or start paying a premium; the anticipated reduction was not as large as CMS expected.

To its credit, however, CMS responded appropriately in 2009, establishing a Medicare Demonstration to use pre-rebate MA-PD premiums in the benchmark formula. This greatly reduces the skewing effect of low post-rebate MA-PD premiums. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the pre-rebate MA-PD premiums  are actually slightly higher than PDP premiums. The weight of LIS-heavy PDP premiums thus pushed benchmark premiums up in all but one region for 2010, and 1.1 million beneficiaries were reassigned.

While some critics maintain that CMS could do more to reduce reassignments, the methods they suggest have rightly been rejected by CMS. Critics suggest the similar options of either allowing plans to waive the difference between their premiums and the benchmark, or reinstituting CMS’ de minimis policy, whereby an LIS-eligible beneficiary left with a premium that is less than a de minimis amount after recalcuation and application of the subsidy would not have to pay that de minimis amount.

CMS rejected both ideas because both provide a disincentive to plans keeping their bids low. If plans knew they could reduce their premiums for LIS-eligible premiums regardless of the premium their bids produced, they would not even try to keep their bids low. Also, if a plan had to write off a large amount of its premium, the revenue estimates in its bid would be undermined.

While recrafting the benchmark formula has not eliminated all reassignments, it has been very successful in reducing them. The new formula has reduced reassignments by half since 2008 and assured that less than 10 percent of LIS-eligible beneficiaries are reassigned. While CMS must work on reducing this number further, the reformulation of the benchmark premium is a good start.

Who’s the New Guy? – Obama Announces Choice for Next CMS Director

President Obama has announced his choice for the position of director of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Dr. Donald Berwick, a pediatrician, professor, and advocate of improving patient care.  The CMS has been without a permanent administrator since 2006.  Berwick, whose appointment must be approved by the Senate before he may assume the position, certainly has the credentials for the important role the CMS director will surely play in the coming years.  Still, whether Republican Senators will be basing their confirmation decision on credentials or resentment of health care reform’s passage is yet to be seen.

Berwick is best known for founding the Institute for Health Care Improvement.  The Institute for Health Care Improvement is a non-profit think tank that is dedicated to helping hospitals improve their patient care delivery.  As attested to by the Institute’s co-founder Dr. Paul Batalden, Berwick takes incremental approaches to improving patient care that are cost-effective and do not lead to the rationing of care.  For example, Berwick finds that reducing the prevalence of hospital-acquired infections through something as small as keeping medical equipment sterile can help to bring down the rate of medical errors.

Berwick is also a proponent of utilizing medical information sharing, and is often called blunt in regard to how he finds the American health care system inefficient in delivering patient care.  Additionally, Berwick has advocated for patient rights on numerous levels, using a philosophy of patient-centered medicine.  He wants doctors to be rewarded based on the health care outcomes of their patients instead of how many procedures a doctor has performed. Having a leader interested in implementing infrstructural changes which incentivize outcomes as opposed to procedures as paydays without regard to outcome, is, many think, a step in the right direction. It is also worth noting that Berwick himself will be taking more than a 66% pay cut if he is appointed as the director of the CMS.

While Berwick may not have functioned as the head of a health care system in his career, he is not new to the world of national health policy.  In 1998, he was on President Clinton’s advisory commission that recommended ways to reduce medical mistakes and ensure consumer protection in the American health care system.  And also served at that same time as  Chair of the agency that is now known as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Berwick has also played a part in improving Britain’s National Health Service, for which he was given an honorary knighthood by Queen Elizabeth II.

Since Obama’s health care overhaul “contemplates key roles for both programs in extending insurance coverage to 32 million people at a cost of $938 billion over 10 years,” if selected to be the CMS’s director, Berwick will certainly need to bring his A-game in helping change the way our current health care system consumes Medicare and Medicaid resources.  Many also hope that good Medicare reforms will start a trend, motivating private insurance companies to also make cost-saving changes.  Before that challenge, Berwick will have to get past a Senate confirmation.  Republican Senators are likely going to make the process a rigorous one, where they will grill Berwick on how exactly he plans to effect the new health care reform legislation.

Given the importance of the CMS and the fact that it currently has no director, it would behoove the Senate to quicken the process of Berwick’s selection, considering his credentials and commitment to the rights and needs of American patients.  As the Washington Post said, “supporters and opponents of the new health-care legislation ought to be able to agree that leaving the agency without a confirmed head is not healthy.”  The job needs to be filled, and instead of using political tactics through rehashing the health care reform debate, the Senate should focus on the many qualities that Berwick has to offer.

Health Care Reform Law: Help for Hospitals?

Last week, Samuel Maizel, a bankruptcy lawyer specializing in representing health care businesses in distress, gave a great talk here at Seton Hall Law on “Hospitals in Crisis: Debt Restructuring Options & Issues for Financial Survival.”  Mr. Maizel painted a grim picture of the financial pressures facing hospitals and said he does not believe the situation is going to improve in the near term despite the overall economic recovery.

Near the end of his talk, Mr. Maizel told us that hospitals across the country are combing through the health reform legislation looking for anything that could improve their bottom lines.  This piqued my interest and made me wonder what they will find.  Using the House Committees’ summary of the provisions in the bill relating to delivery system reform as a guide, I came up with the following.

Sec. 3001.  Rewarding High-Quality and Efficient Care.

This provision, which applies to patients discharged on or after October 1, 2012, establishes “value-based purchasing,” meaning that the government will make “value-based incentive payments” to hospitals that provide care to Medicare patients that meets or exceeds certain performance standards to be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Initially the standards must relate to at least the following five conditions: heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, surgery, and healthcare-associated infections.  Eventually (by fiscal year 2014) the standards are to incorporate “efficiency measures,” that is Medicare spending per beneficiary must be a factor.

Sec. 3022.  Medicare Shared Savings Program.

This provision, which Jordan Cohen analyzed at length here, directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a program by January 1, 2012 through which accountable care organizations that save Medicare money would be entitled to a cut of the savings they achieve.  Hospitals are eligible to participate in the program through a partnership or joint venture arrangement with physicians or as employers of physicians.

Sec. 3023.  National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling.

Under this 5-year long pilot program, which the Secretary must establish by January 1, 2013, the government will make one bundled payment “for integrated care during an episode of care provided to an applicable beneficiary around a hospitalization in order to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services.”  Episodes of care begin 3 days prior to hospitalization and end 30 days after discharge.  Hospitals can apply to participate in the program (and/or submit a bid) as part of “[a]n entity comprised of … a hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a home health agency.”

While the above three provisions hold out hope of improvement to hospitals’ bottom lines, the House Committees’ summary also highlights two provisions which establish negative incentives.  Section 3008 on Hospital Acquired Conditions provides that, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the government will cut by 1% the payments it makes to hospitals in the top quartile for hospital acquired conditions.  Similarly, Section 3025, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, provides that, after October 1, 2012, the government will begin reducing the amount it pays to hospitals with “excess readmissions.”

Medicaid Cuts: Where’s the Outrage?

If Medicare services or provider rates were cut, or threatened to be cut to balance the budget, the firestorm would be epic.  Republicans would accuse Democrats suggesting such cuts of stealing from the elderly.  Democrats would accuse Republicans suggesting such cuts of trying to abolish Medicare.  AARP would express outrage, and if it didn’t do so loudly enough tea partiers would urge seniors to burn their AARP cards in an incongruous support of a government health care program.  So where’s the outrage when states faced with budget cuts look first to cut Medicare’s sister program, Medicaid?

A front page story in the New York Times on Tuesday describes cuts in Michigan’s Medicaid budget, resulting in the elimination of some services and reductions in provider fees.  As Medicaid fees were already absurdly low in Michigan, as in many states, the predictable response was that the pool of doctors available to Medicaid beneficiaries shrank even further.  Those lucky enough to find a doctor willing to take the low Medicaid reimbursement must be willing to travel long distances, and give up days of work to get necessary care for their sick children.  The Times described one such case:

Medicaid enrollees in Michigan’s midsection have grown accustomed to long journeys for care. This month, Shannon M. Brown of Winn skipped work to drive her 8-year-old son more than two hours for a five-minute consultation with Dr. Mukkamala. Her pediatrician could not find a specialist any closer who would take Medicaid, she said.

Later this month, she will take the predawn drive again so Dr. Mukkamala can remove her son’s tonsils and adenoids. “He’s going to have to sit in the car for three hours after his surgery,” Mrs. Brown said. “I’m not looking forward to that one.”

Those who can’t locate a participating physician either do without or wait for the condition to become emergent, at which time they seek more expensive hospital care.  How can this program be so dysfunctional?   The Kaiser Family Foundation, in a report posted last month, described the countercyclical nature of Medicaid’s finance structure:

During an economic downturn, unemployment rises and puts upward pressure on Medicaid. As individuals lose employer sponsored insurance and incomes decline, Medicaid enrollment and therefore spending increase. At the same time, revenue losses make it more difficult for states to pay their share of Medicaid spending increases. Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate is estimated to result in 1 million more Medicaid and CHIP enrollees and an additional 1.1 million uninsured at the same time as state revenues are projected to fall by 3 to 4%.

So, states need to increase funding for Medicaid just when they are losing tax revenues and are facing pressures in other public service settings.  As KFF describes in the report, the problem this year was lessened somewhat by the addition of federal stimulus funding; the funding was apparently not enough to support the program in Michigan, and in any event will not persist nearly as long as states’ projected budget problems.

This is not a new problem.  It has often been noted that a health care system for poor people is a poor health system.  The reasons are, unfortunately, quite clear.  Medicare serves (mostly) the elderly of all income groups.  This is a politically powerful bloc: its members vote, and enough of them are financially and socially powerful to protect their turf.  Medicaid covers low-income people, including our lowest wage-earners, poor children, and people with permanent disabilities.  They have little social clout, by definition little money, and not much in the way of a lobby.  So, when times get hard, their programs are on the line.

That brings us to health reform.  The current bills rely heavily on Medicaid to bring coverage to the uninsured.  That is, as the above discussion makes clear, a risky proposition.  In its several forms, current reform bills have promised some increases, often temporary, to the federal share of states’ Medicaid costs.  And in a letter to Congressional leaders following a summit earlier this month, the President acknowledged the precariousness of the network of providers on whom we’ll rely to render that expansion more than a charade:

At the meeting, Senator Grassley raised a concern, shared by many Democrats, that Medicaid reimbursements to doctors are inadequate in many states, and that if Medicaid is expanded to cover more people, we should consider increasing doctor reimbursement. I’m open to exploring ways to address this issue in a fiscally responsible manner.

That would be a good step.  So would increasing the federal share of Medicaid’s costs.  If the current fiscal crisis has shown us anything about our federalist system, it is that the federal government, with its ability to borrow,  is much better at responding to emergencies than are the states, with their obligations to balance budgets annually.  But ultimately, a program for poor people will always have political, and therefore fiscal problems.

For reform to stick, for expansion of coverage to the poor and near-poor to genuinely serve their health needs over time, we have to tend structurally to our funding system.  The achievement of expansion to near-universal coverage would be a statement of solidarity, proclaiming that we’re all in this together.  To make that stick, we have to be in our health care financing system together.  There will be a list of clean-up work and next steps if and when reform passes.  High on that list should be the repair of Medicaid’s shaky fiscal foundation, integrating the interests of Americans across class and income levels.  When they’re considering reductions in access to health care, legislators should be just as cautious about harming kids in Flint as they are about harming elders in Scarsdale.

While Medicaid Enrollment Rates Increase, States Face Financial Pressure to Decrease State Medicaid Spending

Last week, the Kaiser Family Foundation released a report indicating a large jump in state Medicaid enrollment from June 2008 to June 2009.  The report said that the 7.5 percent increase was the greatest one-year jump in enrollment rates ever, with over 3 million people joining the public health program funded jointly by the federal government and individual state governments.  The reason for the increase  is thought to be that because more people became unemployed due to the economic crash, more individuals turned to Medicaid for health coverage.  However, because the economic downturn meant less revenue entering into state budgets, state Medicaid programs have not been able to keep up with the rise in new enrollees.

During a convening of state governors at the White House this week, state officials will likely raise the issue of Medicaid spending. The issue is pressing in light of the impending funding cut when stimulus money from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will expire in December of this year.  The governors will likely ask that the stimulus funding be continued until states can somehow make up for their large current budget deficits.  In addition to asking for more money, the governors will also likely discuss the feasibility of health care reform efforts.  With both House and Senate versions of health care reform proposing increases to state Medicaid programs to ensure the coverage of more uninsured individuals, the state governors would, understandably, like to know where the money for such expansion would come from.

The National Association of State Medicaid Directors estimates that states’ budgets will fall  short  $140 billion in the next fiscal year.  This means even less money for the likely further increase in Medicaid enrollment to come this year, as Medicaid enrollment generally lags behind unemployment.  To account for the deficit, many states are planning to reduce their Medicaid programs. USA Today finds that three categories of such reductions exist:

• California, Arizona and Virginia propose reducing who’s eligible. In Arizona, 310,000 people would lose coverage. California also wants to increase premiums.
• Michigan, Tennessee, Massachusetts and others propose eliminating benefits. Masachusetts’ elimination of restorative dental services would save $56 million, says Medicaid director Terry Dougherty.
• Texas, Pennsylvania, Louisiana and others propose cutting payments to hospitals, doctors or nursing homes. Several states are considering new taxes on hospitals as a way to avoid cutting these payments.

States that accepted stimulus money to expand their Medicaid programs in 2009 are restricted from any such cuts that would affect low-income enrollment.  However, if the stimulus funding is not extended, some states are planning on heightening eligibility requirements.  For other states, while decreasing hospital and doctor reimbursement seems like the worst possible option– given that many doctors have already stopped accepting  Medicaid patients due to what they deem to be an insufficient rate of reimbursement– many states’ officials find that the only other viable option they have is raising taxes.  Many state leaders refuse to increase taxes in fear of the political backlash come November.

Realizing the need for health care reform to help manage the burden of paying for health care, state governors have stated a desire to be part of the health care reform conversation.  Many have already expressed their dislike for individual mandates, which they believe will drive more individuals to state Medicaid programs.  For the most part, however, the governors want reform and they want it now, finding that they simply can’t afford to wait another year.

It is also worth noting that an underlying issue from these new numbers is whether the Medicaid program is actually a good prototype for expanding health care coverage.  Drew Altman, President and CEO of Kaiser, put in perspective Kaiser’s report as well as the concerns of public spending that were sparked by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ projections for 2009-2019– which forecast that public spending on health care will surpass private spending.  He noted that while spending in public health insurance programs would increase, the cost-benefit would be better, since per capita costs on health care were lower in government-run programs than in private insurance programs.  According to Altman, such numbers did not undermine health reform efforts, but instead denoted “the need to control health care costs in the public and the private sectors alike.”

Why Primary Care in Medicare Matters

Why should we care about primary care in Medicare?  Early in the reform discussions, preventive and primary care was emphasized; in addition to extending medical care to all, reform would also implement preventive measures to keep them well.  In the current reform scrum, some are back peddling pretty fast, and in the course of finding “consensus” points (often focusing on cost-savings), we might lose conceptual coherence.

Ken Thorpe’s new Health Affairs article on chronic care patients in Medicare offers sound research and helpful analysis.  Thorpe’s data point toward a subtle explanation for health inflation keyed not to the increased cost of high-tech interventions, but to a shift in the conditions for which treatment is provided:

Our results highlight important changes in the medical conditions accounting for the rise in spending among beneficiaries over time. The most notable changes were in spending on a handful of chronic conditions: diabetes, kidney disease, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, mental disorders, and arthritis.

Thorpe has long argued that our health care delivery and finance system is stuck in a 20^th Century of acute care, while our 21^st Century needs have migrated toward chronic care.  As he has argued previously, these chronic care needs call for care at a human scale, including care management and supportive community-based care.  But he also points out that many chronic conditions are at least partially preventable, and that attention and resources should not be directed only to treating these conditions, but also to forestalling their incidence.

Prevention is, then, vital to any health care system.  But haven’t studies repeatedly shown that preventive care is not cost-effective?   Sorting this out requires that we step back and assess not only what “prevention” means, but also what we value in health care.

Preventive care can usefully be separated into three categories, as Ron Goetzel  (an Emory University colleague of Thorpe’s) has described.

• Primary prevention: Health promotion measures focus on lifestyle and simple interventions such as vaccinations to keep people from developing sickness; often cost-saving.
• Secondary prevention: Targeting people with preconditions for illness, including genetic or lifestyle markers, with screening technology, maintenance drugs, in order to forestall or prevent the manifestation of the condition; rarely cost-saving, in part because it is often applied to low-risk populations. Worth it? That depends on the design of the intervention and one’s metric for assessing health care value.
• Tertiary prevention: In this context, coordinated care management for those with chronic illness.  Properly implemented, chronic car management could “flatten the curve,” but is unlikely to be “cost-saving.”

So, whether “prevention” can save money (a claim Thorpe’s paper doesn’t make) is a complicated question.  In addition, it is often a poorly framed one. Explicitly or implicitly, cost-based objections to prevention often suggest that preventing one illness simply means that the person will die of something else, or less simplistically, that keeping people alive longer is cost-increasing, not cost saving.  Steven Wolf has elegantly responded to both objections:

[S]keptics of prevention argue that everyone dies of something; preventing demise serves only to allow a different disease to generate illness and spending. However, the aim of health promotion and disease prevention is not to prevent the inevitable but to “compress” morbidity, maximizing health until death.

Another common criticism is that prevention rarely saves money; it costs society if people live longer. The same applies to disease treatments. Health is a good; it is not purchased to save money. Health is a good that costs too much under the current medical care system, a problem of inefficiency that calls for wiser resource use, such as spending less per health unit gained (lower cost-effectiveness ratio). Disease prevention offers a way to improve health with low cost-effectiveness ratios and to also modulate disease rates. To reject health promotion and disease prevention because they do not save money (i.e., cost-effectiveness ratios are not negative) misses the point. (citations omitted)

Advocates who would shift our systemic emphasis to prevention and management of chronic illness, then, are not naïve about cost implications.  To the contrary, they address the issue head-on, with a three-step argument:

• The purpose of our system is or should be the maintenance of or restoration to high levels of functioning consistent with a fulfilling life.
• Our needs have largely shifted from acute to chronic interventions, and our system should shift to meet those needs.
• In preventing or managing chronic illness, as with all interventions, we should carefully examine the capacity of methods to meet our needs, and to demand value for those being served.

Applying this sort of argument to primary care, Goetzel elsewhere advocates skepticism of attempts by medicine to turn prevention into a high-tech enterprise:

We have medicalized prevention and health promotion in this country so that most people believe that only doctors in clinical settings can deliver these services. Although effective in many cases, this approach is the most expensive method of delivering prevention. If we expand our arsenal of potential interventions to include environmental, ecological, and policy changes, in addition to individually focused counseling and coaching programs, we can change the cost-effectiveness equation.

Thorpe’s article has garnered much-deserved attention, although it is tempting to think of his data in only cost-benefit terms.  That is not true to Thorpe’s conclusion, which is consistent with efforts to redirect attention from the business enterprise of health care to the health needs of Americans:

The U.S. health system remains predicated on providing acute, episodic care that is inadequate to address the altered patterns of disease now facing the American public. Our results highlight the need for prevention and care outside doctors’ offices and hospitals designed to address the changing needs of patients at risk for or living with chronic disease and, often, multiple comorbidities. As [reformers] continue their efforts to reshape the U.S. health system, they must address these changed health needs through evidence-based preventive care in the community, care coordination, and support for patient self-management.

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