While Medicaid Enrollment Rates Increase, States Face Financial Pressure to Decrease State Medicaid Spending

Last week, the Kaiser Family Foundation released a report indicating a large jump in state Medicaid enrollment from June 2008 to June 2009.  The report said that the 7.5 percent increase was the greatest one-year jump in enrollment rates ever, with over 3 million people joining the public health program funded jointly by the federal government and individual state governments.  The reason for the increase  is thought to be that because more people became unemployed due to the economic crash, more individuals turned to Medicaid for health coverage.  However, because the economic downturn meant less revenue entering into state budgets, state Medicaid programs have not been able to keep up with the rise in new enrollees.

During a convening of state governors at the White House this week, state officials will likely raise the issue of Medicaid spending. The issue is pressing in light of the impending funding cut when stimulus money from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will expire in December of this year.  The governors will likely ask that the stimulus funding be continued until states can somehow make up for their large current budget deficits.  In addition to asking for more money, the governors will also likely discuss the feasibility of health care reform efforts.  With both House and Senate versions of health care reform proposing increases to state Medicaid programs to ensure the coverage of more uninsured individuals, the state governors would, understandably, like to know where the money for such expansion would come from.

The National Association of State Medicaid Directors estimates that states’ budgets will fall  short  $140 billion in the next fiscal year.  This means even less money for the likely further increase in Medicaid enrollment to come this year, as Medicaid enrollment generally lags behind unemployment.  To account for the deficit, many states are planning to reduce their Medicaid programs. USA Today finds that three categories of such reductions exist:

• California, Arizona and Virginia propose reducing who’s eligible. In Arizona, 310,000 people would lose coverage. California also wants to increase premiums.
• Michigan, Tennessee, Massachusetts and others propose eliminating benefits. Masachusetts’ elimination of restorative dental services would save $56 million, says Medicaid director Terry Dougherty.
• Texas, Pennsylvania, Louisiana and others propose cutting payments to hospitals, doctors or nursing homes. Several states are considering new taxes on hospitals as a way to avoid cutting these payments.

States that accepted stimulus money to expand their Medicaid programs in 2009 are restricted from any such cuts that would affect low-income enrollment.  However, if the stimulus funding is not extended, some states are planning on heightening eligibility requirements.  For other states, while decreasing hospital and doctor reimbursement seems like the worst possible option– given that many doctors have already stopped accepting  Medicaid patients due to what they deem to be an insufficient rate of reimbursement– many states’ officials find that the only other viable option they have is raising taxes.  Many state leaders refuse to increase taxes in fear of the political backlash come November.

Realizing the need for health care reform to help manage the burden of paying for health care, state governors have stated a desire to be part of the health care reform conversation.  Many have already expressed their dislike for individual mandates, which they believe will drive more individuals to state Medicaid programs.  For the most part, however, the governors want reform and they want it now, finding that they simply can’t afford to wait another year.

It is also worth noting that an underlying issue from these new numbers is whether the Medicaid program is actually a good prototype for expanding health care coverage.  Drew Altman, President and CEO of Kaiser, put in perspective Kaiser’s report as well as the concerns of public spending that were sparked by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ projections for 2009-2019– which forecast that public spending on health care will surpass private spending.  He noted that while spending in public health insurance programs would increase, the cost-benefit would be better, since per capita costs on health care were lower in government-run programs than in private insurance programs.  According to Altman, such numbers did not undermine health reform efforts, but instead denoted “the need to control health care costs in the public and the private sectors alike.”

Why Primary Care in Medicare Matters

Why should we care about primary care in Medicare?  Early in the reform discussions, preventive and primary care was emphasized; in addition to extending medical care to all, reform would also implement preventive measures to keep them well.  In the current reform scrum, some are back peddling pretty fast, and in the course of finding “consensus” points (often focusing on cost-savings), we might lose conceptual coherence.

Ken Thorpe’s new Health Affairs article on chronic care patients in Medicare offers sound research and helpful analysis.  Thorpe’s data point toward a subtle explanation for health inflation keyed not to the increased cost of high-tech interventions, but to a shift in the conditions for which treatment is provided:

Our results highlight important changes in the medical conditions accounting for the rise in spending among beneficiaries over time. The most notable changes were in spending on a handful of chronic conditions: diabetes, kidney disease, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, mental disorders, and arthritis.

Thorpe has long argued that our health care delivery and finance system is stuck in a 20^th Century of acute care, while our 21^st Century needs have migrated toward chronic care.  As he has argued previously, these chronic care needs call for care at a human scale, including care management and supportive community-based care.  But he also points out that many chronic conditions are at least partially preventable, and that attention and resources should not be directed only to treating these conditions, but also to forestalling their incidence.

Prevention is, then, vital to any health care system.  But haven’t studies repeatedly shown that preventive care is not cost-effective?   Sorting this out requires that we step back and assess not only what “prevention” means, but also what we value in health care.

Preventive care can usefully be separated into three categories, as Ron Goetzel  (an Emory University colleague of Thorpe’s) has described.

• Primary prevention: Health promotion measures focus on lifestyle and simple interventions such as vaccinations to keep people from developing sickness; often cost-saving.
• Secondary prevention: Targeting people with preconditions for illness, including genetic or lifestyle markers, with screening technology, maintenance drugs, in order to forestall or prevent the manifestation of the condition; rarely cost-saving, in part because it is often applied to low-risk populations. Worth it? That depends on the design of the intervention and one’s metric for assessing health care value.
• Tertiary prevention: In this context, coordinated care management for those with chronic illness.  Properly implemented, chronic car management could “flatten the curve,” but is unlikely to be “cost-saving.”

So, whether “prevention” can save money (a claim Thorpe’s paper doesn’t make) is a complicated question.  In addition, it is often a poorly framed one. Explicitly or implicitly, cost-based objections to prevention often suggest that preventing one illness simply means that the person will die of something else, or less simplistically, that keeping people alive longer is cost-increasing, not cost saving.  Steven Wolf has elegantly responded to both objections:

[S]keptics of prevention argue that everyone dies of something; preventing demise serves only to allow a different disease to generate illness and spending. However, the aim of health promotion and disease prevention is not to prevent the inevitable but to “compress” morbidity, maximizing health until death.

Another common criticism is that prevention rarely saves money; it costs society if people live longer. The same applies to disease treatments. Health is a good; it is not purchased to save money. Health is a good that costs too much under the current medical care system, a problem of inefficiency that calls for wiser resource use, such as spending less per health unit gained (lower cost-effectiveness ratio). Disease prevention offers a way to improve health with low cost-effectiveness ratios and to also modulate disease rates. To reject health promotion and disease prevention because they do not save money (i.e., cost-effectiveness ratios are not negative) misses the point. (citations omitted)

Advocates who would shift our systemic emphasis to prevention and management of chronic illness, then, are not naïve about cost implications.  To the contrary, they address the issue head-on, with a three-step argument:

• The purpose of our system is or should be the maintenance of or restoration to high levels of functioning consistent with a fulfilling life.
• Our needs have largely shifted from acute to chronic interventions, and our system should shift to meet those needs.
• In preventing or managing chronic illness, as with all interventions, we should carefully examine the capacity of methods to meet our needs, and to demand value for those being served.

Applying this sort of argument to primary care, Goetzel elsewhere advocates skepticism of attempts by medicine to turn prevention into a high-tech enterprise:

We have medicalized prevention and health promotion in this country so that most people believe that only doctors in clinical settings can deliver these services. Although effective in many cases, this approach is the most expensive method of delivering prevention. If we expand our arsenal of potential interventions to include environmental, ecological, and policy changes, in addition to individually focused counseling and coaching programs, we can change the cost-effectiveness equation.

Thorpe’s article has garnered much-deserved attention, although it is tempting to think of his data in only cost-benefit terms.  That is not true to Thorpe’s conclusion, which is consistent with efforts to redirect attention from the business enterprise of health care to the health needs of Americans:

The U.S. health system remains predicated on providing acute, episodic care that is inadequate to address the altered patterns of disease now facing the American public. Our results highlight the need for prevention and care outside doctors’ offices and hospitals designed to address the changing needs of patients at risk for or living with chronic disease and, often, multiple comorbidities. As [reformers] continue their efforts to reshape the U.S. health system, they must address these changed health needs through evidence-based preventive care in the community, care coordination, and support for patient self-management.

Cost, Choice, and Value

The Massachusetts Massacre has everyone stepping back a bit.  The President says that we should “coalesce around those elements of the package that people agree on,” but it is unclear just which elements those might be, given the extreme polarization that has defined the debate.  He suggests that points of agreement might center on insurance reform and cost containment, which are both important goals.  I’m skeptical that a sudden flowering of bipartisanship will allow such agreement, however.  Ezra Klein, on the other hand, has a paring proposal that goes in another direction, and reminds us of why we got into this in the first place: to extend coverage to the uninsured.  If we must narrow our focus, Klein says we should extend Medicare to those over 50, and expand Medicaid to those under 200% of poverty.  This would get lots of people insured, and could well be accomplished through budget reconciliation if no Congressional coalescing is to be had.

However the parsing, paring, and palavering goes, cost control is and will be at or near the health reform debate for years to come.  Two recent articles are worth a look for those interested in analysis of cost-containment strategies.

In his health care speech to Congress, the President suggested that one component of an effort to lower health care costs should be to empower a commission of “doctors and medical experts” to identify and,

encourage the adoption of  . . . common-sense best practices by doctors and medical professionals throughout the system. Wrapped up in that suggestion are notions of adhering to expert guidance in treatment decisions.

The stimulus bill passed in February pushed for scientific assessment of modes of care, providing $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research.  The current reform bills further emphasize CER, and would encourage the adoption of proven and promising treatments through professional education and some payment reform.  Harvard Medical School professor Jerome Groopman writes on evidence-based medicine in the latest New York Review of Books.   In his 2007 book, How Doctors Think, Groopman did a great job of explaining the complex and fraught process by which doctors make decisions, and he is fully on board with the notion that there is ample room for improvement.  His new article, however, cautions that the use of panels of experts with authority to impose or even recommend best practices is a dangerous way to go.

Groopman acknowledges the need for health policy folks to consider the bounded rationality of both doctor and patient.  He examines the Obama Administration’s policies on evidence-based practice by contrasting the views of two key advisors: Cass Sunstein, whose view of “libertarian paternalism” incline him to favor gentle “nudges” that may encourage certain behavior while leaving people free to reject the advice if they wish, and Peter Orszag, who is more inclined to employ forceful regulatory standards and financial incentives to achieve cost effective medical practice.  Groopman is compellingly  skeptical of expert claims of definitive standards on what “works” in health care, and cautions that such standards can result in harm to patients who fit uncomfortably into the hard categories defined in such best practices.

Groopman’s analysis seems incomplete for two closely intertwined reasons, and surely as a result of space constraints.  First, he suggests that the administration is faced with a stark choice between

aggressively pushing doctors and patients to do what the government defines as best, or [being] respectful of their own autonomy in making decisions.

Surely there is much middle ground between tying doctors’ hands and respecting complete clinical independence.  And it is not enough to say, as does Groopman, that

Most physicians seek data and views on treatments from peers and, as needed, specialists, and then present information and opinion to patients who ultimately decide.

Maybe so, but physicians are sometimes self-interested, and patients’ choices  are sometimes influenced by advertisements or other considerations disconnected from quality concerns.  For these and other reasons, spending decisions are no longer consigned to the doctor/patient dyad, but increasingly must accommodate the cost-containment interests of third party payers — government, employers, or insurers.

Second, Groopman describes two exclusive categories of procedures: “mechanical procedures” such as the  insertion an intravenous catheter (where he argues that enforcing standards to avoid infections is proper) and all other procedures, where the individual patient’s condition becomes relevant, and where he argues that coercing clinical choices is out of bounds.  It is not obvious that the universe of procedures is so divisible; it is even less clear that the dividing line between the two categories is uncontroversial.

Many questions remain.  Groopman is surely right that we must be cautious in enforcing categorical “best practices;” it is important to create public processes for vetting their accuracy and usefulness.  He is also surely right that public and private health finance rules must accommodate variation in medical needs, and must bend readily when a “best practice” is not suitable for a particular case.  But cost is relevant, and encouraging efficient practice can reduce the cost (and therefore the extent) of coverage.

So, how might a balance between financial constraints and patient protection work?  In a Health Affairs article posted  yesterday, Michael Chernew and coauthors examine the growing phenomenon of “value-based insurance” — a structuring of insurance co-payments responsive to the needs of people with chronic illness.  The co-payments imposed by insurers are, of course, intended to reduce demand for health care services (an Orszag, not a Sunstein tool, you might say).  Value based insurance reduces or eliminates these co-payments for services of “high clinical value.”  That is, if an insurer determines that it would rather not discourage utilization for a particular service, it reduces or removes the patient cost-sharing, presumably increasing usage, for cost as well as clinical reasons.  As the authors explain,

The belief that a value-based insurance program will lower health care spending rests on the recognition that the use of high-value health care services reduces the probability of adverse events related to chronic disease and that on a population basis, these events are much more costly than the services aimed at preventing them.

The authors found some evidence that such programs are cost effective, even in the narrow sense of reducing a plan’s health care expenditures.  They suggest that widening the economic lens to consider broader societal goals would only strengthen those conclusions.

The article acknowledges the reality of economic coercion in the clinical setting, and measures attempts to shape the tools of cost containment in a way that protects patients while maintaining cost containment.  One doesn’t have to accept the general wisdom of patient cost-sharing to value attempts to protect patients from untoward effects of its use.

The need to obtain “value” for health care spending and to take steps to restrain health inflation will persist however we come out of the current reform debate.  The discussion will benefit from both the erudite analysis of Groopman and others warning us away from answers that are too easy, and that of Chernew and others who can shine a light on the efficacy of particular cost containing measures.

Supporting Family Caregivers

Many of our hardest-working caregivers are not professionals, but parents, spouses, and children of people with serious chronic conditions, limited in their ability to engage in activities of daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs).  A new report from the National Alliance for Caregiving and the AARP opens up this informal, but absolutely essential, world of unpaid caregiving (h/t: Howard Gleckman ).

Some basic facts on the caregivers:

• They’re usually (66%) women;
• On average, they provide over 20 hours of care each week;
• They’re of all income levels, with an average income of about $60,000
• About one-third care for more than one person.

Some basic facts about those receiving the care:

• They’re mostly over 50 years of age, and 44% are over the age of 75;
• Most (51%) live in their own homes;
• Most (69%) require care due to long-term physical condition;
• 34% receive informal caregiving for 5 years or more.

In many cases, informal caregivers enable people with significant care needs to avoid nursing home or other institutional care.  Patients are better off, and so is the health budget: the avoided costs of expensive hospitalizations and nursing home care are enormous.   I have previously described the reform bills’ provisions that would support in-place care for people with chronic illness and disabilities.  Medicaid amendments would expand home care services, including such Cash & Counseling programs that give consumers substantial control over the mix of home services, and permit support for kinship caregiving.  And the Senate bill incorporates the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act (the “CLASS Act”), which provides for a new source of funding for personal assistance services for those not Medicaid-eligible.  A move supported by the insurance industry to strip it from the reform bill was narrowly defeated on December 4^th.

The insurance industry, of course, is vigorously trying to protect its own nascent long term care insurance business.  The long term care insurance industry has faced its share of horror stories about bureaucratic double-talk, denied claims, high prices, and limited benefits. The CLASS Act would provide an optional source of coverage, creating a voluntary program of member-supported public insurance for home care costs.  Like Medicaid’s Cash & Counseling system, it provides consumers with flexibility to choose the mix of supportive care when his or her health status triggers eligibility for coverage.

Why do we need such a program?  After all, there are many willing attorneys ready to help people spend down their assets — achieving “Medicaid impoverishment” — in order to qualify for Medicaid’s richer coverage.  Georgetown scholar Judy Feder was asked just that question for a recent Time Magazine article on the CLASS Act.  Her response was dead-on:

“Medicaid is invaluable,” says Judy Feder, a health policy expert at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. “But it’s not insurance. It doesn’t protect you from catastrophe. It takes care of you after catastrophe.”

The long-term care financing mix in the Senate bill is far from perfect.  As a panel of experts surveyed by the Commonwealth Fund overwhelmingly agreed last year, the best solution would be to add a premium-financed long-term care component to Medicare, allowing the cost to be shared by government and consumers, without the trouble or expense of creating a new programmatic structure.  In the alternative, Congress could cobble together a better integrated “system” of long term/home care financing.  Such a system could virtually integrate a long-term care financing continuum, including Medicaid, Medicare, and voluntary insurance (such as that created by the CLASS Act) that could support consumers with chronic illness in the most appropriate setting for supportive care, reducing the discontinuities in coverage, perverse incentives for institutionalization, and counterproductive limits on services.  Either actual integration of all long term care services in Medicare, or the virtual integration (through smooth eligibility and service interfaces) in Medicare, Medicaid, and CLASS Act coverage could improve care and reduce costs.  But that won’t happen this year.

Instead, the best hope for expansion of access to personal assistance services will be the strengthening of Medicaid’s home care provisions and the creation of the CLASS Act program.  The overwhelming reform focus has been on very traditional “medical” insurance run through private, risk bearing insurance companies.  Only at the margins will the reform address the growing need for financing  appropriate health care for chronic illness.  Keeping the CLASS Act is a small step, but it at least acknowledges the obligation to support the personal assistance needs of those with serious chronic illnesses or disabilities, who are not (yet) impoverished, and who prefer to remain in their communities.  The CLASS Act will provide a new funding source for patient-directed personal assistance services.   Family caregivers will continue to devote themselves to their loved ones, but they need help.

Senator Joseph Lieberman “Regrets Any Misunderstanding”

Senator Joseph Lieberman says that he “regrets any misunderstanding.” Lieberman, who according to NPR’s All Things Considered “has angered a lot of people,”  also said  “I thought I made myself clear all along.”

All Things Considered characterized Lieberman’s rejection of the Senate’s Gang of Ten Compromise as follows: Lieberman “rejected both an expansion of Medicare to cover uninsured people down to age 55, as well as its revamping of a Public Option so that users would be covered by private rather than government insurance.”

Joe Lieberman “regrets any misunderstanding.” All Thing Considered noted “But as critics were quick to point out, this was the same Joe Lieberman who told the Connecticut Post just three months ago that he’d been a supporter of expanding Medicare to age 55.”

Lieberman said, regarding the video we posted yesterday,

“I finally got to see that on TV last night and it looked to me like I was referring back to things I had supported in the past to make the point that though I was against the Public Option, I was not against health reform.”

And there you have it– just a big, “regrettable,” misunderstanding.

In addition, Senator Lieberman said: “I haven’t received any pressure from Insurance Companies. I mean it!”

And I believe him. One rarely pressures a man who does everything one wants.

Maybe Instead of a Dollar We Should Send Joe Lieberman Instructions on How to Use YouTube

A little while back Senator Joseph Lieberman stated that, seemingly contrary to his prior positions, he would not–and could not– support a bill which contained a public option–nor would he join in a vote to end a filibuster against the same. Relying heavily on the underlying analysis of Tim Noah, I opined at the time that perhaps we all needed to send Joe Lieberman a dollar so that he could vote his conscience as opposed to the will of Private Insurers: that the financial constraints involved in being an Independent (i.e., little or no infrastructural help from either the Democratic or Republican Parties) meant that Senator Lieberman, if he wished to continue being Senator Lieberman, would have to curry favor among donors to finance a bid for re-election.

I also noted that Chris Dodd, by virtue of his support for a public option and health reform in general, had alienated said Private Insurers and seemingly vacated his seat as “the Senator from Aetna.” I also noted that, as one might imagine, considering the sudden advent of available Aetna money, that a man (or Senator) from Aetna’s home town seeking money (such as Mr. Lieberman) might, somewhat understandably, look to align himself with the will and desires of that money. As much as it pains me to say, my antidote–sending Joe Lieberman a dollar with the words “Public Option” written on it– did not work. Sadly, the efforts of Yale students, who took a concilliatory approach in beseeching Senator Lieberman to back health reform, have seemingly not worked either.

Since then, Mr. Lieberman has come out in opposition to the plan to allow  people from 55-64 years old to buy into Medicare. Unfortunately for Mr. Lieberman, he seems to be unaware of YouTube as a means of chronicling statements made on video. Back when he was attempting to explain his desertion of the Public Option he said (thank you Merril Goozner) this:

Does the VA Cost Less Than Private Health Care?

Taking a break from law, this post is about whether the Veterans Health Administration provides care more efficiently than the private sector.  Paul Krugman and others have held the VA out as a shining example of the government’s ability to provide high quality care efficiently, as well as the private sector’s need to lower costs and improve quality through electronic medical records, comparative effectiveness research, reduced overhead, salaried physicians, and integrated delivery systems — all issues that are central to current health reform debates.  It would be a huge blow if it turns out none of this is true — but that’s precisely what’s suggested by an article published by VA researchers earlier this year.

Wm. Weeks, MD (at Dartmouth and the VA’s regional  center) reported that, from 2001-2006, the VA cost 33% more than equivalent care in the private sector, and its quality was not notably better.  Here, I focus on the cost findings, since they diverge dramatically from the prior, state-of-the-art, study by Nugent, Hendricks et al (also from the VA), which found that, in 1999, the VA cost about 20% less than Medicare.  Since Medicare itself costs 25-30% less than the private sector, Dr. Weeks reports the VA costs about twice what Dr. Nugent and other VA colleagues  previously reported.  What makes this discrepancy even more remarkable is that Weeks did not even cite this prior work of VA colleagues, published in multiple articles in leading journals.

What gives?  I’m not expert, but its clear their methods differed sharply.  Nugent et al. took all care delivered at 6 VA centers and valued the services at actual Medicare fee-for-service rates, comparing the total with costs borne by the 6 VA centers.  Thus, the measures and comparison are direct, apples-to-apples.  Weeks, on the other hand, compared total VA medical costs (excluding nursing homes) per user with per person costs reported by VA users in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which values those services at private sector rates.  MEPS is a national survey that contains only a small subsample of 500 VA users, about 1 of every 50,000 VA user.  Extrapolating from such a small sample is a much more indirect comparison, so merits closer scrutiny, which reveals many potential flaws:

1. The 500 VA users in MEPS  are probably not an accurate reflection of 5 million total users.  MEPS surveys people living at home who respond to surveys.  This entirely excludes people who are homeless, institutionalized, or have died earlier in the year, and it under-represents mentally ill or substance abusers.  All of these categories have worse health, and regrettably are prevalent among vets, so MEPS almost certainly omits vets who reflect the highest burden of illness.
2. This sample may lacks much statistical validity, even for the vets it does include.  MEPS weights responses to make them nationally representative for demographic characteristics, but not for veteran status.  Without this weighting, the chance of random error is much greater.  This is suggested, for instance, by the fact that the value of VA care reported over this six-year study ranged two-fold from year to year, with no discernible pattern (the sixth year was twice the fifth year, which was half the third year, etc.)
3. Even for those whom MEPS does represent, it underreports actual health care costs.  Exactly how much and why is somewhat unsettled, but what seem to be the most recent studies conclude that MEPS underreports by 14% - 19%, in large part because reports of both utilization and costs are understated.    Weeks acknowledges these possible flaws, but asserts that studies he and others have done show MEPS is reasonably accurate — again without citing any of the leading studies to the contrary.

Moreover, even Weeks’ self-selected cites do not fully support his accuracy claim.  For instance, he says a RAND study reports that “MEPS expenditure estimates ‘agree quite well’ with estimates from other databases.”  But, the RAND study (p. 34) spoke in that phrase only to utilization, not to expenditures, and even for utilization it said MEPS underreports by 85% for outpatient hospital use.  For expenditures (use X price), RAND (on the very next page) said that MEPS underreports hospital costs by 21% and physician costs by 54%.

What is this Journal of Health Care Finance that would publish a flawed use of MEPS?  It is hardly a leading health research journal.  According to its website, it is

devoted solely to helping you meet your facility’s financial goals. . . . Make easier, better decisions, with advice from industry experts. . . .  Experts in the field share their experiences on successful programs, proven strategies, practical management tools, and innovative alternatives, . . . including hospital/physician contracts, alternative delivery systems, generating maximum margins under PPS, improving productivity, taxation management, health care insurance, employee benefit cost-containment, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, employee incentive systems, and more.

An e-mail from its editor states that most articles are reviewed only internally, by its editorial board whose members are drawn primarily from industry.

It appears the Weeks article did not receive peer academic scrutiny, but what about scrutiny from the study’s own coauthors, who are affiliated with Dartmouth and Washington & Lee?  The second author happens to be Weeks’ wife, and the third appears to be their son.  As for Weeks himself, he is deeply embroiled in two serious legal controversies with the VA.

On balance, the Nugent, Hendricks et al. study remains unrebutted. In my view, the Weeks study suffers from too many serious flaws, and is too lacking in objective critique, to hold much or any credence in this important debate.

Originally posted at the O’Neill Institute for National Global Health.

Consumer Protection Under the Health Reform “Deal”

News of the Senate “deal” on the public option is trickling out.  It appears to comprise a swap, in which the public option will be dropped in favor of the creation of a nationwide program mimicking the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) (along with a Medicare buy-in for people 55 years of age or older).  Will the FEHBP model (for those under 55) accomplish what the public option would have done?  Tim Greaney’s post here yesterday raises well-founded concerns that it will be less likely to increase competition in concentrated markets.   But we had additional hopes for the public option.  I’ve previously argued that the public option could help assure adequate coverage of people with chronic conditions.  They’re the most vulnerable and increasingly the most costly; sound coordination of their care is necessary to serve their complex needs and to contain costs.   Whether this nascent deal will do that work depends on how the FEHBP model translates to an open exchange model, and in particular on benefits design and process rights components.  The new enrollees are likely to be more vulnerable than the FEHBP’s membership, and sound consumer protections are necessary to assure that their needs are met.  Two components of the program will be critical here: benefits design and process rights.

The FEHBP is mostly a mechanism for contracting with and managing private health insurers.  This deal would, therefore, likely create a form of private health insurance exchange, piggy-backing on private plans’ benefits design.  Congress should be aware of private insurers’ history with coverage of chronic care services.  It is widely documented, for example, that children with special health care needs have more sharply restricted access to necessary therapies through private than public coverage.  Ruth Benedict, of the University of Wisconsin, described access problems for children with functional limitations in 2006:

Public health insurance predicted greater use of supportive services and therapeutic services outside the school setting, a finding that may be attributable to the commitment of public programs to serve vulnerable populations such as children with special needs.  * * *   In contrast to public insurance, private insurance provided children no advantage in accessing therapeutic and supportive services relative to their uninsured counterparts.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has historically addressed benefits design with a broad brush, negotiating and contracting directly with insurers, and balancing premium level against benefits richness.  Unless the bill directs OPM to incorporate the needs of people with chronic illness — physical and speech therapy, home care services, and case management, for example — the sickest of the newly covered will find only coverage that poorly matches their needs.  And state law that would otherwise benefit the private insurers’ benefits design is specifically preempted in the FEHBP statute:

The terms of any contract under this chapter which relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law, or any regulation issued thereunder, which relates to health insurance or plans.

Unless the bill mandates that the OPM protect vulnerable populations in its benefits design contracting, people with chronic illness will likely be left without coverage for vital services that they might have obtained through a public option.

What of process rights under the FEHBP?  Suppose a plan participating in the new national exchange were to deny coverage for a service with the benefits design on, say, medical necessity grounds.   As Nan Hunter described in her 2006 article, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, the process by which covered persons may vindicate their rights of access to covered health care is fractured and often frustrating to participants.  Two features of the FEHBP bear note in this regard.  First, it allows participants “an independent system of external review,” which Nan Hunter argues can assist individuals and society by improving plans’ accountability and enhancing the deliberative process by which coverage decisions are made.  She also identifies, however, the pervasive lack of effective member notice of review options.  Second, judicial appeal from the administrative and independent review process is quite limited.  It is available only after exhaustion of internal plan review, external review independent review, and OPM review, and the scope of the judicial review itself is quite limited:

A covered individual may seek judicial review of OPM’s final action on the denial of a health benefits claim. A legal action to review final action by OPM involving such denial of health benefits must be brought against OPM and not against the Carrier or the Carrier’s subcontractors. The recovery in such a suit shall be limited to a court order directing OPM to require the Carrier to pay the amount of benefits in dispute.

The adequacy and accuracy of the administrative process, then, must be protected by thoughtful and specific statutory and regulatory language.

Insurance coverage does not equate to access to care.  Necessary benefits must be contractually covered, and the insurer must follow through where required.  The benefits design and due process provisions in the FEHBP in many ways mirror those of large, self-funded employers.   The population newly covered by this bill will, however, not be employees of large firms and federal agencies, and instead will be a more economically and medically marginal population with a higher percentage of people with disabilities and chronic illness.  The bill should, then, anticipate the issue directing OPM to set benefits design and review standards serving all, including those with chronic conditions.   If Congress hopes to contract out the responsibility of serving a vulnerable population, it needs to ensure that its contracting partners are charged clearly on the nature of their responsibilities.

Convergence on Health Reform (Death of the Public Option)

Thomas (Tim) Greaney

Saint Louis University School of Law

So maybe the two parties are coming together on health reform after all.   Last night we learned that after days of “secret talks” among the “gang of ten” the Democrats have reached agreement to restructure their health care proposal.  The changes are significant:

• ditch the already-watered-down public option plan;
• create a new insurance exchange “option” for individuals and small groups consisting of a nonprofit plan as negotiated by the Office of Personnel Management;
• expand Medicare eligibility to cover uninsured individuals aged 55-64.

What does the Democrats’ “public option ultralight” compromise have  in common with Republicans’ alternative universe?  Well, consider the latter’s proposal to open interstate competition for all health insurers–a move they promise will immediately lower health care costs.   Besides being shameless attempts to offer simple solutions to complex problems, the two proposals are guilty of the same fundamental misunderstanding of health insurance. Simply put, they both ignore a critical economic truth of health insurance today: insurers require a provider network of hospitals and doctors or must have market leverage in order to negotiate for lower provider prices and for controls on excessive volume.

How, then, would a nonprofit insurer not presently competing in one of the concentrated markets succeed in putting competitive pressure on the incumbents?  As one insurance industry observer put it ,

So, Kaiser Permanente, which operates with highly organized and capital intensive networks in its markets, would now come into a state where it has no networks and offer a plan? Blue Cross of Nebraska might offer an individual and small group plan in Rhode Island? Tufts Health Plan out of Boston might offer a plan in Oregon?

Based upon what network of providers in those places where they do not now do business?

Likewise, in expanding Medicare, the Dems are taking a page out of the Republican playbook. For the last several weeks,  Senate Republicans have been loudly touting the benefits of Medicare.  By their lights, not only does the program produce unmatched (and untouchable) health care services in terms of quality of care and beneficiary satisfaction, but any cost-cutting constitutes a betrayal of our commitment to seniors.  As far as one can tell, the expansion proposal will do just that: offer the now-sacrosanct program to a few million almost-seniors.  As to the other 20 million citizens, forced to shop for insurance through an exchange flawed by inadequate competition and inadequate subsidies? Well, maybe the Democrats will borrow the rhetoric of Republican National Chairman Michael Steele: this is no time for a “government-run health-care experiment.”

The Cost of Dying, 60 Minutes

In case you missed it.

Watch CBS News Videos Online

Taking the Fraud Out of Medicare Expansion

One of the ways the Obama administration hopes to pay for health care reform is through policing Medicare fraud.  It is estimated that the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) spends $60 billion a year on fraudulent claims.  According to Senator Grassley of Iowa, the federal agency received warnings of fraud by watchdog organizations, but did not respond to most of them; these warnings fell upon the CMS’s shoulders under the Bush Administration.

A report by the Department of Health and Human Services finds that much of the fraud in the Medicare Prescription Benefit program could have been avoided through better management of the companies that were hired by the federal government in 2006 to investigate and monitor the fraud.  Grassley notes that the companies, called Medicare drug integrity contractors or Medics, were essentially a waste of money because they were never given the proper information to perform the audits.  The New York Times reports that the Bush Administration did not allow for the audits by Medics to proceed until its final few months in office.

Under the current model, scams to get Medicare reimbursement for non-existent services are easier than one might think.  Just this past July, a couple who owned a medical business was indicted for submitting false reimbursement bills to the CMS for power wheelchairs that they claimed had been lost or destroyed during Hurricane Katrina.  Other scams include medical suppliers billing Medicare for equipment that was never given to patients, creation of fake medical supply companies, and acceptance of illegal kickbacks for referring Medicare patients to unneeded services.

Solutions to fraud, however, are not as clear-cut as one might wish.  For example, there is a worry that over-policing the CMS will lead to valid claims being denied at greater rates. Also, enforcement and punishment are issues.  Some health care companies have been able to escape criminal prosecution by paying restitution amounts for the fraudulent claims.  Finding restitution to be an insufficient deterrent to would-be fraudsters,  Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania wants to see scammers put behind bars. But there is also something to be said for the realization that the “Arthur Anderson solution” is really no solution at all.

Another interesting aspect to consider here is that the CMS finds that provisions of the House bill intended to reduce Medicare fraud will not save all that much money.  In spite of this (or perhaps because of it) many of our leaders have demanded that some action be taken to reduce Medicare fraud– even Sarah Palin says fraud is an issue.  One hopes that the Obama administration will learn from its predecessor’s mistakes (if in fact they be such) when it comes to creating watchdogs such as Medics, but then muzzling and not feeding them.

The Cost of (Not) Implementing Chronic Care Management

Health reform’s primary beneficiaries will be the uninsured, but it should also benefit those with “good” insurance.  We all know horror stories of well-insured relatives and friends driven from pillar to post in attempts to get good treatment for serious chronic conditions.  It too often seems that no one is in control: doctors aren’t paid to talk to patients, but rather to do things to them, and the roles of other professionals (e.g., advanced practice nurses) are sometimes minimized.  As I’ve described earlier, there is some good news regarding medical practice reform in the bills, particularly for people with Medicare or Medicaid.

How do we get people into medical settings where their chronic conditions can be well-managed?  Interesting work is being done in many quarters on this issue.  In a recent Health Affairs paper, Steven D. Pizer and coauthors reported that people with chronic conditions in regions of the country with thin Medicaid programs are likely to be uninsured, notwithstanding Medicaid’s strong orientation toward disability and chronic care.  In a companion article,   Andrew P. Wilper and coauthors reported on high levels of uncontrolled — often undiagnosed — chronic conditions (hypertension, diabetes, and elevated cholesterol) among  people without insurance.  Public insurance expansions in pending reform bills would assist these low-income people with chronic illness get coverage, and the chronic care provisions have the capacity to provide appropriate medical management of their most pressing conditions.

Structure is emerging on best practices for the delivery of sound coordinated care.  The NCQA has worked with physician groups to create tools to evaluate practice settings according to their ability to serve as therapeutic homes for all, but in particular for those with chronic conditions.  The Physician Practice Connections - Patient-Centered Medical Home program provides tools for public and private payers to evaluate a physician practice before designating it a “medical home” - and compensating it accordingly.  The tools evaluate prospective medical homes on factors such as their active support of patient self-management; use of non-physician staff for patient management; employment of procedures to maintain high levels of patient communication; and adoption and use of evidence-based care management protocols for chronic illness.

So how much does it cost to do this right?   A recent study from Commonwealth Fund sheds some light on this complex issue.  In the study, Stephen Zuckerman and coauthors take on the difficult task of examining the marginal cost of converting a 20^th Century practice to a 21^st Century medical home.  It makes interesting reading, and tentatively suggests that the cost could be modest.  Zuckerman et al. are attempting to compute cost. They recognize that cost is only a component in a more important calculation: what is the value of creating medical homes?  They cite to a 2008 Deloitte report that gathers research tending to show that the cost is probably worth it, even in purely economic terms.  That is, it appears that the savings achieved in avoided hospitalizations and other expensive interventions is significant, washing out the cost of supporting sound chronic care management.  It is not, of course, only about efficiency; ending the chronic care horror stories is the true goal.

Expanding insurance is only the first step in delivering the care people need.  For people with chronic illness, the finance and delivery system needs to work with the whole person, family, and community, and not slice the patient into 8 minute blocks and procedure codes.  A consensus statement of the American Academy of Family Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Physicians, and the American Osteopathic Association describes a commendable principle of care coordination that has particular application for people with disabilities and chronic illness:

Care is coordinated and/or integrated across all elements of the complex health care system (e.g., subspecialty care, hospitals, home health agencies, nursing homes) and the patient’s community (e.g., family, public and private community-based services).  Care is facilitated by registries, information technology, health information exchange and other means to assure that patients get the indicated care when and where they need and want it in a culturally and linguistically appropriate manner.

Practice follows payment.  Payment reform must facilitate the adoption of practices that serves chronic needs.

Reform Rodeo

1. At the New England Journal of Medicine, David Cutler discusses possible reasons why the health care cost curve may bend in the future even without health reform.

2. Matthew Yglesias discusses health reform’s “labor problem.”

3. Ezra Klein points to the findings of a study that may undermine the common assumption that calorie labels in fast food restaurants reduce caloric intake.

4. At ABC Australia, an interesting and moving piece about the consequences of the patenting of the BRCA genetic test.

5. For those interested in the administrative side of health reform, Jacqueline Klosek describes and links to a notification and instruction form that HHS has provided to help covered entities comply with the HITECH Act’s new breach notification rules which are now in force.

6. Wild Card: The Lifehacker blog has a post describing a new “mash up” site called Data Masher that allows users to overlay freely accessible statistics onto maps. One of the “mash ups” available is a U.S. map with high school education and health care coverage overlayed.

7.  In case you missed it: Professor Tim Greaney in The Health Care Blog with a post on Medicare & Health Reform originally posted here on HRW.

Consumer Protection in a Reformed Health Care & Insurance System

Implementation is critical to the success of translating universal coverage into access to appropriate health care for all.  Sound follow-through demands the design and execution of well-tailored consumer protection regulations. The first step is a prohibition of underwriting or rating decisions based on preexisting illness.  Insurers have agreed to this reform, as a quid pro quo for the millions of new customers they’ll get from coverage mandates.  Universal coverage and this prohibition of discrimination go together.  Insurers are right that it doesn’t make business sense to ignore preexisting illnesses if consumers can wait for illness to appear before contributing to the insurance pool.  They seem to agree that coverage mandates can adequately do the work of preexisting illness exclusions, rendering them superfluous.

Insurers’ position on non-discrimination would clearly change if folks like Rep. Tom Price (R. Ga.) have their way.  Price objects to mandates because they would allow the government to define “insurance” thereby disadvantaging some forms of currently-marketed coverage, such as bare-bones and HSA-linked consumer-driven products.  But underinsurance has been devastating the American middle class for years; real reform must establish basic levels of fiscal security, as well as medical coverage.  Representative Price’s attack on standards is, then, merely a back door attack on universal coverage.  It is a necessary package deal: either we have universal coverage with an end to preexisting illness exclusions, or markets will continue slicing and dicing “insurance,” leaving huge gaps in coverage. Read more

Medicare and Health Reform: Part II

In his closing remarks to the Senate Finance Committee last week, Senator Baucus pointed with special pride to the effect the Committee’s reform bill will have on shaping the health care system in the longer run:

One point I want to make… is about delivery system reform.  We are starting here in this bill to finally reform our delivery system so it’s based much more on quality and patient focus, moving ever so slowly, but inexorably, from fee for service….which causes a lot of the waste in our system. We’re not going to see savings, the benefits, to the system for a while… but after four, five, six years from now, we’re going to see the real benefits of reform.

There is no doubt that the Committee’s America’s Healthy Future Act devotes considerable attention to fixing what’s wrong with the existing delivery “nonsystem” and improving government oversight. Title II (Disease Prevention and Wellness), Title III (Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care), Title IV (Transparency and Program Integrity) and Title V (Fraud Waste and Abuse) of the Act consume 143 pages of the 259-page Chairman’s Mark.

And well it should.  As Professor Bill Sage’s aphorism, “It’s the delivery system stupid,” suggests, changing the structure and interactions of health care providers has long been seen as critical to efforts to control cost and improve quality.  Given serious questions about the strength and effectiveness of competition among private health insurers, especially without a public plan option to spur them, Medicare reform stands as the only viable means to bring about delivery system change.  Policy analysts have made the point that “Medicare is the place to start delivery system reform,” recommending payment reforms that reward accountable health organizations and move toward bundled payments  as a means to spur needed integration in health care delivery.

But how quickly can all this be accomplished? Read more

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