Will Durant, The Story of Civilization, and Immunization and Human Subject Research, or “I Never Promised You a Rose Garden”

I am reading Will Durant’s Story of Civilization as of late–actually, I’ve been reading the splendid 11 volume set off and on since I first bought it at a garage sale some twenty years ago. The work of a lifetime, Durant and his collaborating wife, Ariel, published these volumes between 1935 and 1975–and few things are so well written. A gifted storyteller, Durant’s prose is lively, personal and terribly witty;  the march of civilization not so much an inexorable plodding of dates, but a series of movements punctuated by the fits and starts, foibles and peccadilloes of an all too human race. For the work, in effect “a biography of civilization” which is said to have put its publisher,  Simon & Schuster, on the map, Durant and his wife were awarded the Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction in 1968 and the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977. It is no small point of alumni pride that for a number of years, early in his career, Will Durant attended and taught at Seton Hall.

At present I am reading The Age of Napoleon, and I cannot help but offer here some characteristic lines from Durant’s work. Of Benjamin Constant (1767- 1816), sometime aide to Napoleon, he writes:

… born in Switzerland, educated in a dozen cities, and finally embattled in France, so littered his life with unpaid debts, discarded mistresses, and political somersaults that it would hardly be profitable to dally with him here had he not come close to history in many frays, been loved to distraction by notable women, and been able to describe his faults with such eloquence, subtlety, and impartiality as might help us understand our own….

He came of a titled Swiss-German family that traced its pedigree through 800 years. We need go back no further than his father, who was so occupied with his own sins that he had little time to supervise his son’s…  On October 25, at Lausanne, [Henriette de Chandieu] gave birth to Benjamin; a week later she died, the first of many women who suffered from his irregularities. The father entrusted the boy to various tutors, carelessly chosen. One tried by beatings and fondlings to make the boy an infant prodigy in Greek. When the beatings endangered Benjamin’s health, he was transferred to a second tutor, who took him to a brothel in Brussels. His third tutor gave him a good knowledge of music, and, for the rest, relied on him to educate himself through reading. Benjamin read eight or ten hours a day, permanently injuring his eyes and his faith. He spent a year at the University of Erlangen, then he was transferred to Edinburgh, where he felt the final flurry of the Scottish Enlightenment; but there too he took to gambling, which became second only to sex in disordering his life. (p. 302-304, footnotes omitted).

Of a woman more than twice Constant’s age (the intellectual beauty, Isabella van Tuyll, who famously rejected Boswell decades prior) twice taken to educating the young man in “the wiles of women and the lies of men,” Durant tells us that she told Benjamin,

If I knew a young and robust person who would love you as much as I do, and who is no more stupid than I am, I would have the generosity to say ‘Go to her!’

Durant: “To her surprise and indignation, he soon found a young and robust person.”

And what does this have to do with Health Reform? Absolutely nothing, except to say that Durant’s work, which happens to chronicle the advances as well as the missteps of medicine in every age and most places, would make a great addition to your library.

Consider this account of vaccinations for small pox in England, while thinking a moment about human subject research, informed consent, and the foundation of experimental medicine and immunology:

In 1806 London recorded a singular event: it had gone a full week without a death from smallpox– that pustulous, feverish, face-marring, and infectious disease which had once been epidemic in England, and might again at any time swell into a deadly plague.

A modest English physician, Edward Jenner–addicted to hunting, botany, composing poetry, and playing the flute or the violin-made the miracle week possible by a decade of inoculations that finally overcame the conservatism of British society. The prevention of smallpox by inoculation with weakened virus from a smallpox-infected human being had been practiced by the the ancient Chinese; Lady Mary Wortley Montagu had found it customary in the Constantinople of 1717; on her return to England she recommended the procedure there. It was tried upon criminals, then upon orphans, with considerable success. In 1760 Drs. Robert and Daniel Sutton reported that in thirty thousand cases of smallpox inoculation they had twelve hundred fatalities. Could a surer method of preventing smallpox be found?

Jenner was led to a better way by noting that many milkmaids in his native Gloucestershire contracted cowpox from infected nipples of cows, and that these women were thereafter immune to smallpox. It occurred to him that a like immunity might be established by inoculating with a vaccine (vacca is Latin for cow) made from a virus of pox-infected cow. In a paper published in 1798 Jenner recounted a venturesome procedure which laid the foundations of experimental medicine and immunology.

…I selected a healthy boy, about eight years old, for the purpose of inoculation for [with] the Cow Pox. The matter was taken from a sore on the hand of a dairymaid who was infected by her master’s cows, and it was inserted, on the 14^th of may, 1796, in the arm of the boy…. On the seventh day he complained of uneasiness…. And on the ninth he became a little chilly, lost his appetite, and had a slight headache…. On the following day he was perfectly well….

I order to ascertain whether the boy, after feeling so slight an affection of the system from the Cow Pox virus, was secure from the contagion of the Small Pox, he was inoculated, the 1^st of July following, with variolous matter [variola is Latin for smallpox] immediately taken from a pustule…. No disease followed…. Several months afterwards he was again inoculated with variolous matter, but no sensible effect was produced in the constitution.

Jenner went on to describe twenty-two other cases of similar procedure with completely satisfactory results. He met with condemnation for what seemed to be human vivisection, and he tried to atone for using a consenting minor by building a cottage for him and planting a rose garden for him with his own hands. In 1802 and 1807 Parliament voted Jenner £ 30,000 to improve and spread his methods. In the course of the nineteenth century smallpox almost disappeared from Europe and America, and when it occurred it was in unvaccinated individuals. Vaccination was applied to other ailments, and the new science of immunology shared with other medical advances, and with public sanitation, in giving modern communities as much health as is allowed by the harassments of poverty, the fertility of ignorance, the recklessness of appetite, and the patient inventiveness of disease. (p. 392-2, footnotes omitted).

As for the leap in immunology, Jenner’s work, was not universally acclaimed– at least not early on. In addition to the above mentioned moral approbation he weathered with the help of the time-tested gift of roses, the feared potential “side-effects” of his vaccine were chronicled in this caricature from 1802, entitled “The COW-POCK– or– The Wonderful Effects of the New Inoculation! Vide– the Publication of y Anti-Vaccine Society,” which is said to depict Jenner vaccinating patients who feared it would make them sprout cowlike appendages.

A Call for Improved Guidance on Research with Pregnant Women

This month, the thoughts of Christians around the world turn to a laboring mother in “a stable at midnight in Bethlehem in the piercing cold.” It seems an appropriate time to direct your attention to the work of the Second Wave Initiative, “a collaborative academic effort to advocate for, and help find, ethically and scientifically responsible solutions for increasing our knowledge base for the treatment of pregnant women who face medical illness.”

At the end of October, the Initiative submitted comments on the Department of Health and Human Services’ Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) regarding revisions to the regulations governing human participation in federally-funded research, known as the Common Rule.  The Initiative’s comments, of which I am a co-signatory, call attention to the fact that the ANPRM fails to address “vagaries and constraints” in the current regulations “that make it difficult for researchers to feel comfortable understanding the parameters of responsible research with pregnant women.”

The Initiative recommends that HHS take the following five steps.

First, amend the Common Rule to allow for research in pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates that creates a minor increase over a minimal risk of harm, as is already permitted in children. The Initiative’s comments explain that the regulations currently provide that “any research that does not carry the potential for direct health benefit to pregnant woman or fetus is disallowed unless it involves ‘no more than minimal risk.’”  Some government officials have concluded from this that even pharmacokinetic studies — which involve nothing more risky than drawing blood and which are vital to determining dosing in pregnancy — are ruled out.

Second, eliminate the requirement that, with certain delineated exceptions, fathers must consent to research that “holds out the prospect of direct benefit solely to the fetus.” The current regulations do not require paternal consent where there is a prospect of direct benefit to the pregnant woman or, oddly, where there is no prospect of direct benefit to the pregnant woman or the fetus.  The regulations governing pediatric research seem more sensible, requiring that both parents give consent where the research involves greater than minimal risk and holds out no prospect of directly benefitting the child.

Third, amend the regulations so that they no longer label pregnant women as “vulnerable.” As Seton Hall Law’s Carl Coleman has explained, the Common Rule does not define vulnerability and the examples it gives of vulnerable populations are diverse.  With regard to pregnant women, “it is not clear why any special issues related to capacity or coercion would necessarily arise.”  The Initiative recommends changing the word “vulnerable” to “population meriting special regulation.”

Fourth, confirm that HHS’ proposed changes with regard to research that is excused from ethics review and research that is eligible for expedited review encompass research with pregnant women. The Initiative contends that explicit confirmation is necessary “to avoid inappropriate exceptionalism about pregnancy on the part of researchers and institutional review boards.”

Finally, “establish and formally charge a working group to propose new model language for the special regulation of clinical research with pregnant women that strikes a more appropriate and more just balance of rights, needs, and interests.” As I explained here, “[w]e lack data on the efficacy or safety or both of most drugs when used by pregnant women. … Without denying or dismissing the real moral conundrums that arise in maternal-fetal medicine, the information gap is deeper and wider than that.”  To the extent that the Common Rule creates unjustified barriers to desperately-needed, ethically-appropriate research, revisions must be made.

Contractual Liability and Clinical Trial Reimbursement in Italy

Contractual Liability and Clinical Trial Reimbursement in Italy

By: Christopher J. Asakiewicz, Esq. and Anna Pinkhas, Esq. [1]

In the Italian Ministerial Decree of July 14, 2009 (the “Decree”) the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Policy sets forth a number of statutory requirements relating to insurance in human clinical trials conducted in Italy. In order to safeguard the clinical participants the Decree expanded on and formulized into law a requirement previously established by the European Union, which provides that a clinical trial can be initiated in the Member States only when provisions have been made for insurance or indemnity to cover the liability of the investigator and sponsor towards clinical trials subjects. [2] However prudent and protective of clinical participants the Decree is, its implementation into Italian law has led to significant delays in the negotiation of the indemnification clauses in clinical trial agreements because of improper interpretation, an interpretation that delays the introduction of possible life saving medicines into the country and the European marketplace.

Indemnification is a critical part of the clinical trial agreements between clinical trial sponsors, investigational sites and, sometimes, the principal investigator. Generally, indemnification language in any agreement seeks to impute liability to a contractual party for acts or omissions and to defend, hold harmless and compensate the other party for any loss that such party may suffer during the performance of the contract that results from said acts or omissions. Indemnification provisions in a clinical trial agreement differ among varying sponsors and investigational sites. Generally, the provisions are mutual. A mutual indemnification provision will have the sponsor indemnify for personal injury or illness to study patients that relates to the study or the study drug, and likewise, the other party will indemnify the sponsor for any negligence or willful misconduct for which it is responsible.

Drafting and negotiating an indemnification clause can be both difficult and tedious, as the clause’s meaning is particularly important during litigation. Frequent confusion, however, between indemnification and study subject reimbursement further complicates and delays negotiations. A clinical trial agreement generally also includes a provision where the sponsor agrees to reimburse the institution for any reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by the investigational site for the treatment of patients’ illness or injuries related to the study or the study drug.  The purpose of such subject injury language is to address reimbursement of expenses incurred to treat an adverse event. [3] This reimbursement language is meant to swiftly compensate such injuries without regard for party fault so the patient can receive care immediately or continue to receive the highest standard of care.

Indemnification, on the other hand, is to assume responsibility and the costs incurred in litigation or from claims that resulted from the fault attributable to the wrongdoing of the indemnifying party. Although these two scenarios are clearly distinguishable, confusion arises over the Italian regulation because of misunderstanding about the nuances of indemnification as compared to subject injury reimbursement. The Decree states that the promoter, or the sponsor, of the clinical trial shall provide insurance to cover “any civil liability of investigator and promotor of the clinical trial, without excluding any damage which may be unintentionally caused by accident e/o be attributed to negligence, imprudence or inexperience.” [4] In other words, the clinical trial sponsor is required by the Decree to be insured to sufficient limits for not only willful or reckless conduct, but also for negligent unintentional acts or omissions. [5] Many Italian sites interpret this language to mean they are not responsible for their own negligence and therefore remove their indemnification obligation of the sponsor, the promotor, from the clinical trial agreements. However, the Decree only governs reimbursement to study subjects by the insured in the event of injuries, and does not limit contribution as well as the investigational site’s indemnity of the sponsor for those third party claims which fault is attributable to either it or its actors.

Article 1 states: “The insurance policy is to grant specific cover in connection with the reimbursement of damages caused to the subjects by the clinical trial activities throughout the entire duration thereof.”

[6] The Decree’s purpose is therefore not to forgive or excuse liability, but only to safeguard participants by ensuring that a damaged party obtains reimbursement immediately. It is incorrect to interpret the legislation’s purpose as being a limit on the scope of the Institution’s liability with respect to its own actions, as the Decree further states “[t]his restriction shall not in any event impair the right of the damaged party to seek reimbursement of damages from the person liable therefor.” [7] Exclusion language which relates to negligence, imprudence or inexperience of the investigator serves to make the insurance policy a no-fault policy, assuring participants appropriate compensation and reimbursement for their injuries or illness without having to litigate the cause of the injury or prove fault. [8]

The patient’s clinical trial injury and treatment expenses will be immediately reimbursed by the policy. But, as the Decree does not limit the remedies at law, and corresponding insurance policy’s only purpose is to compensate the participant immediately, the site can still be held liable by a court for its actions. In the situation, when the sponsor was required to compensate, but is not the determined cause, the sponsor is entitled seek contribution or indemnity for such actions’ expenses from those actors responsible. The Italian Civil Code also supports the notion that the site can still be held liable, as Article 2053 provides that any willful or negligent conduct, causing an unjust harm to third parties, obliges the tortfeasor to compensate the damages. [9]

To resolve this confusion between indemnification and clinical trial injury reimbursement, the authors recommend that a sponsor with sites operating in Italy, (i) obtain an insurance policy covering all treatment expenses incurred by patients and associated with injuries related to the study drug or protocol procedures, and (ii) ensure that any indemnification provision in the clinical trial site’s contract does not exclude the institution or the investigators from liability. The Italian Civil Code and Decree are both in agreement that those persons liable for causing harm to a third party are obligated to compensate for those damages. The sponsor through clinical trial insurance can therefore immediately reimburse the patient’s costs, then, in accordance with the mutual indemnification, the sponsor or the insurer may seek to subrogate or recoup through contribution such expenses which are attributable to the investigational site or investigator and outside the sponsor’s control. [10]

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[1] DISCLAIMER: Both authors are admitted to practice law in the state of New Jersey and draft and negotiate international clinical agreements as well as counsel on patient disclosures for pharmaceutical companies. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and shall not be attributed to any other party, company or entity. The expressed opinions are for informational purposes only, and not meant to nor intended to be an advertisement, solicitation, legal advice, authority nor services of any kind to any Client, including any person or entity in any state, country or sovereign nation. Such information is not meant to create an attorney-client relationship. the reader must not act nor rely upon these materials without seeking professional legal counsel.

[2] See Art. 3(2)(f) Directive 2001/20, of the European Parliament and of the Council of  4 April 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34, 37 ( “provision has been made for insurance or indemnity to cover the liability of the investigator and sponsor. “); See also Art. 3(1)(f) Decreto Legislativo, 24 June 2003, n. 211, G.U. 09 Aug 2003 (It.) (”provision has been made by the trial sponsor for insurance to cover the third-party liability of the investigator and the sponsors in the event of claims for damages by trial subjects.”).

[3] “adverse event” means any untoward medical occurrence in a patient or clinical trial subject administered a medicinal product and which does not necessarily have a causal relationship with this treatment.

[4] Art. 1(2) Decreto Ministeriale 14 July 2009, n. 213, G.U. 14 September 2009 (It.) (Italian Ministerial Decree, Minimum requirements for insurance policies which safeguard participants to clinical trials of medicinal products.).

[5] See Art. 2(2) D.M. n. 213/2009 (It.) (”Insurance shall provide for an insured limit for the reimbursement of damages not lower than Euro 1 million per participant, although the following minimum limits for each individual protocol are required, not less than: a) Euro 5 million if trial participants are less than or equal to 50; b) Euro 7 million five hundred thousand if the trial participants are more than 50 but less than 200; c) Euro 10 million if the trial participants are more than 200.”).

[6] Art. 1(2) D.M. n. 213/2009 (It.) (emphasis added).

[7] Art. 1(6) D.M. n. 213/2009 (It.) (emphasis added).

[8] “no-fault insurance” is any type of insurance contract under which insured’s are compensated for losses, regardless of fault in the incident generating said losses.

[9] Art. 2043 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.) (Italian Civil Code).

[10] See Blacks Law Dictionary (9^th ed. 2009) (1) (SUBROGATION “1. The substitution of one party for another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the debtor.”).

The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Finanacial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research

Seton Hall University School of Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has issued a White Paper, “The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research,” in which the Center agrees that public policy should encourage researchers and institutions to make information about their financial relationships with industry available to the public, but-contrary to many other commentators’ recommendations- concludes that disclosure of financial information should not routinely be required as part of the informed consent process.

While reiterating the Center’s prior recommendations for direct measures to eliminate, reduce, and manage problematic financial relationships in clinical research, the Center notes that, despite “the importance of transparency as an ethical value, incorporating financial issues into the informed consent process would provide few, if any benefits to research subjects and could in fact cause significant harms.”

The Center notes the problem of “information overload,” as clinical research informed consent documents have already become “long and complex, thereby confusing and overwhelming potential research participants,” and evidence indicates that “participants are often unable to sift through the morass of information to tease out the content they find salient or material.” In addition, qualitative studies have shown that “brief concise statements about financial interest within informed consent documents were rarely understood, and sometimes only served to confuse potential participants.

The Center concludes that, if a conflict of interest is so serious that its disclosure would lead a reasonable person to refuse to participate in a study, the proper remedy is to eliminate the conflict. It is therefore essential to ensure that information about financial interests is made available to institutional review boards (IRBs) and conflicts of interest committees, so that they can ensure that any problematic conflicts are eliminated before a study begins.

The Center notes that its conclusion that financial conflicts of interest should not be routinely disclosed as part of the informed consent process is not inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.

While Moore creates the possibility that, in the right set of circumstances, a physician’s failure to disclose research-related financial interests could give rise to liability, it does not mean that any and all financial relationships with industry must necessarily be disclosed. Rather, as in any informed consent claim, liability would depend on the plaintiff’s ability to establish the element of causation–i.e., that, if the omitted information had been disclosed, a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would not have consented to the procedure. As explained above, under the Center’s proposed framework, any conflict serious enough to affect a reasonable person’s decision about enrollment would already have been eliminated before the research began.

“The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research” may be found at http://law.shu.edu/HealthLawPublications.

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices.

Human Farming & the Limits of Medical Research

A Museum of Modern Art exhibit by Michael Burton once proposed that human beings themselves would be the soil for a “future farm:”

Future Farm predicts that the emerging pharmaceutical research in harvesting adult stem cells from fat tissues and its convergence with future nanotechnologies, will bring with it scenarios that reconsider the body as income. We live in a world where industries exist to offer financial rewards for those willing to sell a kidney or produce hair to beautify others. Industries have grown to facilitate transplant tourism as a result of the success of contemporary surgery. And scientific and technological advances continue to bring new possibilities for the practice of farming the body.

This may seem like an overly dramatic or even science-fictionalized description of desperation due to poverty and larger economic trends. But the global economic race to the bottom has now so influenced medical research that Burton’s dark vision is coming closer to realization.

A recent article by Bartlett & Steele and a book by Carl Elliott describe the rise of “contract research organizations” that organize the initial phases of drug trials. Bartlett and Steele choose a provocative metaphor to describe the trend:

To have an effective regulatory system you need a clear chain of command—you need to know who is responsible to whom, all the way up and down the line. There is no effective chain of command in modern American drug testing. Around the time that drugmakers began shifting clinical trials abroad, in the 1990s, they also began to contract out all phases of development and testing, putting them in the hands of for-profit companies.

It used to be that clinical trials were done mostly by academic researchers in universities and teaching hospitals, a system that, however imperfect, generally entailed certain minimum standards. The free market has changed all that. Today it is mainly independent contractors who recruit potential patients both in the U.S. and—increasingly—overseas. They devise the rules for the clinical trials, conduct the trials themselves, prepare reports on the results, ghostwrite technical articles for medical journals, and create promotional campaigns. The people doing the work on the front lines are not independent scientists. They are wage-earning technicians who are paid to gather a certain number of human beings; sometimes sequester and feed them; administer certain chemical inputs; and collect samples of urine and blood at regular intervals. The work looks like agribusiness, not research.

Because of the deference shown to drug companies by the F.D.A.—and also by Congress, which has failed to impose any meaningful regulation—there is no mandatory public record of the results of drug trials conducted in foreign countries. Nor is there any mandatory public oversight of ongoing trials.

Therefore, it is up to journalists like Bartlett & Steele to uncover problems. And they are legion:

The Argentinean province of Santiago del Estero, with a population of nearly a million, is one of the country’s poorest. In 2008 seven babies participating in drug testing in the province suffered what the U.S. clinical-trials community refers to as “an adverse event”: they died. . . . In New Delhi, 49 babies died at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences while taking part in clinical trials over a 30-month period. . . . In 2007, residents of a homeless shelter in Grudziadz, Poland, received as little as $2 to take part in a flu-vaccine experiment. The subjects thought they were getting a regular flu shot. They were not. At least 20 of them died.

Bartlett and Steele also discuss problems in research in the US. Exploitation probably should not be a surprise in a country where unpaid prison labor appears to be a strategy to boost productivity. US companies are also driving the “initial stages of distributed human computing that can be directed at mental tasks the way that surplus remote server rackspace or Web hosting can be purchased to accommodate sudden spikes in Internet traffic.” (Such “human intelligence tasks” can be purchased for as little as a penny each on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.) But the slow infiltration of less developed countries’ standards into US drug testing should be a concern for the FDA.

The system also appears to give drug companies a wide latitude to manipulate results, leading to the rise of “rescue countries” that are particularly prone to produce positive results:

One big factor in the shift of clinical trials to foreign countries is a loophole in F.D.A. regulations: if studies in the United States suggest that a drug has no benefit, trials from abroad can often be used in their stead to secure F.D.A. approval. There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be especially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called “rescue countries.” Rescue countries came to the aid of Ketek, the first of a new generation of widely heralded antibiotics to treat respiratory-tract infections. . . In 2004—on April Fools’ Day, as it happens—the F.D.A. certified Ketek as safe and effective. The F.D.A.’s decision was based heavily on the results of studies in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. The approval came less than one month after a researcher in the United States was sentenced to 57 months in prison for falsifying her own Ketek data.

Massive global inequalities render populations around the world vulnerable to exploitative testing conditions.

Carl Elliott’s book White Coat, Black Hat covers similar terrain, as well as the conflicts of interest and other issues we’ve addressed at Seton Hall’s health law center. His review of recent books on medical research described a “mild torture economy.” His piece “Guinea Pigging” suggests that “rescue counties” in the US may complement the “rescue countries” of Bartlett and Steele:

This unit was in a university hospital, not a corporate lab, and the staff had a casual attitude toward regulations and procedures. “The Animal House of research units” is what [one research subject] calls it. . . . Although study guidelines called for stringent dietary restrictions, the subjects got so hungry that one of them picked the lock on the food closet. “We got giant boxes of cookies and ran into the lounge and put them in the couch,” Rockwell says. “This one guy was putting them in the ceiling tiles.” Rockwell has little confidence in the data that the study produced. “The most integral part of the study was the diet restriction,” he says, “and we were just gorging ourselves at 2 A.M. on Cheez Doodles.”

Elliott’s litany of poorly controlled or ramshackle studies gives us one more item to add to Dr. John Ioannidis’s many reasons for doubting medical research:

Ioannidis [has] laid out a detailed mathematical proof that, assuming modest levels of researcher bias, typically imperfect research techniques, and the well-known tendency to focus on exciting rather than highly plausible theories, researchers will come up with wrong findings most of the time. Simply put, if you’re attracted to ideas that have a good chance of being wrong, and if you’re motivated to prove them right, and if you have a little wiggle room in how you assemble the evidence, you’ll probably succeed in proving wrong theories right. . . .

When a five-year study of 10,000 people finds that those who take more vitamin X are less likely to get cancer Y, you’d think you have pretty good reason to take more vitamin X . . . But these studies often sharply conflict with one another. Studies have gone back and forth on the cancer-preventing powers of vitamins A, D, and E; on the heart-health benefits of eating fat and carbs; and even on the question of whether being overweight is more likely to extend or shorten your life. How should we choose among these dueling, high-profile nutritional findings? Ioannidis suggests a simple approach: ignore them all.

For starters, he explains, the odds are that in any large database of many nutritional and health factors, there will be a few apparent connections that are in fact merely flukes, not real health effects—it’s a bit like combing through long, random strings of letters and claiming there’s an important message in any words that happen to turn up. But even if a study managed to highlight a genuine health connection to some nutrient, you’re unlikely to benefit much from taking more of it, because we consume thousands of nutrients that act together as a sort of network, and changing intake of just one of them is bound to cause ripples throughout the network that are far too complex for these studies to detect, and that may be as likely to harm you as help you. . . .[S]tudies rarely go on long enough to track the decades-long course of disease and ultimately death. Instead, they track easily measurable health “markers” such as cholesterol levels, blood pressure, and blood-sugar levels, and meta-experts have shown that changes in these markers often don’t correlate as well with long-term health as we have been led to believe. . . .

And these problems are aside from ubiquitous measurement errors (for example, people habitually misreport their diets in studies), routine misanalysis (researchers rely on complex software capable of juggling results in ways they don’t always understand), and the less common, but serious, problem of outright fraud (which has been revealed, in confidential surveys, to be much more widespread than scientists like to acknowledge). . . .If a study somehow avoids every one of these problems and finds a real connection to long-term changes in health, you’re still not guaranteed to benefit, because studies report average results that typically represent a vast range of individual outcomes. Should you be among the lucky minority that stands to benefit, don’t expect a noticeable improvement in your health, because studies usually detect only modest effects that merely tend to whittle your chances of succumbing to a particular disease from small to somewhat smaller. “The odds that anything useful will survive from any of these studies are poor,” says Ioannidis—dismissing in a breath a good chunk of the research into which we sink about $100 billion a year in the United States alone.

To summarize: Ioannidis casts some doubt on even the best of studies, and Elliott, Bartlett, and Steele show that bad studies may be far more common than we suspect. It’s a troubling set of observations for all concerned. We should at the very least insist on much more systematic monitoring of global drug trials.

Guatemala and Tuskegee, Winter Man Rides Again

Recent news of STD experiments by U.S. Public Health Service researchers on vulnerable Guatemalans back in the 1940s  gives rise for pause. The Wall Street Journal’s Health Blog reports:

In an article published online in the Journal of the American Medical Association, the CDC’s Thomas Frieden and NIH’s Francis Collins say the unpublished research — which involved intentionally infecting prison inmates, soldiers, sex workers and the mentally incapacitated with syphilis and other STDs — clearly violated ethical standards.

And that

The two say that “regulations safeguarding humans participating in research have been enacted” since the studies were conducted, from 1946-48. Federally funded research projects that could expose human subjects to harm must be overseen by an institutional review board, and researchers are almost always required to get informed consent, they write.

This is true, regulations safeguarding humans participating in research have been enacted. But it’s important to remember that such atrocities–and they are atrocities–were not just relegated to the forties. Although 1948 seems a very long time ago, 1972 does not.

The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment/Study was conducted by the U.S. Health Service between 1932 and 1972 in Tuskegee Alabama. Poor African-American sharecroppers with syphilis were recruited to document the progression of the disease. They were left untreated.

“The Public Health Service, working with the Tuskegee Institute, began the study in 1932. Nearly 400 poor black men with syphilis from Macon County, Ala., were enrolled in the study. For participating in the study, the men were given free medical exams, free meals and free burial insurance. They were never told they had syphilis, nor were they ever treated for it. According to the Centers for Disease Control, the men were told they were being treated for ‘bad blood,’ a local term used to describe several illnesses, including syphilis, anemia and fatigue.”

Although penicillin became the standard treatment for syphilis by 1947, the Tuskegee researchers continued the study for another 25 years, withheld penicillin  from the study subjects, and “prevented participants from accessing syphilis treatment programs available to others in the area.”

As a result, numerous men died from the disease, many spread it to their wives, and a number of children were born with congenital syphilis. The study was stopped, 40 years after it started, only after a newspaper got wind of it.

John Charles Cutler, M.D. “was a senior surgeon, and the acting chief of the venereal disease program in the United States Public Health Service.” He was involved in the studies in both Guatemala and Tuscegee. “In ‘The Deadly Deception,’ the 1993 Nova documentary about the Tuskegee experiments, Dr. Cutler states, “It was important that they were supposedly untreated, and it would be undesirable to go ahead and use large amounts of penicillin to treat the disease, because you’d interfere with the study.”

The utilitarian calculus can be a monstrous thing. That there are laws now to protect against the practice does not relieve me of the dread at the thought that we actually need laws for such a thing.  The inclination alone is reason for pause. In old Lakota Sioux medicine wheel teachings, Hyemeyohsts Storm says that intellect without compassion produces Winter Man– which freezes everything it touches. But I don’t think that’s a standard academic text.

The Ethics of Modern Drugs and Clinical Trials

A recent article in the New York Times raised an interesting question: are traditional, randomized, controlled trials of new genetically targeted cancer drugs unethical?

The piece recounts the story of two cousins, both diagnosed with melanoma.  After enrolling in the last phase of clinical study, the computer lottery selected one cousin to receive PLX4032, experimental “superpills.” The second cousin, now deceased, was relegated to a “notoriously ineffective” course of chemotherapy.

Randomized, controlled trials have become the gold standard in clinical research, comparing competing treatments to determine which extends life most.  The structure of the trial, with an experimental group and control group, is premised on the idea that the comparative effectiveness of the experimental treatment is unknown.  Therefore, one half of the participants in the clinical trial receive a believed to be less effective therapy for a greater good: researchers come to know definitively which treatment is more effective and future patients benefit from that knowledge.

Critics point out that these new drugs are so much more effective than prior treatments that time-consuming clinical trials are futile: the Phase III trial for PLX4032 would cost $100 million and take at least two years before possibly receiving F.D.A. approval.  That is a huge cost, in terms of lives and money, to “prove” what has already been demonstrated in early clinical testing.  Physicians are forced to forego an opportunity “to give patients symptomatic relief, even if the drug turned out not to prolong life.”

Dr. Paul B. Chapman of Sloan-Kettering, a medical oncologist at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and leader of the trial states in the article:

My goal is to find out as quickly as possible in as few patients as possible whether this works.  If we never know, then we’re never going to be able to build on anything.

Making patients’ tumors go away is gratifying.  But that’s not the businss I’m in.  I’m in the business of making people live longer.  That’s what I want to do.

In contrast, Dr. David E. Fisher, a leading melanoma biologist at Massachusetts General  said of the controlled trial:

My personal view is it’s nuts.  I don’t know anyone who hasn’t shuddered at the concept that we can’t let patients on the control arm cross over because we need them to die earlier to prove a point.

The trend towards more targeted and effective drugs changes the framework for evaluating the ethics of clinical trials.  Promising new treatments however, have sometimes been proven to be less effective.  Therefore, the question remains for medical researchers and the F.D.A.: when will early clinical results be so persuasive that a traditional, controlled trial is unnecessary?

Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy Submits Comments on Conflicts of Interest in Research to the National Institutes of Health

On August 19, 2010, on behalf of Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law Professors Kathleen Boozang and Carl Coleman, along with Research Fellow Kate Greenwood, submitted comments on the National Institutes of Health’s proposed revisions to its regulations governing conflicts of interest in federally-funded research.  While the Center’s November 2009 White Paper Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight endorsed limits on conflicts of interest beyond those that the NIH has proposed, the revised regulations are a step in the right direction and in its comments the Center commends the NIH for its decisive action on this issue.


Briefly, the Center:

• Supports the NIH’s proposal that that researchers disclose to their institutions any significant financial interest that “reasonably appears to be related to the Investigator’s institutional responsibilities,” with “institutional responsibilities” defined to include “activities such as research, research consultation, teaching, professional practice, institutional committee memberships, and service on panels such as Institutional Review Boards or Data and Safety Monitoring Boards.” This comports with the Center’s recommendation in the White Paper that investigators not be charged with determining for themselves whether one or more of their financial interests could be affected by a specific research project.

• Supports the NIH’s decision to significantly lower the monetary threshold at which a researcher’s financial interest becomes “significant” to $5,000, but argues that a lower threshold would be better. Collection of data about all of a researcher’s relationships with industry, even those that fall below the proposed $5,000 threshold, would facilitate better conflict of interest assessment and management and make possible research into the effects of conflicts on research integrity and human subject welfare.

• Supports the NIH’s decision not to exclude income from non-profit entities for lectures and similar engagements from the definition of significant financial interest and its conclusion that any equity interest in a non-publicly traded entity is significant, as are any and all intellectual property rights, but encourages the agency to revisit its decision to shield from disclosure (1) equity interests held by investigators in commercial or for-profit institutions and (2) royalties and other remuneration other than salary paid to an investigator by an institution that appoints or employs him or her.

• Notes that the draft revised regulations do not address the White Paper’s criticisms that the conflict of interest regulations place no “substantive limits on the kinds of conflicts that may exist” and fail to put forth “a required minimum response for conflicts that pose the greatest risks to participants and the integrity of the research” and encourages the NIH to consider again the benefits of setting forth required minimum responses to those conflicts that are the most problematic.

• Supports the NIH’s decision to require that grantees provide “sufficient information to enable the [agency] to understand the nature and extent of the financial conflict, and to assess the appropriateness of the Institution’s management plan.”

• Supports the requirement in the draft revised regulations that any significant financial interest that (1) is still held by a principal investigator or senior/key person, (2) is related to PHS-funded research, and (3) is a financial conflict of interest must be disclosed to the public via the world wide web.

• Supports the draft revised regulations’ requirement that investigators complete training on “the Institution’s policy on financial conflicts of interest, the Investigator’s responsibilities regarding disclosure of significant financial interests, and of these regulations” before the commencement of research and then at least once every two years. As recommended in the Center’s White Paper, it would be beneficial for the training to include as well a discussion of the nature of conflicts of interest and their potential for harm.

• Recommends that the agency adopt its own suggestion that institutions be required to “maintain up-to-date, written, enforced policies” on institutional conflicts of interest, as they are for investigator conflicts, and that these policies be made publicly available via the world wide web. The nudge this requirement would provide is necessary because institutions have been slow to develop and adopt policies on institutional conflicts.

• Recommends that the section of the regulations devoted to remedies be revised to include a non-exclusive list of potential enforcement actions such as temporary withholding of cash payments pending correction of the deficiency, suspension or termination of the contract or grant in whole or in part, monetary assessments and penalties, and suspension or debarment from eligibility for future contracts or grants.

The Center’s comments in their entirety are available here.

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. The Center is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices.

Solving the Mysteries of Pregnancy

In last week’s JAMA, the Pandemic H1N1 Influenza in Pregnancy Working Group reported that their analysis of nationwide data on 2009 influenza A (H1N1) in pregnant women revealed that “early antiviral treatment appeared to be associated with fewer admissions to an ICU and fewer deaths.”  Pregnant women who were not treated with antiviral medication until 3-4 days after they began experiencing flu symptoms were more likely to die than those who were treated within 2 days of symptom onset.  Women who were first treated with medication more than 4 days after symptom onset were 54 times more likely to die than those who were treated within 2 days.

The authors speculate that the “reasons for delayed treatment … could include reluctance of pregnant women or clinicians to use antiviral medication because of concern for risk to the fetus, despite available evidence suggesting that treatment benefit likely outweighs the potential risk.”  Given the shocking 54-fold increased risk of death associated with late initiation of antiviral medication, the authors’ use of the qualifiers “suggesting” and “likely” is noteworthy.  They are forced to hedge because, as a group of experts convened by the CDC acknowledged in late 2009, “[l]ittle is known about the effects of the four currently available influenza medications on the fetus.”

In my article The Mysteries of Pregnancy: The Role of Law in Solving the Problem of Unknown But Knowable Maternal-Fetal Medication Risk (forthcoming in the University of Cincinnati Law Review), I point out that this information gap is not unique to antivirals.  We lack data on the efficacy or safety or both of most drugs when used by pregnant women.  A frequent shorthand explanation for the dearth of information is that you cannot test drugs on pregnant women because of ethical concerns.  Without denying or dismissing the real moral conundrums that arise in maternal-fetal medicine, the information gap is deeper and wider than that.  As Ruth Faden puts it: “Everyone thinks, Oh, my God, research on pregnant women!  All kinds of ethical flags go up.  We don’t have to start with high drama.  [There's enough] low-hanging fruit that we could keep lots of medical researchers busy for a long time.”

Two FDA-led efforts promise to begin connecting the dots: the Medication Exposure in Pregnancy Risk Evaluation Program, which will conduct epidemiological research using data on approximately 1 million births gathered by the 11 participating research sites, and the Sentinel Initiative, which is creating a national electronic system with the goal of, among other things, allowing for prompt investigation of the safety of newly-approved drugs in pregnant women.  Other government agencies also have roles to play.  For example, the house committee report accompanying the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education Fiscal 2010 Appropriations measure encouraged the NIH “to  expand research on pregnant women with the goals of better understanding the long-term health effects on women of disease states in pregnancy, the proper therapeutics for pharmacologic treatments for pregnant women who face illness, and the safety and efficacy of medications administered to pregnant women and fetuses.”   Finally, industry can and should do more.  Congress should empower FDA to require pharmaceutical companies to sponsor maternal-fetal medication research in appropriate cases, authority the agency already has in the pediatric arena.

Alternative Revenue Stream for Private Practice Physicians – Research Investigator

Clinical research is the only way [for a physician in the managed care era] to make a boat payment, quips David Stark, M.D.

With increasing frequency, pharmaceutical and medical device companies are turning to physicians in private practice, rather than academic medical centers, to serve as investigators overseeing the 60,000-odd clinical trials each year, between 80 and 90% of which are funded by industry as opposed to, say, NIH. Academic medical centers are losing the “business,” having fallen from 63% to 26% as the site for clinical research between 1994 and 2004. While it might be argued that trials in the private practice setting produce superior results because they occur under circumstances that more closely resemble how the drug or device will actually be used if approved by the FDA, there are significant risks attendant to this phenomenon that have received too little attention.

The ultimate question is whether physicians can compartmentalize the competing incentives that exist in advising patients about whether to pursue conventional therapy or participate in a clinical trial. This is especially true if the physician is being handsomely compensated for each patient she recruits into a trial, and is exacerbated when the physician also has other financial relationships with the trial sponsor (the drug or device company) for, say, speaking and consulting gigs. Clinical Research in the Private Office Setting — Ethical Issues The recruitment process for clinical trials is the longest and most costly part of the process - prospective participants have to undergo testing to see if they qualify for the study, and federal law requires that they receive significant amounts of information and have ample opportunity to have their questions answered pre-enrollment. A per capita payment contingent upon successful enrollment of the patient will tempt a physician to fudge on this process and enroll unqualified subjects. This not only may put them at risk because they are too sick, but also skew the research results because they’re not sick enough. Bonuses for meeting enrollment goals only make it worse.

Without impugning physician integrity, how realistic it is for physicians to serve in the dual capacity of treating physician and researcher? Studies have repeatedly confirmed “therapeutic misconception” whereby study participants believe, no matter how clearly told to the contrary, that they are “patients” receiving treatment, rather than “subjects” of research who may be receiving a placebo or an experimental drug. This phenomenon is certainly exacerbated when the patient’s treating physician is doubling as the investigator of the clinical trial. Most patients continue to believe that their own personal physician would be driven solely by their best interests. Ironically, some people have more faith in an experimental intervention when they learn that the investigator has a “piece of the action.”

Obviously, significant policy and legal questions arise from this practice, and a more holistic approach to the question of the best way to encourage clinical trials while safeguarding the interests of trial subjects is beyond what I can attempt here. But one possible approach could be drawn from informed consent law — whether statutory or common law, which should require physician disclosure of conflicts of interest to patients. Imagine the beginning of a conversation between doctor and patient/potential research subject:

Doctor: “Just so you know, if you agree to participate in this clinical trial, I get paid $1000 by the manufacturer of the product being tested, but if you don’t, and you just want regular treatment, I’ll only get paid $60 by your insurance company. But, in fairness, that’s because a clinical trial is a lot more work for me….”

But to be honest, I don’t really believe in this solution either. Most recipients of this information either don’t understand it, or have no idea what to do with it, or both. Some fear that too much confusing information might kill trials altogether, which would be a terrible outcome. And there are certainly reasons to fear that such trials are becoming harder to run, to the point where they’re not worth the money. Ultimately, I guess, I want to control how physicians get paid to serve as investigators — the Goldilocks Solution — not too much, and not too little. I want them to be paid just right, so that they are willing to conduct clinical trials, but aren’t tempted to act other than in the patient’s best interest. Of course, what is just right and how to enforce it poses its own problems.

Seton Hall Law School, the author’s employer, is the recipient of grants, donations and endowments from the pharmaceutical industry. No part of the author’s compensation is funded by these gifts.

x-posted at Concurring Opinions

Drug Study Fails to Mention Risk of Death to Test Subjects

[Ed. Note: Today's Post is by Maansi K. Raswant, a Seton Hall Law student pursuing the Health Law concentration. She is a research assistant to the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and an intern at the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation.]

As reported recently in the Boston Globe, a federal probe found that heart attack survivors enrolled in a clinical trial conducted in over 120 sites nationally had not been adequately informed of the safety risks of the study, including the risk of death.

The process under study, chelation, involves “periodic infusions of a drug– in this case, disodium EDTA.” The infusions are being tested in conjunction with the ingestion of high doses of  vitamins and minerals. However, according to the federal probe, “in 2008 FDA removed disodium EDTA from the FDA’s approved list and withdrew of approval of new drug applications for disodium EDTA.” Test subjects were not informed that disdodium EDTA “is no longer FDA approved for any use and has been removed from the market because of safety concerns.”

Funded by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute and the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine, the study has over 1,500 subjects. Though researchers suspended enrollment last August due to the investigation, federal officials allowed the study to continue pending further findings of the probe, a decision that has been highly criticized.

In addition to the deficiencies regarding the  informed consent of study participants, the Boston Globe reported that the investigation found that several co-investigators involved in the study had been disciplined for “substandard practices” or had been involved in insurance fraud. Three were convicted felons. Federal officials explained that they found the substandard practices and convictions of the principal investigators “concerning” but not a reason to “automatically preclude an investigator from participating in research.”

The U.S. Office of Human Research Protections detailed the findings of the investigation and required corrective actions in a letter to the three medical institutions heading the study. In response to the investigation’s findings, the study modified the consent form to recognize death as a “rare complication of the EDTA [chelation] infusions.” The Office of Human Research Protections has also requested further modification of the form to disclose that disodium EDTA had been removed from the market.

Despite the change in consent form, questions remain about the acceptability of the risks posed by the study. As the Globe reports, critics of the study, including the head of bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, Arthur Caplan, have charged that the risks posed by the study are unethical. The complaint against the study filed with the Office of Human Research Protections noted that since “the mid-1970’s court documents and newspapers have reported at least 30 deaths associated with intravenous EDTA.”

The probe is the lastest in a string of major investigations of clinical trials, including the continuing investigation into payments by device maker Medtronic to Dr. Timothy Kulko (who is accused of falsifying author names and  study results), and the Synthes indictment for allegations that its subsidiary, Norian, conspired to conduct unauthorized clinical trials that placed subjects at risk of death without properly informing them of the risks. In the Synthes/Norian matter, three patients are believed to have died as a result of the use of the companies’ bone cement products.