Accountable Care Organizations and Antitrust: A New PSA Test

A New PSA Test

Tim Greaney

Saint Louis University School of Law

There’s a new PSA test in health care.  Hopefully it will prove more reliable than that other one.

In conjunction with the unveiling of the long-awaited ACO regulation by HHS, the FTC and Department of Justice issued a Joint Policy Statement setting forth their standards for conducting an expedited (90-day) antitrust review of applicants for ACO certification.  The agencies explained that they will evaluate applicants’ market power based on the ACO’s share of services in each participant’s Primary Service Area (PSA) defined as the “lowest number of contiguous postal zip codes” from which the hospital or physician draws at least 75 percent of its patients for its services.   The Statement summarized the antitrust implications of ACOs formed by hospitals or physician groups with large market shares in their markets:

ACOs with high PSA shares may pose a higher risk of being anticompetitive and also may reduce quality, innovation, and choice for both Medicare and commercial patients. High PSA shares may reduce the ability of competing ACOs to form, and could allow an ACO to raise prices charged to commercial health plans above competitive levels.

The antitrust enforcers were properly concerned with the risk that ACOs could become a vehicle for increasing or entrenching provider market power.  Studies by academics, health policy experts and state governments have documented the impact of provider concentration on insurance premiums. Moreover, a post-reform merger wave may have increased the number of hospital and specialty physician markets and many areas are already served by dominant local providers.  Inasmuch as the success of the ACO concept depends on its ability to spur delivery system change, the predictable intransigence of monopolistic providers presents an important issue. In this regard, it is heartening that the extended (and apparently controversial) regulation drafting process produced a result that promises to constrain the growth and exercise of market power.

Notably, the Policy Statement also removed some uncertainty that may have existed as to the application of prior antitrust enforcement actions and advisory opinions in the ACO context.  For example, the Statement should provide some comfort to those organizing physician networks: ACOs that clear the CMS review of their integration efforts will almost certainly be regarded by FTC and DOJ as “clinically integrated” and hence not subject to the strict “per se” legal standard (More in a subsequent post on the issues raised in evaluating the competitive problems of ACOs in given circumstances).

Market power, however, remains a major sticking point in evaluating ACOs. Antitrust aficionados may question whether the PSA approach employed in the Policy Statement accurately indentifies markets or measures the market power of providers.  As the FTC and DOJ themselves have found, zip code data gives a highly imperfect measure of health care markets. Moreover, there are significant problems in obtaining the necessary data regarding the total volume of services in the providers’ markets, particularly with regard to their services provided to commercial insurers and employers.  However, it appears that the agencies will use this measure as a rough and ready starting point to identify potentially problematic ACOs and those that most obviously raise no competitive problems.

An important and, again, heartening, aspect of the Policy Statement is the agencies’ insistence that applicants with large market shares come forward with justifications and produce data and documents that would assuage competitive concerns.  This should help expedite the process. (Though, if past practice with mergers is a guide, the 90-day clock will not start running until the ACO completes its production of all required information). The agencies make it clear that they will solicit the views of payers and employers before making their determination.  Finally the CMS ACO regulation makes it clear that high PSA ACOs will not be approved unless the FTC or DOJ provides a clearance letter.

Not unlike the inexact science of medical diagnosis, the antitrust agencies are making do with the tools they have.

Reform Rodeo

1. The Health Care Blog has an important piece on the role of HIT in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and whether they will be open networks or walled gardens.

Will ACO (accountable care organization) IT models be walled gardens or open platforms?  i.e., will ACO IT platforms focus on exchanging information within the provider network of the ACO, or will they also be able to exchange information with providers outside the ACO network?

2. Kaiser Health News  discusses rules proposed by the Obama administration that would require health insurers to justify double-digit increases in premium rates.

Under the proposal, the flagged premium increases would be subject to review by the states – or the federal government in some cases – to determine if they are unreasonable.

In following years, the Department of Health and Human Services will adjust the specific percentage threshold for each individual state. Thresholds would vary partly because medical costs vary by state.

3. The New York Times has run a piece on a new antitrust lawsuit filed against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan.

Federal prosecutors contend that Blue Cross in Michigan thwarts competitors by pressuring hospitals to charge rival insurers more to provide care, a practice prosecutors say has made health care extremely expensive in a state that can’t afford it.

4.  Tim Jost provides an overview at Health Affairs of the current state of the argument over the constitutionality of the individual mandate — including the recent decision by a federal judge in Virginia ruling the mandate unconstitutional.

Virginia adopted a statute purporting to nullify the minimum essential coverage requirement even before Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act, and the lawsuit was brought to enforce this statute.  Judge Hudson had earlier this year denied a Justice Department motion to dismiss the Virginia case, holding that the Commonwealth had standing to defend its legislation.  In his earlier decision, Judge Hudson had also held that the Commonwealth had an arguable claim that the minimum coverage requirement was unconstitutional.  Subsequent briefs filed by the Justice Department and by amici (interested parties who file as “friends of the court,” or amici curiae) supporting the reform law apparently failed to change Judge Hudson’s mind.

5. The Wall Street Journal has a story outlining the tremendous pecuniary benefits that certain spine doctors are receiving for conducting spine surgeries that some question as unnecessary.

The five surgeons are also among the largest recipients nationwide of payments from medical-device giant Medtronic Inc. In the first nine months of this year alone, the surgeons—Steven Glassman, Mitchell Campbell, John Johnson, John Dimar and Rolando Puno—received more than $7 million from the Fridley, Minn., company.

Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by FTC and DOJ

On August 19, the Federal Trade Commission (”FTC”) and Department of Justice (”DOJ”) issued revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (”guidelines”).  First adopted in 1968 and revised in 1992, the guidelines are an outline of the primary “analytical techniques, practices and enforcement policies” used to evaluate mergers and acquisitions of actual or potential competitors under federal antitrust laws, including Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

As the first major revision in 18 years, the FTC and DOJ assert that the guidelines are not a change in policy, but a clarification of the merger review process.  In 2006, both agencies issued “Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,” the first step towards the refinement of the guidelines.  The agencies jointly announced the project in September 2009.  They posed a number of questions for public comment and conducted a series of workshops this past winter.  As a result, 51 parties provided comments for the revisions.  The agencies further considered 31 written comments to the proposed revisions issued on April 20.

According to the FTC Press Release, the guidelines are primarily aimed to “help the agencies identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or likely will have no competitive impact on the marketplace.” In addition, the guidelines are intended to assist private parties, courts and antitrust practitioners.  Representatives of both agencies had the following to say:

“Because of the hard work of all involved at both agencies, private parties and judges will be better equipped to understand how the agencies evaluate deals. That improvement in clarity and predictability will benefit everyone,” said FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz…

“The revised guidelines better reflect the agencies’ actual practices,” said Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “The guidelines provide more clarity and transparency, and will provide businesses with an even greater understanding of how we review transactions.”

What Has Changed?

According to the FTC Press Release, the guidelines do the following:

• Clarify that merger analysis does not use a single methodology, but is a fact-specific process through which the agencies use a variety of tools to analyze the evidence to determine whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.
• Introduce a new section on “Evidence of Adverse Competitive Effects.” This section discusses several categories and sources of evidence that the agencies, in their experience, have found informative in predicting the likely competitive effects of mergers.
• Explain that market definition is not an end itself or a necessary starting point of merger analysis, and market concentration is a tool that is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects.
• Provide an updated explanation of the hypothetical monopolist test used to define relevant antitrust markets and how the agencies implement that test in practice.
• Update the concentration thresholds that determine whether a transaction warrants further scrutiny by the agencies.
• Provide an expanded discussion of how the agencies evaluate unilateral competitive effects, including effects on innovation.
• Provide an updated section on coordinated effects. The guidelines clarify that coordinated effects, like unilateral effects, include conduct not otherwise condemned by the antitrust laws.
• Provide a simplified discussion of how the agencies evaluate whether entry into the relevant market is so easy that a merger is not likely to enhance market power.
• Add new sections on powerful buyers, mergers between competing buyers, and partial acquisitions.

Analysis by private parties is mixed.  Constantine Cannon LLP writes that the guidelines “reflect a more tolerant approach to mergers, stressing the need to ‘avoid unnecessary interference with . . . competitively beneficial’ mergers.”   In support, Constantine Cannon cites the increased Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (”HHI”) thresholds and statements clarifying that coordination can be legal.

On the other hand, Weil Gotshal writes that the guidelines “appear to provide the agencies with more tools… [and] offer less predictability regarding which analytical methodology will be applied.”  Of primary concern is the decreased emphasis on market definition and increased emphasis on a fact-specific process with a variety of analytical tools.  Revised definitions may create narrower relevant markets which will negate any benefits of higher HHI thresholds.  The newly enumerated categories of evidence may lead to broader document requests and longer investigations.  In providing many alternative techniques and theories, the agency has provided “few true guidelines to assist parties considering a transaction.”

Criticism From Within the Commission

Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch issued a separate concurring statement, in which he “acknowledged” flaws in the guidelines.  According to Commissioner Rosch, the following substantial changes since the 1992 revisions are not reflected in the new guidelines:

First, the Commission is increasingly challenging mergers in preliminary injunction and administrative (Part 3) proceedings…   Second, economic theories embedded in the 1992 Guidelines emphasized price effects almost exclusively. Increasingly, the Agencies and courts have considered nonprice effects, like effects on quality, variety, and innovation, to be no less important. Third, for a variety of reasons, many, if not most, courts have relied on empirical evidence instead of economic evidence, and have considered economic evidence as corroborative of that empirical evidence, if they have considered it at all…  As previously discussed, that in turn has led the staff reviewing mergers ex ante to devote more attention to the empirical evidence that can be presented and defended at trial.

As a result, Commissioner Rosch believes the guidelines do not reflect the way staff at the FTC conduct ex ante merger reviews or the information courts should be told about merger analysis.

According to Commissioner Rosch, the guidelines possess the following additional flaws:

• Stakeholder perspectives were considered unequally. As a result, the guidelines overemphasize “economic formulae and models based on price theory.” Commissioner Rosch credits the large influence of the defense bar, academics, and other kindred souls and at least one private meeting held with the leadership of the ABA Antitrust Section.
• The economic theories of the revised guidelines are improperly based wholly or partially on margins (prices minus incremental costs). Although the draft guidelines acknowledge in two footnotes that “high margins are not in themselves of antitrust concern,” Section 4.1.3 discusses the role of margins in critical loss analysis and as an indication of the sensitivity of demand to price.
• The guidelines say little about non-price competitive effects (ie., how a transaction affects quality, service innovation, and product variety). See page 2 of the guidelines, “[f]or simplicity of exposition, these Guidelines generally discuss the analysis in terms of… price effects.”
• The guidelines fail to offer a clear framework for analyzing non-price considerations. Commissioner Rosch supports this claim with four non-exhaustive illustrations of guideline deficiencies.

Commissioner Rosch’s statement raises many questions about the future of the guidelines.  Are the revised guidelines an accurate statement of current practices?  Will the issuance of the guidelines lead to a greater number of enforcement actions?  How will courts square this administrative document with prior merger and acquisition case law?  Only time will tell.

Are GPO’s Suppressing Safer Devices?

S. Prakash Sethi has called group purchasing organizations (GPO’s) an “undisclosed scandal in the U.S. health care industry.” Mariah Blake’s article in the Washington Monthly on GPO’s is a sobering “must-read” for those concerned about the future of health care in the US. She writes about the entrepreneur Thomas Shaw, who’s invented a syringe that drastically reduces the risk of bloodstream infections for patients and healthcare workers. (According to Barry Lynn, who’s also written on the issue, “each year about 6,000 medical workers come down with HIV or infectious hepatitis from such accidents, and dozens end up dead.”) Shaw’s brilliant innovation “added only a few pennies to the cost of production,” but it’s rarely used today. Blake traces the non-diffusion of this innovation to a complex set of deregulatory decisions relating to GPO’s.

GPO’s are supposed to use purchasing clout on behalf of buyers (like hospitals) to drive down prices from sellers. But it appears that these intermediaries, like large Wall Street firms, are often more interested in fees and payments from the sell-side than they are in helping the buy-side. As one analyst testified before the DOJ and FTC, “the compensation of most GPO management is almost always based on . . . fee income [from suppliers] rather than on the real savings to hospital members.”

Shaw’s bad luck was to enter the market shortly after a massive GPO, Premier, struck a multiyear deal with supplier Becton Dickinson. As Blake notes, “Premier signed a $1.8 billion, seven-and-a-half-year deal with Becton Dickinson [whereby its 1700 member hospitals] had to buy 90 percent of their syringes and blood collection tubes from” Becton Dickinson, which also “landed similar deals with all but one major GPO.” Lynn says that “many hospital buying agents won’t even dare to talk to Shaw for fear of upsetting their more powerful suppliers.”

How did the GPO-Supplier nexus grow so strong? Blake does a terrific job explaining developments that transmogrified many cost-cutting intermediaries into self-serving middlemen:

To keep costs in check, in the 1970s many medical facilities began banding together to form group purchasing organizations, or GPOs. The underlying idea was simple: because suppliers generally give price breaks to customers who buy large quantities, hospitals could get better deals on, say, gauze or gloves, if a group of them came together and bargained for ten cases, rather than each hospital buying a case on its own. . . . By decade’s end, virtually every hospital in America belonged to a GPO.

Then, in 1986 Congress passed a bill exempting GPOs from the anti-kickback provisions embedded in Medicare law. This meant that instead of collecting membership dues, GPOs could collect “fees”—in other industries they might be called kickbacks or bribes—from suppliers in the form of a share of sales revenue. (For example, in exchange for signing a contract with a given gauze maker, a GPO might get a percentage of whatever the company made selling gauze to members.) The idea was to help struggling hospitals by shifting the burden of funding GPOs’ operations to vendors. To prevent abuse, “fees” of more than 3 percent of sales were supposed to be reported to member hospitals and (upon request) the secretary of [HHS].

[This shift] turned the incentives for GPOs upside down. Instead of being tied to the dues paid by members, GPOs’ revenues were now tied to the profits of the suppliers they were supposed to be pressing for lower prices. This created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers. . . . Before long, large suppliers began using “fees”—sometimes very generous ones—along with tiered pricing to secure deals that locked GPO members into buying their products. . . .

This situation only grew thornier in 1996, when the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission overhauled antitrust rules and granted the organizations protection from antitrust actions, except under “extraordinary circumstances.” . . . Within a few years, five GPOs controlled purchasing for 90 percent of the nation’s hospitals, which only amplified the clout of big suppliers.

There are a few lessons here. Within the confines of competition law, the message should be clear: Einer Elhauge was right to state in 2003 that “Serious antitrust concerns remain about exclusionary agreements that charge higher prices to GPOs or hospitals that won’t commit to limiting purchases from rivals of dominant manufacturers to a small (often 5-10%) percentage of their purchases.” The broader lesson is that intermediaries in many fields are often tempted to put their own profits ahead of the entities they’re ostensibly serving. In the endless battle for compensation between providers, hospitals, and insurers, there are many profitable opportunities to shift alliances. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs like Thomas Shaw, patients, and thousands of medical workers are enduring unsafe conditions that could easily be remedied.

Repealing Insurers’ Antitrust Exemption Under McCarran-Ferguson: Less There Than Meets the Eye?

Tim Greaney, Saint Louis University School of Law

The House Judiciary Committee’s vote (20-9) to send H.R. 3596 , to the floor has been heralded by proponents as providing a significant spur to competition in health insurance. Sorry to rain on this parade, but there is less here than meets the eye.

The bill  would repeal, but only in part,  the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s limited exemption from antitrust law for health and malpractice insurers. The bill narrows McCarran’s reach, providing that “nothing in that act shall be construed to permit  insurers “to engage in any form of price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations in connection with the conduct of the business of providing health insurance coverage or coverage for medical malpractice claims or actions.” A Senate bill with broader effect was the subject of hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee last week.

Although, as I’ve argued elsewhere, competition in health insurance markets has been less than robust, the case law reveals only a handful of instances in which the exemption protected anti-competitive conduct in the health care sector. The most prominent example, Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), involved an HMO’s challenge to the exclusionary effect of the dominant insurer’s pricing policy and its offering a rival HMO product. Ironically, this conduct would not appear to be covered by H.R. 3596 and hence would remain immune from antitrust scrutiny.  In addition, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted McCarran-Ferguson requirement that only the “business of insurance” is exempt; hence insurers’ actions vis a vis providers is not exempt.  Moreover, it appears that health insurers do not engage in the kind of activities that are most clearly protected by McCarran-Ferguson, viz. joint forecasts of future medical costs and cooperative ratemaking.

Despite these reservations, repeal is not altogether a bad idea.  Most antitrust authorities agree McCarran-Ferguson is not needed to protect pro-competitive conduct, which already is well-insulated under modern antitrust doctrine.  For example, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (a blue ribbon –and very mainstream– panel that examined antitrust policy a few years ago) concluded that McCarran-Ferguson immunity was unnecessary to accomplish the Act’s goal of allowing insurers to collect, aggregate, and review data on losses so that they can better set their rates to cover their likely costs. Insurance companies, it found, “would bear no greater risk than companies in other industries engaged in data sharing and other collaborative undertakings.” When insurers engage in anti-competitive collusion “they appropriately [should] be subject to antitrust liability.” Moreover in insurance lines other than health, such as property/casualty, the exemption may protect collective price fixing with few offsetting benefits for consumers.

It is also noteworthy that the Department of Justice stopped short of endorsing repeal.

Assistant Attorney General Varney testified as follows:

In sum, the Department of Justice generally supports the idea of repealing antitrust exemptions. However, we take no position as to how and when Congress should address this issue. In conjunction with the Administration’s efforts to strengthen insurance regulation and states’ role in setting and enforcing policies, the Department supports efforts to bring more competition to the health insurance marketplace that lower costs, expand choice, and improve quality for families, businesses, and government.

This carefully-worded statement (”in conjunction with …efforts to strengthen insurance regulation and states role in setting and enforcing policies“) seems to signal that the Justice Department is worried about hamstringing state regulatory efforts by allowing parallel antitrust scrutiny of insurance industry practices.  But I would have expected the Antitrust Division to take precisely the opposite position.  Perhaps the strongest argument for repeal of McCarran-Ferguson (and also redefining the state action doctrine) is that a system that relies on extensive state-based insurance regulation (and perhaps state-run exchanges) risks undermining the consumer benefits of competition should regulators become beholden to insurer or provider interests. If history is a guide, this is a legitimate concern.

The Broken Health Care “Marketplace”

While Mitch McConnell goes on Meet the Press to praise free enterprise in American health care, he ignores the market concentration that gives us vastly more expensive care than comparable countries. As Blue Dogs and other Dems start to tap on the brakes of health reform efforts, they would do well to consider the work of Tim Greaney and David Balto. Both have recently delivered Congressional testimony that indicates just how far health care is from a well-functioning, competitive market.

Balto is hardly a leftist on antitrust matters; for example, he has aggressively defended some Google initiatives now under scrutiny by the DOJ. But even he is alarmed by the extraordinary trends toward concentration in health care:

Few markets are as concentrated, opaque and complex, and subject to rampant anticompetitive and deceptive conduct. As the health care debate progresses, many advocate for limited reform of the health insurance system. Their belief is that it is a fundamentally sound market and with a little dose of additional regulatory oversight, all the ills of the market will be cured. They could not be more mistaken.

As a former antitrust enforcement official, I strongly believe the mission of the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is vital to protecting consumers and competition. However, in the past administration, the priorities of those enforcement agencies were not effectively aligned with the critical priorities in the health care market, with the result that there is substantial anticompetitive and fraudulent activity that raises prices and costs for consumers and the American taxpayer, especially conduct by certain health care intermediaries—Health Insurers, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, or PBMs, and Group Purchasing Organizations, or GPOs.

The full testimony appears here. Balto argues that “the Bush administration did not bring a single case challenging anticompetitive conduct by insurance companies,” while it “spent a hugely disproportionate amount of time, money and effort prosecuting relatively small groups of doctors.” By the end of the testimony, it almost appears that Balto has made his case too well, given the limited resources of current antitrust enforcers. It is hard for me to imagine them investigating even a fraction of the schemes and situations he describes, though perhaps some high profile cases (and partnerships with state attorneys general) would have an in terrorem effect.

Tim Greaney’s testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee paints a similarly grim picture. Greaney notes that, “by 2003, ninety-three percent of the nation’s population lived in concentrated hospital markets.” He quickly identifies the core problem in an increasingly sickly health care antitrust jurisprudence: courts’ short-sighted failure to understand the unconventional economics of medicine:

Legal decisions approving mergers of competing acute care hospitals have been roundly criticized. The judicial missteps can be traced to the courts’ tendency to oversimplify antitrust analysis by adopting plain vanilla, Chicago School assumptions about markets while failing to incorporate the effects of market imperfections in their analyses. Most of these decisions found extraordinarily large geographic markets for basic acute care hospital services as they ignored the heterogeneity of demand for care and the fact that consumers exhibit different preferences for [and ability to] travel.

Other cases refused to recognize supply side heterogeneity, failing to appreciate that mergers of “must have” hospitals may give rise to anticompetitive effects. To right the ship, the FTC has brought two recent hospital merger cases and undertaken retrospective reviews of the outcomes of several hospital mergers. Unfortunately, developing legal precedent takes time and effort and mergers may be attractive to the hospital industry during a period of legal uncertainty and regulatory change. An important priority for the FTC therefore should be to undertake close scrutiny of all horizontal consolidations by hospitals– including joint ventures involving physician-controlled specialty hospitals and outpatient facilities, none of which have been challenged to date.

Greaney also notes substantial failures in antitrust enforcement against physicians, health insurers, and PBM’s.

While Balto and Greaney focus on improving competition policy, I’m left wondering: can this market be saved? Greaney argues that “the nation’s competitive infrastructure — provider and payor markets — is not well designed to produce cost savings if reform proposals simply turn over the job to the private market. . . . [and] this quandary lends strong support to the idea of having a public plan option to nudge private insurers toward more vigorous competition and to serve as a backstop where markets fail.” A highly concentrated health care marketplace has neither the means nor the motive to discipline costs–external competition has to prod it in that direction. Well-designed health insurance exchanges will be key to success here.

Paying Attention to Competition: Payors, Providers and the Public Plan

Paying Attention to Competition: Payors, Providers and the Public Plan

Thomas (Tim) Greaney
Professor of Law and Director Center for Health Law Studies
Saint Louis University School of Law

Count me as a member of the Bill Sage School of Health Care Reform. Writing in Health Affairs, Professor Sage, a physician, law professor and Vice Provost for Health Affairs at the University of Texas, offered a slogan that should be on every Congressman’s wall: “It’s the delivery system, stupid.”

Somewhat overlooked in the debate over inclusion of a public plan option as part of the health reform legislation is the proposal’s potential to help deal with delivery system problems. There are a number of sound policy arguments favoring the public plan option. For example, it offers the promise of stability, choice, and innovation that may not be readily forthcoming in an unrestricted private market. Frank Pasquale and Ezra Klein have pointed to the “benchmark” function of such a plan, especially in exposing the various “gotcha” or “capricious” practices common in today’s less-than-transparent insurance business. But without cost control there is no reform at all. As the outline of legislation comes into focus it seems clear that in order to persuade law makers that costs will not continue to escalate, there needs to be some assurance that vigorous, efficient and competitive markets will emerge. Critical to achieving that goal are two things: putting in place a regulatory infrastructure to correct market failures and developing structurally competitive provider and insurance markets. As to the first issue, much depends on the scope of regulatory authority vested in insurance exchanges, for example, whether they will have the authority to set rules standards for health plans inside and outside the exchange. As to the structure of the market, there are reasons for serious concern. My view is that the public plan option can offer significant help in dealing with structural defects that have been a long time in the making.

If there is one thing that that finds almost universal agreement among health economists, it is that in America, health care “delivery” (we should abandon the misnomer ‘system’) is a fragmented hodgepodge of autonomous doctors, hospitals, facility owners, and vendors of technology, pharmaceuticals and equipment. Their lack of interconnectedness and coordination is at the core of most of the quality and cost problems Congress is now confronting. Add to that the fact that “consumer” decisions are filtered through a triple layer of agency (i.e. their employers, doctors, health plans). Moreover, as a result of lax antitrust enforcement and providers’ relentless efforts to gain “leverage”, many hospital and physician markets are now tight oligopolies or de facto monopolies. And one more: information on quality, outcomes and cost is scarce, and in some cases, unobtainable.

So its more than a little bit remarkable that conservative blogs and political operatives ignore the fundamental economic problems that reform must address: overcoming market failure and improving the competitive marketplace. Perhaps it is understandable. Their preferred solution, “consumer directed health care” which heroically assumes that individuals can and will effectively shop for low cost high quality care given the appropriate incentives (high deductible plans with health savings accounts), has been excoriated in the academic and policy literature. Looking at the uninsured market–the one place today where individuals shop on their own for insurance and services–Mark Hall and Carl Schneider put it well: “the market for uninsured medical services is a calamity.” Left to compare price, quality and outcomes under consumer directed model, Americans face overwhelming informational and practical hurdles. Uwe Reinhart’s colorful depiction of the defects inherent in consumers shopping for health services is apt :

Suppose, purchases of shirts by individuals were partly prepaid from collective funds assembled for large groups of shirt purchasers, although the individual buyer might also have to pay a part of the price. Suppose next that prospective buyers of shirts were led into a store stocked with boxes marked “Shirt.” The consumer would have free choice of boxes, although only the most vague idea of what actually was in each of the myriad of boxes. …Once a box with a shirt in it had been accepted by the consumer, he could not return it for a refund. A month or so after having received the box, the buyer would be sent a nearly indecipherable statement whose only comprehensible line is: Pay $56.95. It is only then that the buyer knows what the shirt has cost him or her. The shirt, by the way, may or may not fit.

But perhaps equally disconcerting is the apparent reluctance of Congressional reformers to tackle delivery reform head on. For better or worse, it appears likely that under reform legislation a reconstituted health insurance industry will do the heavy lifting of controlling cost and monitoring quality, tasks it has been disinclined to tackle in the past. The apparent logic is that by removing insurers’ perverse incentives to chase only good risks (healthy insureds) and create bureaucratic traps for providers and consumers, plans will have little choice but to do the right thing. This of course vests enormous faith in the regulatory mechanisms the new system will deploy: risk adjustment, community rating, the insurance exchange, standardized benefit packages, and so on.

Which brings us to the public plan option. Does it correct the myriad market failures and assure an efficient health delivery system emerges? Not by itself. However, if we are going to rely on the market interplay between insurers and providers in many hundreds of markets around the country (like politics, most health services and health insurance are local), then we need some assurance that each market will have vigorous intermediaries negotiating for consumers. Unfortunately, our experience with private health insurance over the last twenty years does not fill one with confidence that this kind of vigorous negotiation will emerge. First there is the behavior of insurers. As noted it has been more profitable to obtain good risks and in some case engage in questionable behavior (slow pay to providers; hassling their insureds, etc). The landscape of extraordinary health insurance profits, premiums increasing at rates far exceeding other sectors of the economy, and an inability or unwillingness to control health expenditures does not describe an industry which is benefiting consumers through vigorous competition.

But maybe that will change. The real question here is one of incentives. We’ve learned that most local insurance and provider markets are concentrated: dominant hospital systems of specialty services have formed single specialty groups. Economic studies reveal that increasing hospital concentration resulted in higher prices which in turn cause higher insurance premiums (and in fact increased disparities in access to care). Although research regarding insurance markets is less well developed, there is some evidence that insurance market concentration has resulted in higher premiums. Where dominant insurers face dominant providers–what economists call bilateral monopoly–the outcome depends on the strategic interactions of the parties. In the case of the now notorious “market covenant” involving Partners Health Care and Blue Cross of Massachusetts, the parties reached a mutually beneficial understanding to maintain hight premiums and high hospital charges.

In oligopolistic markets (only a few sellers) the dynamic in the health insurance industry suggest behavior consistent with self interested coordination rather than aggressive competition and price rivalry. Urban Institute economists John Holohan and Linda Blumberg summarized these propensities :

Dominant insurers do not seem to use their market power to drive hard bargains with
providers, [while]small insurers do not aggressively compete over price. Rather, rising
premiums and increased profitability of nondominant firms13 provide indirect evidence
of shadow pricing by smaller insurers; that is, smaller insurers do not seem to compete on
premiums to gain market share but rather seem to follow the pricing of the dominant insurer.

What might a public plan add to the mix? First, it will likely enjoy cost advantages associated with the infrastructure and experience of federal payment under the Medicare program. This can spur its rivals to emulate its methods and, well, just try harder (an old adage is that a benefit of monopoly is leading the “quiet life”). However, the principle competitive significance of the public plan may well lie in its independence. Although such plans will almost certainly be required to “float on their own bottom” (i.e. not receive federal subsidies), they should also be allowed to chart a course that does not necessarily maximize revenue as rivals do that engage in anticompetitive practices or collusive coordination. In this respect, the public plan should act as what economic theory calls the “maverick” competitor: one that breaks away from the closely-knit band of rivals. A second benefit might accrue from the public plan’s willingness to sponsor innovations in payment and delivery (such as those being developed by CMS for Medicare). In health insurance some cost control innovations are not routinely developed where reluctant to adopt because they cannot capture the long term benefits of efficient innovations. In short, the expectation is that the public plan will have the incentive and the market leverage to insist that providers change their ways.

There is no quick and easy way to change health care delivery arrangements that are deeply embedded in institutions and habits. The radical course, I would think, would be to subsidize a vast expansion of health insurance without putting in place institutions capable of improving a badly broken system.

Health Insurance, Competition & the McCarran-Ferguson Act

A post by Jordan Cohen on June 17 raised a very important point:  “what [do] we currently know about the role of competition in the health insurance market [?]” As Mr. Cohen makes the connection between cost and competition and another relating to slowing the rate of growth of health care expenses generally, his caveat raises an important concern that the information supporting conclusions in this regard may be less than optimum. One factor to consider is that competition, or the lack thereof, in the insurance industry is subject to the distortions of a wide, if not dizzying, array of often conflicting state regulation.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act (”the Act”) exempts the “business of insurance” from federal antitrust law. Which is to say that federal antitrust law applies only to the extent that “the business of insurance” is not regulated by state law.  The Act goes so far as to permit price fixing — joint ratemaking — if permissible under state law.  Hovenkamp Antitrust Hornbook, at 732.  In one case, Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 724 F.2d 419 (4^th Cir. 1984) (Superseded by Regulation as Stated in Home Quest Mort. LLC V. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp.2d 1177 (D.Kan. Oct. 12 2004), the Act even protected the practice of redlining on the reasoning that it “related to the particular types of risks [the] company [was] willing to insure against.”  State of Maryland v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assn., 620 F. Supp. 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (referring to Mackey).

While the lack of competition in the health insurance industry may well have other causes, which may or may not be cured through a public plan, the Act, with its exemption from federal antitrust law has not helped.  Private competition may have more to offer than currently realized in the McCarran-Ferguson environment.  Repealing the Act coupled with increased antitrust enforcement would seem a relatively affordable first step if competition, with the ultimate goal of benefiting the consumers/patients, is the goal.

I believe the repeal of McCarran-Ferguson will happen and that  Professor Greaney is correct that increased antitrust enforcement and better antitrust laws in the health care industry generally should be forthcoming– but I am somewhat more optimistic than he that this will happen sooner rather than later. While in the Senate, then Senator Obama “introduced legislation to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act for medical malpractice insurance.”  Furthermore, his picks of Christine Varney as assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division and Jonathan Leibowitz as chairman of the FTC are said to have members of the insurance industry concerned about greater antitrust enforcement as well as the elimination of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption. I would suggest that AIG’s self-destruction at taxpayer expense does not bode well for the Act either.

Greaney on the Public Plan

Is genuine health reform possible? Several recent developments are promising. President Obama’s big Congressional majorities (plus the Specter defection) are reminiscent of the Johnson-era milieu that led to Medicare and Medicaid. Key interest groups are less “Harry and Louise” and more “try to appease.” Most importantly, the failures of managed care, consumer-directed health care, and other artifacts of the “ownership society” are now self-evident. As unemployment rises, lack of insurance spikes, compounding the misery of many of those unlucky enough to get thrown out of work.

What could derail real health reform? Most likely, fake health care reform, particularly the kind that assumes there is something near a “free market” in operation now. As health care antitrust scholar Thomas Greaney argued yesterday, markets for health care are often very concentrated or riddled with barriers to entry:

The unfortunate fact is that a majority of the country is served by a few dominant insurers. (In 16 states, one insurer accounts for more than 50 percent of private enrollment; in 36 states, three insurers have more than 65 percent of enrollment). Likewise, because of lax antitrust enforcement, most markets are characterized by dominant hospital systems and little competition among high-end physician specialists.

In these circumstances, which economists call ‘bilateral monopoly,” the players often reach an accommodation in which they share the monopoly profits rather than compete vigorously. A prime example is the experience in Massachusetts, where Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the dominant insurer, reached an understanding with the dominant hospital system, Partners Healthcare, that entrenched higher prices for health insurance and hospital care.

Some might hold out hope that the Obama administration’s new emphasis on antitrust enforcement might solve that problem, but I would not hold my breath. After losing seven hospital merger cases in a row, the government is not exactly in a position to go storming into health care markets to demand competition. Only new antitrust laws are likely to accomplish much in that direction, and even if they were by some miracle adopted this year, I can’t imagine them having much effect within any reasonable time frame.
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