New Rules for Insurance Appeals Under PPACA

On July 22, the Obama Administration released interim final rules that allow patient appeals of health insurance coverage decisions as required under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (”PPACA”) and Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (”Reconciliation Act”).  Published by the departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor, these rules create standards for the internal and external processes by which patients can appeal adverse benefits decisions.

Prior to these rules, coverage appeals were governed by contract and State law.  Forty-four States have created some form of external appeal process for insurance coverage decisions; however, their coverage is limited and the processes vary greatly.  Effective January 1, 2003, changes to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1976 (”ERISA”) regulations provided standards for internal appeals processes.  However, these standards only apply to employer-sponsored group health insurance.

As stated in the Obama Administration fact sheet entitled, “Appealing Health Plan Decisions,”

Today, if your health plan tells you it won’t cover a treatment your doctor recommends, or it refuses to pay the bill for your child’s last trip to the emergency room, you may not know where to turn. Most health plans have a process that lets you appeal the decision within the plan through an “internal appeal” — but depending on your State’s laws and your type of coverage, there’s no guarantee that the process will be swift and objective. Moreover, if you lose your internal appeal, you may not be able to ask for an “external appeal” to an independent reviewer.

Internal Appeals Process

Under the rules, new health plans beginning on or after Sept. 23, 2010, must have an internal appeals process for beneficiaries to challenge “adverse benefits decisions” — a “denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make a payment (in whole or in part) for a benefit.”  Such adverse benefits decisions may be based on individual eligibility, benefit coverage, limitations on otherwise covered benefits (such as preexisting condition exclusions, source-of-injury exclusions, and network exclusions), and a determination that a benefit is experimental or not medically necessary.

In addition, health plans must do the following:

• Notify a claimant of a benefit determination as soon as possible;
• Provide claimants, free of charge, with the evidence relied upon and the rationale for the decision;
• Avoid conflicts of interest by making decisions regarding hiring, compensation, termination, and promotion independent of a claims adjustor or medical experts record of denial of benefits; and
• Meet additional requirements for notice, including information on internal appeals and external review processes.

However, these requirements do not pertain to so-called “grandfathered health plans” — those health plans that were in existence before March 23, 2010 when PPACA was enacted.  In the individual market, health insurance providers must meet the foregoing requirements as well as the following three:

• Applicants for individual insurance must be allowed to appeal initial eligibility determinations;
• Internal review must be limited to a single level, allowing claimants to appeal to external or judicial review immediately; and
• Insurers must maintain all claims and notices for a minimum of six years, which is already required of employer-sponsored health plans under ERISA.

External Appeals Process

If the internal appeal is denied, patients may choose to have the claim reviewed by an independent reviewer.   According to Appealing Health Plan Decisions, States are encouraged to adopt the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) standards in “their external appeals laws to adopt these standards before July 1, 2011.”

The NAIC standards call for:

• External review of plan decisions to deny coverage for care based on medical necessity, appropriateness, health care setting, level of care, or effectiveness of a covered benefit.
• Clear information for consumers about their right to both internal and external appeals — both in the standard plan materials, and at the time the company denies a claim.
• Expedited access to external review in some cases — including emergency situations, or cases where their health plan did not follow the rules in the internal appeal.
• Health plans must pay the cost of the external appeal under State law, and States may not require consumers to pay more than a nominal fee.
• Review by an independent body assigned by the State. The State must also ensure that the reviewers meet certain standards, keep written records, and are not affected by conflicts of interest.
• Emergency processes for urgent claims, and a process for experimental or investigational treatment.
• Final decisions must be binding so, if the consumer wins, the health plan is expected to pay for the benefit that was previously denied.

If State laws don’t meet these standards, consumers in those States will be protected by comparable Federal external appeals standards.

As Kaiser Health News reported, “This is a regulation that benefits everyone — consumers get protections, business and providers get more certainty in the rules and the need for litigation to settle these issues should be dramatically minimized,” Phyllis Borzi, assistant secretary of the Department of Labor, said at a briefing for reporters Thursday.

Consumer Assistance Grants

However, procedural rights for consumers are not sufficient to ensure proper appeals.  “Not enough consumers know this is an option that they have,” said Angel Robinson, the consumer advocate in the Iowa Insurance Division, according to Kaiser Health News.

In addition to the new requirements for internal and external appeals processes under the interim final rules, the federal government is offering nearly $30 million in resources to States and Territories to strengthen and establish consumer assistance programs.  Specifically, these programs are charged with:

• Helping consumers enroll in health coverage;
• Helping consumers file complaints and appeals against health plans;
• Educating consumers about their rights and empowering them to take action; and
• Tracking consumer complaints to help identify problems and strengthen enforcement.

Image Credit: Appeal to the Great Spirit, Cyrus Edwin Dallin (1909) Photo by Toni To via Flickr

Jost on Cooperatives: “Are Cooperatives a Reasonable Alternative to a Public Plan?”

[Ed. Note: Considering recent speculation that the Public Option may be "dropped" in favor of adoption of Health Care Cooperatives, this post by Timothy S. Jost which was originally posted to Health Reform Watch on June 15 , along with yesterday's re-post from Tim Greaney, should go some way towards answering some questions about Health Care Co-ops. As the clamor rises to understand the nature and implications of Health Care Cooperatives, this post from Professor Jost has been linked everywhere from NPR's Planet Money to  The Democratic Underground, the Patriot Room and all points in between. The point taken by most is that we've tried Health Care Co-ops before, and, for the most part, they've failed. For those of you who've missed the article, it is re-posted below as originally posted by Editor-in-Chief, Professor Frank Pasquale. You can access Professor Jost's bio by clicking here.]

In the last post, I introduced Timothy S. Jost and his case for a public insurance plan option. Jost has also recently addressed the new “middle ground” between a public option and the status quo: cooperatives. I’m honored to print his analysis below on our blog.

Are Cooperatives a Reasonable Alternative to a Public Plan?
by Timothy S. Jost

First, a word about history. We have tried cooperatives before. During the 1930s and 1940s, the heyday of the cooperative movement in the United States, the Farm Security Administration encouraged the development of health cooperatives. At one point, 600,000 mainly low-income rural Americans belonged to health cooperatives. The movement failed. The cooperatives were small and undercapitalized. Physicians opposed the cooperative movement and boycotted cooperatives. When the FSA removed support in 1947, the movement collapsed. Only the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound survived. Over time, moreover, even Group Health, though nominally a cooperative, has become indistinguishable from commercial insurers-it underwrites based on health status, pays high executive salaries, and accumulates large surpluses rather than lower its rates.

The Blue Cross/Blue Shield movement, which also began in the 1930s, shared some of the characteristics of cooperatives. Although the Blue Cross plans were initiated and long-dominated by the hospitals and the Blue Shield plans by physicians, they did have a goal of community service. The plans were established under special state legislation independent from commercial plans. They were non-profit and, in many states, exempt from premium taxes. They were exempt from reserve requirements in some states because they were service-benefit rather than indemnity plans and because the hospitals and physicians stood behind the plans. They were exempt from federal income tax until the 1980s. In turn, they initially offered community-rated plans and offered services to the community, such as health fairs. In some states their premiums were regulated and they were generally regarded as the insurer of last resort for the individual market.

Over time, however, the Blues lost their focus on community service and began to look more and more like their competitors. They abandoned community rating (which, realistically, they could not maintain when faced with competition from experience-rated commercial plans) and began to impose underwriting and cost-sharing requirements indistinguishable from the private plans. Although providers lost control of the Blue plans, the plans never took a leadership role in bargaining aggressively with providers, despite their market dominance in many states. Many of the largest Blue plans became for-profit, and those that remain non-profit are largely indistinguishable from commercial insurers. Although the national Blue Cross/Blue Shield association offers some coordination services to local plans, it has not resisted the move of Blue plans away from a community-service toward a for-profit orientation. Lacking a national focus on public service, state and regional plans have become indistinguishable from their commercial competitors.

Blue plans are not the only non-profit insurers that survive. Many church and fraternal organizations have their own non-profit plans. Although these plans often try to serve their communities, they usually have a small presence and little bargaining power in most communities in which they operate; tend to insure individuals and small groups, the most costly market; are often the victims of adverse selection; usually underwrite much like commercial plans; and tend to offer low value, high cost-sharing policies. They are not a model on which to build national reform. Mutual insurers are also in theory owned by their members. They also, however, are indistinguishable from for-profit insurers in most states.

What can we learn from this history? First, health care cooperatives are, in fact, an American response to health care reform. Cooperatives and non-profit insurers were there before for-profit commercial insurers entered the health insurance business, and we could try to revive the idea again.

But why would state or locally-run cooperatives be any more successful now than they were when we tried them before?

First, it is hard to imagine how they would get underway. Capitalization and critical size were problems before and would likely be problems again. Senator Conrad’s recent draft suggests that members of the coops would elect their boards, and that the coops would then obtain state licensure as mutual insurers, meeting state standards for solvency and reinsurance (with the help of federal seed money). But there is a chicken and egg problem here. Until the coops had members they could not have a board. Until they had a board, how would they meet licensure requirements? The state coops, moreover, would, under Conrad’s proposal be supervised by a national board, but the national board would be elected by the state coops. Again, the state coops would presumably not be able to get underway until the national board provided policy guidance, but the national board could not get underway until the state coops were formed to elect it. None of this makes sense.

Second, there is every reason to believe that small, state run coops would fail like their predecessors did in the 1930s and 1940s. Unless they reached the critical mass necessary to bargain effectively with providers, to accumulate reserves, and to compete with national private insurance plans, they would be doomed to failure. Even if they managed to succeed here and there, they would contribute nothing to a national effort to control costs, drive value, and make affordable care accessible.

Third, if state-run coops in fact, against all odds, became large, successful competitors for insurance business, what would keep them from following the course of the Blue and mutual plans before them? Without strong Congressional direction and a unifying national leadership, what could keep them focused on cost control, quality improvement, transparency, and service rather than simply becoming indistinguishable from their commercial competitors? How would they drive the delivery system change we need?

Fourth, how does setting up cooperatives on a state-by-state basis drive national health care reform? Each state currently can set up cooperatives if it wishes to, but none have done so. Why would states suddenly embrace this concept? And what assurance do we have that they would pursue anything like a common strategy? To approach this issue on a state-by-state basis is simply to surrender on national health care reform. A federal fallback plan to be implemented in the future is also unlikely to work. HIPAA contained a federal fallback plan for states that failed to implement reforms in the individual market, but it was poorly implemented and eventually abandoned. To revert to a state-by-state approach is to surrender on national health care reform.

What Would Make the Cooperative Concept Work?

In fact the cooperative idea in itself is promising. The proposed cooperatives look much like the social insurance funds of Germany and of other central European states. Those funds are governed by their members and do a comparatively good job of keeping health care costs in check. But they operate in a strong framework of national laws and under the guidance of national leadership.

The only viable strategy is Senator Conrad’s Option 2–a federal charter to license and regulate a national non-profit coop, with coop governance prescribed by Congress. Leadership could initially be appointed as directed by Congress to represent consumer, labor, and small business interests, and thereafter be elected by the membership. The federal government could provide seed funding to assure initial solvency, but thereafter the coop could be self-supporting. It would be financed through premiums, and compete on a level playing field with private insurers (although some account would have to be taken of the fact that private insurers, no matter what underwriting rules were imposed, would still dump high-risk insureds into the coop). Some administrative functions could be delegated to the regional level, much as Medicare Advantage or drug plans are administered at the regional level. Regional councils could also be elected by members, who could have a role in selecting the national board and an influence on national policy.

A national cooperative could perhaps compete effectively with national private insurers. It could perhaps bargain effectively with providers, including global pharmaceutical firms and national hospital chains. It is possible that it could drive creative national quality initiatives and provide national data on health care use. It would not be government-run insurance, the great fear of the American right. But it could perhaps provide a national solution for a national problem. It will not happen on its own, however. It will only work with concerted and probably long-lasting support from the federal government.

Dead Center

A lot of attention has focused on attempts by health reform proponents to woo what the press insists on calling “moderate” or “centrist” members of Congress.

But what constitutes a centrist position on health reform issues?

Apparently, opposing fair taxation, consumer protection laws, and regulation to make the health care market more competitive gets you branded a moderate these days. And despite their yelping about fiscal responsibility, neither the Blue Dogs (who seem to have ignored the real benefits of the Obama plan to working folks in their rural districts) or the “gang of six” on the Senate Finance Committee (who collectively represent 2.75 percent of the nation’s population) appear ready to vest real power in the government to reign in Medicare spending but at the same time are demanding more subsidies for providers in their communities.

So to get beyond misleading labels and see where they really stand on core issues, here’s a quick quiz that the press might pose to the putative centrists.

• Do you believe that the health reform initiatives should be funded by a progressive tax? If yes, do you regard a tax placed exclusively on families earning more than $350,000 as progressive? Does taxing health insurance premiums advance the goal of fairness?

• Do you believe that competition among insurers in the private market will control cost and reduce waste? If yes, why have insurers not succeeded over the last thirty years. If no, how would you improve their performance?

• Arguing against a public plan on the Senate floor, Senator Kyle recently offered the following pronouncement “The health insurance industry is one of the most regulated industries in America. They don’t need to be ‘kept honest’ by the government.”
Do you feel that the current regime of regulation of insurance companies provides Americans with adequate competition and consumer protection? Does the ERISA law help or hinder effective regulation?

• Will health insurance cooperatives–your alternative to the public plan–spring up in every market in the country? If not, what will insure competition works well in those markets without cooperatives?

• Is the current system of fee for service payments for doctors under Medicare efficient? Do you agree that payment systems that encourage continuity of care, rewards quality and elimination of waste would save money and produce better outcomes? Are regulations that move Medicare in that direction a move toward “socialized medicine”?

• What is the cost of “affordable health insurance” for a family of four earning $50,000 per year? Will the reduced subsidies under your plan enable them to buy insurance without sacrificing education, housing and other necessities?

Jost on Cooperatives

In the last post, I introduced Timothy S. Jost and his case for a public insurance plan option. Jost has also recently addressed the new “middle ground” between a public option and the status quo: cooperatives. I’m honored to print his analysis below on our blog.

Are Cooperatives a Reasonable Alternative to a Public Plan?
by Timothy S. Jost

First, a word about history. We have tried cooperatives before. During the 1930s and 1940s, the heyday of the cooperative movement in the United States, the Farm Security Administration encouraged the development of health cooperatives. At one point, 600,000 mainly low-income rural Americans belonged to health cooperatives. The movement failed. The cooperatives were small and undercapitalized. Physicians opposed the cooperative movement and boycotted cooperatives. When the FSA removed support in 1947, the movement collapsed. Only the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound survived. Over time, moreover, even Group Health, though nominally a cooperative, has become indistinguishable from commercial insurers–it underwrites based on health status, pays high executive salaries, and accumulates large surpluses rather than lower its rates.

The Blue Cross/Blue Shield movement, which also began in the 1930s, shared some of the characteristics of cooperatives. Although the Blue Cross plans were initiated and long-dominated by the hospitals and the Blue Shield plans by physicians, they did have a goal of community service. The plans were established under special state legislation independent from commercial plans. They were non-profit and, in many states, exempt from premium taxes. They were exempt from reserve requirements in some states because they were service-benefit rather than indemnity plans and because the hospitals and physicians stood behind the plans. They were exempt from federal income tax until the 1980s. In turn, they initially offered community-rated plans and offered services to the community, such as health fairs. In some states their premiums were regulated and they were generally regarded as the insurer of last resort for the individual market.

Over time, however, the Blues lost their focus on community service and began to look more and more like their competitors. They abandoned community rating (which, realistically, they could not maintain when faced with competition from experience-rated commercial plans) and began to impose underwriting and cost-sharing requirements indistinguishable from the private plans. Although providers lost control of the Blue plans, the plans never took a leadership role in bargaining aggressively with providers, despite their market dominance in many states. Many of the largest Blue plans became for-profit, and those that remain non-profit are largely indistinguishable from commercial insurers. Although the national Blue Cross/Blue Shield association offers some coordination services to local plans, it has not resisted the move of Blue plans away from a community-service toward a for-profit orientation. Lacking a national focus on public service, state and regional plans have become indistinguishable from their commercial competitors.

Blue plans are not the only non-profit insurers that survive. Many church and fraternal organizations have their own non-profit plans. Although these plans often try to serve their communities, they usually have a small presence and little bargaining power in most communities in which they operate; tend to insure individuals and small groups, the most costly market; are often the victims of adverse selection; usually underwrite much like commercial plans; and tend to offer low value, high cost-sharing policies. They are not a model on which to build national reform. Mutual insurers are also in theory owned by their members. They also, however, are indistinguishable from for-profit insurers in most states.

What can we learn from this history? First, health care cooperatives are, in fact, an American response to health care reform. Cooperatives and non-profit insurers were there before for-profit commercial insurers entered the health insurance business, and we could try to revive the idea again.

But why would state or locally-run cooperatives be any more successful now than they were when we tried them before?

First, it is hard to imagine how they would get underway. Capitalization and critical size were problems before and would likely be problems again. Senator Conrad’s recent draft suggests that members of the coops would elect their boards, and that the coops would then obtain state licensure as mutual insurers, meeting state standards for solvency and reinsurance (with the help of federal seed money). But there is a chicken and egg problem here. Until the coops had members they could not have a board. Until they had a board, how would they meet licensure requirements? The state coops, moreover, would, under Conrad’s proposal be supervised by a national board, but the national board would be elected by the state coops. Again, the state coops would presumably not be able to get underway until the national board provided policy guidance, but the national board could not get underway until the state coops were formed to elect it. None of this makes sense.

Second, there is every reason to believe that small, state run coops would fail like their predecessors did in the 1930s and 1940s. Unless they reached the critical mass necessary to bargain effectively with providers, to accumulate reserves, and to compete with national private insurance plans, they would be doomed to failure. Even if they managed to succeed here and there, they would contribute nothing to a national effort to control costs, drive value, and make affordable care accessible.

Third, if state-run coops in fact, against all odds, became large, successful competitors for insurance business, what would keep them from following the course of the Blue and mutual plans before them? Without strong Congressional direction and a unifying national leadership, what could keep them focused on cost control, quality improvement, transparency, and service rather than simply becoming indistinguishable from their commercial competitors? How would they drive the delivery system change we need?

Fourth, how does setting up cooperatives on a state-by-state basis drive national health care reform? Each state currently can set up cooperatives if it wishes to, but none have done so. Why would states suddenly embrace this concept? And what assurance do we have that they would pursue anything like a common strategy? To approach this issue on a state-by-state basis is simply to surrender on national health care reform. A federal fallback plan to be implemented in the future is also unlikely to work. HIPAA contained a federal fallback plan for states that failed to implement reforms in the individual market, but it was poorly implemented and eventually abandoned. To revert to a state-by-state approach is to surrender on national health care reform.

What Would Make the Cooperative Concept Work?

In fact the cooperative idea in itself is promising. The proposed cooperatives look much like the social insurance funds of Germany and of other central European states. Those funds are governed by their members and do a comparatively good job of keeping health care costs in check. But they operate in a strong framework of national laws and under the guidance of national leadership.

The only viable strategy is Senator Conrad’s Option 2–-a federal charter to license and regulate a national non-profit coop, with coop governance prescribed by Congress. Leadership could initially be appointed as directed by Congress to represent consumer, labor, and small business interests, and thereafter be elected by the membership. The federal government could provide seed funding to assure initial solvency, but thereafter the coop could be self-supporting. It would be financed through premiums, and compete on a level playing field with private insurers (although some account would have to be taken of the fact that private insurers, no matter what underwriting rules were imposed, would still dump high-risk insureds into the coop). Some administrative functions could be delegated to the regional level, much as Medicare Advantage or drug plans are administered at the regional level. Regional councils could also be elected by members, who could have a role in selecting the national board and an influence on national policy.

A national cooperative could perhaps compete effectively with national private insurers. It could perhaps bargain effectively with providers, including global pharmaceutical firms and national hospital chains. It is possible that it could drive creative national quality initiatives and provide national data on health care use. It would not be government-run insurance, the great fear of the American right. But it could perhaps provide a national solution for a national problem. It will not happen on its own, however. It will only work with concerted and probably long-lasting support from the federal government.

Jost on the Public Plan

Timothy S. Jost is one of the leading figures of the American health law academy. He has unparalleled knowledge of comparative health law, which he’s applied to the American debate in an impressive series of articles and books.

When I heard that Jost was writing on current debates, I really wanted his insights on our blog. Here is the first part of an essay he wrote making a case for a public option, which 83% of Americans support.

Why Public Plan Choice?
by Timothy Stoltzfus Jost

One of the most significant and innovative proposals of the 2009 health-reform debate has been the concept of public plan choice. Although the exact features of a public plan have not been specified, the public plan concept offers several significant benefits:

Cost control. Health reform cannot happen unless we can control the continual upwards spiral of health care costs. The public plan would control costs in three ways. First, it would be able to keep its costs down by not having to make a profit and by avoiding many of the administrative costs incurred by private insurers. Second, it would introduce competition into the health insurance industry. Although there may be, as Karl Rove asserted yesterday, 1300 health insurers in the United States, health insurance markets are segmented into the large group, small group, and nongroup markets and within each of those categories competition is exceedingly local. In 36 states, 65% of the small group market is controlled by 3 insurers; in 16 states one insurer controls half of the market. In any one locality, moreover, the market is even more concentrated. In my home town of Harrisonburg, Va., one insurer controls 86% of the market.

Private insurers simply do not compete; they simply take prices from providers and pass them on to consumers, driving the health care price spiral. A national public plan would introduce vigorous competition into every part of the country, forcing private insurers to compete for business and to bring down their premiums. Third, a national public plan would also have the bargaining clout to make providers moderate the increase in their prices, bringing down the cost of health care itself.

Choice. Right now the only choice available to most Americans is private insurance and, in many markets, small businesses have only a choice of one or two insurers. Americans want to have alternatives to choose among to best meet their needs. A public plan offers this.

Delivery System Reform. A national public plan could drive delivery system reform and improve the quality of care, as Medicare has been doing through its demonstration projects, payment reforms, and consumer information initiatives.

Transparency and Accountability. One of the most important developments in the health care reform debate over the past decade has been the data that has emerged from the Dartmouth research group on variations in health care spending. This data, discussed by Atul Gawande in his widely noted recent article on health care costs and the President in his speech at Green Bay, could only be collected because Medicare data are available to researchers. No comparable research can be done on the under 65 population because private insurers regard whatever data they have to be proprietary. Private insurers are also much more secretive about their coverage and utilization review policies. A public plan could make anonymized data available to researchers and be open with its subscribers about coverage and utilization policies.

A National Strategy. We have waited for decades for the states to make affordable health care available to Americans. A few have tried, most have failed. None have developed an effective alternative to private insurance. All Americans are experiencing the same problems with health care–lack of access, high costs, and uneven quality. We need a national strategy for health care reform that will help all Americans, not just some. We also need a national public plan that offers uniform benefits to all Americans and national bargaining power.