Third Circuit Recognizes Federal Civil Rights Action for Death Caused by Substandard Nursing Home Care

Viejos Comiendo Sopa, Francisco de Goya, 1819-1823

[Ed. note: Today's post comes from Danielle Y. Alvarez. She is a Seton Hall Law student and a graduate of NYU, where she majored in Political Science. Ms. Alvarez is a research assistant to Dean Kathleen M. Boozang, and a former legal assistant to the Augulius Law firm.]

State and federal legislatures won’t fix the health care system by themselves, which is why a recent Third Circuit decision is a welcome tool to fight substandard long-term residential care.  A few enforcement officials have been aggressively creative in using false claims act theories to pursue providers of substandard health care (See here and here).  In short, the government claims that the submission of a bill to Medicare for services that were so bad they were the equivalent of no care at all is a false claim for which the government should be reimbursed and recover penalties.  And now the Third Circuit has recognized that the provision of such substandard care violates an individual’s civil rights.

In Grammer v. Kane, a nursing home resident’s child sued the nursing home, operated by Allegheny County in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, alleging the home’s failure to provide adequate care caused her mother to develop ulcers, become malnourished and develop sepsis, from which she died. Plaintiff invoked  42 U.S.C. §1983 to argue that the nursing home had violated decedent’s civil rights by breaching a duty to provide the standards of care delineated by the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments (FNRA), contained in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA). The district court granted the nursing home’s  motion to dismiss, finding that FNRA merely sets forth requirements for nursing homes to comply with but does not grant the deceased rights that are enforceable under §1983. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that FNRA grants Medicaid recipients like the deceased rights whose violation can be remedied under §1983.

Congress passed FNRA in 1987 to address the substandard conditions in nursing homes that participated in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. FNRA sets forth various quality and residents’ rights standards to which the nursing homes must adhere in order to be paid by the federal government.  And yet, as everyone knows, the problems persist. And so it should be a welcome outcome that the Third Circuit held that FNRA unambiguously confers federal rights upon Medicaid recipients in nursing homes, which gives rise to an action under §1983 which imposes liability on every person who, under color of state law, deprives another of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2009).

To determine that FNRA affords protection under §1983, the court applied a three factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in Blessing: first, the court determined that Congress intended FNRA to protect personal rights of Medicaid beneficiaries and nursing home residents rather than the nursing homes themselves; second, the court found that the rights asserted are not so “vague or amorphous” that their enforcement would strain judicial resources; third, the court concluded that the statutory language is sufficiently mandatory in nature with its repeated use of “must” such as “a nursing facility must provide services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental and psychosocial well-being of each resident.” See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); 42 U.S.C. §1396r(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court found Congressional intent to create a right of action through rights-creating language, legislative history, statutory structure and Congress’ failure to set forth a more comprehensive remedial scheme. Thus, the Third Circuit recognized individual rights conferred by FNRA that are presumably enforceable under §1983.

District Judge Stafford, sitting by designation, wrote a dissenting opinion finding that FNRA is Spending Clause legislation which does not confer upon funding beneficiaries individual rights to sue funding recipients. The dissent highlighted specific statutory language to conclude that FNRA focuses on what nursing homes must do in order to receive federal funds rather than focusing on the individuals who benefit from the federal funds. Absent unambiguous Congressional intent to the contrary, FNRA does not grant nursing home residents individual rights to sue nursing homes under §1983 for alleged violations of FNRA. As such, the dissent argued that the District Court properly granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss.