FDA Recalls and Selective Analysis

Researchers at the National Research Center for Women & Families and the Cleveland Clinic published a controversial report in the Archives of Internal Medicine in February.   The research team, led by Diana Zuckerman, analyzed high-risk medical device recalls from 2005 to 2009.  The report concludes that “reform of the [510(k)] regulatory process is needed to ensure the safety of medical devices.”

510(k) Process: Cause for Concern?

Zuckerman’s team determined that of the 113 recalls from 2005 through 2009, eighty (71%) medical devices — or the vast majority of those recalled — passed through the 510(k) process.  Twenty-one (19%) medical devices had passed through the more rigorous premarket approval process and eight (7%) were exempted from review.

Consumer advocates and the study authors argue that the disproportionate number of medical devices recalled after being reviewed under the 510(k) process demonstrates the need to reform the review process.   But do these statistics demonstrate a flaw in the 510(k) process?

Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), an industry lobbying group says no.  It calls the study flawed.  Why?  The vast majority of devices (~90%) are cleared through the 510(k) process.   Therefore, it would be expected that more recalls are for 510(k) cleared devices.  A 2010 AdvaMed report, analyzed the recall rates for the PMA approval and 510(k) clearance processes.  The report demonstrated that the overall recall rate was very low for both — less than 1% and that PMA approved devices were more likely to be recalled.

In fact, during the Zuckerman study period, 19,000 devices were cleared through the 510(k) process, making the overall recall rate for 510(k) cleared devices approximately 0.4%.

When NPR asked Zuckerman to compare her study with the AdvaMed study, she agreed that most devices had not been recalled. “But I’m taking the public health perspective. How many people have been harmed by these products? We know that 112.6 million devices have been recalled in the last five years. That’s a lot of products. We know thousands of people have died. And those are deaths that did not have to happen.”

But what about all the lives saved?  Mark Adelman, MD, of the NYU Langone Medical Center in New York City, counters, “While some lives have been lost by expedited approval, many lives have been saved by getting better devices to market quickly. How many lives have been saved by the 510(k) fast track?”  Public health advocates, like Zuckerman, would offer a more complete analysis if they took account of both the risks and the benefits in their evaluation of the FDA approval processes.

Misclassification and Proper Review Path?

What if the processes are adequate, but some devices get thrown in the wrong review bucket?  Physicians Rita Redberg and Sanket Dhruva of USC San Francisco wrote in the invited commentary that “Zuckerman and colleagues demonstrate the dangers to patient safety posed by these innumerable device misclassifications.”  The Zuckerman report focused on “high-risk” recalls, or “those that could cause serious health problems or death.”

The report states that “[o]f the recalled devices cleared for market through the 510(k) process, 12% were marketed for risky or life sustaining Class III indications, which are required by law to undergo a full PMA regulatory review.”  In an email to MedPage Today, study author Steven Nissen, MD, of the Cleveland Clinic, elaborated:

There should be NO recalls for ’serious injuries or death’ amongst 510(k) approved devices. The FDA is supposed to require a PMA for Class III devices, those used to sustain life or preserve health. If a PMA is required for devices used to support or sustain life, why were so many of the devices recalled for ’serious injury or death’ originally approved using 510(k)?

Unfortunately, Nissen conflates risk of injury with the life-sustaining capacity of the device.  Although the failure of a Class III device will more likely result in serious injury or death, medical devices in all three Classes may cause serious injury or death if improperly designed or manufactured.  But maybe there is something to this.

Strengthening 510(k) process

What about the steps the FDA has already taken to improve the process?  In late 2009, the FDA began a review of its 510(k) process.  Last August, 55 recommendations were issued by two working groups.  In January, the FDA announced the adoption of 25 changes to the 410(k) process to take place this year.

According to Dr. Jerry Avorn, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School in Boston, “The current FDA leadership has been trying to improve the carefulness of device review, and that is very good for patients. But those attempts have been met by self-serving complaints from the device industry that better review and surveillance will somehow stifle innovation, which is not the case.”  Avorn suggests that both industry innovation and consumer safety can be achieved.

Meanwhile, the Institute of Medicine is working on a comprehensive report, commissioned by the FDA, on what’s wrong with medical device regulation. That’s due later this year.

Left to Our Own Devices?

Lucia Burgos sued Satiety, Inc. after an experimental stomach stapling device perforated her esophagus.  Her first complaint was dismissed on preemption grounds, but she was given permission to “replead her claims as state-law parallel claims.”  So called “state-law parallel claims” are state law tort claims where the duty that the defendant manufacturer is alleged to have violated stems from the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act or its implementing regulations.  Such claims are not preempted because they do not impose additional duties on defendants, beyond those imposed by Congress and the Food & Drug Administration.

Ms. Burgos amended her complaint to state two new claims, including a state law negligence cause of action founded on Satiety’s alleged failure to manufacture the device in conformance with the requirements of its investigational device exemption (IDE).  Ms. Burgos believes that it was the device (as opposed to human error) that caused her injury because of an incident report filed by her treatment team, but, because the documentation supporting the FDA’s grant of an IDE is confidential, her complaint does not specify how the device deviated from the IDE.  On April 5, 2011, Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York held that Ms. Burgos had stated a claim for negligence and that, despite the lack of specifics, her suit could proceed “to a brief and strictly-cabined period of discovery in order to determine the terms of Satiety’s IDE, and to explore whether or not the specific device used in her procedure was manufactured in accordance with the IDE.”

The Burgos case is of interest to civil procedure buffs because of what the BNA Medical Research Law & Policy Report characterized as Judge Gleeson’s “liberal approach” to the pleading of parallel claims, but it is important to the rest of us, too, because of what it tells us about the state of the products liability backstop to FDA’s oversight of medical devices.  In the words of Ms. Burgos’ attorney, there is only a “narrow window” for parallel claims.

The limited recourse that those injured by medical devices have in court makes the FDA’s pre-market clearance and approval processes and its post-market surveillance and recall oversight efforts that much more important.  Testimony given earlier this month by Marcia Crosse, Health Care Director at the Government Accountability Office, before the Senate’s Special Committee on Aging suggests that there is cause for concern.  As Ms. Crosse explained, in January 2009 the GAO issued a report in which it “found that a significant number of high-risk devices-including device types that FDA has identified as implantable; life sustaining; or posing a significant risk to the health, safety, or welfare of a patient-were cleared for the U.S. market through FDA’s less stringent 510(k) review process.”  Section 510(k) of the FD&C Act allows for streamlined review and clearance of devices that are shown to be substantially equivalent to devices already on the market.  Data from clinical trials is typically not required to make this showing.

The FDA agreed with the GAO’s 2009 recommendations.  If the devices at issue did not actually belong in the highest-risk class, Class III, they should be re-classified.  On the other hand, if they did belong in Class III, they should be subject to the more stringent premarket approval process, which typically requires clinical data in support of an agency determination that a device is safe and effective for its intended use.  In her testimony, Ms. Crosse noted that, to date, the FDA has issued a final rule reclassifying one device — a blood test for herpes — from Class III to Class II.  Rules regarding the classification of another five devices are pending.  “There are still 26 types of high-risk devices, including, for example, automated external defibrillators and implantable hip joints, that can enter the market via 510(k).”  Moreover, since January 2009, “FDA cleared at least 67 individual submissions that fall within 12 of these class III device types through the 510(k) process.”

While the GAO has not completed its review of the FDA’s post-market activities, Ms. Crosse testified that their “preliminary findings suggest that shortcomings in FDA’s oversight of the medical device recall process may limit the agency’s ability to ensure that the highest-risk recalls are being implemented in an effective and timely manner. These shortcomings span the entire range of the agency’s oversight activities-from the lack of a broad-based program to systematically assess trends in recalls, to inconsistencies in the way FDA ensures the effective completion of individual recalls.”

Do I Need 9 Lives Just to Get a Cat Scan?

Tonight’s post will be relatively brief, as I wish only to call attention to another post and a particularly disturbing number contained therein. The post was published over at The Health Care Blog by Robert Wachter, MD, a leading figure in the modern patient safety movement. It is entitled “A Game-Changing Statistic: 1 in 250.” It is. Or at least it should be. You should take a minute or two to read it– it’s provoking, and not in a good way.

The 1 in 250 refers to the odds of getting cancer from a single CT scan.

Wachter writes:

Last month, my colleague Rebecca Smith-Bindman, professor of radiology, epidemiology, and ob/gyn at UCSF and one of the nation’s experts in the risks of radiographs, gave Medical Grand Rounds at UCSF. Her talk was brimming with amazing statistics, but this is the one that took my breath away:

A 20-year old woman who gets an abdominal-pelvic CT scan (i.e., just about any young woman coming to the ED with belly pain) has a 1 in 250 chance of getting cancer from that single scan.

Did that fully register? One CAT scan, which until recently most of us ordered with no more restraint than we exhibit when asking the Starbucks barista for a tall latte, will cause cancer in one out of every 250 patients. Two-hundred fifty: that’s the number of students in my college Bio 101 class. Wow.

Wachter adds fuel to that disturbing fire and reports that his above mentioned colleague found both increased radiation dosage (66% greater than that which is the usually quoted dose) and wide variation in dosage among different scanners in 4 Bay area hospitals.

If the variation and increased dosage isn’t scary enough, perhaps this nugget from Wachter regarding the usual dose is:

• A multiphase abdominal/pelvic CT scan has the same radiation wallop as 500 transcontinental flights, 450 chest radiographs, and 74 mammograms.

The effects? Well, there’s the 1 in 250 number, but Wachter is kind enough to give us an aggregate estimate:

• The best estimates are that radiation from CT scans causes 29,000 excess cancers each year in the U.S., mostly in women.
• Researchers estimate that 15,000 people will die from the direct effects of the 72 million CT scans performed in 2007 alone.

And if that weren’t enough, it seems the death and danger are accompanied by widespread ignorance–

• A 2004 study found that less than 50 percent of radiologists, and 9 percent of ER docs, were aware that CT scans could increase the subsequent risk of cancer.

Unfortunately, quite a few CT scans are done each year. And the number has risen dramatically over the last few decades–a more cynical man (or perhaps just a man who has read Atul Gawande and Adam Smith) might think the increase in usage might bear some relationship to the high cost of purchase for a CT scan machine-Buy it and they will come. Wachter tells us that

• One in five Americans will receive a CT scan in any given year; some experts suggest that at least one-third of those scans are unnecessary.

Even if only one-fifth were unnecessary, with a 1 in 250 chance of getting cancer from a single scan, the odds are ugly– and at least in some cases, amount to a dire risk without any merit whatsoever. In other cases, we risk greatly for minimal gain–and, perhaps, most disturbingly, that risk is often called for by doctors and radiologists who are sans knowledge of the risk. Yes,  a 1 in 250 chance of getting cancer from a single scan–when you perform 72 million of them per year–should be a game changer.

The Downfall of Mammography?

Mammography’s reputation as gold standard in breast cancer screening took another hit this past month.  As the New York Times reported last week, research studies demonstrate that the radiation emitted by mammography can actually increase the incidence of cancer. Two nuclear technologies, breast-specific gamma imaging (B.S.G.I.) and positron emission mammography (P.E.M.), expose “patients to a risk of radiation-induced cancer that is comparable to the risk from an entire lifetime of yearly mammograms starting at 40.”

While digital mammography has an average lifetime risk of inducing 1.3 fatal breast cancers per 100,000 women aged 40 at exposure, a single B.S.G.I. exam was estimated to involve a lifetime risk 20 to 30 times greater in women aged 40, and the lifetime risk of a single P.E.M. was 23 times greater.

Moreover, mammography only increases a woman’s risk for breast cancer while B.S.G.I. and P.E.M. increase the risk of cancer in other organs, such as the intestines, kidneys, bladder, gallbladder, uterus, ovaries and colon, the study said.

That’s right, the risk of breast cancer is greater in those women that regularly receive mammograms.  At a November 30, 2009 conference, researchers reported that “for young women who have a high risk of breast cancer because of genetic mutations or family history, the radiation from yearly mammograms may make the risk even higher.”  Meta-analysis of prior research pertaining to high-risk women (0.5 - 1% of the population) with a median age of 45 found that “those women who had had mammograms or chest X-rays (which use a lower radiation dose than mammography) were more likely to have breast cancer.”

Researchers Question the Value of Mammography

The great mammogram debate began on October 21, 2009, when a Journal of the American Medical Association article stated that mammography is not as effective as anticipated:

[S]creening may be increasing the burden of low-risk cancers without significantly reducing the burden of more aggressively growing cancers and therefore not resulting in the anticipated reduction in cancer mortality… There are several reasons that may help to explain why screening has not led to a more significant reduction in deaths from these 2 diseases in the United States. First, screening increases the detection of indolent cancers. Second, screening likely misses the most aggressive cancers.

The “increasing burden of low-risk cancers” can be characterized by the high rate of false positive tests, resulting in over-treatment. As a prior HealthReformWatch post reported:

The recent analysis of all the available evidence from multiple studies published in the British Medical Journal shows that if 2,000 women are screened with mammograms regularly for ten years, only one single woman’s life will be prolonged, but 500 will have at least one false positive and ten will be diagnosed with a “cancer” that would never have become a real disease if it had been left alone.

The New York Times reports that since the mammograms became widely used in the 1980s, the diagnosis of ductal carcinoma in situ (D.C.I.S.), what many believe to be a breast cancer precursor, has increased significantly with more to more than 50,000 women in the U.S. each year.  However, the diagnosis of these borderline breast legions has raised concerns that 17 percent of diagnoses are false positives.

Researchers at Dartmouth College succinctly summed up the deficits of mammography.  In addition to the discomfort of x-ray mammography:

• The rate of false negatives from x-ray mammography range from 4% to 34%
• X-ray mammography is less sensitive in women with dense breast tissue (a common among trait among young women who are at high-risk for developing the most aggressive breast cancers)
• Seventy-five percent of biopsied lesions resulting from suspicious mammogram findings turn out to be benign (a false-positive)

It would be surprising if the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved an imaging modality with such poor results today.  However, the FDA never approved x-ray mammography for the diagnosis of breast cancer; it was grandfathered by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 because it was already in clinical use.  The mammogram does not detect cancer directly, but is a measurement of tissue abnormalities such as microcalcifications, architectural distortions, masses, and asymmetrical densities.

The only mammography device to pass the pre-market approval (PMA) process is the T-Scan 2000 ED by Mirabel Medical Systems, a form of impedance imaging.  Research into impedance imaging has received attention because it does not emit radiation, can more accurately image dense breast tissue, and can differentiate between tissue types without biopsy.  Despite producing greater sensitivity in clinical trials than x-ray mammography or ultrasound, it has not become a primary imaging method.

So When Should Mammography Be Used?

The rumblings of debate turned into a roar when the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) changed its breast cancer screening recommendations.  The Task Force listed many of the foregoing problems, including false positives, overdiagnosis, and radiation exposure, in support of its decision.  Despite the evidence that more effective screening measures are needed, the response in support of x-ray mammography was overwhelming.  As HealthReformWatch reported:

A number of professional and advocacy groups have responded to the Task Force’s November 16 recommendation.   The ACS continues to recommend annual screening using mammography and clinical breast examination for all women beginning at age 40.  The American College of Radiology issued a frankly titled statement, “USPSTF Mammography Recommendations Will Result in Countless Unnecessary Breast Cancer Deaths Each Year” and labeled the recommendations “cost cutting.”  And the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists continues to recommend a screening mammography every 1-2 years for women aged 40-49 years and every year for women 50 and over, as well as to recommend BSE.

The editors of Annals of Internal Medicine, which published the Task Force recommendations, responded in an editorial titled, When Evidence Collides With Anecdote, Politics, and Emotion: Breast Cancer Screening.  ”Although prevention is vital to public health, none of the previous guidelines grabbed the public’s attention as much as the Task Force’s recommendation against “routine screening mammography in women aged 40 to 49 years.”  Results of an Annals‘ website survey suggested that clinicians are more likely than the general public to be influenced by the Task Force recommendations.  In response, the editors took a position in support of the new recommendations:

Unfortunately, only a fraction of abnormalities initially detected on mammography and subsequently treated truly represents a life saved rather than unnecessary or premature treatment. Sadly, it is also true that many women who have cancer detected by screening die of the disease despite early detection and treatment… Breast cancer prematurely claims the lives of many, but it is wrong to mislead women about the effectiveness of current screening methods. Women deserve to make decisions about screening for breast cancer armed with the best available information about potential benefits and harms.

One survey respondent wrote, “This Task Force has performed a vital service for years. It brings a welcome dose of science to the politics of screening.” The editors heartily agree… Because the USPSTF issued recommendations that were politically unpopular among some constituents, there have been calls to curtail this independent body’s work. If the USPSTF sinks in turbulent waters whipped up by emotion, anecdotes, and politics, Americans should mourn its loss.

Politics and Science in the Breast Cancer Screening Debate

But what role do politics actually play in breast cancer screening?  According to Dr. Barron Lerner of Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, a big one. In an interview with Kaiser Health News, he recounted:

In the late 1990s, Congress passed a bill that mandated that women who had a mastectomy would have their reconstructive surgery paid for. If you think about this, this really doesn’t happen in most areas except for breast cancer, where Congress would act, and say, “This is something we’re forcing insurance companies to do.” But it speaks to the powerful nature of the breast-cancer lobby.

One other time a report came out criticizing mammograms… the House voted 430 to nothing [ed. note: it was 424-0] — to rebuke that scientific report. So, politics is always intruding into the world of breast cancer….

In the early 1990s, there was some suggestion that if you did something called a bone marrow transplant, or stem cell transplant — which was a very aggressive treatment for metastatic breast cancer — that women live longer… The power of that lobby was so strong that insurance companies began to pay for the procedure, even though it was still experimental and its value hadn’t been proven….

It turns out that when the randomized studies came through and we got good data — at the end of the 1990s — that treatment was, in fact, no better than standard chemotherapy and caused more harm along the way. So it was not indicated at all. But, again, this was an example of Congress, or the government, sort of sticking its foot where it shouldn’t — trying to do the right thing, trying to insure access for all women who have a serious disease. But if you don’t look at the data and you’re acting based on your heart, or your gut instinct, you often make the wrong decision.

In supporting some breast cancer treatments, some lobby groups divert important resources away from important goals (e.g., development of an x-ray mammography alternative) and waste them on every promise of hope (e.g., extensive x-ray screening despite evidence of its negative effects).  The most recent example involves the new drug Avastin.

As the Fiscal Times reports, the FDA gave “accelerated approval” for the marketing of Avastin in 2008.  Two confirmatory trials submitted earlier this year led an FDA advisory committee decision to withdraw agency approval.  The first study showed that Avastin did not delay patient death and a second study indicated that patients on Avastin actually died more quickly than those on chemotherapy alone.  In spite of these findings, Susan B. Komen for the Cure chief Nancy G. Brinker and Sen David Vitter, R-La, have called upon the FDA to continue its approval of Avastin.  The FDA has yet to issue a decision.

Clinical Research: When the Compensation Begs the Answer

The New York Times reports that New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram announced a settlement agreement with medical device maker, Synthes, for failing to disclose the financial conflicts of interest of doctors researching its products. Synthes is the maker of the ProDisc, an artificial spinal disk.

The settlement agreement with Synthes was described in the AG’s press release, which quoted Ms. Milgram, as “the first of its kind because of its disclosure provisions, as well as its ban on compensating clinical researchers with company stock. She said the latter provision runs counter to widespread industry practice — a practice she called unacceptable.” Notably, the state pursued the case as a matter of consumer fraud. The premise being that the failure to fully disclose such conflicts constituted such for both human trial subjects and the purchasing public.

In a letter to the FDA, critical of the FDA and cc’d to key members of Congress, Ms. Milgram described the results of the AG’s investigation into the business and research practices of Synthes. The letter states:

The investigation revealed that a majority of the physicians who participated in these clinical trials had significant investments in the products -investments that would have been worthless had the product failed to obtain regulatory approval from the FDA. And, the investigation revealed that Synthes, which acquired ProDisc while the clinical trials were underway, failed to disclose these financial conflicts of interest to the FDA.

Yet, despite the fact that Synthes’ failure to adequately disclose these interests should have been obvious from even a cursory review of its FDA submissions, the FDA did nothing to regulate these conflicts. A number of the disclosure forms were signed and dated, but were otherwise left blank. Others indicated that the clinical investigator had a significant equity interest in the product, but did not attach the requisite details. But the FDA approved Synthes’ applications for premarket approval without any delay or further inquiry into this issue.

Leaving aside for the moment the criticism of the FDA (the State of New Jersey joins a long list of increasingly vocal complainants, including the Program on Government Oversight (citing “dramatically reduced inspections of ‘good laboratory practices’ at facilities that do the earliest testing of medical devices. Such inspections declined from 33 in 2005, to seven in 2007, to just one last year”),  and FDA scientists from the Center for Devices and  Radiological Health, who have openly proclaimed that the FDA “is fundamentally broken.”), it’s worth a moment to consider that Synthes has agreed to “stop paying doctors who are conducting clinical trials of its products with stock or stock options,” and that AG Milgram described the compensation of research doctors with stock as being “apparently common” and a “widespread industry practice.”

Compensating a  doctor with stock or stock options financially tied to the results of his research may well be the antithesis of an impetus for objective clinical research.

The basic proposition is this: you, doctor, are charged with investigating whether or not this medical device is safe and fit and shows efficacy for human use. For doing so, we will give you a portion of the company (stock or stock options) which owns the medical device. If the medical device is efficacious and fit for human use, the company will stand to profit. As a holder of stock and/or stock options in the company, you will be paid a portion of that profit and/or the value of your holdings in the company will increase correspondent to your determination of safety for human use and efficacy. If you determine that the device is not safe for human use and/or not efficacious, your holdings in the company will be worth much less, if not worthless. “Is the device safe for human use and efficacious?” Does an answer of “Yes” surprise anyone?

It is also not an answer to say that the doctors may have merely been compensated in cash and then later converted that cash into stock or stock options independently. My guess is that in constructing these compensation packages, as with most securities matters, timing and knowledge is important. That the stock or stock options must be issued or at least contracted for by the researcher simultaneous with the hiring so as to avoid SEC difficulty regarding the particulars of the researchers’ “inside” and “confidential” knowledge regarding the device and the research itself. Researchers who have purchased interested stock (or who have had stock purchased by others) before news of their research has been made public have often paid a price.

And obviously, once the doctor’s research has been made public, any positive results will have been already reflected in the market price of the stock, all but foreclosing the research doctor from reaping profits tied directly to his research determinations.

As part of A.G. Milgram’s “Assurance of Voluntary Compliance agreement (the Synthes case was handled by Deputy Attorney General Megan Lewis, Chief of the Division of Law’s Affirmative Litigation Section, and Deputy Attorney General Michelle T. Weiner) Synthes must disclose any future payments made by the company to physicians conducting clinical trials on its devices, as well as any investments held by such physicians in the devices they test. A $3 billion global company, Synthes has also agreed to stop paying clinical trial physicians with company stock or stock options.”

Attorney General Milgram said that “the Synthes agreement should serve as a template for the entire industry,” and in her letter to the FDA remarked that she was “hopeful the Synthes terms will become “best practices” for disclosure among medical device makers.”

In addition to signifying her hope, Ms. Milgram announced that her office issued subpoenas “to five major medical device manufacturing companies seeking information about their business practices.”

The FDA to Evaluate 25 Medical Devices Marketed Before 1976 Without Premarket Approval

The FDA announced last week that they are requiring the makers of 25 medical devices marketed before 1976 to submit safety and effectiveness information regarding their devices.   These devices were allowed onto the market without undergoing the current FDA testing and classification because they were first manufactured before the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1976, and include many of the riskiest devices — defibrillators, pacemakers accessories, and heart valves.

The FDA classifies medical devices into three categories, with class III being the riskiest devices– as such, they require premarket approval.  Currently, the 25 pre-amendment devices in question are class III, but based on the 1976 law these devices were not required to undergo premarket approval at the time.

The FDA will use the submitted safety and effectiveness data to review the devices and classify them into what they deem to be the appropriate risk category.  According to the FDA, if a device is found to be a class III device, the manufacturer will need to submit a premarket approval application.  If the device is moved to class I or II, it will not require premarket approval.

The FDA’s announcement comes after the Government Accountability Office reported in January that the FDA was not doing enough to thoroughly evaluate the safety and effectiveness of many medical devices marketed before 1976.  They urged the FDA to review the devices and said that “it is imperative that FDA take immediate steps” to fix this review and approval process for devices.

Daniel G. Schultz, M.D., director of the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, said regarding the FDA’s new requirement:

We are taking the necessary steps to complete this very complex process while continuing to protect public health by thoroughly reviewing and evaluating all medical device submissions presented to the agency.  New premarket notification submissions for devices of these 25 types will continue to receive an appropriate level of scrutiny to ensure safety and effectiveness.

This decision to evaluate these devices and further public safety comes after recent criticism of the agency, such as the opinion expressed publicly by a number of  FDA scientists that the “FDA is fundamentally broken.”  We have blogged about the much maligned agency on numerous occasions, with specific emphasis upon the Center for Devices and Radiological Health and a decline in medical device lab inspections.

FDA Scientists Say FDA is “Fundamentally [More] Broken”

Just this last week we posted that a group of nine FDA scientists from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health– which is responsible for medical devices ranging from stents and breast implants to MRIs and other imaging machinery-authored a letter which asserted that “The FDA is “fundamentally broken” and requires reforms.”

We wrote:

With what A.P refers to as an “unusually blunt letter,” the group of federal scientists contacted “John Podesta, head of the transition team, as well as former Senate Majority Leader and HHS Secretary-designate Tom Daschle (D-S.D.); Baltimore Health Commissioner Joshua Sharfstein, who has led a team assembled by Obama to assess FDA; Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee Chair Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.); and eight other lawmakers,” according to Kaiser.

In that post, we also called attention to the contention of the scientists that “Managers with incompatible, discordant and irrelevant scientific and clinical expertise in devices…have ignored serious safety and effectiveness concerns of FDA experts.”

Noting that

To say that these managers had “incompatible” and “discordant” scientific and clinical expertise in devices is one thing. One expects a certain degree of disagreement within the scientific community-and to some extent, one reasonably relies upon the crucible of such “discordant” viewpoints in scientific debate to provide tested answers to real problems. But the scientists who wrote this letter added one more word: “irrelevant.” And in this context, that leaves us uncomfortably with the knowledge that in the estimation of these nine scientists, the determining force in these particular scientific inquiries-the managers-lack relevant scientific expertise in the pertinent subject matter-medical devices.

Apparently, the “expertise” at issue in the approval of a breast cancer imaging device is alleged to go somewhat beyond the scientific.

The New York Times reports that it has obtained various FDA emails and internal documents which underlie the scientists’ complaint and are the present subject of both an FDA internal inquiry and a congressional investigation. The emails and documents are said to provide details of the investigations which had not previously been made public.

The New York Times reports that

An official at the Food and Drug Administration overruled front-line agency scientists and approved the sale of an imaging device for breast cancer after receiving a phone call from a Connecticut congressman, according to internal agency documents.

The congressman is Republican Chris Shay, who lost re-election in November. A component of the imaging device was produced by a Fujifilm Medical Systems, which “is based in Stamford, Conn., the heart of Mr. Shays’s former district,” according to the NY Times.

The article also states that

The legislator’s call and its effect on what is supposed to be a science-based approval process is only one of many of accusations in a trove of documents regarding disputes within the agency’s office of device evaluation.
Read more here.