Pharma Marketing, Advanced

With the Senate’s bill clearing late night hurdles, the coverage in the mainstream media is, at least for the moment, broad. But there was a segment on NPR’s All Things Considered in the midst of all that Health Reform bill coverage that is well worth a listen. The segment, “How A Bone Disease Grew To Fit The Prescription,” (transcript linked, audio below) functions as a sort of biography of the evolution of both a drug and a disease– which was not, it seems, an entirely independent process.

The drug is Merck’s Fosomax, the disease is Osteopenia. Fosomax had sales in 1996 of $281.8 million; by 2005, on the heels of what qualifies as a comprehensive and wildly successfull marketing effort, the drug had sales of $3.2 billion.  Osteopenia derives its origin as somewhat of an afterthought, when in 1992 “a group of osteoporosis experts gathered under the auspices of the World Health Organization” and drew a somewhat arbitray bright line to determine what level of bone mass loss was normal and what amount constituted a disease. The term “Osteopenia” was coined, on the spot, to give clinical researchers a term which described those whose bone loss was considered normal, but was close to the line. They never imagined that Osteopenia would come to be considered a disease in itself, but it did. Millions of women are said to have it; millions treat it with Fosomax. The story of how this came to be (and the implications regarding the role of Pharma in health care) is fascinating.

The FDA Steps In: Regulating Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet

The FDA has been widely criticized for not providing guidance for drug companies eager to promote their products on the internet.  Earlier this year, the FDA expressed the view that the message was what was important, not the medium, meaning that companies should simply apply the rules governing prescription drug advertising in print media to the internet.  On April 2, 2009 the agency issued Notice of Violation letters to 14 companies who sponsored links on internet search engines advertising their products; the links gave the name of the drug and, in some cases, its indicated use, without including the required “fair balance,” i.e., safety information such as contraindications and potential side effects.  In reliance on the so-called “one-click rule” — which had never actually been adopted by the FDA — the companies had put the required safety information one click away on a separate page.

In recent months, the FDA has indicated that it is open to providing internet-specific marketing guidance.  Yesterday and today (November 13^th) the agency is holding a hearing on “Promotion of FDA–Regulated Medical Products Using the Internet and Social Media Tools.”  Representatives from advertising agencies, consumer groups, health-related websites, pharmaceutical companies, and search engines are scheduled to testify.

In written testimony released before the hearing, PhRMA, the pharmaceutical industry’s trade group, proposed that the FDA approve a standard universal warning: PhRMA suggests “All drugs have risks.  Click here for more information from the manufacturer.” — for use “in places throughout the Web where there is not enough room for complete disclosure of all warnings, indications, and contraindications (e.g., search results and microblog posts.)”  Such a warning would, PhRMA argues, allow companies to take advantage of sponsored links, make full use of Twitter, etcetera, while also providing easy access to safety information.  PhRMA even suggests that the warning incorporate the FDA’s logo, arguing that this could mitigate against “the dangers posed by illegal Internet drug sellers.”

It will be interesting to see whether and how the proposals of the other groups represented at the hearing differ from PhRMA’s, and, of course, whether the FDA in the end decides that its “fair balance” requirements should be modified for the web.  Among the other interesting issues FDA may address is companies’ responsibility for web content they do not control.  Google’s introduction of Sidewiki, which allows anyone visiting a pharmaceutical company’s website to leave a comment, has brought this issue to the fore, raising, for example, the prospect of doctors discussing a product’s off-label uses on the manufacturer’s site.

Anyone who wishes to comment on these or other internet-specific promotion issues may do so through February 28, 2010.

Risks to Directors and Trustees of Health Care & Life Sciences Companies: Corporate Compliance in a Distressed Economy

“Risks to Directors and Trustees of Health Care & Life Sciences Companies: Corporate Compliance in a Distressed Economy,” was sponsored by Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Epstein Becker & Green P.C., and Navigant Consulting, Inc. The program urged profit and nonprofit health care organizations to prioritize effective corporate compliance programs, particularly in today’s economy.

Moderated by Professor Kathleen Boozang, the program featured keynote speaker Mark Anderson, the New Jersey Medicaid Inspector General, as well as presentations by Lynn Shapiro Snyder and Hervé Gouraige of Epstein Becker & Green P.C. and Sandra Piersol and Geoffrey Kaiser of Navigant Consulting, Inc.

The participants focused on the financial challenges and potential exposure for board members of health care and life sciences entities in maintaining an effective compliance program in order to minimize noncompliant behavior and corporate liability risks.  Current trends in HHS Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIA’s) have shown a movement toward imposing personal liability on boards of directors for failure to ensure that a company has an effective corporate compliance program.

Inspector Anderson first addressed the 2007 statute governing the New Jersey Office of Medicaid Inspector General, focusing in particular on the statute’s broad definitions of “fraud” and “abuse,” which allows his office broad discretion.  Asking the key question, “is your compliance compliant?”, he emphasized that effective compliance programs go beyond simple written policies and procedures, but are specific to the entity’s need to prevent fraud and abuse, and are supported at every level of management — with the tone set “at the top.”  He concentrated on one specific element of compliance programs — self-disclosure of problems within one’s own organization — and stressed that self-disclosure is essential to compliance and is in the company’s best interest, as his office provides incentives to health care entities to self-disclose.  These incentives include forgiveness or reduction of interest payments, waiver of penalties and/or sanctions, timely resolution of overpayment, and a decrease in likelihood of imposition of an OMIG Corporate Integrity Program.

Lynn Shapiro Snyder, Co-Chair of the Health Care Fraud Practice Group at Epstein Becker & Green, spoke about the looming threat of enforcement activities aimed at board members of health care and life sciences entities, and noted that, until recently, the risk has been reputational rather than legal.  She highlighted the blurred line between governance and management obligations, and questioned whether boards need their own consultants to determine whether to sign off on a company’s compliance program.  Later, suggesting a simple, cost-effective way to examine the effectiveness of a compliance program, she recommended that compliance officers file (and follow) a “dummy report” within their own organization, thereby bringing to light gaps and issues in the company’s program.

Sandra Piersol, a Director with the Healthcare Disputes and Investigators practice at Navigant Consulting, addressed how directors and trustees can determine whether they have an effective corporate compliance program.  Discussing the seven elements of an effective compliance program, she emphasized ensuring that the compliance officer has direct access to the board of directors, setting the “tone at the top,” and the need for ongoing training and communication.  She provided a list of structural and operational questions to be considered when examining whether an entity’s corporate compliance program is effective, and concluded with the recommendation that boards should request the performance of an objective and comprehensive review of the program activities performed by persons independent of the compliance program.

Hervé Gouraige, Co-Group Leader of the National Litigation Practice at Epstein Becker & Green, spoke about the risk to board members of personal liability for an ineffective compliance program.  After an overview of the law as it relates to board oversight of compliance, Gouraige discussed the requirement that companies have a process established to address compliance risks within the organization.  Second, he underscored that the process must be executed by the chief compliance officer and monitored by the board.  Finally, he explained that the board must be involved in the selection of a chief compliance officer who is capable of, and willing to, stand up to the board.  He stressed that the chief compliance officer should not also be the general counsel, due to the conflicting duties and obligations of those positions.  He also suggested that there be a separate board committee — which includes the CEO, general counsel, and chief compliance officer — to monitor the compliance program.  Annually, this committee should meet without the CEO and general counsel as well.  Finally, Gouraige suggested that in order to learn about — and address — problems before a prosecutor does, compliance officers periodically spot check internal emails between employees.

Geoffrey Kaiser, Managing Director in the Healthcare Dispute, Compliance and Investigations Practice at Navigant Consulting, focused on the benefits of having an effective compliance program.  He noted that, although it is difficult to quantify the harm avoided by any program, an effective program can reduce or mitigate the risk of violations, particularly through education, which is a cost-effective way to sensitize employees to risk.  Second, having an effective voluntary information and reporting system allows a board of directors to introduce corrective measures proactively.  Third, having an effective corporate compliance program in place can influence prosecutorial discretion.  In addition, having an effective compliance program can reduce the severity of penalties facing an organization at sentencing — not only affecting the amount of the fine, but also the range in which the fine will be imposed.

Overall, each speaker highlighted the cost-effectiveness and benefits of devoting resources to an effective compliance program.  Inspector Anderson, stating that the economic environment cannot dictate compliance policies, emphasized that cutting such programs is short-sighted and a future compliance violation could potentially decimate a company in the long run.  Gouraige explained that it would be a terrible mistake to cut compliance, due to the “wisdom of the long-term investment.”  The speakers, in a question and answer session moderated by Professor Boozang, addressed effective ways to increase board attention to corporate compliance, including focusing on corporate compliance as one of the many legal requirements required by boards and underscoring the investment — rather than the cost — of implementing an effective corporate compliance program.  As attendee Eve Costopoulos of Merck aptly stated, “if you don’t pay today, you’ll pay tomorrow.”

All Photos by Sean Sime

Reform Rodeo

1. Kaiser Health News discusses the details of the House’s latest iteration of their Health bill.

2.  Ezra Klein analyzes whether the public plan will cost insureds more than private insurance.

3.  The New England Journal of Medicine circles back to a reform issue that is often overlooked: primary care and accountable care.

4. Jonathan Cohn at The New Republic looks at how two of the biggest players in the U.S. health care system–the medical device industry and the pharmaceutical industry–are affected by the House bill.

5.  The Healthcare Economist reports on a study released by the Urban Institute that breaks down how the House Bill will affect the number of uninsured.

6.  Wild Card: Eugene Volokh highlights on a case involving one company’s desire to patent a physician’s thought process.

7. In Case You Missed It: The Cost of (Not) Implementing Chronic Care Management by Professor John V. Jacobi.

ACCME: Showing Some Teeth?

This week, the New York Times reported on efforts by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) to step up its enforcement of its Standards for Commercial Support.  Drug and device companies spent over a billion dollars on accredited continuing medical education (CME) courses in 2008; ACCME’s Standards for Commercial Support are meant to ensure that industry funding does not translate into commercially-biased content.  ACCME’s new focus on enforcement comes in the wake of a Senate Committee on Aging hearing over the summer at which Dr. Steven Nissen of the Cleveland Clinic testified that ACCME should be abolished because it is a toothless watchdog, “uninterested or incapable” of enforcing its Standards.  And that was not the first time ACCME’s oversight of CME has attracted congressional attention.  A 2007 Senate Finance Committee investigation uncovered numerous cases in which drug and device companies violated ACCME’s Standards and expressed concern about ACCME’s years-long delays in imposing penalties for compliance failures.

While noting that medical education is largely self-regulated, Dr. Murray Kopelow, ACCME’s head, told the New York Times that, relative to years past, ACCME was active in 2008 and 2009, investigating twelve complaints and finding five courses to be commercially biased.  In addition, the organization will soon post to its website a list of CME courses and providers found to be biased.  ACCME will also consider a proposal that providers whose courses are found to be commercially biased be required to alert the doctors who attended and provide them with corrective materials.

While these efforts are salutary, an effective enforcement program would require a significant commitment of time and resources (in 2008, there were just under 50,000 accredited CME activities), which ACCME may not have.  Well-known critic of industry-funded CME Daniel Carlat (author of “Dr. Drug Rep,” a fascinating piece about his experience giving paid promotional talks for a drug company) had this  to say about the prospects for effective enforcement:

…if the Atypical Antipsychotic program is bad enough to be pulled for commercial [bias], my conservative estimate is that at least half, probably more, of all industry funded psychiatry CME will also need the retraction treatment. The problem is, who on earth has the time to police these things? Certainly not ACCME. Dr. Carroll and I try to keep on top of the worst of the worst, but we have other things to do in order to make a living. The best and simplest solution would be to end industry funding of medical education altogether.

Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has recommended just that — that industry funding be ended altogether, on the grounds that drug and device industry funding too often leads to bias and that such bias is incompatible with CME’s educational aims.  Dr. Nissen makes the additional argument that ending bias in CME would reduce inappropriate prescribing of branded prescription drugs, which would in turn yield significant cost savings.  As Dr. Nissen told the Senate Committee on Aging, “That’s one of the ways we can pay for healthcare reform.”

A Hat Tip to Pharmalittle

Health Reform Watch wishes to congratulate the folks over at Pharmalittle for being named one of the Top 100 Pharma Blogs. They deserve it–and if you’ve never checked out their site– I highly encourage you to do so. Upon the dissolution of Ed Silverman’s Pharmalot, which was hosted here in Newark by the Star Ledger, a group of contributors and commenters banded together to pick up the mantle. For those of you who have a keen interest in Pharma (and who doesn’t?), you’ll find truly insightful and often witty commentary over at Pharmalittle. As an example, this post of theirs announcing their Top 100 status is classic:

HAT TIP TO OURSELVES….

Pharmalittle to be Honored at White House

OK, so we lied. It’s all part of the same strategy. As the impressive badge on the left (suitable for framing) shows, this blog has been named one of the top 100 pharma blogs. Did anyone know there were that many pharma blogs?

Anyway, a lot of people out there will wonder how we accomplished this. It’s simple. We followed basic marketing principles:

1. We promoted the blog for off-label uses. For example, it makes a great eye chart and may help slow the growth of cataracts.

2. We gave kickbacks to everyone on the internet. Really.

3. We buried studies 34, 57, and 105.

4. We changed the endpoints in study 35 and left out the last six months of data.

5. We delayed the appearance of generic Pharmalittle (liloxazorx) through a bunch of nuisance suits.

6. We intimidated people who read other blogs.

7. We hired Key Opinion Leaders like Anonymous to talk us up.

8. We funded studies showing all the dangers of other pharma blogs.

9. We convinced people that failure to read Pharmalittle will result in the end of innovation in the industry and the complete dissolution of life-saving medications.

10. We avoided being bought by Pfizer.

11. There is no evidence reading Pharmalittle leads to weight gain, morbid obesity, and diabetes. And anyone who thinks differently will never find Study 57 anyway.

12. We don’t believe in morbid obesity. If you’re going to be obese, at least be up-beat about it.

And stuff like that.

Read more from Pharmalittle here.

Under the Radar: Health Care Reform & Drug Advertising & Marketing

At the Food and Drug Law Institute’s 21^st Annual Advertising & Promotion Conference John Kamp of the pro-industry Coalition for Healthcare Communication discussed four proposals addressing drug advertising and marketing issues that may be incorporated into the final health care reform bill but have not been widely debated.  Mr. Kamp’s presentation is available here.  

Off the Table (For Now)

Of most concern to industry is an oft-floated proposal to eliminate the tax deduction for drug advertising.  (See, for example, bills sponsored by Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and Representative Daniel Lipinski (D-IL) here and here.)  Most recently, on September 11, 2009 Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), a member of the Senate Finance Committee, announced his plan to put forth an amendment to the Baucus Bill that would eliminate the “tax break drugmakers get for TV advertising.”

Direct-to-consumer advertising is a prime target because, as the New York Times put it, for many “the ads are a daily reminder of a health care system run amok,” which “prompt people to diagnose themselves with chronic quality-of-life problems like insomnia or restless leg syndrome; lead people to pressure their doctors for prescriptions for expensive brand-name drugs to treat these conditions; and steer people away from cheaper generic pills.”   There is also concern that DTC ads do not present an accurate picture of drug risks and benefits and that they drive uptake of new drugs before their safety is fully known.

Another obvious driver is the need to pay for health care reform.  Senator Nelson echoed a claim made earlier this year by Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) that eliminating the tax break for TV ads would free up $37 billion over the next ten years.  Industry representatives contest the $37 billion figure, arguing that drug companies spend far too little on direct-to-consumer advertising to achieve that level of additional tax revenue.  They contend that Congress would have to eliminate the tax deduction for physician advertising and other marketing expenditures to garner $37 billion.

Less than a week after he announced it, Senator Nelson backed off his plan, perhaps under pressure from other members of Congress who come from districts with a strong media presence and have spoken out against eliminating the deduction.  According to Mr. Kamp, however: “Somebody else will raise this again before it’s over, you bet … Baucus says the reforms will cost $850 billion, the Congressional budget office $750 billion. Three-quarters of a trillion dollars is a lot of real money in Washington. The $37 billion will continue to be in the buffet of options as they try and figure out healthcare.”  

Still on the Table

Three proposals related to drug and device promotion are still on the table, with varying chances for inclusion in the final health care reform bill.

First, health care reform bills in both the House and the Senate contain transparency provisions akin to those in the Physicians Payments Sunshine Act of 2009 introduced in January by Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA).  Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy recommended that disclosure of drug and device company payments to doctors be federally mandated in its January 2009 white paper.  As the Sunshine Act has widespread support, including from industry, transparency provisions are likely to be included in the final bill.

Second, Section 138 of the health care reform bill reported out of the House Education and Labor Committee   bans the commercial use of “prescription information containing patient identifiable and prescriber identifiable data,” essentially adopting as federal law New Hampshire’s ban on prescription data mining which survived a First Amendment challenge in the First Circuit.  If passed, Section 138 would end drug reps’ current practice of tailoring their sales messages to each doctor’s prescribing history, which many believe creates undue pressure on doctors to prescribe newer more expensive medications.

Third, a bill sponsored by Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) would authorize the FDA to evaluate whether use of a “drug facts box” format for presenting a drug’s benefits and risks would improve healthcare decision making and, if so, to promulgate regulations requiring that drug facts boxes be added to drug labels.  Senator Reed’s bill also empowers the FDA to set standards for comparative clinical effectiveness information included in drug labeling and advertising.

It is difficult to predict whether the data mining ban or Senator Reed’s bill will be included in the final health care reform bill.  Mr. Kamp calls Senator Reed’s bill’s chances a “toss up;” regarding the data mining ban, he has “no idea.”

Alternative Revenue Stream for Private Practice Physicians – Research Investigator

Clinical research is the only way [for a physician in the managed care era] to make a boat payment, quips David Stark, M.D.

With increasing frequency, pharmaceutical and medical device companies are turning to physicians in private practice, rather than academic medical centers, to serve as investigators overseeing the 60,000-odd clinical trials each year, between 80 and 90% of which are funded by industry as opposed to, say, NIH. Academic medical centers are losing the “business,” having fallen from 63% to 26% as the site for clinical research between 1994 and 2004. While it might be argued that trials in the private practice setting produce superior results because they occur under circumstances that more closely resemble how the drug or device will actually be used if approved by the FDA, there are significant risks attendant to this phenomenon that have received too little attention.

The ultimate question is whether physicians can compartmentalize the competing incentives that exist in advising patients about whether to pursue conventional therapy or participate in a clinical trial. This is especially true if the physician is being handsomely compensated for each patient she recruits into a trial, and is exacerbated when the physician also has other financial relationships with the trial sponsor (the drug or device company) for, say, speaking and consulting gigs. Clinical Research in the Private Office Setting — Ethical Issues The recruitment process for clinical trials is the longest and most costly part of the process - prospective participants have to undergo testing to see if they qualify for the study, and federal law requires that they receive significant amounts of information and have ample opportunity to have their questions answered pre-enrollment. A per capita payment contingent upon successful enrollment of the patient will tempt a physician to fudge on this process and enroll unqualified subjects. This not only may put them at risk because they are too sick, but also skew the research results because they’re not sick enough. Bonuses for meeting enrollment goals only make it worse.

Without impugning physician integrity, how realistic it is for physicians to serve in the dual capacity of treating physician and researcher? Studies have repeatedly confirmed “therapeutic misconception” whereby study participants believe, no matter how clearly told to the contrary, that they are “patients” receiving treatment, rather than “subjects” of research who may be receiving a placebo or an experimental drug. This phenomenon is certainly exacerbated when the patient’s treating physician is doubling as the investigator of the clinical trial. Most patients continue to believe that their own personal physician would be driven solely by their best interests. Ironically, some people have more faith in an experimental intervention when they learn that the investigator has a “piece of the action.”

Obviously, significant policy and legal questions arise from this practice, and a more holistic approach to the question of the best way to encourage clinical trials while safeguarding the interests of trial subjects is beyond what I can attempt here. But one possible approach could be drawn from informed consent law — whether statutory or common law, which should require physician disclosure of conflicts of interest to patients. Imagine the beginning of a conversation between doctor and patient/potential research subject:

Doctor: “Just so you know, if you agree to participate in this clinical trial, I get paid $1000 by the manufacturer of the product being tested, but if you don’t, and you just want regular treatment, I’ll only get paid $60 by your insurance company. But, in fairness, that’s because a clinical trial is a lot more work for me….”

But to be honest, I don’t really believe in this solution either. Most recipients of this information either don’t understand it, or have no idea what to do with it, or both. Some fear that too much confusing information might kill trials altogether, which would be a terrible outcome. And there are certainly reasons to fear that such trials are becoming harder to run, to the point where they’re not worth the money. Ultimately, I guess, I want to control how physicians get paid to serve as investigators — the Goldilocks Solution — not too much, and not too little. I want them to be paid just right, so that they are willing to conduct clinical trials, but aren’t tempted to act other than in the patient’s best interest. Of course, what is just right and how to enforce it poses its own problems.

Seton Hall Law School, the author’s employer, is the recipient of grants, donations and endowments from the pharmaceutical industry. No part of the author’s compensation is funded by these gifts.

x-posted at Concurring Opinions

Biologics, How Long Exclusive? What Cost?

Biologics — products such as vaccines, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins that are isolated from natural sources and may be produced by biotechnology methods and other technologies — are at the center of a national debate regarding access to cutting-edge therapies and protection of biotech’s ability to create products that may require millions of dollars to develop. As always, Mintz Levin, Health Law Washington Beat (link also in the “Resources” section of this blog) has offered great coverage of the issue– articles here and here.

For months now, the federal government has been considering legislation to balance the competing need for scientific and medical innovation with the costs to patients for biosimilars (generic versions of innovator pioneer biologics, also referred to as follow-on biologics).  Unlike its approval pathway for generic small-molecule, chemically synthesized drugs, the FDA currently has no process for the approval of biosimilars.  All regulatory proposals by both the Senate and the House have included an exclusivity period for pioneer biologics before a generic biologic may be introduced in the market, as well as patent protections for the pioneer biologic.

As part of its July 15, 2009 health reform bill, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee adopted an amendment proposed by Senators Kay Hagan (D-NC), Michael Enzi (R-WY), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) that provides for a 12-year exclusivity period for pioneer biologics.  Among the Senate’s other biosimilar proposals, all introduced in June 2009, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH)’s bill allows for seven years of exclusivity, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY)’s bill provides for a 5 year exclusivity period, and the proposal by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) calls for a nine-year exclusivity period.  In the House, Reps. Henry A. Waxman (D-CA)’s proposed bill limits the exclusion period to five years, while Anna Eshoo (D-CA)’s bill proposes an initial exclusivity period of 12 years, with a possible additional two-and-a-half years for new indications and pediatric populations.

In June 2009, the FTC released a report that determined that innovation and investment will be sustained even without the exclusivity recommended by even the least restrictive of the proposed bills.  The report states that the competition between pioneer and follow-on biologics will more closely resemble the competition between different brands of drugs — with the pioneer biologic retaining 70-90% of the market share — rather than the competition between small-molecule branded pharmaceuticals and their comparable generics — where entry of the generic drug on the market leads to loss of market share and drop in the price of the drug.  The FTC found that due to the complexities in the development and use of biologics and the absence of therapeutic equivalence between pioneer and follow–on biologics, biosimilars are unlikely to be direct substitutes for the pioneer biologics on which they were based.

Relying on the FTC’s conclusion that the introduction of follow-on biologics will lower prices and increase access, Read more

Medical Education & Health Reform

[Ed. note: As noted in the post above, we are very pleased to welcome Associate Dean & Professor of Law Kathleen M. Boozang, J.D., LL.M., to Health Reform Watch today.]

The news has been much absorbed by the “scandals” associated with physician conflicts of interest arising out of their relationships with the pharmaceutical and medical device industries. Concerns include the potential biases created by industry funding of continuing medical education, the impact on patient care of physician activities as paid industry consultants and promotional speakers, as well as the impact on the integrity and patient safety of industry-funded research.  Analogous issues emerge from industry funding of medical schools themselves.

A pervasive conception of systemic health care reform would provide the opportunity to address many of these problems.  Academic medicine’s drive for money arises not only from the amount of uncompensated care they provide to the under- and uninsured, but from the structural flaws of the funding mechanisms for medical education and research in the United States.  According to the June MedPac Report on medical education,  it is unclear how much it actually costs to train new physicians, partly because of the multiplicity of funding sources.  While it could be that the funding is sufficient, medical school faculty and deans nonetheless find themselves under tremendous pressure to raise money from government grants, industry relationships, and clinical practice to support themselves. This pressure increases as constrained state budgets contribute less to public universities. Income from physician practice plans is leveling off as academic medical centers become unappealing participants in managed care plans — they too frequently focus insufficiently on primary care, and managed care increasingly balks at contributing to the costs of medical education which are built into academic hospital rates. Further, many academic medical centers are less nimble and efficient than the multi-practice plans and surgi-centers pervasive in many communities.

While greed and poor judgment are certainly factors driving some physicians’ relationships with industry, academic medicine’s over-reliance on “alternative revenue” streams can also be explained by the irrationality of the extraordinarily complex mechanisms for funding medical education and research. More frustrating is Medicare is spending $9 Billion annually to new train physicians to function in a health care system that is hopefully short-lived in its current form.  Meaningful healthcare reform will rest on reform of the delivery and finance systems — new health care professionals must be educated to perform in this reformed environment, which should involve increased collaboration between physicians and allied healthcare professionals; treatment of patients outside of the hospital; and knowledge of comparative effectiveness of alternative therapeutic options.

Health care reform should condition future financing of medical education on the absence of collaborations that create conflicts of interest that threaten the integrity of the medical profession.  It should also jumpstart radical reform of the content, methodology and quality of educating medical students, residents, and physicians, who are the linchpin to changing how we deliver healthcare.  The plan for systemic reform should compel a reconceptualization and expansion of allied health care professionals’ roles in health care delivery to address cost, access, quality, and error avoidance.  Finally, the vision for the future should commit to resolving the inequities in the health care status of all who live in the United States, an issue whose solution is inextricably linked to producing a sufficient number and variety of health care providers available in every part of the country who have a broader conception of health care, with the knowledge and skills to achieve the goals of health for all.

Medical Science Liaisons: Walking the Line between Scientific Exchange and Promotion

[Ed. note: As noted in the post above, we are very pleased to welcome Kate Greenwood, J.D., to the blog today.]

As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, at a time when the ranks of pharmaceutical sales representatives are thinning, the number of medical science liaisons (MSLs) is (or was until very recently) growing.  MSLs are doctors, pharmacists, or scientists employed by drug companies to disseminate scientific information about the companies’ drugs — including information about off-label uses of those drugs — usually to physicians who are key opinion leaders.  MSLs are, at most companies, part of the medical affairs or research and development departments and, unlike sales reps, they are not typically evaluated or compensated based on increases in market share or prescription volume in their regions.  Still, as suggested by this PharmExec article on permissible metrics for measuring the value to companies of both MSLs and the thought leaders they court, it is not always clear how the work MSLs do differs from that of a sales rep.

FDA regulations ban companies from “represent[ing] in a promotional context that an investigational new drug is safe or effective for the purposes for which it is under investigation” but explicitly allow companies to engage in “the full exchange of scientific information.”  Sales reps cannot take advantage of the scientific exchange safe harbor to discuss off-label uses with physicians, but MSLs can, as long as they do so in response to a physician’s unsolicited request.  Jeff Patrick, who holds a doctorate in pharmacy and is Director of Medical Scientists at the biopharmaceutical company Dyax, explained to the Wall Street Journal that, unlike a sales rep, he could respond to a question like “Were there pediatrics in your trial?” even if the drug being evaluated was not approved for pediatric use.

Because MSLs are out in the field engaging doctors in free-ranging and difficult to police discussions, they present evident compliance challenges for companies attempting to follow the rules regarding off-label promotion.  On the other hand, their scientific expertise and established relationships with thought leaders may also present compliance opportunities.  For example, earlier this year, the FDA approved the use of MSLs in the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for UCB’s Cimzia, a drug used to treat Crohn’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis which carries with it a risk of serious infection.  The Cimzia REMS requires as part of its communication plan that the company’s MSLs make a presentation about the drug’s risks to all of the nation’s approximately 500 gastroenterology key opinion leaders.

Synthes Legal Troubles –Again

[Today's Post is by Maansi K. Raswant, a Seton Hall Law student pursuing the Health Law concentration. She is a research assistant to the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and an intern at the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation.]

Recently, the Synthes corporation has been garnering a lot of attention, but for all the wrong reasons. A June 17^th indictment comes a little over a month after the New Jersey Attorney General announced that the medical device maker had entered into a settlement agreement for failing to disclose financial conflicts of interests held by physicians conducting clinical trials for its products (see prior post, “Clinical Research: When the Compensation Begs the Answer“). Filed by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the recent 52-count indictment alleges that from May 2002 to Fall 2004, the Swiss company Norian, and its parent company Synthes, (both based in West Chester, Pennsylvania) conspired to conduct unauthorized clinical trials of Norian XR and Norian SRS, bone cement products used in surgery to treat vertebral compression fractures of the spine. Not only did the trials lack FDA authorization, but the FDA had specifically warned Synthes against using Norian XR for spinal surgery due to safety concerns.

The indictment explains that preliminary studies using human blood in test tubes found that the bone cement products chemically reacted with the blood to create blood clots. In further studies of the prod in a pig, the clots became wedged in the lungs. Despite this knowledge, Synthes continued to market the Norian products for use in spinal surgery, and did not stop doing so until after three patients had died on the operating table.  According to the indictment, rather than recall the products following the patient deaths, the company engaged in a cover up by lying to FDA officers during an official inspection in May and June 2004.

The two recent legal actions against Synthes break new ground, and represent significant inroads by prosecutors in the arena of clinical research. Among other remedies, the settlement with the State of New Jersey required Synthes to disclose all relevant financial interests of its investigators on a public website, and barred the company from compensating investigators with stock, a practice the Attorney General called widespread in the industry. The latest indictment contains not just the usual charges against the corporations, but also criminal charges against four corporate executives charged with shipment of unauthorized devices. If found guilty, each executive faces up to a year in prison.

Rationing or Cost Effectiveness?

In today’s Wall Street Journal, Scott Gottlieb, a former senior official with both the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), warns that “Government Health Plans Always Ration Care.” Aside from recasting the same old aspersions about “rationing,” Gottlieb warns that if reform efforts can’t tame health care costs, the “government will turn to a less appealing but more familiar tool to cut costs: the regulation of access to drugs and medical services.”

Of course, “access” can mean many things. Theoretically, Americans have “access” to the best medical technologies in the world. But practically, most Americans-including those with health insurance-don’t actually access this type of care and couldn’t even if they tried. The bottom line is that every health insurer in the world, public or private, has to “ration” for the simple fact that health care resources are not unlimited. Only wealthy citizens truly have “access” to the best medical care money can buy, regardless of the country they live in or the health system they live under. That won’t change with or without major health reform.

Gottlieb is worried that reformers might formally embrace recommendations by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC), which currently has a broad statutory mandate to advise Congress on the Medicare program. He also warns that rationing is “a European import,” as if no health insurer in the United States has ever had to draw the line somewhere and decide what not to pay for. For example, Gottlieb warns about organizations like the Committee for the Evaluation of Medicines in France and the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care in Germany. He doesn’t mention the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, but it drew similar scorn after the economic stimulus package funded comparative effectiveness research here in the United States. Gottlieb cautions that European countries “aren’t shy about rationing.”

Gottlieb is correct in one aspect: these organizations are prevalent in Europe. However, he misses three important points.

First, the countries in Europe that Gottlieb warns about spend considerably less than we do on health care (and don’t suffer negative health consequences for it).

Second, wealthy residents in pretty much all of these countries can purchase services and technologies over and above what the organizations that Gottlieb warns us about approve.

And third, we’re not exactly strangers to these organizations in the United States. Gottlieb is concerned about European imports, but he’s ignoring our home grown organizations, like the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which makes new technology assessments for Gottlieb’s old agency, CMS, and supports comparative effectiveness research. Or the Medicare Evidence Development and Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC), which also performs new technology assessments. In fact, it’s no secret in Washington that Medicare has long considered some amalgam of cost effectiveness and comparative effectiveness in its coverage decisions, even if nothing in the Medicare statute explicitly allows it to do so. (CMS has long stretched the definition of “reasonable and necessary” in section 1862(a)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act to fit its fiscal realities, even if CMS or its precursor, HCFA, haven’t been successful in cementing cost effectiveness as a formal criterion, as evidenced through failed rulemaking in 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 4,302) and 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 31,124)).

And just as importantly, private insurers make cost and comparative effectiveness determinations too, either by following Medicare’s lead, as expressed through national and local coverage determinations (NCDs and LCDs), or by setting up their own new technology evaluation systems, like BlueCross BlueShield has with its Technology Evaluation Center. Though the offical duties and decisionmaking processes of these organizations differ, the health care community generally understands these decisions as implicitly factoring in cost effectiveness or at least clinical effectiveness-thus doing precisely what the anti-reformers like Gottlieb warn about.

Of Doughnut Holes and Simple Math, or, “Even if I Pay Half Price For Brand Name Drugs, Won’t That Still Be $4,350 Out of Pocket Until Medicaid Kicks In?”

Forgive me if I sound naïve, or perhaps a wee bit skeptical, but I’m somewhat perplexed as regards the bottom line of PhRMA’s well cheered announcement to offer a 50% discount on name brand prescription drugs to seniors stuck in the money pit known as the Medicare “Doughnut Hole.”  The New York Times has said that the “Federal Saving From Lowering of Drug Prices Is Unclear” and the Washington Post has said that  ”It was not clear how much of the savings would accrue to the government side of the ledger and how much would represent lower out-of-pocket payments for consumers.” Unclear as it may be, it may be worth a look. This is not to say that this move announced by PhRMA is not a step in the right direction, just that a closer gauge of the step, as it appears at present, would seem to be in order.

First things first, in its 2008 fact sheet, “Prescription Drug Trends, September 2008,” Kaiser Family Foundation found (pdf. page 2) that

“The average brand name prescription price in 2007 was over 3 times the average generic price ($119.51 vs. $34.34).

Kaiser also found that “For products with a large number of generics, the average generic price falls to 20% of the branded price and lower.” And that “Approximately three-quarters of FDA-approved drugs have generic counterparts.”

When considering the approximately 25% of FDA-approved drugs which do not have generic counterparts, and which would figure largely in any savings under the new PhRMA discount plan, it is probably important to remember that pharmaceutical companies often  engage in what is known as “pay-for-delay:” the practice of paying generic drug manufacturers not to market generic drugs which would compete with their own branded drugs.

Might I suggest that without a concomitant decrease in the breadth of the lapse in coverage known as the “Doughnut Hole,” or some after purchase rebate scheme which allows the full price of the discounted drug to count towards satisfaction of the Doughnut Hole requirement, the net result for many of the hardest hit  seniors will be fairly limited? That they will still have to pull approximately $4,350 per year out of their pockets?

What’s a Doughnut Hole?

The PhRMA discount goes to the price of brand name prescription drugs after the initial cap is met on the Medicare prescription drug benefit. This initial cap on prescription benefit coverage can result in what CMS refers to as “the coverage gap” or what is often referred to as the Medicare Part D “doughnut hole.”

As we reported in a post back in February,

The Dallas Morning News has offered this explanation of “the doughnut hole”

Seniors with Medicare’s standard drug benefit for 2008 pay the full price once their total drug expenses — both Medicare’s costs and their own out-of-pocket deductibles and co-payments — reach $2,510.

They are then on their own for the next $3,216, until their total drug spending exceeds $5,726. At that point, catastrophic coverage kicks in, and Medicare pays 95 percent of their drug costs.

Some seniors are able to avoid the doughnut hole because they qualify for extra government help or buy extra insurance. But everyone else has to mind the gap, which lawmakers included in Medicare’s drug benefit to hold the line on federal costs.
The WSJ Health Blog reports that in 2009, “The coverage gap will open up after beneficiaries and their drug plans have spent a total of $2,700 on medications…. Seniors are then on the hook for the next $4,350.”

We also noted that “In response to that expense, the Kaiser Foundation has shown that many seniors cease or diminish the use of their medications.”

Some simple, if not rudimentary, math
In order to make a complex matter slightly easier, allow me the liberty of making the numbers even: we’ll use $2,500 for an initial cap, and we’ll use $4,500 for the out of pocket or “on the hook number” — that which one must pay until Medicaid kicks in and pays 95% of the cost. [Because of the wide variation in coverage plans, the actual numbers can vary as well, and there is some fluctuation in the amounts reported.]

Again for even number ease sake, consider someone with a large, constituting catastrophic, $12,000 per year brand name prescription bill. That person, regardless of the discount, will still have to take $4,500 out of his or her own pocket during the Doughnut Hole period of non-coverage-unless the Donut Hole itself is changed or eliminated. Looking at the calendar year, if the Doughnut Hole is not changed or eliminated, with or without the discount, the initial cap ($2500 @ 1000 per month) will be met at around the middle of March. The primary difference with the discount is that instead of making it only to August before Medicaid picks up the tab for the consumer, Medicaid will not kick in until December. Under this scenario, the brand name consumer stands to ultimately save roughly $200 as a result of the 5% Medicaid co-pay,  and Medicaid will have to make a payment for the brand name pharmaceuticals for roughly 3 weeks worth of supply. But the consumer’s out of pocket $4,500 still went to the brand name  pharmaceutical. Read more

Clinical Research: When the Compensation Begs the Answer

The New York Times reports that New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram announced a settlement agreement with medical device maker, Synthes, for failing to disclose the financial conflicts of interest of doctors researching its products. Synthes is the maker of the ProDisc, an artificial spinal disk.

The settlement agreement with Synthes was described in the AG’s press release, which quoted Ms. Milgram, as “the first of its kind because of its disclosure provisions, as well as its ban on compensating clinical researchers with company stock. She said the latter provision runs counter to widespread industry practice — a practice she called unacceptable.” Notably, the state pursued the case as a matter of consumer fraud. The premise being that the failure to fully disclose such conflicts constituted such for both human trial subjects and the purchasing public.

In a letter to the FDA, critical of the FDA and cc’d to key members of Congress, Ms. Milgram described the results of the AG’s investigation into the business and research practices of Synthes. The letter states:

The investigation revealed that a majority of the physicians who participated in these clinical trials had significant investments in the products -investments that would have been worthless had the product failed to obtain regulatory approval from the FDA. And, the investigation revealed that Synthes, which acquired ProDisc while the clinical trials were underway, failed to disclose these financial conflicts of interest to the FDA.

Yet, despite the fact that Synthes’ failure to adequately disclose these interests should have been obvious from even a cursory review of its FDA submissions, the FDA did nothing to regulate these conflicts. A number of the disclosure forms were signed and dated, but were otherwise left blank. Others indicated that the clinical investigator had a significant equity interest in the product, but did not attach the requisite details. But the FDA approved Synthes’ applications for premarket approval without any delay or further inquiry into this issue.

Leaving aside for the moment the criticism of the FDA (the State of New Jersey joins a long list of increasingly vocal complainants, including the Program on Government Oversight (citing “dramatically reduced inspections of ‘good laboratory practices’ at facilities that do the earliest testing of medical devices. Such inspections declined from 33 in 2005, to seven in 2007, to just one last year”),  and FDA scientists from the Center for Devices and  Radiological Health, who have openly proclaimed that the FDA “is fundamentally broken.”), it’s worth a moment to consider that Synthes has agreed to “stop paying doctors who are conducting clinical trials of its products with stock or stock options,” and that AG Milgram described the compensation of research doctors with stock as being “apparently common” and a “widespread industry practice.”

Compensating a  doctor with stock or stock options financially tied to the results of his research may well be the antithesis of an impetus for objective clinical research.

The basic proposition is this: you, doctor, are charged with investigating whether or not this medical device is safe and fit and shows efficacy for human use. For doing so, we will give you a portion of the company (stock or stock options) which owns the medical device. If the medical device is efficacious and fit for human use, the company will stand to profit. As a holder of stock and/or stock options in the company, you will be paid a portion of that profit and/or the value of your holdings in the company will increase correspondent to your determination of safety for human use and efficacy. If you determine that the device is not safe for human use and/or not efficacious, your holdings in the company will be worth much less, if not worthless. “Is the device safe for human use and efficacious?” Does an answer of “Yes” surprise anyone?

It is also not an answer to say that the doctors may have merely been compensated in cash and then later converted that cash into stock or stock options independently. My guess is that in constructing these compensation packages, as with most securities matters, timing and knowledge is important. That the stock or stock options must be issued or at least contracted for by the researcher simultaneous with the hiring so as to avoid SEC difficulty regarding the particulars of the researchers’ “inside” and “confidential” knowledge regarding the device and the research itself. Researchers who have purchased interested stock (or who have had stock purchased by others) before news of their research has been made public have often paid a price.

And obviously, once the doctor’s research has been made public, any positive results will have been already reflected in the market price of the stock, all but foreclosing the research doctor from reaping profits tied directly to his research determinations.

As part of A.G. Milgram’s “Assurance of Voluntary Compliance agreement (the Synthes case was handled by Deputy Attorney General Megan Lewis, Chief of the Division of Law’s Affirmative Litigation Section, and Deputy Attorney General Michelle T. Weiner) Synthes must disclose any future payments made by the company to physicians conducting clinical trials on its devices, as well as any investments held by such physicians in the devices they test. A $3 billion global company, Synthes has also agreed to stop paying clinical trial physicians with company stock or stock options.”

Attorney General Milgram said that “the Synthes agreement should serve as a template for the entire industry,” and in her letter to the FDA remarked that she was “hopeful the Synthes terms will become “best practices” for disclosure among medical device makers.”

In addition to signifying her hope, Ms. Milgram announced that her office issued subpoenas “to five major medical device manufacturing companies seeking information about their business practices.”

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