Better Hospital Discharges = Lower Healthcare Costs?

[Ed. Note: We are pleased to welcome Jae W. Joo to HRW. Jae is a third year student at Seton Hall Law.  He graduated from Rutgers College in 2006 with a B.A. in Psychology and a minor in Philosophy.  In 2009, he interned for the Honorable Denise A. Cobham in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Currently, he is a summer intern at the New Jersey Attorney General's Tobacco and Securities Litigation Section, and also a research assistant for the Healthcare Compliance Certification Program at Seton Hall Law.]

With healthcare reform fresh out of the congressional oven, many changes are taking place in the field of healthcare and a myriad of new challenges will undoubtedly arise.  However, one of the perpetual challenges in the midst of all these changes has been the substantial amount of money needed to fund Medicare.  The Patient Protection Affordable Care Act is laden with economically efficient methods and plans to reduce costs.  However, as Lesley Alderman suggests in her NY Times article, a drastic cost saving measure may be implemented with a simple change in hospital procedure.

According to the article,

[In] a study published last year in The New England Journal of Medicine, one in five Medicare patients returns to the hospital within 30 days of being discharged. The problem is an expensive one: in 2004 these readmissions cost Medicare $17.4 billion dollars, the researchers also found.

As the study shows, readmission within 30 days of discharge has been costly and remains a substantial contributing source to the Medicare deficit.  However, discharge procedures rarely get the same level of attention as admission procedures to a hospital.

At discharge, the assumption is that the patient is better and all will be fine, said Dr. Eric A. Coleman, a geriatrician and professor of medicine at the University of Colorado Denver. But many patients, especially older ones, leave the hospital with a host of issues to manage. They may have additional medications to take, new symptoms to monitor and follow up appointments to keep, all of which require focused attention at a time when patients may not be at their sharpest.

What’s more, while insurers will pay for limited hospital stays, there’s no financial incentive for hospitals to insure that patients get and stay out. ‘A hospital may actually be financially rewarded for mishandled discharge,’ said Dr. Williams, chief of hospital medicine at Northwestern University. ‘If the patient is readmitted, they get paid again.’

While there may be a general lack of concern or awareness to improve conditions of patient discharge, Alderman’s article mentions some initiatives that have been taken to improve the discharge process.  Care Transition Intervention is a hospital-based program that helps reduce readmissions by coaching older adults on how to manage their health and take better care.  Project Boost provides hospitals guidelines to help standardize and enhance the discharge process.  Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid has a program to improve hospital hand-offs for high risk patients and has also been developing a program to incentivize hospitals to lower their readmission rates.

Whether or not hospitals decide to implement new discharge protocols and procedures, individual patients can help alleviate the financial burdens placed on the system by taking an active role in managing their health.  Alderman’s article points out a few tips to follow if a hospital does not have an up to date discharge procedure in place.  Following these simple tips can, it seems, make a big difference.

Alliance for Health Issues Major Resource, “Covering Health Issues”

Amazing resource for health care and health care reform info over at Alliance for Health, “Covering Health Issues, 5th Edition, 2010 Update.” Made possible by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, it has 12 chapters and covers such issues as Health Reform, Cost of Health Care, Quality of Care, Mental Health & Substance Abuse, Long-Term Care, and Disparities. The collection is a veritable treasure trove of information presented in a readily accessible manner. Though the phrase is lacking because access is free, the Fast Facts alone are worth the price of admission. A few to think about (footnotes omitted):

• Two-thirds of people age 65 today will need some long-term care in their lifetimes.

• An estimated 22.3 million people were classified as substance dependent or substance abusers in 2007. Substances abused range from alcohol, pain relievers and tranquilizers to hallucinogens, cocaine and heroin.

• Each year, about one in four adults (26.2 percent) suffers from a diagnosable mental illness, according to National Institute of Mental Health.

• In a ranking of 19 industrialized countries, the U.S. had the highest number of unnecessary deaths.

• Among 37 nations, the U.S ranks 29th in terms of infant mortality with nearly twice as many infant deaths per capita than France.

• The United States spent $2.3 trillion on health care in 2008, or $7,681 per person. This amounted to 16.2 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).

• Health care costs more than tripled from 1990 to 2008,² and are projected to rise to 19.3 percent of GDP in 2019.

• Nearly 82 percent of the uninsured in 2009 lived in families headed by workers.

• In 2008, 17.2 percent of full-time employees and 25.5 percent of part-time employees age 19-64 were uninsured all year.

Too Much Transparency?

Interesting article in the Wall St. Journal Health blog regarding prospective legislation which would require full pricing disclosure by providers:

Yesterday, a House subcommittee held a hearing on three bills - two sponsored by Republicans, and one by a Democrat - aiming to pull back the veil on prices, the Hill reports. Provisions vary by bill, but include price transparency for hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, pharmacies and vendors; more complete disclosure by insurance plans and more information on quality.

Here at Health Reform Watch we have written a number of posts calling for transparency, and perhaps most notably the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has issued two White Papers in the last year calling for such in different aspects of medical relationships. The first White Paper called for broad reforms in the marketing of drugs and devices. Entitled, Drug and Device Promotion: Charting a Course for Policy Reform, the Center proposed legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationship of medicine and industry. The Center’s recommendations included “making payments by drug and device companies to doctors transparent, with public disclosure by industry and physicians of their financial relationships.”

In its second White Paper, entitled Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight, “the Center proposed legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationships between industry and doctors that can create unwarranted risks to trial participants and to the scientific integrity of research.” Obviously, transparency here too plays a large role in rooting out such conflicts and apprising potential research subjects of what may amount to vested interests in those who wish to recruit them for such studies.

In a sense, “Transparency” has become somewhat of a mantra. And rightfully so. The prospect of clandestine arrangements in medical care has a nefarious overtone that is well deserved. The ultimate nature of the doctor patient relationship is premised on trust. The doctor, by virtue of his education and profession, is privy to information the vast majority of us do not hold. In a sense, every diagnosis and prescription accepted is an article of faith. It is important to know that the doctor’s information has not been skewed by improprieties in research, and that the doctor’s ultimate diagnosis and prescription has not been skewed by a vested interest.

Generally speaking, except in cases of dire and/or unconscious emergency, the patient must assent to treatment. And assent must be premised on informed consent. A failure of assent, legally speaking, amounts to battery.  Arguably, a failure to disclose vested interests in a particular course of action or procedure can diminish, if not negate, the “informed” aspect of informed consent. Transparency is important.

But the WSJ article raises an issue worth considering as it regards Transparency and pricing: provider competitors in concentrated markets may, in seeing the exact numbers, find the opportunity to raise prices.

What struck us, though, was the concern voiced by Frank Pallone, chairman of the Energy and Commerce health subcommittee. “The concern I guess is about the unintended consequences of too much transparency,” he said, according to the Hill. How could more info on pricing and costs be a problem?

Pallone refers to a 2008 Congressional Budget Office brief on this very issue. It covers the benefits of transparency, but also the chief potential disadvantage: in concentrated markets, providers might look at their competitors’ prices and raise their own to match them. Here’s an excerpt from the prepared remarks of then-CBO Director Peter Orszag (now director of the Office of Management and Budget), discussing the findings before a Senate committee’s health reform summit:

On the consumer side, more than 80 percent of the population is covered by some form of health insurance, which insulates people from the full price of their health care, limiting their incentive to compare prices. Doctors and other health professionals often direct the decisions about what services to buy from whom, as patients may have little information on the care they need or the quality or value of that care. Moreover, for insured and uninsured people alike, awareness of prices will make little difference in emergencies or in the relatively small number of cases that account for a disproportionate share of overall health care spending.

On the provider side, more transparency would make information about the prices that hospitals, physicians, and drug companies charge insurers more visible, but whether such disclosure would lead to higher or lower prices for consumers on average is unclear and depends on the nature of competition in the relevant market. The markets for some health care services are highly concentrated, so increasing transparency in such markets could lead to higher, rather than lower, prices because higher prices are easier to maintain when the prices charged by each provider involved can be observed by all of the others. However, aggregated information or information on average prices would make it more difficult for providers to coordinate higher prices because individual providers’ prices would not be obvious. Whatever the effect on average prices, more transparent prices would probably reduce the range of prices.

In tact as the mantra of Transparency may be in regard to medical relationships, in a marketplace unfettered by fee regulation, Orszag’s  analysis and Frank Pallone’s concern regarding Transparency and pricing gives weight to the counter-intuitive prospect of “Too much Transparency.” We fail to consider such at our own peril.

Study Demonstrates Link Between Physician Surgicenter Ownership and Volume of Surgeries

There has long been a concern — reflected in the federal Stark Law and its state law analogues — that a conflict of interest arises when a physician refers patients to an ambulatory surgery center he or she owns.  Prior research established that a doctor’s rate of referrals of patients for surgery and other hospital-based services is positively correlated with an ownership stake in a specialty hospital; now there is similarly concrete, empirical evidence of the deleterious effect of the conflict created when doctors own surgicenters.

In an article in the April issue of Health Affairs, John M. Hollingsworth and his co-authors present the results of a study comparing “the practice patterns of physician-owners of surgicenters, before and after they acquired ownership, to those of physician-nonowners over the same time period.”  Using data from Florida for the years 2003-2005, the authors identified all patients who underwent one of five ambulatory procedures — carpal tunnel release, cataract excision, colonoscopy, knee arthroscopy, and ear tube surgery.  The procedures were chosen because “substantial variation exists … in their use,” making them “susceptible to the influences of financial incentives associated with surgicenter ownership.”  After accounting for differences in the populations served by physician-owners and physician-nonowners, the authors found that “the mean annual caseloads for owners … were at least twofold greater than those for nonowners.”  Even more telling, using earlier data, from 1998-2000, the authors found that, even after accounting for the fact that some of the eventual owners had higher-volume practices before they invested in a surgicenter, for four of the five procedures studied, “acquisition of ownership status kicked owners’ already high volumes even higher.”

In an earlier post, I noted that a 2009 New Jersey law conditions physicians’ ability to refer patients to surgicenters on the following: (1) for patients they refer, they personally perform the surgery; (2) they be paid in proportion to their ownership interests, not the number of patients they refer; (3) they and their physician partners make all healthcare decisions, leaving non-physician partners without a say; and (4) they inform their patients in writing of their ownership interest at the time they make the referral.

The work done by Hollingsworth and his co-authors suggests that while the first and second conditions might eliminate certain especially troubling payment arrangements, a “relationship between surgicenter ownership and surgical volume” can persist even when physician-owners personally perform the surgeries.  Similarly, while the third condition would require that physicians make healthcare decisions, it would do nothing to ensure that those decisions are uninfluenced by conflicts of interest.  The fourth condition — which puts the burden on patients to suss out which referrals are medically necessary and which result from a physician-owner inappropriately lowering his or her threshold for intervention due to a financial conflict of interest — is also unlikely to reduce “physician-induced demand.”  There is no evidence that patients are able to perform such a sifting function.  To the contrary, existing evidence suggests that they are not.

Ultimately, as Hollingsworth and his co-authors suggest, the government may need to “intervene through physician reimbursement.”  “[P]artial capitation or global payment schemes, or both, implemented in the context of proposed delivery system reforms (such as accountable care organizations) may be needed to discourage the over-use that fee-for-service payment rewards.”

Health Care Reform Law: Help for Hospitals?

Last week, Samuel Maizel, a bankruptcy lawyer specializing in representing health care businesses in distress, gave a great talk here at Seton Hall Law on “Hospitals in Crisis: Debt Restructuring Options & Issues for Financial Survival.”  Mr. Maizel painted a grim picture of the financial pressures facing hospitals and said he does not believe the situation is going to improve in the near term despite the overall economic recovery.

Near the end of his talk, Mr. Maizel told us that hospitals across the country are combing through the health reform legislation looking for anything that could improve their bottom lines.  This piqued my interest and made me wonder what they will find.  Using the House Committees’ summary of the provisions in the bill relating to delivery system reform as a guide, I came up with the following.

Sec. 3001.  Rewarding High-Quality and Efficient Care.

This provision, which applies to patients discharged on or after October 1, 2012, establishes “value-based purchasing,” meaning that the government will make “value-based incentive payments” to hospitals that provide care to Medicare patients that meets or exceeds certain performance standards to be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Initially the standards must relate to at least the following five conditions: heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, surgery, and healthcare-associated infections.  Eventually (by fiscal year 2014) the standards are to incorporate “efficiency measures,” that is Medicare spending per beneficiary must be a factor.

Sec. 3022.  Medicare Shared Savings Program.

This provision, which Jordan Cohen analyzed at length here, directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a program by January 1, 2012 through which accountable care organizations that save Medicare money would be entitled to a cut of the savings they achieve.  Hospitals are eligible to participate in the program through a partnership or joint venture arrangement with physicians or as employers of physicians.

Sec. 3023.  National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling.

Under this 5-year long pilot program, which the Secretary must establish by January 1, 2013, the government will make one bundled payment “for integrated care during an episode of care provided to an applicable beneficiary around a hospitalization in order to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services.”  Episodes of care begin 3 days prior to hospitalization and end 30 days after discharge.  Hospitals can apply to participate in the program (and/or submit a bid) as part of “[a]n entity comprised of … a hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a home health agency.”

While the above three provisions hold out hope of improvement to hospitals’ bottom lines, the House Committees’ summary also highlights two provisions which establish negative incentives.  Section 3008 on Hospital Acquired Conditions provides that, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the government will cut by 1% the payments it makes to hospitals in the top quartile for hospital acquired conditions.  Similarly, Section 3025, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, provides that, after October 1, 2012, the government will begin reducing the amount it pays to hospitals with “excess readmissions.”

Health Reform, “Death Panels,” & Section 1182–What the Text Really Says

This post is a follow-up to my prior post on the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, a nonprofit corporation created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Health Reform Law), which will oversee comparative clinical effectiveness research–or, in Palin-ese, “the Death Panel.” The pertinent text of the law under which the Institute will operate appears below along with explanation in the plainest English available.

LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN USES OF COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

Sec. 1182. (a) The Secretary may only use evidence and findings from research conducted under section 1181 to make a determination regarding coverage under title XVIII if such use is through an iterative and transparent process which includes public comment and considers the effect on subpopulations.

• TRANSLATION: Must be open and transparent and must consider effect on particular groups, but can use research to make determinations regarding coverage

‘(b) Nothing in section 1181 shall be construed as–

‘(1) superceding or modifying the coverage of items or services under title XVIII that the Secretary determines are reasonable and necessary under section 1862(l)(1); or

‘(2) authorizing the Secretary to deny coverage of items or services under such title solely on the basis of comparative clinical effectiveness research.

• TRANSLATION: Coverage cannot be based solely on CER

‘(c)(1) The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from comparative clinical effectiveness research conducted under section 1181 in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII in a manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill.

• TRANSLATION: CER cannot be used to assign a  lesser value to extending the life of the elderly, disabled or terminally ill (as compared to the younger and healthier) in regard to treatment. Health care dollars cannot be allocated first (or exclusively) to young and relatively healthy individuals under the rationale that extending the lives of the younger and healthier is, by definition, more valuable. The issue is further explored in 1182(e), discussed below. 1182(e) further limits the use of such valuations with regard to the Quality Adjusted Life Year.

‘(c)(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as preventing the Secretary from using evidence or findings from such comparative clinical effectiveness research in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII based upon a comparison of  the difference in the effectiveness of alternative treatments in extending an individual’s life due to the individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness.

• TRANSLATION: When evaluating treatments to extend an individual’s life, CER can be used to determine whether Medicare will cover one  treatment rather than an alternative. Specifically, an individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness can be a factor in deciding which treatment will be covered, reimbursed and/or incentivized.  For example an elderly person with severe coronary artery disease may have two treatment options: surgery (e.g. revascularization) or drug therapy. Both of these treatments would theoretically extend the life of the patient by reducing the odds of a heart attack or stroke. However (hypothetically) CER data may demonstrate that an individual of advanced age lives longer on average if they opt for drug therapy. In such a circumstance, this section provides that CER data may take into account the individual’s age, disability and terminal illness when comparing two alternative treatments. It may also be the case that CER data shows that individuals with certain disabilities are less likely to respond to surgery or to different treatment, possibly due to immobility, or even impending death. Again, these facts can be taken into account in the CER calculus.

‘(d)(1) The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from comparative clinical effectiveness research conducted under section 1181 in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII in a manner that precludes, or with the intent to discourage, an individual from choosing a health care treatment based on how the individual values the tradeoff between extending the length of their life and the risk of disability.

• TRANSLATION: The Secretary cannot use CER to deny or try to persuade a patient from choosing a treatment that may prolong their life but leave them severely disabled. Alternatively, the Secretary cannot prevent a patient from choosing a treatment which may improve the quality of their life, as opposed to an alternative treatment which may extend the length of life.

‘(2)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to–

‘(i) limit the application of differential copayments under title XVIII based on factors such as cost or type of service; or

• TRANSLATION: The extant differential copayment guidelines are unaffected. 

‘(ii) prevent the Secretary from using evidence or findings from such comparative clinical effectiveness research in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under such title based upon a comparison of the difference in the effectiveness of alternative health care treatments in extending an individual’s life due to that individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness.

• TRANSLATION: See 1182(c)(2) discussed above.

‘(3) Nothing in the provisions of, or amendments made by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, shall be construed to limit comparative clinical effectiveness research or any other research, evaluation, or dissemination of information concerning the likelihood that a health care treatment will result in disability.

• TRANSLATION: This section is straightforward. The Institute can compare various treatments and determine which is more likely to result in a disability, and disseminate those findings.

‘(e) The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute established under section 1181(b)(1) shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an adjusted life year (or such a similar measure) as a threshold to determine coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII.’

• WHAT IS A QALY?: The Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) is defined by the NIH as:
  • (1) A unit of measure of utility which combine life years gained as a result of health interventions/health care programs with a judgment about the quality of these life years.
    (2) A common measure of health improvement used in cost-utility analysis, it measures life expectancy adjusted for quality of life. (See NIH’s Health Economics Information Resources, Glossary, at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/edu/healthecon/glossary.html#QALY)
• The goal of the QALY is to ensure that healthcare resources are allocated in a manner which is most beneficial. Because healthcare resources are scarce, however, the $/QALY looks to allocate those resources economically. The QALY ipso facto discounts the value of life due to a disability. This is because the QALY works by assigning different states of health along a continuum, with perfect health being 1 and death being 0. The QALY is interested in whether different treatments provide more QALYs, In other words, QALYs are interested in whether one treatment provides more years at a better state of health (i.e., closer to 1) than another treatment. See M. Weinstein, Spending Health Care Dollars Wisely: Can Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Help? (2005)

• TRANSLATION: The Institute cannot utilize a $/QALY ( or a similar measure) as a threshold to establish what treatment is cost-effective, recommended or incentivized. (It is, however, noteworthy that in describing “similar measure,” both “age” and “terminal illness” are not expressly excluded as prohibited criteria in the development of a metric, as they are throughout the text of other portions of the provision).

• Note: 1182(c)(2) does allow for a disability to be taken into account when comparing various treatments for an individual. That section must be distinguished from the current section (1182(e)), where the upshot is that the dollar valued QALY cannot be a benchmark by which to allocate resources. If we are only determining which of two resources to a given individual shall be reimbursed, then the individual’s disability may be taken into account, i.e., treatment effectiveness under the individual’s circumstances  is a metric for which CER may be utilized; however, dollar value of life quality is not a permitted metric or criteria for treatment.

Comparative Effectiveness Research Under Health Reform, “The Institute”

“Bend the cost curve” has been the mantra of many students of health care reform. The Dartmouth Health Atlas has shown that up to 1/3 of care may be unnecessary. But how do we find out what care is unnecessary? One tool that holds promise is comparative effectiveness research.   Now that health reform has been signed into law, there is greater certainty as to the future of comparative effectiveness research (CER). The Stimulus bill had already allocated $1.1 billion dollars to investigate CER. The newest health reform law continues to build on that start. So what about HR 3590, also known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act? Will they ration care? Pull the plug on your grandmother? Get between you and your doctor? To start answering these questions, I will provide a brief overview of CER under the new law, and describe the law’s vision for a new institute for CER research.

Part D of  H.R. 3509 is entitled “Comparative Clinical Effectiveness Research.” Section 1181 of  Part D defines CER as: “research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items described in subparagraph (B).” Subparagraph B goes on to describe various services and goods associated with health care.

The Institute
Section (b) of 1181 is where the rubber hits the road. Under this this section, the law creates a nonprofit corporation to be called the “Patient-Centered Research Institute,” known as “the Institute,” which is neither an agency nor establishment of the United States. This is rather interesting, and I did not know that our federal government created such corporations, but I suppose it could be compared to a nonprofit Amtrak.

Funding
The Institute will be backed by a Trust Fund created by money transferred from the Medicare Part A and B trust fund. It will receive, for year 2013, an amount equal to 1$ multiplied by the number of individuals entitled to benefits of Medicare Part A or enrolled under Part B. For years 2014 through 2019 the multiplier is $2.

The Purpose and Duties of the Institute
The purpose of the Institute is stated as what amounts to the typical reason for CER: making better health care decisions based on the evidence.

The duties of the institute are listed as:

1. Identifying and adopting (by majority vote within the Institute) research priorities and establishing research project agenda
2. Carrying out research project agenda by doing
   1. Systematic reviews of previous (and future) research (often known as meta-analysis), and
   2. Primary research including randomized clinical trials. The primary research the Institute conducts can be subcontracted to other institutions, under certain constraints.
3. Data collection from various electronic sources like those at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
4. Appointing expert advisory panels for clinical trials
5. Supporting patient and consumer representatives
6. Establishing a methodology committee to study new ways to measure and conduct CER.
7. Providing a peer-review process for primary research conducted by the Institute. Notably, if the Institute subcontracts, they can use the peer-review process of the organization to which they contract with.
8. Release of research findings to clinicians, patients, and the general public. The Institute must also release an annual report.

Governing in the Institute
The Institute will be run by a Board of Governors. The breakdown of the Board of Governors is quite interesting, and possibly telling:

• The Director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
• The Director of the National Institute of Health
• 17 members appointed by the Comptroller General of the U.S. The 17 members must be composed of:
  • 3 members representing patients and health care consumers.
  • 5 members representing physicians and providers, including at least 1 surgeon, nurse, State-licensed integrative health care practitioner, and a representative of a hospital.
  • 3 members representing private payers, of whom at least 1 member shall represent health insurance issuers and at least 1 member shall represent employers who self-insure employee benefits.
  • 3 members representing pharmaceutical, device, and diagnostic manufacturers or developers.
  • 1 member representing quality improvement or independent health service researchers.
  • 2 members representing the Federal Government or the States, including at least 1 member representing a Federal health program or agency.

This very well may be one of the handouts that the Senate provided Big Pharma and device manufacturers to get them on board. Remember that CER may very well show that a drug that a company has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in turns out to be ineffective when compared to its competitor. Thus, it is not surprising, for the cynics among us, that the Board has at minimum 3 industry reps from pharma and devices while there is a minimum of only 1 doctor. You start to wonder why the AMA supported the bill if physicians are only guaranteed 1/17th of the positions. After all, it is undeniable that physicians will be interacting with the CER data more than anyone, and they have on the ground experience using CER and related decision aids like Clinical Practice Guidelines.

Reform Rodeo: Latest News & Interviews; CER; the Constitution; HIT; Robotic Surgery

1. News: Kaiser Health News keeps you up to date by rounding up various stories on the Dems’ latest down-to-the-wire push on health reform. Their coverage of Representative Dennis Kucinich’s (and other reluctant Dems’) endorsement of the bill is here.

2. Betting on Health Care: The New York Times asks health wonks for opinions on the chances of passing health reform. Respondents include Robert Reich, former secretary of labor Gail Wilensky, Project Hope; Paul Starr, professor of public policy;  James C. Capretta, Ethics and Public Policy Center; Karen Davenport, Center for American Progress; Jacob S. Hacker, political science professor.

3. Evidence-based Medicine: A group at the New England Journal of Medicine proposes 5 steps to advance one of the most promising–yet often ignored–means of reforming our health care system: comparative effectiveness research.

4. Deem and Pass: Jonathan Adler at the Volokh Conspiracy discusses the constitutionality of the “deem and pass.” Regardless of its constitutionality, Ezra Klein exposes some factual inaccuracies in recent reporting on the tactic.

5. The Blues: The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette alerts us to a lawsuit by Highmark Inc. against the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance, which claims that the Department exceeded its authority when challenging Highmark’s proposed merger with Independence Blue Cross.

6. Meaningful Use Partial Credit: John Halamka at Life As A Healthcare CIO discusses the aggressive thresholds for meaningful use that have been set in the most recent rules, and what the HIT Policy Committee is doing to assuage those concerns.

7. Wild Card: A new TED talk about the current state of robotic surgery. An article covering the topic can be found here.

A Guide to Accountable Care Organizations, and Their Role in the Senate’s Health Reform Bill

The accountable care organization has been a model for health care reform, yet its modest success has been limited to a handful of health care systems across the country. However, the accountable care organization model has recently taken on far greater significance since being introduced as one of Medicare’s pilot programs in the Senate’s health reform bill.

The phrase is attributed to Dr. Elliot Fisher of Dartmouth Medical School.  Dr. Fisher has led the Dartmouth Atlas Project — a project that has, for the last 30 years, painstakingly documented the variation in care across the United States. (Click here for an interactive map of some of the Dartmouth Atlas results). The Dartmouth Atlas has focused on both the quality of health care as well as its cost. More importantly, they have reported on the relationship between the two, and their findings are nothing short of an indictment of our current paradigm.

Specifically, their findings illustrate that there exists wide variations in the cost of care across the country, and profoundly, that the regions that spend more per patient do not necessarily obtain better outcomes. So what to do? Dr. Fisher believes he has found at least part of the answer: the Accountable Care Organization, known as an “ACO”.

What is an ACO, and How Does it Differ from Other Payment Reforms?

In his paper “Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff,” Dr. Fisher acknowledges that the term ACO “grew out of an exchange between he and Dr. Glenn Hackbarth at a MedPAC meeting in November of 2006″. (Fisher, 2006 n. 7). Dr. Fisher’s purpose in writing the aforementioned paper was to help identify the proper “locus for shared accountability” for a patient’s health care. HMO’s and other health insurers are obvious candidates, but as Dr. Fisher notes, HMOs only comprise a small percentage of the current market, and health plans in general have focused on negotiating favorable prices within relatively open networks of providers. (Fisher, 2006, p. 45).  Read more

High-Risk Pools: a Precarious Pillar of Republican Reform

At the Health Summit last week we were able to more fully observe the Republican vision for reforming health care. A constant idea that the Republican leadership came back to was the concept of “high risk pools.” But what are high risk pools, and what potential do they have to lower costs?

High-risk pools are state-run programs that provide insurance for those who suffer from pre-existing conditions or have some other issue that makes them “medically uninsurable.”  They are often utilized by those in limbo who were previously covered by an employer’s group coverage, but for whatever reason are now relegated to the veritable disaster that is the individual market. Currently, 34 states have high-risk pools, with the combined number of insured from those pools at 200,000. (See Kaiser Family Foundation, State High Risk Pools: An Overview). As noted by Kaiser, coverage is typically at 125% to 200% of the standard market rate for health insurance.  In some states, the high-risk pool insurance costs as much as $14,000 per year. Thirty states offering high-risk pool coverage have waiting periods before pre-existing medical conditions can be covered.

Edmund Haislmaier of the Heritage Foundation has provided a succinct and helpful discussion of the relationship between high-risk pools and the related concept of “reinsurance.”  Haislmaier breaks down these risk-transfer tools into two groups: “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” risk-transfer mechanisms:

The “exclusionary” mechanisms segregate high-risk individuals from the low-risk population, subsidizing them in a separate pool. The “inclusionary” mechanisms keep high-risk individuals in the same pool as everyone else but seek to redistribute and/or subsidize their more expensive claims.

A common exclusionary mechanism is a state-run “high-risk pool” for the individual health insurance market. The pool offers coverage to people who have been refused coverage in the individual market due to poor health status. Although coverage carries high premiums, the premiums are not enough to cover the cost of claims by enrollees. To make up the difference, lawmakers use a mix of assessments on private insurers and public subsidies. In some states, the losses are funded entirely out of assessments on insurers and, thus, ultimately included in the premiums paid by everyone with health insurance coverage. In other states, the losses are funded primarily out of general revenue appropriations and, thus, are ultimately born by all the state’s taxpayers. Still other states use a mix of both funding sources.

Inclusionary risk transfer mechanisms operate on essentially the same principle, except that high-cost individuals are not given separate coverage. Instead, some portion of their claims is pooled and then proportionately redistributed among the carriers in the market. As with high-risk pools, public subsidies may also be used to offset some of the cost of claims. This type of mechanism is often called, somewhat inaccurately, a “reinsurance pool.” A more precise termed is “risk-transfer pool.”

Notably, Haislmaier recognizes that high-risk pools offer little help when it comes to the true goal of health reform: reducing costs:

Regardless of design, risk transfer mechanisms only shift or redistribute costs among funding sources. Specifically, risk transfer mechanisms offer ways to more equitably redistribute the costs of a small number of expensive cases or individuals across a broader population. While these features enable health insurance markets to function more smoothly, they are not a solution for controlling health care costs in general.

This is noteworthy coming from the Heritage Foundation. However, to be sure, high-risk pools are not peculiar to Republican health reform proposals. Both the House and the Senate bills provide for high-risk pools. The follow table is from The Kaiser Foundation’s paper “High-risk Pools: An Overview”:

The important row of the above table is “Timeline.” Whereas the House and Senate bills utilize high-risk pools as a temporary measure to provide insurance to those with pre-existing conditions before the exchanges take shape, the Republican proposal would implement risk transfer mechanisms as the primary means by which individuals with pre-existing conditions can obtain coverage. For those purchasing on the individual market, the Republican proposal would provide federal funding for state-run high-risk pools. Reinsurance mechanisms would operate in the small group market.

This is in contrast to both the House and Senate proposal which both prohibit the insurance exchanges  from denying coverage because of an applicant’s pre-existing condition–thus negating the need for high-risk pools.  Instead of subsidizing high-risk pools that would segregate the sick from the healthy, the individual mandate in the Democrats’ bill would ensure that the costs of high-risk and currently sick individuals would be spread throughout the exchange.

As Haislmaier noted, it is unclear how risk transfer mechanisms would lower health care costs. For example, whereas exchanges would increase competition by making the purchase of health insurance more accessible, high-risk pools and reinsurance would not alter the current maze that is the individual insurance market.   It is somewhat remarkable that the Republicans opt for high-risk pools instead of a proscription against pre-existing condition preclusions, especially given the public disdain for pre-existing condition preclusions. But the Republicans have little choice. Since they are wholly opposed to the individual mandate, insurers and states running high-risk pools under the Republican plan would not have healthy individuals paying into the system to offset the cost of sick insureds.

Why Primary Care in Medicare Matters

Why should we care about primary care in Medicare?  Early in the reform discussions, preventive and primary care was emphasized; in addition to extending medical care to all, reform would also implement preventive measures to keep them well.  In the current reform scrum, some are back peddling pretty fast, and in the course of finding “consensus” points (often focusing on cost-savings), we might lose conceptual coherence.

Ken Thorpe’s new Health Affairs article on chronic care patients in Medicare offers sound research and helpful analysis.  Thorpe’s data point toward a subtle explanation for health inflation keyed not to the increased cost of high-tech interventions, but to a shift in the conditions for which treatment is provided:

Our results highlight important changes in the medical conditions accounting for the rise in spending among beneficiaries over time. The most notable changes were in spending on a handful of chronic conditions: diabetes, kidney disease, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, mental disorders, and arthritis.

Thorpe has long argued that our health care delivery and finance system is stuck in a 20^th Century of acute care, while our 21^st Century needs have migrated toward chronic care.  As he has argued previously, these chronic care needs call for care at a human scale, including care management and supportive community-based care.  But he also points out that many chronic conditions are at least partially preventable, and that attention and resources should not be directed only to treating these conditions, but also to forestalling their incidence.

Prevention is, then, vital to any health care system.  But haven’t studies repeatedly shown that preventive care is not cost-effective?   Sorting this out requires that we step back and assess not only what “prevention” means, but also what we value in health care.

Preventive care can usefully be separated into three categories, as Ron Goetzel  (an Emory University colleague of Thorpe’s) has described.

• Primary prevention: Health promotion measures focus on lifestyle and simple interventions such as vaccinations to keep people from developing sickness; often cost-saving.
• Secondary prevention: Targeting people with preconditions for illness, including genetic or lifestyle markers, with screening technology, maintenance drugs, in order to forestall or prevent the manifestation of the condition; rarely cost-saving, in part because it is often applied to low-risk populations. Worth it? That depends on the design of the intervention and one’s metric for assessing health care value.
• Tertiary prevention: In this context, coordinated care management for those with chronic illness.  Properly implemented, chronic car management could “flatten the curve,” but is unlikely to be “cost-saving.”

So, whether “prevention” can save money (a claim Thorpe’s paper doesn’t make) is a complicated question.  In addition, it is often a poorly framed one. Explicitly or implicitly, cost-based objections to prevention often suggest that preventing one illness simply means that the person will die of something else, or less simplistically, that keeping people alive longer is cost-increasing, not cost saving.  Steven Wolf has elegantly responded to both objections:

[S]keptics of prevention argue that everyone dies of something; preventing demise serves only to allow a different disease to generate illness and spending. However, the aim of health promotion and disease prevention is not to prevent the inevitable but to “compress” morbidity, maximizing health until death.

Another common criticism is that prevention rarely saves money; it costs society if people live longer. The same applies to disease treatments. Health is a good; it is not purchased to save money. Health is a good that costs too much under the current medical care system, a problem of inefficiency that calls for wiser resource use, such as spending less per health unit gained (lower cost-effectiveness ratio). Disease prevention offers a way to improve health with low cost-effectiveness ratios and to also modulate disease rates. To reject health promotion and disease prevention because they do not save money (i.e., cost-effectiveness ratios are not negative) misses the point. (citations omitted)

Advocates who would shift our systemic emphasis to prevention and management of chronic illness, then, are not naïve about cost implications.  To the contrary, they address the issue head-on, with a three-step argument:

• The purpose of our system is or should be the maintenance of or restoration to high levels of functioning consistent with a fulfilling life.
• Our needs have largely shifted from acute to chronic interventions, and our system should shift to meet those needs.
• In preventing or managing chronic illness, as with all interventions, we should carefully examine the capacity of methods to meet our needs, and to demand value for those being served.

Applying this sort of argument to primary care, Goetzel elsewhere advocates skepticism of attempts by medicine to turn prevention into a high-tech enterprise:

We have medicalized prevention and health promotion in this country so that most people believe that only doctors in clinical settings can deliver these services. Although effective in many cases, this approach is the most expensive method of delivering prevention. If we expand our arsenal of potential interventions to include environmental, ecological, and policy changes, in addition to individually focused counseling and coaching programs, we can change the cost-effectiveness equation.

Thorpe’s article has garnered much-deserved attention, although it is tempting to think of his data in only cost-benefit terms.  That is not true to Thorpe’s conclusion, which is consistent with efforts to redirect attention from the business enterprise of health care to the health needs of Americans:

The U.S. health system remains predicated on providing acute, episodic care that is inadequate to address the altered patterns of disease now facing the American public. Our results highlight the need for prevention and care outside doctors’ offices and hospitals designed to address the changing needs of patients at risk for or living with chronic disease and, often, multiple comorbidities. As [reformers] continue their efforts to reshape the U.S. health system, they must address these changed health needs through evidence-based preventive care in the community, care coordination, and support for patient self-management.

Use of APRNs in Primary Care Settings

Some health care problems must be addressed whatever happens with reform. High on the list is the supply of primary care professionals.  Shortages have been reported in Massachusetts, and primary care access concerns have been raised in national reform discussions.  The shortage of primary care physicians is often tied to their low income, compared to specialists, and the consequent diversion of medical graduates to specialties.  The shortage of primary (and in some areas, specialty) physicians has prompted recommendations for increased medical school enrollment and residency slots for all areas of medical practice.

The wisdom of pumping up physician supply has been questioned.   It has been noted that, beyond a low threshold, increasing specialty physician supply is poorly correlated with better outcomes, and that previous efforts to increase supply has made the rich richer and the poor poorer, as graduates have flocked to locales and specialties already well-served by physicians.

So what is the proper policy response to a shortage of primary care physicians?  Physicians claim exclusive control of a broad swath of professional practice.  They dominate primary care, and exclusively control a more and more finely differentiated series of specialty fields.  With power comes responsibility, one might think.  Richard Cooper, a leading analyst of physician supply, commented in 2002 (at a time when many saw a surplus, not a shortage, of physicians) in an article with colleagues on the ramifications of this broad near-monopoly in a profession with falling production and fixed supply:

The sociologist Andrew Abbott has observed that “a profession whose jurisdiction is excessive must increase its productivity or expand its numbers.” Conversely, “when a powerful profession ignores a potential clientele, paraprofessionals appear to provide the needed services.” These statements characterize the dilemma that physicians now face. Their ability to increase their productivity is limited by their declining work effort. Their ability to grow their numbers is hostage to the belief that surpluses exist. And organized medicine has embarked on a vigorous campaign to thwart expansion of the NPC [non-physician clinician] disciplines. Yet it was shortages in the past that motivated state legislatures to remove the barriers to licensure for NPCs and to enlarge their range of privileges, and it is perceived professional opportunities that stimulated the creation of new disciplines and the expansion of existing ones. (footnotes omitted)

So, health reform efforts have emphasized access to primary care for its beneficial effects, while the supply of primary care docs has suffered a flight to specialty practice.  Is it, as Cooper suggested, time to rethink the place of non-physician caregivers on the front line of primary care?  As advanced practice registered nurses (”APRNs”) have gradually increased their scope of practice, studies and meta-studies have found that outcomes are equivalent when services are provided by a physician or APRN, and patients satisfaction measures may favor nurse practitioners.

But what about the nursing shortage?  It may be that expanding the profile and responsibilities of APRNs could further efforts to recruit and retain nurses.  Talented, hard-working nurses have long been concerned that their career path is limited; their salary steps are few and shallow, and they are unable to gain responsibility and autonomy commensurate with their training and experience.  Facilitating RNs’ graduate education to allow licensure as advanced practice nurses would enrich their career paths and encourage then to remain in the profession.   To move in this direction, those states that have not done so could expand the scope of licensure of APRNs to permit more fully independent primary care practice options.   The length of time needed for education and training would be long, but not as long as for physicians; compensation would have to be increased to reflect a higher level of training and responsibility, but not to the compensation level of physicians.

The path to regularizing the scope of practice for APRNs is described in a 2008 consensus document endorsed by 39 national general nursing and nursing specialty organizations.  A 2009 report from the Connecticut Office of Legislative Research described that state’s APRN scope of practice:

Advanced practice registered nursing is defined as the performance of advanced level nursing practice activities that, by virtue of postbasic specialized education and experience, are appropriate to and may be performed by an APRN. The APRN performs acts of diagnosis, and treatment of alterations in health status and must collaborate with a Connecticut-licensed physician. In all settings, the APRN may, in collaboration with a licensed physician, prescribe, dispense, and administer medical therapeutics and corrective measures and may request, sign for, receive, and dispense drug samples.

The required “collaboration” with physicians was also described:

The law defines “collaboration” as a mutually agreed upon relationship between an APRN and a physician who is educated, trained, or has relevant experience that is related to the work of the APRN. The collaboration must address a reasonable and appropriate level of consultation and referral, patient coverage in the absence of the APRN, a method to review patient outcomes, and a method of disclosing the relationship to the patient.

The physician oversight rule is typical, and has been the source of tension with APRNs.   Physicians can be suspicious of APRNs, and it has even been suggested that physicians may avoid working with them as APRNs gain more autonomy — a reaction that could be fueled by concerns with APRNs’ competency and training, or by a desire to weaken a source of competition for control of the profession.

APRNs might fill the primary care end of the physician practice spectrum, should physicians continue to flee primary care for more remunerative specialties.  There are genuine professional competency issues to work out, but they ought not be resolved by physicians as a matter of naked market power.  In addition, the terms of appropriate collaboration between physicians and APRNs need to be ironed out, to protect patients while avoiding the possibility of anti-competitive refusals to deal with APRNs.  Many researchers and physicians welcome the emergence of APRNs as partners in primary care practice.  Further research on the proper autonomous practice settings for APRNs will serve the interests of patients, and can guide planning for the future of primary care.

Little Beds and Little Help at Jfk Hartwyck at Edison Estates

We speak here of health care and health care reform, most often in the larger, policy sense. This weekend I had occasion to witness the beast up close. My younger brother had his knee replaced earlier in the week at JFK Medical Center here in Edison, NJ. By all accounts the operation was a success; although he is only 45 years old (which I’m told is considered young for a knee replacement) he has had a history of knee problems initially ensuing from his having been struck by a car while working a number of years ago. After the surgery, his doctor asked him how he had even been walking– there was, he said, no cartilage left to speak of.

Initially his insurance company balked (perhaps pro forma?) at the prospect of my brother entering a convalescent center for physical therapy and rehab, citing his relatively young age, but relented under the demands of the doctor. He was initially to have been transferred to the rehab center on Thursday, but was inexplicably delayed until Friday late afternoon. He was sent to Jfk Hartwyck at Edison Estates, which seems to function primarily as a Nursing Home– but not a particularly highly rated one.

On Saturday at around 1:30 pm, as I set out to see him, I called to a) make sure he had in fact been transferred and was there; and, b) find out his room number. After three call transfers and three fairly frustrating conversations I was finally able to confirm that he was there; I also learned that he was on the third floor. I gave up on the room number.

To say the place is a bit run down is not to engage in hyperbole; to say that there was an absence of care is merely to mimic the US News Report on the Nursing Home and Rehab Center.

My brother is a big man– 6′ 3″ or 4″ tall, and having lost some weight, scales in at about 295lbs. Despite the fact that his chart says such, provisions were not made to accommodate him. He did not fit in the bed: his head struck against the headboard and his feet crushed against the footboard if he tried to lay straight. Presumably, with his knee having just been replaced, this matters even more than it would normally. There is a contraption that he was supposed to put his leg and knee in– it would not fit on the bed. Furthermore, the foam mattress that came with his too-short bed was so old and beat up that he sunk into the bed’s metal slats tossing and turning (though not laying straight) while trying to sleep. In doing so,  he had actually been cut.

In addition, no one had thought to give him an elevated toilet seat; his knee precluded him from reaching a standard seat.

He had made these problems known to staff earlier, and was told that they would fix them. This did not happen.

After I arrived and reiterated these needs to various levels of staff, I was told of a number of different, but conflicting remedies and the schedules for such. They did not have a bed long enough but would  remove the footboard so that his feet would hang off the bed??? until they could fasten an extender or buy or rent a bed to fit him– which could take either a few hours or a few days.  I said I could live with a few hours, but that a few days was patently unacceptable. The contraption would have to wait.

He is 6′ 3″ or 4″ tall, he is not 7′ 2.” It is decidedly not a new facility. They have 280 beds. Surely, from time to time they get patients taller than 6′ 2″? They acted as though they never had.

The shoddy mattress was soon replaced, though, inexplicably, no one entered the room to assist my brother as he struggled to get out of the bed and hoist himself precariously onto the walker as the mattresses were exchanged. Throughout the four or so hours I was there, this absence of assistance was a recurring theme. Having been trained as a lawyer, this willingness on the part of staff to court, if not embrace, liability was, quite frankly, appalling. I assure you, somewhere there’s an in-house attorney prematurely gray.

As for the elevated toliet seat? I had to ask again, but urgently, as he had to go. The nursing assistant unable to find one elsewhere, ultimately snatched one from another patient’s room and hurried to clean it as my brother, the outcome uncertain, anxiously waited.

The truth is, they ultimately moved in response to my demands formulated in accord with my legal training. Otherwise, I imagine he’d still be lying there with a too-short bed, presumably covered in his own fecal matter as he vainly attempted to make his new knee bend and descend to an unprepared toliet.

In the end, they gave up on removing the footboard as they realized while taking it apart that it would actually disable the bed controls by doing so. When the rental bed came, they had no mattress to fit it but, tired of it all, we assented to pillows shoved in at the end. When the bed was set up, after the rental bed man told the nurse that she was going to want to go over the bed– which had different controls than the former bed– with my brother–and to make sure we set up the height of the bed to accommodate him–the nurse nodded her head and promptly walked directly out of the room. We managed without her.

I won’t bore you with more, but I will say that the attending doctor had briefly visited my brother earlier in the day and, without so much as asking him his relative pain level, apparently changed his pain prescription for the afternoon, but didn’t bother to actually tell my brother that she was doing so. Tentative about leaving the direct care of his surgeon, before he left the hospital my brother actually asked his surgeon if he would continue on this particular prescription that seemed to be working–the surgeon assured him that this prescription was “the law” and would remain in place wherever he went to combat the pain. Apparently, the rehab’s attending had not heard of the law and by the evening it became apparent that something was wrong. My brother, who is tough as nails and has worked a harsh blue collar job all his life, began to cry. The nurse informed us soon thereafter that his prescription had been changed. A lengthy explanation/argument with the nurses and phone call to the doctor filling in for the attending resulted in a reinstatement of “the law.”

It is also worth mentioning that although we were told by the nurses that standard protocol for incoming sub-acute was a physical therapy evaluation within at least, the very next day– that never happened. And although I was assured that although there must have been some form of communication failure which deprived him of his evaluation, he would be evaluated very first thing the next morning. That did not happen either. My brother was told this morning that “no physical therapy staff work on Sundays.” Obviously, he has received no physical therapy yet. At best, he will be evaluated for such come Monday morning– he got there on Friday. His knee and leg have further swollen. Insurance will only pay for so many days stay. It is also my understanding that the first few days of rehab are crucial to an effective recovery.

I routinely villify insurers (as they deserve it), but I can’t help but see at least one of their points here. My question is this: exactly what will this medical facility be charging the insurer for this weekend? Therapeutic Services? Rehab? He was warehoused– and poorly at that.

I’ll keep you posted.

Reform Rodeo

1a. Massachusetts: A blog post by Harold Pollock can be found here, discussing why 47 health policy experts have sent a letter urging the House to pass the Senate’s bill in the wake of Scott Brown’s upset victory.

1b. Interesting Poll of Brown Voters: As MoveOn.org’s poll reveals: “Nearly half (49%) of Obama voters who voted for Brown support the Senate health care bill or think it does not go far enough.”

2. Health Care Economics: David Herszenhorn at the New York Times discusses William J. Baumol’s theory of cost disease, and why it should give us pause in expecting too much from health care reform.

3. Health IT: Adrian Gropper M.D. describes the advantages of the OAuth system of linking electronic health record systems.

4. The Science Behind Reform: The NEJM has a short editorial describing the findings of a recent study that underscore the importance of lowering salt consumption; findings that associate reduced salt intake with public health benefits on the level of smoking cessation and weight reduction.

5. Individual Mandate Constitutionality Redux: At the O’Neill Institute, Mark Hall responds to the Constitutional argument that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it regulates inactivity as opposed to activity.

6. Visualizing Health Care: Comments on  a National Geographic piece apparently spurred National Geographic to discuss why they chose the plot on the top instead of the plot on the bottom.

Click the images below to enlarge:

Cost, Choice, and Value

The Massachusetts Massacre has everyone stepping back a bit.  The President says that we should “coalesce around those elements of the package that people agree on,” but it is unclear just which elements those might be, given the extreme polarization that has defined the debate.  He suggests that points of agreement might center on insurance reform and cost containment, which are both important goals.  I’m skeptical that a sudden flowering of bipartisanship will allow such agreement, however.  Ezra Klein, on the other hand, has a paring proposal that goes in another direction, and reminds us of why we got into this in the first place: to extend coverage to the uninsured.  If we must narrow our focus, Klein says we should extend Medicare to those over 50, and expand Medicaid to those under 200% of poverty.  This would get lots of people insured, and could well be accomplished through budget reconciliation if no Congressional coalescing is to be had.

However the parsing, paring, and palavering goes, cost control is and will be at or near the health reform debate for years to come.  Two recent articles are worth a look for those interested in analysis of cost-containment strategies.

In his health care speech to Congress, the President suggested that one component of an effort to lower health care costs should be to empower a commission of “doctors and medical experts” to identify and,

encourage the adoption of  . . . common-sense best practices by doctors and medical professionals throughout the system. Wrapped up in that suggestion are notions of adhering to expert guidance in treatment decisions.

The stimulus bill passed in February pushed for scientific assessment of modes of care, providing $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research.  The current reform bills further emphasize CER, and would encourage the adoption of proven and promising treatments through professional education and some payment reform.  Harvard Medical School professor Jerome Groopman writes on evidence-based medicine in the latest New York Review of Books.   In his 2007 book, How Doctors Think, Groopman did a great job of explaining the complex and fraught process by which doctors make decisions, and he is fully on board with the notion that there is ample room for improvement.  His new article, however, cautions that the use of panels of experts with authority to impose or even recommend best practices is a dangerous way to go.

Groopman acknowledges the need for health policy folks to consider the bounded rationality of both doctor and patient.  He examines the Obama Administration’s policies on evidence-based practice by contrasting the views of two key advisors: Cass Sunstein, whose view of “libertarian paternalism” incline him to favor gentle “nudges” that may encourage certain behavior while leaving people free to reject the advice if they wish, and Peter Orszag, who is more inclined to employ forceful regulatory standards and financial incentives to achieve cost effective medical practice.  Groopman is compellingly  skeptical of expert claims of definitive standards on what “works” in health care, and cautions that such standards can result in harm to patients who fit uncomfortably into the hard categories defined in such best practices.

Groopman’s analysis seems incomplete for two closely intertwined reasons, and surely as a result of space constraints.  First, he suggests that the administration is faced with a stark choice between

aggressively pushing doctors and patients to do what the government defines as best, or [being] respectful of their own autonomy in making decisions.

Surely there is much middle ground between tying doctors’ hands and respecting complete clinical independence.  And it is not enough to say, as does Groopman, that

Most physicians seek data and views on treatments from peers and, as needed, specialists, and then present information and opinion to patients who ultimately decide.

Maybe so, but physicians are sometimes self-interested, and patients’ choices  are sometimes influenced by advertisements or other considerations disconnected from quality concerns.  For these and other reasons, spending decisions are no longer consigned to the doctor/patient dyad, but increasingly must accommodate the cost-containment interests of third party payers — government, employers, or insurers.

Second, Groopman describes two exclusive categories of procedures: “mechanical procedures” such as the  insertion an intravenous catheter (where he argues that enforcing standards to avoid infections is proper) and all other procedures, where the individual patient’s condition becomes relevant, and where he argues that coercing clinical choices is out of bounds.  It is not obvious that the universe of procedures is so divisible; it is even less clear that the dividing line between the two categories is uncontroversial.

Many questions remain.  Groopman is surely right that we must be cautious in enforcing categorical “best practices;” it is important to create public processes for vetting their accuracy and usefulness.  He is also surely right that public and private health finance rules must accommodate variation in medical needs, and must bend readily when a “best practice” is not suitable for a particular case.  But cost is relevant, and encouraging efficient practice can reduce the cost (and therefore the extent) of coverage.

So, how might a balance between financial constraints and patient protection work?  In a Health Affairs article posted  yesterday, Michael Chernew and coauthors examine the growing phenomenon of “value-based insurance” — a structuring of insurance co-payments responsive to the needs of people with chronic illness.  The co-payments imposed by insurers are, of course, intended to reduce demand for health care services (an Orszag, not a Sunstein tool, you might say).  Value based insurance reduces or eliminates these co-payments for services of “high clinical value.”  That is, if an insurer determines that it would rather not discourage utilization for a particular service, it reduces or removes the patient cost-sharing, presumably increasing usage, for cost as well as clinical reasons.  As the authors explain,

The belief that a value-based insurance program will lower health care spending rests on the recognition that the use of high-value health care services reduces the probability of adverse events related to chronic disease and that on a population basis, these events are much more costly than the services aimed at preventing them.

The authors found some evidence that such programs are cost effective, even in the narrow sense of reducing a plan’s health care expenditures.  They suggest that widening the economic lens to consider broader societal goals would only strengthen those conclusions.

The article acknowledges the reality of economic coercion in the clinical setting, and measures attempts to shape the tools of cost containment in a way that protects patients while maintaining cost containment.  One doesn’t have to accept the general wisdom of patient cost-sharing to value attempts to protect patients from untoward effects of its use.

The need to obtain “value” for health care spending and to take steps to restrain health inflation will persist however we come out of the current reform debate.  The discussion will benefit from both the erudite analysis of Groopman and others warning us away from answers that are too easy, and that of Chernew and others who can shine a light on the efficacy of particular cost containing measures.

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