Financial Remuneration of Clinical Study Investigators

In November 2009, the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, in its White Paper, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight, explored payments to investigators — and other potential motivators — to conduct research.  A study in this month’s IRB: Ethics & Human Research explores the impact payments may have on researchers to conduct and complete studies.  In Motivated by Money? The Impact of Financial Incentive for the Research Team on Study Recruitment, Sharon Unger and her colleagues examine the effect financial remuneration has on researchers in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).

Taking advantage of a “fortuitous set of circumstances” in which two separate clinical trials with nearly identical inclusion criteria were conducted simultaneously in an NICU in Canada, the authors looked at two issues: 1) whether financial remuneration impacted the rate at which the research team approached parents about research participation, and 2) whether financial remuneration impacted the rate at which parents provided consent to participate.

In the first study (Study A), a placebo-controlled trial involving a medication that was the standard of care for treatment of newborns nearing extubation to prevent apnea of prematurity, members of the research team were financially compensated for their time if they were successful in obtaining parental consent (parents were unaware of this arrangement).  In the second study (Study B), which involved two different forms of noninvasive respiratory support following extubation, there was no financial compensation of the research team.  Both studies had the same recruiting team.  Study A was federally funded, multicentered and high-profile, while Study B was a single-center, unfunded trial.

The payments in Study A were per capita, which, while creating a direct incentive to recruit individual enrollees, is usually not problematic as long as the payment is not excessive.  The Center recommends “that the benchmark for compensation for physician services for research should be comparable payment for time and services for treatment. This will compensate physicians fairly for their time and services, and will assure that there are no hidden bonuses or incentives for physicians to recruit patients into research or to refer them to research rather than treatment.”  As noted in the study, finder’s fees are increasingly considered “ethically problematic;” the Center recommends a wholesale bar on finder’s fees because they can create conflicts of interest that can incentivize investigators to recruit and retain individuals who do not meet the study’s inclusion and exclusion criteria.

As the authors noted, and as acknowledged in the Center’s White Paper, potential enrollees are increasingly vulnerable as increasing numbers of individuals seek to participate in research either as a primary means of access to treatment or as a form of income.  The results of this study indicate a much higher likelihood of approach when there was a prospect of financial remuneration.  These results are concerning, and were anticipated by the Center’s White Paper, which noted the potential for poor compliance with inclusion and exclusion criteria and pressure to enter or remain in a clinical trial.

However, surprisingly, the authors found that, despite the much higher likelihood of approach for Study A than Study B, parents were much more likely to actually agree to enroll their newborn in Study B — for which there was no financial remuneration of the research team.  The authors explored various explanations for this result, including that the research team was overly cautious about giving the appearance that their approach for consent was motivated by financial compensation, or that parents chose to withhold consent  due to the research team’s  increased pressure.

The authors do acknowledge other potential factors — beyond financial remuneration –  that could have affected the study’s results.  For example, parents’ hesitancy to enroll their newborn in a placebo-controlled drug trial could explain the discrepancy between enrollment in the studies.  Likewise, the authors consider that parents may not have been able to differentiate between the two modes of support being investigated in Study B.  In addition, the recruiting team, when presented with the results of the study, did not recall feeling influenced by the financial arrangement of Study A, but did “recall being highly motivated to ensure the success of Study A as it was part of a high-profile, multicentered trial.”

The authors concluded by noting concerns that “there may be a point at which the amount of the financial remuneration or the manner in which it is assigned could negatively impact the ethical conduct of the researcher,” but cautions that these concerns should be balanced with the value of conducting research in patients’ best interests.  This balancing act is considerably important.  As the Center notes,

Research is critical to the advancement of medical treatment and health. It must be structured to produce high quality data that facilitates the assessment of safety and efficacy in the population for whom the treatment will be used. The good of the enterprise requires that the clinical trial system sufficiently balance the costs and benefits to physicians and prospec­tive trial participants to ensure the continued sufficient supply of researchers and subjects. The system must also be imbued with actual and perceived integrity — so that it produces scientifi­cally reliable results, participants are safe, and people trust the system sufficiently to be willing to participate.

Developments in the Law Governing Physician-Owned Ambulatory Surgery Centers in New Jersey

Over the past year, one or the other of my sons has had minor surgery in no less than three of New Jersey’s many ambulatory surgery centers (”ASCs”).  So, I noted with interest the Appellate Division’s recent decision in Garcia v. Health Net in which it affirmed a lower court holding that physicians who make referrals to ASCs in which they have an ownership interest violate the Codey Law, New Jersey’s version of the Stark Law.  The Appellate Division also affirmed the lower court’s decision that, despite the illegal referrals, the physician-owners in the case committed no fraud.  They (along with other physicians-owners across the state) acted in reliance on the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners’ conclusion that the Codey Law’s exception to the self-referral ban for services provided at the referring physician’s medical office applied to ASCs.

In response to the lower court’s holding and heavy lobbying from physicians, the New Jersey State Legislature enacted revisions to the Codey Law which were signed into law in March 2009.  Physicians are now expressly permitted to refer patients to ASCs in which they have a financial interest if they meet a list of conditions, including that: (1) for patients they refer, they personally perform the surgery; (2) they be paid in proportion to their ownership interests, not the number of patients they refer; (3) they and their physician partners make all healthcare decisions, leaving non-physician partners without a say; and (4) they inform their patients in writing of their ownership interest at the time they make the referral.

On the other hand, the Legislature acted to all but put a stop to the establishment of new physician-owned ASCs, with the exception of those which are jointly owned by a general hospital.  Development of hospital– and medical school–owned centers may proceed apace.  Fox Rothschild’s Elizabeth Litten notes  that this “resonates more of long-forgotten certificate of need and health planning policy than it does of the original law’s concern with physician profit motives and overutilization.”  Clearly, the Legislature hopes that the new limits will be good for general hospitals’ financial health.  Professor Frank Pasquale has written here and elsewhere about the concern that ASCs and other niche facilities harm general hospitals by “cherry-picking” lucrative patients and “lemon dropping” those that are more costly.

What about patients?  Should we care whether ASCs are physician-owned or not?  Unsurprisingly, the American Medical Association believes that “physician ownership interests in health facilities, products or equipment can benefit patient care.” Peer-reviewed research suggests that physician-ownership makes no difference in health outcomes, however.  And, as Dean Kathleen Boozang states here, there is evidence that “physicians who hold an equity interest in an entity that provides ancillary health care services, such as a clinical laboratory or MRI, more frequently order those services for their patients, referring them, unsurprisingly, to the entity they own,” although there is no evidence that “this higher use equated to over-utilization.”  I would suggest, admittedly based on a small (and potentially unrepresentative) sample, that, if nothing else, physician-owned surgery centers have better amenities than those that are hospital-owned.  Some of these amenities could easily be done without (orchids in the lobby, souvenir teddy bear); others (popsicles and DVDs in the recovery room) are potentially more significant.

Further Calls for Increased Oversight on Medical Research & Physician Conflitcs of Interest

The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has continued to focus on the implications of research funding in patients’ decisions to participate in clinical research, as well as the effects such funding can have on researcher behavior and research results.  In January 2009, the Center recommended that all financial relationships between industry and physicians be publicly disclosed by industry.  And just this month, the Center released its most recent White Paper, “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight.”

Similarly, in a November 17 letter to Francis Collins, 100 researchers, academics, and public policy analysts asked the NIH to “fund studies on medical ethics, conflicts of interest in medicine and research, and prescribing behavior” in order to determine the effects of industry-academic relationships on human health.  The letter implores the director of NIH to focus on “the research gap on the effect of conflicts of interest and commercial influence on medical decisionmaking” and to establish a mechanism for funding relevant research.

One of the primary concerns in the researchers’ letter is an issue also identified in a November OIG report, “How Grantees Manage Financial Conflicts of Interest in Research Funded by the National Institutes of Health,” which found that a majority of academic researchers’ conflicts of interest are unreported.   The report flags the potential for extensive conflicts between faculty members and their government-financed research.  In response, the US Senate Finance Committee recently sent letters to several universities requesting such information.  Just yesterday, Northwestern University’s Feinberg School of Medicine, reacting to national concern about physicians’ and researchers’ financial conflicts of interest, began posting external professional and industry relationships for approximately 2000 faculty members — including service on boards of directors, consulting and related activities, ownership or investment interests, royalties and inventor shares, and additional activities such as lectures and participation in scientific advisory boards and professional societies.

Further research is obviously necessary to determine how financial relationships influence — as the authors of the letter to NIH call it — “the beliefs and behaviors of researchers and clinicians, and the effects of industry-academic relationships on the generation and dissemination of medical knowledge.”  In the meantime, increased oversight of physician-industry relationships by the federal government to evaluate and oversee investigator or institutional conflicts of interest, both for research within and without academic medical centers, is necessary.

Reform Rodeo

1. Kaiser Health News rounds up today’s editorials on health reform.

2. The New York Times reports that the CBO’s latest report finds that the Senate’s health bill will not increase premiums for the majority of Americans.

3. David Leonhardt describes how the Senate’s bill may offer more cost-cutting options than it is typically given credit.

4. John Iglehart offers his perspective on the the process that has allowed the Senate’s health reform bill to proceed to floor debate.

5. The Hastings Center has a thorough piece on the controversy surrounding the U.S. Preventitive Services Task Force’s decision to alter the recommended guidelines for mammography.

6. In case you missed it: Associate Dean Kathleen Boozang in The Health Care Blog regarding the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy’s latest White Paper: “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight.”

7. In case you missed it again: Professor John V. Jacobi in the New Jersey Law Journal on “Genetic Discrimination and the Future of Health Insurance.” (First posted here on HRW).

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy Issues White Paper Calling for Major Reforms in the Financing and Oversight of Clinical Research

Seton Hall University School of Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has called for major substantive reforms in the financing and oversight of clinical research. In a White Paper entitled “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” the Center proposes legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationships between industry and doctors that can create unwarranted risks to trial participants and to the scientific integrity of research.

Kathleen Boozang, a dean who oversees the Law School’s Center, explains that “Some of the ways that drug and device trial sponsors pay the physicians who lead clinical trials can tempt them to recruit individuals for clinical trials who would be better off receiving conventional therapy. This is of particular concern if physicians encourage their own patients to enroll in trials that these same physicians are overseeing.”

Over 60% of testing of experimental drugs and medical devices now occurs in physicians’ private offices; unlike years past, industry funds a much higher percent of clinical trials than government, frequently paying researchers significantly more than government does.  For some physician practices, conducting clinical trials represents a significant portion of their income.

According to Carl Coleman, a Seton Hall Law professor who collaborated on the White Paper, “A different kind of problem arises if people are enrolled in trials who don’t meet the criteria for who should participate - these individuals’ health can be put at risk, and their participation can skew the results of the trial, which is bad for everyone.”

Federal regulations in this area have not kept up with the rapid changes in how research occurs, and even those regulations that exist are poorly enforced, according to recent government studies.  Understanding that the collaboration among industry, government, and medicine in the pursuit of clinical research is critical to driving scientific progress, particularly as industry increasingly replaces the government as the primary source of research funding, the Center’s recommendations include:

1) Establishing a norm of financial neutrality between treatment and research. Ensuring that physicians receive comparable compensation for treatment and research will help ensure that their decisions to conduct research, as well as to recommend that a particular individual participate in a clinical trial, are grounded in reasons unrelated to their personal financial interests. This will be best accomplished, in the first instance through regulations that ban certain kinds of research compensation, and provide examples of acceptable payment methodologies that industry can follow. Reform by prosecution signals what practices government dislikes, but does not provide a clear vision of ideal approaches to managing conflicts of interest related to the conduct of research.

2) Establishing federal guidelines as to the principles or methodology by which to determine fair market value of physician time spent in clinical work. Federal regulations should be promulgated that establish a benchmark formula for determining fair market value of physicians’ time, effort and expenses for clinical research. Such regulations would promote the goal of financial neutrality between treatment and research. Physicians cannot be underpaid for research either - compensation for clinical trial work should therefore include reimbursement for any additional expenses that are unique to the research environment.

3) Banning payments with equity interests; disqualification of investigators who hold direct interests in the outcome of the research. Federal regulations should prohibit compensation for research in the form of an equity interest in the sponsor of a clinical trial. The law should preclude researchers who have investments that give them a direct interest in the outcome of the research from leading clinical trials.  Where absolutely necessary, such individuals might appropriately serve as consultants.

4) Banning payments of finder’s fees and bonuses for recruitment and retention of trial subjects. Certain forms of compensation create conflicts of interest that can incentivize investigators to enroll individuals in a clinical trial who are too healthy or too sick to participate, or to deemphasize information that might discourage individuals from consenting to trial enrollment. Federal law should ban such compensation methods, including finder’s fees and bonuses for meeting recruitment and retention goals.

5) Reforming federal regulations to compel and better guide the evaluation of relationships between industry and would-be physician investigators prior to the commencement of research.   The White Paper includes overlapping but sometimes distinctive recommendations for federal regulation to evaluate and oversee investigator or institutional conflicts of interest, both for research within and without academic medical centers.  Specific to research outside of academic medical centers, federal regulations should spell out clearly the obligation of community-based physicians acting as investigators or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for research and other financial interests to Institutional Review Boards.

Summarizing the importance of this White Paper, Boozang states, “The pharmaceutical and medical device industries save millions of lives each year with their innovations.  It is imperative that we maintain the integrity of research, and the public’s trust in the process.”

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. The Center is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices. The White Paper, “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” may be found here.

Seton Hall University School of Law, New Jersey’s only private law school and a leading law school in the New York metropolitan area, is dedicated to preparing students for the practice of law through excellence in scholarship and teaching, with a strong focus on clinical education. The Law School’s health law program has been ranked as one of the top programs in the country. Founded in 1951, Seton Hall Law School is located in Newark and offers both day and evening degree programs. For more information visit law.shu.edu.

American Health Lawyers Association on the Stark Law and its Revision: a Good Step Towards Holistic & Ethical Reform

Health reform that focuses exclusively on health care finance — that is, how we pay for universal access to insurance coverage — will not produce successful reform.  Reform must be holistic, with a focus on the entire system, as well as its component parts, including whether the system is structured to deliver the right kind of health care services in the most appropriate setting, whether we have sufficient quantity and kind of health care professionals and technology geographically dispersed to provide the health care services that people will presumably have insurance to access, and whether the system properly incentivizes health care professionals to make decisions that are efficient, effective, and in patients’ best interests.  This is a massive undertaking, with a tremendous risk that important components will be overlooked precisely because of the size of the undertaking.  The Stark Law represents the kind of on-the-ground healthcare delivery problems that healthcare reform must tackle.

The American Health Lawyers Association’s Public Interest Committee today released a Whitepaper entitled: “A Public Policy Discussion: Taking Measure of the Stark Law” analyzing the ” Ethics in Patient Referrals Act” (and its progeny), more commonly known collectively as the “Stark Law“, after its primary sponsor, Congressman Pete Stark, who now counts himself among the many who believe that while the problem the law aimed to address is real, the statute and its multitudinous exceptions have become a nightmare.

Stark was enacted in response to empirical studies showing that physicians who hold an equity interest in an entity that provides ancillary health care services, such as a clinical laboratory or MRI, more frequently order those services for their patients, referring them, unsurprisingly, to the entity they own (the Whitepaper notes that no studies indicated that this higher use equated to over-utilization).  The implication, then, is that the opportunity for additional profit causes excessive referrals, whether consciously or unconsciously.  Thus, Stark sought to establish a bright line test regarding the propriety of physician referrals.  Stark prohibits a physician from referring patients to entities in which the physician (or a family member) holds an equity interest.  Congress seeks to ensure that patients are referred only for tests and other health care services that are medically necessary and appropriate.  The law also prohibits the entity actually providing the services to the patient (the recipient of the referral) from billing Medicare if the patient care resulted from an impermissible referral (even if the patient needed the service).

But a basic prohibition proved too broad to be practicable.  For example, how should the law treat rural areas where the only potential investors in an MRI for the community are all of the local physicians?   While many of situations crying for exceptions have been legitimate, virtually every single business relationship that seems justified requires the adoption of a new exception — which, the Whitepaper points out, stymies innovation in a dynamic health care market.  I would add that simultaneous with the continuous recognition of new exceptions, Congress and CMS keep adopting new prohibitions in response to physicians (with the aid of their lawyers) who take advantage of loopholes by engaging in business practices that violate the philosophical goals of the law, but are not specifically banned.

And so now we simply have a mess on our hands.  According to the Whitepaper, on the positive side, Stark has encouraged health care institutions to adopt corporate compliance programs and contract management systems; hospitals are more careful about their relationships with physicians.  Repeating a recurring theme of this blog about physicians’ conflicts of interest, the AHLA Whitepaper suggests that Stark has had less effect on physicians’ awareness and avoidance of conflicts of interest — my observation is that they continue to engage in business arrangements and practices that increase healthcare expenditures and cause patients to receive unnecessary medical services.  This is likely because physicians don’t understand Stark, which is rarely enforced against them.  The Whitepaper conveys the observations of some of its participants that Stark has caused a restructuring of healthcare delivery (some would argue that physicians have simply re-packaged their business relationships, rather than eliminated their “pernicious” conduct).  Even more problematic is that Stark precludes the experimental implementation of some creative ideas to reduce health care costs and improve quality, such as pay-for-performance, shared savings, and bundled payments.  Essential to a reform of how we deliver health care is an alignment of physician and institutional financial incentives - Stark (as well as some other laws) makes difficult that effort.

The AHLA Whitepaper seeks statutory reforms and increased CMS discretion as part of overall healthcare reform.  It suggests reimbursement modifications as a mechanism that would more directly accomplish the government’s goals of reducing costs and controlling utilization, including: decreasing reimbursement for ancillary services provided through a physician group practice; decreasing payments for high margin services; implementing more stringent credentialing requirements for the provision of certain services; bundling the payment for a physician office visit and ancillary services;  and payments for episodes of care, rather than delivery of specific services.

While AHLA addressed an important problem that begs for resolution, the ultimate challenges for health care reform that the Stark problem points up are significant:

• First is the question of whether reform will restructure health care delivery so that patients receive quality care that they actually need, in a timely cost-effective and convenient way.
• Second is how to identify the most effective means of adjusting physicians’ norms of behavior so that they recognize and avoid or ameliorate conflicts of interest that adversely affect their care of patients.
• Third, since the HHS OIG began issuing its Guidances, the relationship between government and provider has been like one of cat and mouse — the government articulates a philosophy about its interpretation of fraud, waste and abuse and the attendant practices that violate the law, and providers adjust their behavior to discontinue the specifically enumerated offensive practices, and then adopt new behaviors that government then addresses and it goes on and on and on.
• All of the above points result from the fact that politicians have created a huge perception divide — physicians believe that they are professionals operating in a market who should be guided by their ethical code and the business practices that make America great - government regulators and prosecutors believe that taxpayers foot 40-60% of the healthcare bill, and should expect very stringent oversight of the behavior of health care providers to make sure taxpayer money isn’t being wasted. Whatever our health care system looks like this time next year, everyone — provider, supplier, and patient needs to acknowledge that irrespective of what descriptors we use, it is a system significantly underwritten by the government, which means that it necessarily operates by different rules….

In the meantime, the AHLA Whitepaper is a terrific description of all that is right and wrong with the Stark Law. Let’s hope Congress takes notice.  More important, it exemplifies the important contributions professional organizations can make to productively convey to policy-makers the on-the-ground effects of their laws.  The AHLA process also models an exemplary collaboration between the private sector and government to their mutual education and, hopefully, benefit.

While the author is an AHLA board member, this post solely represents the author’s interpretation of and opinions about the AHLA Whitepaper, and has not been reviewed by any director, officer or member of AHLA.  The author had no involvement in the production of the Whitepaper.

Will Conflicts of Interest Sabotage Health Reform?

With health care reform in full gear, one crucial question is that of prioritization. Where should we focus our efforts? Who needs greater treatment, and what type of care is missing from the everyday lives of everyday Americans? Unfortunately, the politicians crafting the legislation may be swayed–not surprisingly–by stakeholders and lobbyists who are concerned with how reform will affect their bottom line. Interestingly, it is not just private insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies that are influencing the legislation.

A recent New York Times piece underscores how the emerging landscape of physician-owned hospitals is helping to shape congressional legislation.

The Times article states that one of the largest sources of campaign contributions for the Senate Democrats Campaign Committee is from the Doctors Hospital at Renaissance for a not-so-paltry sum of $500,000. Ironically, the event that raised the sum was at the home of Alonzo Cantu, a real estate developer in–you guessed it–McAllen Texas. Another event at Cantu’s house “brought in at least $800,000 for the committee’s House counterpart, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.”

McAllen became (in)famous as the town depicted by Atul Gawande in his now oft-cited piece exposing the framework of incentives available to providers and hospitals to perform a greater number of tests and procedures in order to increase their bottom line, even when the greater volume of tests and procedures does not necessarily correspond to an increase in quality of care. Health Reform Watch has discussed the “cost conundrum” before.  Nevertheless, the incessant media and blog coverage of our inefficient system does not seem to have dissuaded those with a stake in that inefficient system from advocating for the status quo. As the Times points out that:

…like others here, he [Mr. Cantu] is not pleased about the president’s depiction of health care in McAllen.

“What’s so upsetting,” he said, “is that to make his case he threw McAllen under the bus.”

One might ask–given Gawande’s seemingly accurate portrayal of the overly-entrepreneurial nature of McAllen’s health care system–why we shouldn’t throw McAllen under the bus, especially when we can put a face on a problem undermining our system? Mr. Cantu and other Doctors Hospital officials are said to have offered the following argument for why Doctors Hospital and other physician-owned hospitals were beneficial and shouldn’t be singled out:

They have argued they are being unfairly grouped with boutique specialty hospitals that do not have emergency departments and that cater to privately insured patients. Eighty-eight percent of Doctors Hospital patients are either on public insurance or uninsured, 750 babies are delivered there a month, and no one is turned away because of inability to pay, they said.

Physician ownership, they added, has meant major investments in the latest equipment and good staffing ratios for nurses. Appealing to local pride, the hospital markets itself as the first in the area to offer services like PET scans, robotic surgery and breast imaging, which once required trips to Houston or San Antonio.

It is perhaps important to remember, as the McAllen boys attempt to mitigate the damages of the Gawande article, just what Gawande found. As we wrote prior:

Gawande writes that McAllen “is one of the most expensive health-care markets in the country. Only Miami-which has much higher labor and living costs-spends more per person on health care. In 2006, Medicare spent fifteen thousand dollars per enrollee here, almost twice the national average. The income per capita is twelve thousand dollars. In other words, Medicare spends three thousand dollars more per person here than the average person earns.”

El Paso, Texas, similarly situated, spends significantly less– half as much.

Might I suggest that there is little consolation in the fact that the largesse found in McAllen is largely funded through “public insurance,” or that there are “boutique hospitals” which charge even more?

In addition, “Local pride” aside, the real question is whether McAllen needs a PET scan facility or robotic surgery. Importantly, Texas is not a Certificate of Need (C.O.N.) law state. Therefore “local pride” (i.e. desire of a local, often private, facility) may often trump the actual “need” of the community. This idea is reinforced when taking into account that a PET scanner may have an annual operational cost of over $1 million, in addition to the upfront construction costs that can also venture into the millions. Altruism aside for the moment (or perhaps, it seems, longer), the investors in those machines will seek to recoup their cost plus profit. To do so, they simply must use that machine.

Thus, as it stands, the allocation of expensive high-tech machinery in physician-owned hospitals is based upon the government subsidized decision of private investors regarding the liklihood of turning a profit (for the subsidies, think “depreciation” and “expensing” for business equipment; think “public insurance” for billables). Perhaps we should not be quite so surprised when they then comport themselves in a way which ensures such a profit. But, it certainly may be argued that with our health care system in its precarious state, without a showing of actual need, the trip to Houston or San Antonio for very advanced high-tech procedures is a price we must be willing to pay and that the allocation of medical resources (and government subsidies for such) should be based on public need and not private profit.

In addition, given the overlap between physician-owned hospitals and single specialty hospitals, as Professor Frank Pasquale points out, these single specialty hospitals may siphon scarce health resources and undercut the care that community hospitals provide.

In a previous post, I discussed comparing a health care system to a pyramid, the foundation of the pyramid requiring a solid base of primary, preventive, and wellness care, that tapers to the top of the pyramid where we find the specialists utilizing, for example, advanced equipment and procedures like robotic surgery. However, a stable foundation for the pyramid is necessary, and the favoritism described above may stymie actual reform–reform that will provide Americans with the basics that they need at an affordable price.

Democrats are surely not the only ones to blame, and money has flowed to Republicans as well. As we discussed in an earlier post, a Common Cause report finds that $1.4 million dollars per day is being spent by healthcare interests lobbying Congress this year. From the perspective of the physician-owned hospitals and private health insurance companies, donating to both sides of the aisle makes sense; it ensures that both political parties have a financial stake in preventing legislation that would limit physician-owned hospitals from being subject to greater restrictions (like CON laws), or tightly regulating insurer practices. Though there are some restrictions governing physician-owned facilities in the House bill, these have been watered down, and will now allow facilities like Doctors Hospital to maintain their current structure, and even expand in certain future circumstances. As the Times reports:

The Senate Finance Committee has yet to release its final draft, but bills passed by two House committees would prevent the opening of new physician-owned hospitals by disqualifying them from receiving Medicare reimbursements. Existing facilities like Doctors Hospital would be grandfathered in.

One key provision would limit a hospital’s ownership by doctors to the level in place at the time of enactment. That is a change from previous language in House bills to restrict physician ownership to 40 percent. It would have forced Doctors Hospital, where physicians have an 82-percent stake, to be sold or required some of its owners to divest.

The future disallowance by Congress of Medicare funding for procedures performed at physician-owned hospitals is a tacit acknowledgment that the structure is one in which conflicts of interest abound; that he who owns a machine and will profit from its use is apt to refer patients for its use–regardless of actual need. It is the acknowledgment that the foxes are essentially guarding the henhouse–and that hens cost money. The exception made for Doctors Hospital and others of its ilk, however, considering the large campaign contributions, gives rise to other questions about conflicts of interest.

The problem is not simply the amount of money that is being funneled to Congress by the health care industry. The more pertinent issue at this point is: Read more

Clinical Research: When the Compensation Begs the Answer

The New York Times reports that New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram announced a settlement agreement with medical device maker, Synthes, for failing to disclose the financial conflicts of interest of doctors researching its products. Synthes is the maker of the ProDisc, an artificial spinal disk.

The settlement agreement with Synthes was described in the AG’s press release, which quoted Ms. Milgram, as “the first of its kind because of its disclosure provisions, as well as its ban on compensating clinical researchers with company stock. She said the latter provision runs counter to widespread industry practice — a practice she called unacceptable.” Notably, the state pursued the case as a matter of consumer fraud. The premise being that the failure to fully disclose such conflicts constituted such for both human trial subjects and the purchasing public.

In a letter to the FDA, critical of the FDA and cc’d to key members of Congress, Ms. Milgram described the results of the AG’s investigation into the business and research practices of Synthes. The letter states:

The investigation revealed that a majority of the physicians who participated in these clinical trials had significant investments in the products -investments that would have been worthless had the product failed to obtain regulatory approval from the FDA. And, the investigation revealed that Synthes, which acquired ProDisc while the clinical trials were underway, failed to disclose these financial conflicts of interest to the FDA.

Yet, despite the fact that Synthes’ failure to adequately disclose these interests should have been obvious from even a cursory review of its FDA submissions, the FDA did nothing to regulate these conflicts. A number of the disclosure forms were signed and dated, but were otherwise left blank. Others indicated that the clinical investigator had a significant equity interest in the product, but did not attach the requisite details. But the FDA approved Synthes’ applications for premarket approval without any delay or further inquiry into this issue.

Leaving aside for the moment the criticism of the FDA (the State of New Jersey joins a long list of increasingly vocal complainants, including the Program on Government Oversight (citing “dramatically reduced inspections of ‘good laboratory practices’ at facilities that do the earliest testing of medical devices. Such inspections declined from 33 in 2005, to seven in 2007, to just one last year”),  and FDA scientists from the Center for Devices and  Radiological Health, who have openly proclaimed that the FDA “is fundamentally broken.”), it’s worth a moment to consider that Synthes has agreed to “stop paying doctors who are conducting clinical trials of its products with stock or stock options,” and that AG Milgram described the compensation of research doctors with stock as being “apparently common” and a “widespread industry practice.”

Compensating a  doctor with stock or stock options financially tied to the results of his research may well be the antithesis of an impetus for objective clinical research.

The basic proposition is this: you, doctor, are charged with investigating whether or not this medical device is safe and fit and shows efficacy for human use. For doing so, we will give you a portion of the company (stock or stock options) which owns the medical device. If the medical device is efficacious and fit for human use, the company will stand to profit. As a holder of stock and/or stock options in the company, you will be paid a portion of that profit and/or the value of your holdings in the company will increase correspondent to your determination of safety for human use and efficacy. If you determine that the device is not safe for human use and/or not efficacious, your holdings in the company will be worth much less, if not worthless. “Is the device safe for human use and efficacious?” Does an answer of “Yes” surprise anyone?

It is also not an answer to say that the doctors may have merely been compensated in cash and then later converted that cash into stock or stock options independently. My guess is that in constructing these compensation packages, as with most securities matters, timing and knowledge is important. That the stock or stock options must be issued or at least contracted for by the researcher simultaneous with the hiring so as to avoid SEC difficulty regarding the particulars of the researchers’ “inside” and “confidential” knowledge regarding the device and the research itself. Researchers who have purchased interested stock (or who have had stock purchased by others) before news of their research has been made public have often paid a price.

And obviously, once the doctor’s research has been made public, any positive results will have been already reflected in the market price of the stock, all but foreclosing the research doctor from reaping profits tied directly to his research determinations.

As part of A.G. Milgram’s “Assurance of Voluntary Compliance agreement (the Synthes case was handled by Deputy Attorney General Megan Lewis, Chief of the Division of Law’s Affirmative Litigation Section, and Deputy Attorney General Michelle T. Weiner) Synthes must disclose any future payments made by the company to physicians conducting clinical trials on its devices, as well as any investments held by such physicians in the devices they test. A $3 billion global company, Synthes has also agreed to stop paying clinical trial physicians with company stock or stock options.”

Attorney General Milgram said that “the Synthes agreement should serve as a template for the entire industry,” and in her letter to the FDA remarked that she was “hopeful the Synthes terms will become “best practices” for disclosure among medical device makers.”

In addition to signifying her hope, Ms. Milgram announced that her office issued subpoenas “to five major medical device manufacturing companies seeking information about their business practices.”