The Ethics of Modern Drugs and Clinical Trials

Garden of Death, Hugo Simberg (1896)

A recent article in the New York Times raised an interesting question: are traditional, randomized, controlled trials of new genetically targeted cancer drugs unethical?

The piece recounts the story of two cousins, both diagnosed with melanoma.  After enrolling in the last phase of clinical study, the computer lottery selected one cousin to receive PLX4032, experimental “superpills.” The second cousin, now deceased, was relegated to a “notoriously ineffective” course of chemotherapy.

Randomized, controlled trials have become the gold standard in clinical research, comparing competing treatments to determine which extends life most.  The structure of the trial, with an experimental group and control group, is premised on the idea that the comparative effectiveness of the experimental treatment is unknown.  Therefore, one half of the participants in the clinical trial receive a believed to be less effective therapy for a greater good: researchers come to know definitively which treatment is more effective and future patients benefit from that knowledge.

Critics point out that these new drugs are so much more effective than prior treatments that time-consuming clinical trials are futile: the Phase III trial for PLX4032 would cost $100 million and take at least two years before possibly receiving F.D.A. approval.  That is a huge cost, in terms of lives and money, to “prove” what has already been demonstrated in early clinical testing.  Physicians are forced to forego an opportunity “to give patients symptomatic relief, even if the drug turned out not to prolong life.”

Dr. Paul B. Chapman of Sloan-Kettering, a medical oncologist at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and leader of the trial states in the article:

My goal is to find out as quickly as possible in as few patients as possible whether this works.  If we never know, then we’re never going to be able to build on anything.

Making patients’ tumors go away is gratifying.  But that’s not the businss I’m in.  I’m in the business of making people live longer.  That’s what I want to do.

In contrast, Dr. David E. Fisher, a leading melanoma biologist at Massachusetts General  said of the controlled trial:

My personal view is it’s nuts.  I don’t know anyone who hasn’t shuddered at the concept that we can’t let patients on the control arm cross over because we need them to die earlier to prove a point.

The trend towards more targeted and effective drugs changes the framework for evaluating the ethics of clinical trials.  Promising new treatments however, have sometimes been proven to be less effective.  Therefore, the question remains for medical researchers and the F.D.A.: when will early clinical results be so persuasive that a traditional, controlled trial is unnecessary?

Health Reform, “Death Panels,” & Section 1182–What the Text Really Says

Photo by Cathologiccga

This post is a follow-up to my prior post on the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, a nonprofit corporation created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Health Reform Law), which will oversee comparative clinical effectiveness research–or, in Palin-ese, “the Death Panel.” The pertinent text of the law under which the Institute will operate appears below along with explanation in the plainest English available.

LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN USES OF COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

Sec. 1182. (a) The Secretary may only use evidence and findings from research conducted under section 1181 to make a determination regarding coverage under title XVIII if such use is through an iterative and transparent process which includes public comment and considers the effect on subpopulations.

• TRANSLATION: Must be open and transparent and must consider effect on particular groups, but can use research to make determinations regarding coverage

‘(b) Nothing in section 1181 shall be construed as–

‘(1) superceding or modifying the coverage of items or services under title XVIII that the Secretary determines are reasonable and necessary under section 1862(l)(1); or

‘(2) authorizing the Secretary to deny coverage of items or services under such title solely on the basis of comparative clinical effectiveness research.

• TRANSLATION: Coverage cannot be based solely on CER

‘(c)(1) The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from comparative clinical effectiveness research conducted under section 1181 in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII in a manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill.

• TRANSLATION: CER cannot be used to assign a  lesser value to extending the life of the elderly, disabled or terminally ill (as compared to the younger and healthier) in regard to treatment. Health care dollars cannot be allocated first (or exclusively) to young and relatively healthy individuals under the rationale that extending the lives of the younger and healthier is, by definition, more valuable. The issue is further explored in 1182(e), discussed below. 1182(e) further limits the use of such valuations with regard to the Quality Adjusted Life Year.

‘(c)(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as preventing the Secretary from using evidence or findings from such comparative clinical effectiveness research in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII based upon a comparison of  the difference in the effectiveness of alternative treatments in extending an individual’s life due to the individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness.

• TRANSLATION: When evaluating treatments to extend an individual’s life, CER can be used to determine whether Medicare will cover one  treatment rather than an alternative. Specifically, an individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness can be a factor in deciding which treatment will be covered, reimbursed and/or incentivized.  For example an elderly person with severe coronary artery disease may have two treatment options: surgery (e.g. revascularization) or drug therapy. Both of these treatments would theoretically extend the life of the patient by reducing the odds of a heart attack or stroke. However (hypothetically) CER data may demonstrate that an individual of advanced age lives longer on average if they opt for drug therapy. In such a circumstance, this section provides that CER data may take into account the individual’s age, disability and terminal illness when comparing two alternative treatments. It may also be the case that CER data shows that individuals with certain disabilities are less likely to respond to surgery or to different treatment, possibly due to immobility, or even impending death. Again, these facts can be taken into account in the CER calculus.

‘(d)(1) The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from comparative clinical effectiveness research conducted under section 1181 in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII in a manner that precludes, or with the intent to discourage, an individual from choosing a health care treatment based on how the individual values the tradeoff between extending the length of their life and the risk of disability.

• TRANSLATION: The Secretary cannot use CER to deny or try to persuade a patient from choosing a treatment that may prolong their life but leave them severely disabled. Alternatively, the Secretary cannot prevent a patient from choosing a treatment which may improve the quality of their life, as opposed to an alternative treatment which may extend the length of life.

‘(2)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to–

‘(i) limit the application of differential copayments under title XVIII based on factors such as cost or type of service; or

• TRANSLATION: The extant differential copayment guidelines are unaffected. 

‘(ii) prevent the Secretary from using evidence or findings from such comparative clinical effectiveness research in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under such title based upon a comparison of the difference in the effectiveness of alternative health care treatments in extending an individual’s life due to that individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness.

• TRANSLATION: See 1182(c)(2) discussed above.

‘(3) Nothing in the provisions of, or amendments made by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, shall be construed to limit comparative clinical effectiveness research or any other research, evaluation, or dissemination of information concerning the likelihood that a health care treatment will result in disability.

• TRANSLATION: This section is straightforward. The Institute can compare various treatments and determine which is more likely to result in a disability, and disseminate those findings.

‘(e) The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute established under section 1181(b)(1) shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an adjusted life year (or such a similar measure) as a threshold to determine coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII.’

• WHAT IS A QALY?: The Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) is defined by the NIH as:
  • (1) A unit of measure of utility which combine life years gained as a result of health interventions/health care programs with a judgment about the quality of these life years.
    (2) A common measure of health improvement used in cost-utility analysis, it measures life expectancy adjusted for quality of life. (See NIH’s Health Economics Information Resources, Glossary, at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/edu/healthecon/glossary.html#QALY)
• The goal of the QALY is to ensure that healthcare resources are allocated in a manner which is most beneficial. Because healthcare resources are scarce, however, the $/QALY looks to allocate those resources economically. The QALY ipso facto discounts the value of life due to a disability. This is because the QALY works by assigning different states of health along a continuum, with perfect health being 1 and death being 0. The QALY is interested in whether different treatments provide more QALYs, In other words, QALYs are interested in whether one treatment provides more years at a better state of health (i.e., closer to 1) than another treatment. See M. Weinstein, Spending Health Care Dollars Wisely: Can Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Help? (2005)

• TRANSLATION: The Institute cannot utilize a $/QALY ( or a similar measure) as a threshold to establish what treatment is cost-effective, recommended or incentivized. (It is, however, noteworthy that in describing “similar measure,” both “age” and “terminal illness” are not expressly excluded as prohibited criteria in the development of a metric, as they are throughout the text of other portions of the provision).

• Note: 1182(c)(2) does allow for a disability to be taken into account when comparing various treatments for an individual. That section must be distinguished from the current section (1182(e)), where the upshot is that the dollar valued QALY cannot be a benchmark by which to allocate resources. If we are only determining which of two resources to a given individual shall be reimbursed, then the individual’s disability may be taken into account, i.e., treatment effectiveness under the individual’s circumstances  is a metric for which CER may be utilized; however, dollar value of life quality is not a permitted metric or criteria for treatment.

Comparative Effectiveness Research Under Health Reform, “The Institute”

Image by nick.garrod via Flickr

“Bend the cost curve” has been the mantra of many students of health care reform. The Dartmouth Health Atlas has shown that up to 1/3 of care may be unnecessary. But how do we find out what care is unnecessary? One tool that holds promise is comparative effectiveness research.   Now that health reform has been signed into law, there is greater certainty as to the future of comparative effectiveness research (CER). The Stimulus bill had already allocated $1.1 billion dollars to investigate CER. The newest health reform law continues to build on that start. So what about HR 3590, also known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act? Will they ration care? Pull the plug on your grandmother? Get between you and your doctor? To start answering these questions, I will provide a brief overview of CER under the new law, and describe the law’s vision for a new institute for CER research.

Part D of  H.R. 3509 is entitled “Comparative Clinical Effectiveness Research.” Section 1181 of  Part D defines CER as: “research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items described in subparagraph (B).” Subparagraph B goes on to describe various services and goods associated with health care.

The Institute
Section (b) of 1181 is where the rubber hits the road. Under this this section, the law creates a nonprofit corporation to be called the “Patient-Centered Research Institute,” known as “the Institute,” which is neither an agency nor establishment of the United States. This is rather interesting, and I did not know that our federal government created such corporations, but I suppose it could be compared to a nonprofit Amtrak.

Funding
The Institute will be backed by a Trust Fund created by money transferred from the Medicare Part A and B trust fund. It will receive, for year 2013, an amount equal to 1$ multiplied by the number of individuals entitled to benefits of Medicare Part A or enrolled under Part B. For years 2014 through 2019 the multiplier is $2.

The Purpose and Duties of the Institute
The purpose of the Institute is stated as what amounts to the typical reason for CER: making better health care decisions based on the evidence.

The duties of the institute are listed as:

1. Identifying and adopting (by majority vote within the Institute) research priorities and establishing research project agenda
2. Carrying out research project agenda by doing
   1. Systematic reviews of previous (and future) research (often known as meta-analysis), and
   2. Primary research including randomized clinical trials. The primary research the Institute conducts can be subcontracted to other institutions, under certain constraints.
3. Data collection from various electronic sources like those at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
4. Appointing expert advisory panels for clinical trials
5. Supporting patient and consumer representatives
6. Establishing a methodology committee to study new ways to measure and conduct CER.
7. Providing a peer-review process for primary research conducted by the Institute. Notably, if the Institute subcontracts, they can use the peer-review process of the organization to which they contract with.
8. Release of research findings to clinicians, patients, and the general public. The Institute must also release an annual report.

Governing in the Institute
The Institute will be run by a Board of Governors. The breakdown of the Board of Governors is quite interesting, and possibly telling:

• The Director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
• The Director of the National Institute of Health
• 17 members appointed by the Comptroller General of the U.S. The 17 members must be composed of:
  • 3 members representing patients and health care consumers.
  • 5 members representing physicians and providers, including at least 1 surgeon, nurse, State-licensed integrative health care practitioner, and a representative of a hospital.
  • 3 members representing private payers, of whom at least 1 member shall represent health insurance issuers and at least 1 member shall represent employers who self-insure employee benefits.
  • 3 members representing pharmaceutical, device, and diagnostic manufacturers or developers.
  • 1 member representing quality improvement or independent health service researchers.
  • 2 members representing the Federal Government or the States, including at least 1 member representing a Federal health program or agency.

This very well may be one of the handouts that the Senate provided Big Pharma and device manufacturers to get them on board. Remember that CER may very well show that a drug that a company has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in turns out to be ineffective when compared to its competitor. Thus, it is not surprising, for the cynics among us, that the Board has at minimum 3 industry reps from pharma and devices while there is a minimum of only 1 doctor. You start to wonder why the AMA supported the bill if physicians are only guaranteed 1/17th of the positions. After all, it is undeniable that physicians will be interacting with the CER data more than anyone, and they have on the ground experience using CER and related decision aids like Clinical Practice Guidelines.