The NIH’s Amended Conflict of Interest Regulations: A New, Weaker Approach to Intellectual Property Interests?

Yesterday, at long last, the National Institutes of Health released the final revisions to its regulations governing financial conflicts of interest on the part of applicants for federal research funds.  And there is good news.  The rule’s sunshine provisions have not, as was feared, been “gutted.”  Grant recipients will have to make their investigators’ financial conflicts of interest publicly accessible.  While an institution will not have to post the details of each conflict on its website, as was provided in the proposed regulations, if it does not it will instead have to provide the information in writing to anyone who asks for it.  Academics, advocates, federal and state prosecutors, other regulators, and members of the news media will have the access they need.  For sure, prospective patients or research participants will be less likely to come across information about investigator conflicts, but, as Kathleen Boozang explains here, it is far from clear that they would find such information helpful.

Of potentially more significance than the weakened sunshine provisions, the final regulations diverge from the proposed regulations with regard to the treatment of intellectual property.  Under the prior regulations, investigators were required to inform their institutions about relevant intellectual property rights, including copyrights, patents, and royalties in excess of $10,000.  The proposed regulations modified the definition to require disclosure of copyrights, patents, and royalties (and agreements to share in royalties) regardless of amount.  Under the final regulations, investigators do not need to tell their institutions about their intellectual property rights and interests unless and until they are in “receipt of income related to such rights and interests.”

The preamble to the final regulations is somewhat confusing.  For example, while the final regulations define significant financial interest to exclude intellectual property rights and interests that do not produce income, the agency states in the preamble that it “would expect institutional policies to require disclosure upon the filing of a patent application or the receipt of income related to the intellectual property interest, whichever is earlier.”  The preamble also contradicts itself with regard to the applicability of the rule’s $5,000 threshold, stating at one point that the threshold “applies to licensed intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights), royalties from such rights, and agreements to share in royalties related to licensed intellectual property rights,” while explaining (correctly, I think) at another point that “the $5,000 threshold would apply to equity interests and ‘payment for services,’ which would include salary but not royalties.”

The NIH’s explanation of its addition of the “receipt of income related to such rights and interests” qualifier to the definition of a significant intellectual property right or interest is especially confusing.  The agency writes that its intent was to exclude from the definition

“the rare cases when unlicensed intellectual property is held by the Investigator instead of flowing through the Institution,” because “it is difficult to determine the value of such interests.”  The agency’s point about valuation may be true, but that is an argument in favor of disclosure not against it.  With regard to equity interests, the final regulation requires investigators to disclose any equity interest in a non-publicly traded entity; the Food and Drug Administration similarly requires disclosure of equity interests “whose value cannot be readily determined through reference to public prices[.]“  The FDA also requires disclosure of any “[p]roprietary interest in the tested product,” without regard to value.

When an investigator has a proprietary interest in a product under study the potential exists for a serious conflict regardless of the interest’s current value or whether it is currently income-generating.  Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and others have recommended a near-total ban on serving as an investigator in that case.  Such a ban cannot, of course, be implemented unless investigators are required to tell their institutions about their proprietary interests.

Auditing Studies of Anti-Depressants

Marcia Angell has kicked off another set of controversies for the pharmaceutical sector in two recent review essays in the New York Review of Books. She favorably reviews meta-research that calls into question the effectiveness of many antidepressant drugs:

Kirsch and his colleagues used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain FDA reviews of all placebo-controlled clinical trials, whether positive or negative, submitted for the initial approval of the six most widely used antidepressant drugs approved between 1987 and 1999—Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, Celexa, Serzone, and Effexor. . . .Altogether, there were forty-two trials of the six drugs. Most of them were negative. Overall, placebos were 82 percent as effective as the drugs, as measured by the Hamilton Depression Scale (HAM-D), a widely used score of symptoms of depression. The average difference between drug and placebo was only 1.8 points on the HAM-D, a difference that, while statistically significant, was clinically meaningless. The results were much the same for all six drugs: they were all equally unimpressive. Yet because the positive studies were extensively publicized, while the negative ones were hidden, the public and the medical profession came to believe that these drugs were highly effective antidepressants.

Angell discusses other research that indicates that placebos can often be nearly as effective as drugs for conditions like depression. Psychiatrist Peter Kramer, a long-time advocate of anti-depressant therapy, responded to her last Sunday. He admits that “placebo responses . . . have been steadily on the rise” in FDA data; “in some studies, 40 percent of subjects not receiving medication get better.” But he believes that is only because the studies focus on the mildly depressed:

The problem is so big that entrepreneurs have founded businesses promising to identify genuinely ill research subjects. The companies use video links to screen patients at central locations where (contrary to the practice at centers where trials are run) reviewers have no incentives for enrolling subjects. In early comparisons, off-site raters rejected about 40 percent of subjects who had been accepted locally — on the ground that those subjects did not have severe enough symptoms to qualify for treatment. If this result is typical, many subjects labeled mildly depressed in the F.D.A. data don’t have depression and might well respond to placebos as readily as to antidepressants.

Yves Smith finds Kramer’s response unconvincing:

The research is clear: the efficacy of antidepressants is (contrary to what [Kramer's] article suggests) lower than most drugs (70% is a typical efficacy rate; for antidepressants, it’s about 50%. The placebo rate is 20% to 30% for antidepressants). And since most antidepressants produce side effects, patients in trials can often guess successfully as to whether they are getting real drugs. If a placebo is chosen that produces a symptom, say dry mouth, the efficacy of antidepressants v. placebos is almost indistinguishable. The argument made in [Kramer's] article to try to deal with this inconvenient fact, that many of the people chosen for clinical trials really weren’t depressed (thus contending that the placebo effect was simply bad sampling) is utter[ly wrong]. You’d see the mildly/short-term depressed people getting both placebos and real drugs. You would therefore expect to see the efficacy rate of both the placebo and the real drug boosted by the inclusion of people who just happened to get better anyhow.

Felix Salmon also challenges Kramer’s logic:

[Kramer's view is that] lots of people were diagnosed with depression and put onto a trial of antidepressant drugs, even when they were perfectly healthy. Which sounds very much like the kind of thing that Angell is complaining about: the way in which, for instance, the number of children so disabled by mental disorders that they qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) was 35 times higher in 2007 than it was in 1987. And it’s getting worse: the editors of DSM-V, to be published in 2013, have written that “in primary care settings, approximately 30 percent to 50 percent of patients have prominent mental health symptoms or identifiable mental disorders, which have significant adverse consequences if left untreated.”

Those who would defend psychopharmacology, then, seem to want to have their cake and eat it: on the one hand it seems that serious mental health disorders have reached pandemic proportions, but on the other hand we’re told that a lot of people diagnosed with those disorders never really had them in the first place.

That is a very challenging point for the industry to consider as it responds to concerns like Angell’s. The diagnosis of mental illness will always have ineradicably economic dimensions and politically contestable aims. But doctors and researchers should insulate professional expertise and the interpretation of maladies as much as possible from inappropriate pressures.

How can they maintain that kind of independent clinical judgment? I think one key is to assure that data from all trials is open to all researchers. Consider, for instance, these findings from a NEJM study on “selective publication:”

We obtained reviews from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for studies of 12 antidepressant agents involving 12,564 patients. . . . Among 74 FDA-registered studies, 31%, accounting for 3449 study participants, were not published. Whether and how the studies were published were associated with the study outcome. A total of 37 studies viewed by the FDA as having positive results were published; 1 study viewed as positive was not published. Studies viewed by the FDA as having negative or questionable results were, with 3 exceptions, either not published (22 studies) or published in a way that, in our opinion, conveyed a positive outcome (11 studies). According to the published literature, it appeared that 94% of the trials conducted were positive. By contrast, the FDA analysis showed that 51% were positive. Separate meta-analyses of the FDA and journal data sets showed that the increase in effect size ranged from 11 to 69% for individual drugs and was 32% overall. (emphasis added).

Melander, et al. also worried (in 2003) that, since “The degree of multiple publication, selective publication, and selective reporting differed between products,” “any attempt to recommend a specific selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor from the publicly available data only is likely to be based on biased evidence.” Without clearer “best practices” for data publication, clinical judgment may be impaired.

Full disclosure of study funding should also be mandatory and conspicuous, wherever results are published. Ernest R. House has reported that, “In a study of 370 ‘randomized’ drug trials, studies recommended the experimental drug as the ‘treatment of choice’ in 51% of trials sponsored by for-profit organizations compared to 16% sponsored by nonprofits.” The commodification of research has made it too easy to manipulate results, as Bartlett & Steele have argued:

One big factor in the shift of clinical trials to foreign countries is a loophole in F.D.A. regulations: if studies in the United States suggest that a drug has no benefit, trials from abroad can often be used in their stead to secure F.D.A. approval. There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be especially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called “rescue countries.” Rescue countries came to the aid of Ketek, the first of a new generation of widely heralded antibiotics to treat respiratory-tract infections. Ketek was developed in the 1990s by Aventis Pharmaceuticals, now Sanofi-Aventis. In 2004 . . . the F.D.A. certified Ketek as safe and effective. The F.D.A.’s decision was based heavily on the results of studies in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The approval came less than one month after a researcher in the United States was sentenced to 57 months in prison for falsifying her own Ketek data. . . . As the months ticked by, and the number of people taking the drug climbed steadily, the F.D.A. began to get reports of adverse reactions, including serious liver damage that sometimes led to death. . . . [C]ritics were especially concerned about an ongoing trial in which 4,000 infants and children, some as young as six months, were recruited in more than a dozen countries for an experiment to assess Ketek’s effectiveness in treating ear infections and tonsillitis. The trial had been sanctioned over the objections of the F.D.A.’s own reviewers. . . . In 2006, after inquiries from Congress, the F.D.A. asked Sanofi-Aventis to halt the trial. Less than a year later, one day before the start of a congressional hearing on the F.D.A.’s approval of the drug, the agency suddenly slapped a so-called black-box warning on the label of Ketek, restricting its use. (A black-box warning is the most serious step the F.D.A. can take short of removing a drug from the market.) By then the F.D.A. had received 93 reports of severe adverse reactions to Ketek, resulting in 12 deaths.

The great anti-depressant debate is part of a much larger “re-think” of the validity of data. Medical claims can spread virally without much evidence. According to a notable meta-researcher, “much of what medical researchers conclude in their studies is misleading, exaggerated, or flat-out wrong.” The “decline effect” dogs science generally. Statisticians are also debunking ballyhooed efforts to target cancer treatments.

Max Weber once said that “radical doubt is the father of knowledge.” Perhaps DSM-VI will include a diagnosis for such debilitating skepticism. But I think there’s much to be learned from an insistence that true science is open, inspectable, and replicable. Harvard’s program on “Digital Scholarship” and the Yale Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing* have taken up this cause, as has the work of Victoria Stodden.

We often hear that the academic sector has to become more “corporate” if it is to survive and thrive. At least when it comes to health data, the reverse is true: corporations must become much more open about the sources and limits of the studies they conduct. We can’t resolve the “great anti-depressant debate,” or prevent future questioning of pharma’s bona fides, without such commitments.

*In the spirit of full disclosure: I did participate in this roundtable.

…After the Horse Has Already Left the Barn: FDA Continues to Postpone Conflicts Review Until Studies Are Complete

On Tuesday, the Food and Drug Administration released a draft guidance on financial disclosure by clinical investigators, targeted at the investigators themselves, at drug and device companies and others who sponsor clinical trials, and at the agency staff who review the disclosures.  In the draft guidance, which updates an earlier one, the FDA briefly reviews the financial disclosure regulations, which have not changed, and then provides heavily revised and expanded answers to frequently asked questions.

The draft guidance is a response to a January 2009 report by the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) which recommended that the FDA (1) “ensure that sponsors submit complete financial information for all clinical investigators[,]” (2) “ensure that reviewers consistently review financial information and take action in response to disclosed financial interests[,]” and (3) “require that sponsors submit financial information for clinical investigators as part of the pretrial application process.”  The draft guidance addresses the first two recommendations but, unfortunately, FDA has still not taken action on the third.

The draft guidance responds to the OIG’s first recommendation in a number of ways, including in its response to the question “What does the FDA mean by due diligence?” which has grown from three sentences in the earlier guidance to four paragraphs in this one.  The draft guidance sets forth in detail what those applying for marketing approval must do to obtain financial information from every investigator who worked on every clinical trial submitted in support of the application.  For example, when an applicant is missing an investigator’s financial information because it cannot find him or her, it must try to locate the investigator by making at least two phone calls, sending at least two certified letters, and requesting new contact information from the investigator’s previous institutions.  From there, the search might progress to contacting professional associations and conducting internet searches.  The draft guidance’s recommendations, if followed, should drastically reduce the number of applications that rely on the due diligence exemption to excuse missing financial information.

With regard to the OIG’s second recommendation, the draft guidance adds and answers the following question: “What will FDA’s reviewers consider when evaluating the financial disclosure information?”  In its answer, the FDA explains that “outcome payments (that is, payment that is dependent on the outcome of the study) elicit the highest concern, followed by proprietary interests (such as patents, royalties, etc.); but these are rarely seen.”  More typical are equity interests and significant payments of other sorts, in which case the agency takes into consideration the amount and nature of the payment as well as other factors such as the total number of investigators and subjects in the study, whether and how the study is blinded, controlled, and randomized, and whether the study endpoints were objective or subjective.  While the agency elsewhere rejects the idea that the financial disclosure requirements be waived for “efficacy studies that include large numbers of investigators and multiple sites[,]” it would appear to agree that the likelihood of a single investigator biasing such a study’s results is low.

The FDA has not taken action on the OIG’s third recommendation, that investigators’ financial information be submitted to the agency as part of the investigational new drug applications (IND) and investigational device exemptions (IDE) applications that are filed before studies in humans are initiated.  The draft guidance does exhort sponsors to consult the FDA early and often to minimize potential bias.  The draft guidance explains that “[b]y collecting the information prior to the study start, the sponsor will be aware of any potential problems, can consult with the agency early on, and can take steps to minimize any possibility for bias.”

When sponsors do choose “to consult the FDA early”, the draft guidance provides that agency staff should “focus on the protection of research subjects and the minimization of bias from all sources.”  The suggestion that agency staff play a role in protecting research subjects is interesting.  It is not mentioned in the regulations or anywhere else in the draft guidance and it is only possible where sponsors voluntarily seek the FDA’s input.  By the time an applicant is required to turn over investigators’ financial information, as part of an application for marketing approval, the horse has left the barn.  The clinical trials are complete and it is too late to protect participant’s rights and interests.  Bias, by contrast, can sometimes be addressed retroactively.  The draft guidance notes that the FDA’s “[r]eviewers might … compare results from more than one investigator, re-analyze the data excluding the investigator’s results, analyz[e] the data in multiple ways, and/or determin[e] if results can be replicated over multiple studies.”  Even bias is better dealt with prospectively, though, not least because agency staff are aware of and sensitive to the expense associated with conducting clinical trials and are likely to be highly reluctant to disregard a trial’s results.

Because prospective review of investigators’ financial information would allow the FDA to “focus on the protection of research subjects and the minimization of bias” across the universe of studies, not just those in which the sponsor chooses “to consult the FDA early,” the financial disclosure regulations should be revised per the OIG’s recommendations to require that financial information be submitted as part of the pretrial application process.

Comments on the draft guidance are due by July 25, 2011.

The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Finanacial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research

Seton Hall University School of Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has issued a White Paper, “The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research,” in which the Center agrees that public policy should encourage researchers and institutions to make information about their financial relationships with industry available to the public, but-contrary to many other commentators’ recommendations- concludes that disclosure of financial information should not routinely be required as part of the informed consent process.

While reiterating the Center’s prior recommendations for direct measures to eliminate, reduce, and manage problematic financial relationships in clinical research, the Center notes that, despite “the importance of transparency as an ethical value, incorporating financial issues into the informed consent process would provide few, if any benefits to research subjects and could in fact cause significant harms.”

The Center notes the problem of “information overload,” as clinical research informed consent documents have already become “long and complex, thereby confusing and overwhelming potential research participants,” and evidence indicates that “participants are often unable to sift through the morass of information to tease out the content they find salient or material.” In addition, qualitative studies have shown that “brief concise statements about financial interest within informed consent documents were rarely understood, and sometimes only served to confuse potential participants.

The Center concludes that, if a conflict of interest is so serious that its disclosure would lead a reasonable person to refuse to participate in a study, the proper remedy is to eliminate the conflict. It is therefore essential to ensure that information about financial interests is made available to institutional review boards (IRBs) and conflicts of interest committees, so that they can ensure that any problematic conflicts are eliminated before a study begins.

The Center notes that its conclusion that financial conflicts of interest should not be routinely disclosed as part of the informed consent process is not inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.

While Moore creates the possibility that, in the right set of circumstances, a physician’s failure to disclose research-related financial interests could give rise to liability, it does not mean that any and all financial relationships with industry must necessarily be disclosed. Rather, as in any informed consent claim, liability would depend on the plaintiff’s ability to establish the element of causation–i.e., that, if the omitted information had been disclosed, a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would not have consented to the procedure. As explained above, under the Center’s proposed framework, any conflict serious enough to affect a reasonable person’s decision about enrollment would already have been eliminated before the research began.

“The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research” may be found at http://law.shu.edu/HealthLawPublications.

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices.

Human Farming & the Limits of Medical Research

A Museum of Modern Art exhibit by Michael Burton once proposed that human beings themselves would be the soil for a “future farm:”

Future Farm predicts that the emerging pharmaceutical research in harvesting adult stem cells from fat tissues and its convergence with future nanotechnologies, will bring with it scenarios that reconsider the body as income. We live in a world where industries exist to offer financial rewards for those willing to sell a kidney or produce hair to beautify others. Industries have grown to facilitate transplant tourism as a result of the success of contemporary surgery. And scientific and technological advances continue to bring new possibilities for the practice of farming the body.

This may seem like an overly dramatic or even science-fictionalized description of desperation due to poverty and larger economic trends. But the global economic race to the bottom has now so influenced medical research that Burton’s dark vision is coming closer to realization.

A recent article by Bartlett & Steele and a book by Carl Elliott describe the rise of “contract research organizations” that organize the initial phases of drug trials. Bartlett and Steele choose a provocative metaphor to describe the trend:

To have an effective regulatory system you need a clear chain of command—you need to know who is responsible to whom, all the way up and down the line. There is no effective chain of command in modern American drug testing. Around the time that drugmakers began shifting clinical trials abroad, in the 1990s, they also began to contract out all phases of development and testing, putting them in the hands of for-profit companies.

It used to be that clinical trials were done mostly by academic researchers in universities and teaching hospitals, a system that, however imperfect, generally entailed certain minimum standards. The free market has changed all that. Today it is mainly independent contractors who recruit potential patients both in the U.S. and—increasingly—overseas. They devise the rules for the clinical trials, conduct the trials themselves, prepare reports on the results, ghostwrite technical articles for medical journals, and create promotional campaigns. The people doing the work on the front lines are not independent scientists. They are wage-earning technicians who are paid to gather a certain number of human beings; sometimes sequester and feed them; administer certain chemical inputs; and collect samples of urine and blood at regular intervals. The work looks like agribusiness, not research.

Because of the deference shown to drug companies by the F.D.A.—and also by Congress, which has failed to impose any meaningful regulation—there is no mandatory public record of the results of drug trials conducted in foreign countries. Nor is there any mandatory public oversight of ongoing trials.

Therefore, it is up to journalists like Bartlett & Steele to uncover problems. And they are legion:

The Argentinean province of Santiago del Estero, with a population of nearly a million, is one of the country’s poorest. In 2008 seven babies participating in drug testing in the province suffered what the U.S. clinical-trials community refers to as “an adverse event”: they died. . . . In New Delhi, 49 babies died at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences while taking part in clinical trials over a 30-month period. . . . In 2007, residents of a homeless shelter in Grudziadz, Poland, received as little as $2 to take part in a flu-vaccine experiment. The subjects thought they were getting a regular flu shot. They were not. At least 20 of them died.

Bartlett and Steele also discuss problems in research in the US. Exploitation probably should not be a surprise in a country where unpaid prison labor appears to be a strategy to boost productivity. US companies are also driving the “initial stages of distributed human computing that can be directed at mental tasks the way that surplus remote server rackspace or Web hosting can be purchased to accommodate sudden spikes in Internet traffic.” (Such “human intelligence tasks” can be purchased for as little as a penny each on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.) But the slow infiltration of less developed countries’ standards into US drug testing should be a concern for the FDA.

The system also appears to give drug companies a wide latitude to manipulate results, leading to the rise of “rescue countries” that are particularly prone to produce positive results:

One big factor in the shift of clinical trials to foreign countries is a loophole in F.D.A. regulations: if studies in the United States suggest that a drug has no benefit, trials from abroad can often be used in their stead to secure F.D.A. approval. There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be especially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called “rescue countries.” Rescue countries came to the aid of Ketek, the first of a new generation of widely heralded antibiotics to treat respiratory-tract infections. . . In 2004—on April Fools’ Day, as it happens—the F.D.A. certified Ketek as safe and effective. The F.D.A.’s decision was based heavily on the results of studies in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. The approval came less than one month after a researcher in the United States was sentenced to 57 months in prison for falsifying her own Ketek data.

Massive global inequalities render populations around the world vulnerable to exploitative testing conditions.

Carl Elliott’s book White Coat, Black Hat covers similar terrain, as well as the conflicts of interest and other issues we’ve addressed at Seton Hall’s health law center. His review of recent books on medical research described a “mild torture economy.” His piece “Guinea Pigging” suggests that “rescue counties” in the US may complement the “rescue countries” of Bartlett and Steele:

This unit was in a university hospital, not a corporate lab, and the staff had a casual attitude toward regulations and procedures. “The Animal House of research units” is what [one research subject] calls it. . . . Although study guidelines called for stringent dietary restrictions, the subjects got so hungry that one of them picked the lock on the food closet. “We got giant boxes of cookies and ran into the lounge and put them in the couch,” Rockwell says. “This one guy was putting them in the ceiling tiles.” Rockwell has little confidence in the data that the study produced. “The most integral part of the study was the diet restriction,” he says, “and we were just gorging ourselves at 2 A.M. on Cheez Doodles.”

Elliott’s litany of poorly controlled or ramshackle studies gives us one more item to add to Dr. John Ioannidis’s many reasons for doubting medical research:

Ioannidis [has] laid out a detailed mathematical proof that, assuming modest levels of researcher bias, typically imperfect research techniques, and the well-known tendency to focus on exciting rather than highly plausible theories, researchers will come up with wrong findings most of the time. Simply put, if you’re attracted to ideas that have a good chance of being wrong, and if you’re motivated to prove them right, and if you have a little wiggle room in how you assemble the evidence, you’ll probably succeed in proving wrong theories right. . . .

When a five-year study of 10,000 people finds that those who take more vitamin X are less likely to get cancer Y, you’d think you have pretty good reason to take more vitamin X . . . But these studies often sharply conflict with one another. Studies have gone back and forth on the cancer-preventing powers of vitamins A, D, and E; on the heart-health benefits of eating fat and carbs; and even on the question of whether being overweight is more likely to extend or shorten your life. How should we choose among these dueling, high-profile nutritional findings? Ioannidis suggests a simple approach: ignore them all.

For starters, he explains, the odds are that in any large database of many nutritional and health factors, there will be a few apparent connections that are in fact merely flukes, not real health effects—it’s a bit like combing through long, random strings of letters and claiming there’s an important message in any words that happen to turn up. But even if a study managed to highlight a genuine health connection to some nutrient, you’re unlikely to benefit much from taking more of it, because we consume thousands of nutrients that act together as a sort of network, and changing intake of just one of them is bound to cause ripples throughout the network that are far too complex for these studies to detect, and that may be as likely to harm you as help you. . . .[S]tudies rarely go on long enough to track the decades-long course of disease and ultimately death. Instead, they track easily measurable health “markers” such as cholesterol levels, blood pressure, and blood-sugar levels, and meta-experts have shown that changes in these markers often don’t correlate as well with long-term health as we have been led to believe. . . .

And these problems are aside from ubiquitous measurement errors (for example, people habitually misreport their diets in studies), routine misanalysis (researchers rely on complex software capable of juggling results in ways they don’t always understand), and the less common, but serious, problem of outright fraud (which has been revealed, in confidential surveys, to be much more widespread than scientists like to acknowledge). . . .If a study somehow avoids every one of these problems and finds a real connection to long-term changes in health, you’re still not guaranteed to benefit, because studies report average results that typically represent a vast range of individual outcomes. Should you be among the lucky minority that stands to benefit, don’t expect a noticeable improvement in your health, because studies usually detect only modest effects that merely tend to whittle your chances of succumbing to a particular disease from small to somewhat smaller. “The odds that anything useful will survive from any of these studies are poor,” says Ioannidis—dismissing in a breath a good chunk of the research into which we sink about $100 billion a year in the United States alone.

To summarize: Ioannidis casts some doubt on even the best of studies, and Elliott, Bartlett, and Steele show that bad studies may be far more common than we suspect. It’s a troubling set of observations for all concerned. We should at the very least insist on much more systematic monitoring of global drug trials.

Guatemala and Tuskegee, Winter Man Rides Again

Recent news of STD experiments by U.S. Public Health Service researchers on vulnerable Guatemalans back in the 1940s  gives rise for pause. The Wall Street Journal’s Health Blog reports:

In an article published online in the Journal of the American Medical Association, the CDC’s Thomas Frieden and NIH’s Francis Collins say the unpublished research — which involved intentionally infecting prison inmates, soldiers, sex workers and the mentally incapacitated with syphilis and other STDs — clearly violated ethical standards.

And that

The two say that “regulations safeguarding humans participating in research have been enacted” since the studies were conducted, from 1946-48. Federally funded research projects that could expose human subjects to harm must be overseen by an institutional review board, and researchers are almost always required to get informed consent, they write.

This is true, regulations safeguarding humans participating in research have been enacted. But it’s important to remember that such atrocities–and they are atrocities–were not just relegated to the forties. Although 1948 seems a very long time ago, 1972 does not.

The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment/Study was conducted by the U.S. Health Service between 1932 and 1972 in Tuskegee Alabama. Poor African-American sharecroppers with syphilis were recruited to document the progression of the disease. They were left untreated.

“The Public Health Service, working with the Tuskegee Institute, began the study in 1932. Nearly 400 poor black men with syphilis from Macon County, Ala., were enrolled in the study. For participating in the study, the men were given free medical exams, free meals and free burial insurance. They were never told they had syphilis, nor were they ever treated for it. According to the Centers for Disease Control, the men were told they were being treated for ‘bad blood,’ a local term used to describe several illnesses, including syphilis, anemia and fatigue.”

Although penicillin became the standard treatment for syphilis by 1947, the Tuskegee researchers continued the study for another 25 years, withheld penicillin  from the study subjects, and “prevented participants from accessing syphilis treatment programs available to others in the area.”

As a result, numerous men died from the disease, many spread it to their wives, and a number of children were born with congenital syphilis. The study was stopped, 40 years after it started, only after a newspaper got wind of it.

John Charles Cutler, M.D. “was a senior surgeon, and the acting chief of the venereal disease program in the United States Public Health Service.” He was involved in the studies in both Guatemala and Tuscegee. “In ‘The Deadly Deception,’ the 1993 Nova documentary about the Tuskegee experiments, Dr. Cutler states, “It was important that they were supposedly untreated, and it would be undesirable to go ahead and use large amounts of penicillin to treat the disease, because you’d interfere with the study.”

The utilitarian calculus can be a monstrous thing. That there are laws now to protect against the practice does not relieve me of the dread at the thought that we actually need laws for such a thing.  The inclination alone is reason for pause. In old Lakota Sioux medicine wheel teachings, Hyemeyohsts Storm says that intellect without compassion produces Winter Man– which freezes everything it touches. But I don’t think that’s a standard academic text.

The Ethics of Modern Drugs and Clinical Trials

A recent article in the New York Times raised an interesting question: are traditional, randomized, controlled trials of new genetically targeted cancer drugs unethical?

The piece recounts the story of two cousins, both diagnosed with melanoma.  After enrolling in the last phase of clinical study, the computer lottery selected one cousin to receive PLX4032, experimental “superpills.” The second cousin, now deceased, was relegated to a “notoriously ineffective” course of chemotherapy.

Randomized, controlled trials have become the gold standard in clinical research, comparing competing treatments to determine which extends life most.  The structure of the trial, with an experimental group and control group, is premised on the idea that the comparative effectiveness of the experimental treatment is unknown.  Therefore, one half of the participants in the clinical trial receive a believed to be less effective therapy for a greater good: researchers come to know definitively which treatment is more effective and future patients benefit from that knowledge.

Critics point out that these new drugs are so much more effective than prior treatments that time-consuming clinical trials are futile: the Phase III trial for PLX4032 would cost $100 million and take at least two years before possibly receiving F.D.A. approval.  That is a huge cost, in terms of lives and money, to “prove” what has already been demonstrated in early clinical testing.  Physicians are forced to forego an opportunity “to give patients symptomatic relief, even if the drug turned out not to prolong life.”

Dr. Paul B. Chapman of Sloan-Kettering, a medical oncologist at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and leader of the trial states in the article:

My goal is to find out as quickly as possible in as few patients as possible whether this works.  If we never know, then we’re never going to be able to build on anything.

Making patients’ tumors go away is gratifying.  But that’s not the businss I’m in.  I’m in the business of making people live longer.  That’s what I want to do.

In contrast, Dr. David E. Fisher, a leading melanoma biologist at Massachusetts General  said of the controlled trial:

My personal view is it’s nuts.  I don’t know anyone who hasn’t shuddered at the concept that we can’t let patients on the control arm cross over because we need them to die earlier to prove a point.

The trend towards more targeted and effective drugs changes the framework for evaluating the ethics of clinical trials.  Promising new treatments however, have sometimes been proven to be less effective.  Therefore, the question remains for medical researchers and the F.D.A.: when will early clinical results be so persuasive that a traditional, controlled trial is unnecessary?

Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy Submits Comments on Conflicts of Interest in Research to the National Institutes of Health

On August 19, 2010, on behalf of Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law Professors Kathleen Boozang and Carl Coleman, along with Research Fellow Kate Greenwood, submitted comments on the National Institutes of Health’s proposed revisions to its regulations governing conflicts of interest in federally-funded research.  While the Center’s November 2009 White Paper Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight endorsed limits on conflicts of interest beyond those that the NIH has proposed, the revised regulations are a step in the right direction and in its comments the Center commends the NIH for its decisive action on this issue.


Briefly, the Center:

• Supports the NIH’s proposal that that researchers disclose to their institutions any significant financial interest that “reasonably appears to be related to the Investigator’s institutional responsibilities,” with “institutional responsibilities” defined to include “activities such as research, research consultation, teaching, professional practice, institutional committee memberships, and service on panels such as Institutional Review Boards or Data and Safety Monitoring Boards.” This comports with the Center’s recommendation in the White Paper that investigators not be charged with determining for themselves whether one or more of their financial interests could be affected by a specific research project.

• Supports the NIH’s decision to significantly lower the monetary threshold at which a researcher’s financial interest becomes “significant” to $5,000, but argues that a lower threshold would be better. Collection of data about all of a researcher’s relationships with industry, even those that fall below the proposed $5,000 threshold, would facilitate better conflict of interest assessment and management and make possible research into the effects of conflicts on research integrity and human subject welfare.

• Supports the NIH’s decision not to exclude income from non-profit entities for lectures and similar engagements from the definition of significant financial interest and its conclusion that any equity interest in a non-publicly traded entity is significant, as are any and all intellectual property rights, but encourages the agency to revisit its decision to shield from disclosure (1) equity interests held by investigators in commercial or for-profit institutions and (2) royalties and other remuneration other than salary paid to an investigator by an institution that appoints or employs him or her.

• Notes that the draft revised regulations do not address the White Paper’s criticisms that the conflict of interest regulations place no “substantive limits on the kinds of conflicts that may exist” and fail to put forth “a required minimum response for conflicts that pose the greatest risks to participants and the integrity of the research” and encourages the NIH to consider again the benefits of setting forth required minimum responses to those conflicts that are the most problematic.

• Supports the NIH’s decision to require that grantees provide “sufficient information to enable the [agency] to understand the nature and extent of the financial conflict, and to assess the appropriateness of the Institution’s management plan.”

• Supports the requirement in the draft revised regulations that any significant financial interest that (1) is still held by a principal investigator or senior/key person, (2) is related to PHS-funded research, and (3) is a financial conflict of interest must be disclosed to the public via the world wide web.

• Supports the draft revised regulations’ requirement that investigators complete training on “the Institution’s policy on financial conflicts of interest, the Investigator’s responsibilities regarding disclosure of significant financial interests, and of these regulations” before the commencement of research and then at least once every two years. As recommended in the Center’s White Paper, it would be beneficial for the training to include as well a discussion of the nature of conflicts of interest and their potential for harm.

• Recommends that the agency adopt its own suggestion that institutions be required to “maintain up-to-date, written, enforced policies” on institutional conflicts of interest, as they are for investigator conflicts, and that these policies be made publicly available via the world wide web. The nudge this requirement would provide is necessary because institutions have been slow to develop and adopt policies on institutional conflicts.

• Recommends that the section of the regulations devoted to remedies be revised to include a non-exclusive list of potential enforcement actions such as temporary withholding of cash payments pending correction of the deficiency, suspension or termination of the contract or grant in whole or in part, monetary assessments and penalties, and suspension or debarment from eligibility for future contracts or grants.

The Center’s comments in their entirety are available here.

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. The Center is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices.

Recommended Reading, “Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Research: The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth”

Jesse Goldner’s Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Research:  The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1211 (2009), is a must-read for anyone who has anything to do with oversight of researchers’ conflicts of interest.  The article reflects an insider’s understanding of academic physicians’ perspectives on this still-contentious topic, provides a terrific survey of the literature, and proposes regulatory fixes by the feds that HHS will hopefully seriously consider.  The article’s timing is perfect, given that HHS is receiving comments until August 19, 2010 on proposed changes to its conflict of interest regulations.  See http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coi/. Even in the short time since the publication of Goldner’s article, HHS OIG has issued yet another report on conflicts of interest management, entitled “How Grantees Manage Financial Conflicts of Interest in Research Funded by the National Institutes of Health,” (Nov. 2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-07-00700.pdf.  Based upon an in-depth audit of 41 grantee institutions that reported conflicts in FY 2006, the OIG found that equity interests represent the most pervasive form of financial conflict of interest. The most popular tool employed by entities managing conflicts is disclosure to publications or at academic presentations; entities only rarely required the reduction or elimination of conflicts.  As important, and unsurprising based upon AAMC surveys, is the unreliability of the conflict reporting mechanisms used by most academic institutions.

The OIG report emphasizes the need for increased oversight of conflicts of interest.  Academic medical centers have had plenty of time and forewarning to address the issue but, as demonstrated by a vignette described by Goldner about his own efforts to accomplish this through the IRB which he chaired, faculty resistance is significant.  Consequently, Goldner is exactly right in calling upon HHS to issue aggressive regulations that accomplish the necessary reforms.  He would require the establishment of conflict of interest committees at every research institution, comprised primarily of independent members, to which faculty would report all financial relationships that create conflicts of interest. Resolution of such conflicts would be a condition precedent to proceeding with proposed research, and violations would result in significant penalties, including debarment from research.

As shall be discussed in a forthcoming Seton Hall White Paper entitled The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, I do not have confidence in benefits accruing from requiring disclosure of conflicts to research participants in consent forms, although research participants do have a right to know of such conflicts.  This is a minor quibble.  Goldner’s article is a great contribution to the literature. 

San Francisco Has Cancer on the Brain

Recently, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the city’s Board of Supervisors has thrown its hat into the ring of the great cell phone brain cancer debate.  The Board voted 9-1 in favor of an ordinance requiring local retailers to display specific absorption rate (SAR) notices detailing radiation levels in cell phones.  SAR measures the rate at which radiofrequency electromagnetic energy is absorbed in a body when using a cell phone.  The FCC requires that cell phones sold in the U.S. not exceed a SAR level of 1.6 watts per kilogram.  (If you’re curious about your own cell phone, check out CNET’s SAR level list for voice calls).  Mayor Gavin Newsom is expected to sign off on the ordinance and his spokesman says “this is a very reasonable and quite modest measure that will provide greater transparency and information to consumers for whom this is an area of interest or concern.” If this really does come through, it won’t affect retailers until 2011 or so.

Meanwhile, the industry trade group CTIA-The Wireless Association has issued a statement admonishing and punishing the Board for its vote:

“CTIA and the wireless industry are disappointed that the San Francisco Board of Supervisors has approved the so-called ‘Cell Phone Right-to-Know’ ordinance.  Rather than inform, the ordinance will potentially mislead consumers with point of sale requirements suggesting that some phones are ’safer’ than others….  [A]ll phones sold legally in the U.S. must comply with the Federal Communications Commission’s safety standards….  While we have enjoyed bringing our three day fall show to San Francisco five times in the last seven years, which has meant we’ve brought more than 68,000 exhibitors and attendees and had an economic impact of almost $80 million to the Bay Area economy, the Board of Supervisors’ action has led us to decide to relocate our show [starting in 2011].”

So is this just fear-mongering or does San Francisco’s Board know something that the rest of us don’t?  According to the 10 year Interphone study conducted by the World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer and published online last month by the International Journal of Epidemiology, there is no conclusive evidence supporting or disaffirming any connection between cell phones and the risk of brain tumors.  The study was not without controversy, though, even among the researchers themselves — and it had nothing to do with industry trade organizations– the Mobile Manufacturers’ Forum and the GSM Association– contributing funds for the study.  Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Interphone researchers were puzzled by their data because

[t]he result is a strange set of numbers.  Many levels of cellphone use appeared to reduce the chance of developing a tumor.  Only the people who talked on cellphones the most had a significantly greater chance of developing glioma [a type of tumor] - 40% greater - than those who didn’t use cellphones.

The use of cell phones might reduce the chance of developing a brain tumor?  Go figure.  For now, our very own FDA supports the Interphone study and refers to others which have shown no increased health risk.

Perhaps San Francisco politicians and consumers, like the rest of us, are really just facing a case of caveat emptor.  However, until there is a study which can definitively support or disaffirm any connection between cell phones and the risk of brain tumors,  I wouldn’t mind knowing whether one phone has a higher or lower SAR level than another.  CTIA needn’t worry though.  Having such information won’t make me break my contract with AT&T or stop me from eagerly awaiting the arrival of my iPhone 4 (whose SAR level, according to FCC documents, appears to be lower than my current iPhone 3G but higher than the iPhone 3GS).  At least I’ve now given some thought about the risks to which I may be exposing myself.  So too have the folks in San Francisco.

Health Reform, “Death Panels,” & Section 1182–What the Text Really Says

This post is a follow-up to my prior post on the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, a nonprofit corporation created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Health Reform Law), which will oversee comparative clinical effectiveness research–or, in Palin-ese, “the Death Panel.” The pertinent text of the law under which the Institute will operate appears below along with explanation in the plainest English available.

LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN USES OF COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

Sec. 1182. (a) The Secretary may only use evidence and findings from research conducted under section 1181 to make a determination regarding coverage under title XVIII if such use is through an iterative and transparent process which includes public comment and considers the effect on subpopulations.

• TRANSLATION: Must be open and transparent and must consider effect on particular groups, but can use research to make determinations regarding coverage

‘(b) Nothing in section 1181 shall be construed as–

‘(1) superceding or modifying the coverage of items or services under title XVIII that the Secretary determines are reasonable and necessary under section 1862(l)(1); or

‘(2) authorizing the Secretary to deny coverage of items or services under such title solely on the basis of comparative clinical effectiveness research.

• TRANSLATION: Coverage cannot be based solely on CER

‘(c)(1) The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from comparative clinical effectiveness research conducted under section 1181 in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII in a manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill.

• TRANSLATION: CER cannot be used to assign a  lesser value to extending the life of the elderly, disabled or terminally ill (as compared to the younger and healthier) in regard to treatment. Health care dollars cannot be allocated first (or exclusively) to young and relatively healthy individuals under the rationale that extending the lives of the younger and healthier is, by definition, more valuable. The issue is further explored in 1182(e), discussed below. 1182(e) further limits the use of such valuations with regard to the Quality Adjusted Life Year.

‘(c)(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as preventing the Secretary from using evidence or findings from such comparative clinical effectiveness research in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII based upon a comparison of  the difference in the effectiveness of alternative treatments in extending an individual’s life due to the individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness.

• TRANSLATION: When evaluating treatments to extend an individual’s life, CER can be used to determine whether Medicare will cover one  treatment rather than an alternative. Specifically, an individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness can be a factor in deciding which treatment will be covered, reimbursed and/or incentivized.  For example an elderly person with severe coronary artery disease may have two treatment options: surgery (e.g. revascularization) or drug therapy. Both of these treatments would theoretically extend the life of the patient by reducing the odds of a heart attack or stroke. However (hypothetically) CER data may demonstrate that an individual of advanced age lives longer on average if they opt for drug therapy. In such a circumstance, this section provides that CER data may take into account the individual’s age, disability and terminal illness when comparing two alternative treatments. It may also be the case that CER data shows that individuals with certain disabilities are less likely to respond to surgery or to different treatment, possibly due to immobility, or even impending death. Again, these facts can be taken into account in the CER calculus.

‘(d)(1) The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from comparative clinical effectiveness research conducted under section 1181 in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII in a manner that precludes, or with the intent to discourage, an individual from choosing a health care treatment based on how the individual values the tradeoff between extending the length of their life and the risk of disability.

• TRANSLATION: The Secretary cannot use CER to deny or try to persuade a patient from choosing a treatment that may prolong their life but leave them severely disabled. Alternatively, the Secretary cannot prevent a patient from choosing a treatment which may improve the quality of their life, as opposed to an alternative treatment which may extend the length of life.

‘(2)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to–

‘(i) limit the application of differential copayments under title XVIII based on factors such as cost or type of service; or

• TRANSLATION: The extant differential copayment guidelines are unaffected. 

‘(ii) prevent the Secretary from using evidence or findings from such comparative clinical effectiveness research in determining coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under such title based upon a comparison of the difference in the effectiveness of alternative health care treatments in extending an individual’s life due to that individual’s age, disability, or terminal illness.

• TRANSLATION: See 1182(c)(2) discussed above.

‘(3) Nothing in the provisions of, or amendments made by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, shall be construed to limit comparative clinical effectiveness research or any other research, evaluation, or dissemination of information concerning the likelihood that a health care treatment will result in disability.

• TRANSLATION: This section is straightforward. The Institute can compare various treatments and determine which is more likely to result in a disability, and disseminate those findings.

‘(e) The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute established under section 1181(b)(1) shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an adjusted life year (or such a similar measure) as a threshold to determine coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII.’

• WHAT IS A QALY?: The Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) is defined by the NIH as:
  • (1) A unit of measure of utility which combine life years gained as a result of health interventions/health care programs with a judgment about the quality of these life years.
    (2) A common measure of health improvement used in cost-utility analysis, it measures life expectancy adjusted for quality of life. (See NIH’s Health Economics Information Resources, Glossary, at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/edu/healthecon/glossary.html#QALY)
• The goal of the QALY is to ensure that healthcare resources are allocated in a manner which is most beneficial. Because healthcare resources are scarce, however, the $/QALY looks to allocate those resources economically. The QALY ipso facto discounts the value of life due to a disability. This is because the QALY works by assigning different states of health along a continuum, with perfect health being 1 and death being 0. The QALY is interested in whether different treatments provide more QALYs, In other words, QALYs are interested in whether one treatment provides more years at a better state of health (i.e., closer to 1) than another treatment. See M. Weinstein, Spending Health Care Dollars Wisely: Can Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Help? (2005)

• TRANSLATION: The Institute cannot utilize a $/QALY ( or a similar measure) as a threshold to establish what treatment is cost-effective, recommended or incentivized. (It is, however, noteworthy that in describing “similar measure,” both “age” and “terminal illness” are not expressly excluded as prohibited criteria in the development of a metric, as they are throughout the text of other portions of the provision).

• Note: 1182(c)(2) does allow for a disability to be taken into account when comparing various treatments for an individual. That section must be distinguished from the current section (1182(e)), where the upshot is that the dollar valued QALY cannot be a benchmark by which to allocate resources. If we are only determining which of two resources to a given individual shall be reimbursed, then the individual’s disability may be taken into account, i.e., treatment effectiveness under the individual’s circumstances  is a metric for which CER may be utilized; however, dollar value of life quality is not a permitted metric or criteria for treatment.

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy Issues White Paper Calling for Major Reforms in the Financing and Oversight of Clinical Research

Seton Hall University School of Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy has called for major substantive reforms in the financing and oversight of clinical research. In a White Paper entitled “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” the Center proposes legal and policy changes to address conflicts of interest in the relationships between industry and doctors that can create unwarranted risks to trial participants and to the scientific integrity of research.

Kathleen Boozang, a dean who oversees the Law School’s Center, explains that “Some of the ways that drug and device trial sponsors pay the physicians who lead clinical trials can tempt them to recruit individuals for clinical trials who would be better off receiving conventional therapy. This is of particular concern if physicians encourage their own patients to enroll in trials that these same physicians are overseeing.”

Over 60% of testing of experimental drugs and medical devices now occurs in physicians’ private offices; unlike years past, industry funds a much higher percent of clinical trials than government, frequently paying researchers significantly more than government does.  For some physician practices, conducting clinical trials represents a significant portion of their income.

According to Carl Coleman, a Seton Hall Law professor who collaborated on the White Paper, “A different kind of problem arises if people are enrolled in trials who don’t meet the criteria for who should participate - these individuals’ health can be put at risk, and their participation can skew the results of the trial, which is bad for everyone.”

Federal regulations in this area have not kept up with the rapid changes in how research occurs, and even those regulations that exist are poorly enforced, according to recent government studies.  Understanding that the collaboration among industry, government, and medicine in the pursuit of clinical research is critical to driving scientific progress, particularly as industry increasingly replaces the government as the primary source of research funding, the Center’s recommendations include:

1) Establishing a norm of financial neutrality between treatment and research. Ensuring that physicians receive comparable compensation for treatment and research will help ensure that their decisions to conduct research, as well as to recommend that a particular individual participate in a clinical trial, are grounded in reasons unrelated to their personal financial interests. This will be best accomplished, in the first instance through regulations that ban certain kinds of research compensation, and provide examples of acceptable payment methodologies that industry can follow. Reform by prosecution signals what practices government dislikes, but does not provide a clear vision of ideal approaches to managing conflicts of interest related to the conduct of research.

2) Establishing federal guidelines as to the principles or methodology by which to determine fair market value of physician time spent in clinical work. Federal regulations should be promulgated that establish a benchmark formula for determining fair market value of physicians’ time, effort and expenses for clinical research. Such regulations would promote the goal of financial neutrality between treatment and research. Physicians cannot be underpaid for research either - compensation for clinical trial work should therefore include reimbursement for any additional expenses that are unique to the research environment.

3) Banning payments with equity interests; disqualification of investigators who hold direct interests in the outcome of the research. Federal regulations should prohibit compensation for research in the form of an equity interest in the sponsor of a clinical trial. The law should preclude researchers who have investments that give them a direct interest in the outcome of the research from leading clinical trials.  Where absolutely necessary, such individuals might appropriately serve as consultants.

4) Banning payments of finder’s fees and bonuses for recruitment and retention of trial subjects. Certain forms of compensation create conflicts of interest that can incentivize investigators to enroll individuals in a clinical trial who are too healthy or too sick to participate, or to deemphasize information that might discourage individuals from consenting to trial enrollment. Federal law should ban such compensation methods, including finder’s fees and bonuses for meeting recruitment and retention goals.

5) Reforming federal regulations to compel and better guide the evaluation of relationships between industry and would-be physician investigators prior to the commencement of research.   The White Paper includes overlapping but sometimes distinctive recommendations for federal regulation to evaluate and oversee investigator or institutional conflicts of interest, both for research within and without academic medical centers.  Specific to research outside of academic medical centers, federal regulations should spell out clearly the obligation of community-based physicians acting as investigators or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for research and other financial interests to Institutional Review Boards.

Summarizing the importance of this White Paper, Boozang states, “The pharmaceutical and medical device industries save millions of lives each year with their innovations.  It is imperative that we maintain the integrity of research, and the public’s trust in the process.”

Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. The Center is a think tank that fosters dialogue, scholarship, and policy solutions to critical issues in health and pharmaceutical law. As part of its mission, it convenes policymakers, consumer advocates, the medical profession, industry, and government in the search for concrete solutions to the ethical, legal, and social questions presented in the health and pharmaceutical arenas. The Center also runs a compliance training program covering the state and federal laws governing the development and marketing of drugs and medical devices. The White Paper, “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight,” may be found here.

Seton Hall University School of Law, New Jersey’s only private law school and a leading law school in the New York metropolitan area, is dedicated to preparing students for the practice of law through excellence in scholarship and teaching, with a strong focus on clinical education. The Law School’s health law program has been ranked as one of the top programs in the country. Founded in 1951, Seton Hall Law School is located in Newark and offers both day and evening degree programs. For more information visit law.shu.edu.