Reform Rodeo

1. Kaiser Health News rounds up today’s editorials on health reform.

2. The New York Times reports that the CBO’s latest report finds that the Senate’s health bill will not increase premiums for the majority of Americans.

3. David Leonhardt describes how the Senate’s bill may offer more cost-cutting options than it is typically given credit.

4. John Iglehart offers his perspective on the the process that has allowed the Senate’s health reform bill to proceed to floor debate.

5. The Hastings Center has a thorough piece on the controversy surrounding the U.S. Preventitive Services Task Force’s decision to alter the recommended guidelines for mammography.

6. In case you missed it: Associate Dean Kathleen Boozang in The Health Care Blog regarding the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy’s latest White Paper: “Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight.”

7. In case you missed it again: Professor John V. Jacobi in the New Jersey Law Journal on “Genetic Discrimination and the Future of Health Insurance.” (First posted here on HRW).

Taking Steps Toward Reform

Should an imperfect health reform bill be passed?  Health reform should be about four things: 1) expanding coverage to all; 2) providing health security for those already insured; 3) ending the fragmentation of health care delivery in favor of sound coordination of care; and, 4) constraining cost to ensure that we can afford appropriate care in the future.

The House leadership bill (HR 3962) does a good job on the first, reaching a large proportion of the uninsured — although it will not achieve universal coverage.  It also gets good marks for reforming insurance regulations — although its weak version of the public plan will make true insurance reform more difficult to achieve.  It makes some tentative progress on care coordination, mostly through pilots and demonstrations in public insurance programs.  It provides some cost saving measures in Medicare and through encouraging alignment of financing systems — but cost containment is clearly the weakest aspect of the bill.   So, should the reform be passed, warts and all?

After months of criticism of the majority’s plans and promises of the production of a better plan, House Republicans proposed a substitute to the House leadership bill.   How does it stack up?  The CBO finds that the Republican substitute would reduce the deficit over the next ten years by about $68 billion, which is about $40 billion less than the reduction the CBO projects from the Democratic version.   The CBO also estimates that the Republican bill would reduce the number of uninsured over the next ten years by “about 3 million relative to current law, leaving about 52 million nonelderly residents uninsured,”  compared with its assessment that HR 3962 would reduce the number of nonelderly uninsured by 36 million during that time period.  So, the GOP substitute would do less to reduce the deficit, and cover 33 million fewer uninsured.   It includes some insurance reform provisions, many based on consumer-directed models that tend to further fragment, rather than coordinate care.  HR 3962 is far from perfect, and the CBO’s estimates have been subject to criticism, but the reports provide food for thought for those who hoped that the Republican plan would offer a meaningful alternative.

Sometimes proceeding in steps is necessary, particularly with complex systemic reform.  Massachusetts has in many ways been a model for drafters of federal reform plans, and stands as an example of incremental steps toward full reform.  It enacted sweeping health insurance reforms in 2006, creating a marketplace for regulated private insurance, the addition of public plans, and responsibility shared among businesses, individuals, and providers.  It has been remarkably successful at expanding access, driving the uninsurance rate down to 2.6% as of the spring of this year, and enjoying continuing strong support within Massachusetts.    Costs are a growing concern.  But the coalition of business, consumer, and provider groups behind the reform anticipated the need to circle back and tackle finance.  Cost concerns have only grown with the economic downturn, as tax receipts lag and countercyclical demand for Medicaid coverage strains budgets.  Resolve to push forward appears strong.  Representatives of several stakeholders reported last year that,

Since passage, all stakeholder groups have remained deeply engaged in implementation.  Despite news reports of higher-than-expected costs, the governor, legislative leaders, and stakeholders have repeatedly reiterated support for full implementation.  This consensus, crucial to enactment, has proved equally vital to implementation.

Massachusetts reformers made the decision to proceed in two steps: coverage first, cost control second.   While no one is proposing a two-step process for federal reform, expanding coverage and reforming insurance practices have been the overriding emphases in Washington.  And HR 3962 does advance the cause of care coordination for the chronically ill.  It was interesting to see the Dutch Health Minister in a recent interview emphasize coordinated care as a central feature of reform.  In describing his country’s reforms (from which some draw lessons for our country), he explained:

We are trying to make sure that no one receives health care that is not coordinated. And [we intend] that the general practitioners cannot negotiate any longer with insurance companies unless they are part of a coherent group that is offering coherent care.

What does the GOP bill do for people with chronic illness?   The CBO found that provisions in the proposed substitute would “tend to increase the premiums paid by less healthy enrollees.”   The substitute, then, entails fiscal benefits for the well at the expense of those who most need care and coverage.

HR 3962 reforms the insurance market to safeguard coverage for those who have it now; expands coverage for the uninsured; and begins the arduous task of shifting care delivery from fragmentation to coordination.  The GOP alternative covers one-twelfth as many uninsured, makes coverage for the chronically ill harder to maintain, and does less to reduce the deficit.  Common sense tells us that taking positive steps toward reform is vital, and that the GOP substitute is no reform at all.

CBO Wrong on Health Care Reform Cost Numbers

Just as opponents of  the current Health Care Reform plans often cite reports from The Lewin Group, which, as we posted the other day, turns out to be wholly owned by one of the Nation’s leading insurers, UnitedHealth; they also cite to recent reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as to the relative fiscal impact of the various plans. Although the CBO does not seem to be owned by UnitedHealth (though recent statements by the CBO (as made clear by Professor Frank Pasquale here) they are certainly susceptible to being labeled “partisan” for exceeding the scope of their role), CBO is prone, it seems, to being wrong.

Professor Pasquale’s post, “Politicized Prognostication at CBO,” details and quotes a number of experts who have expressed grave doubt as to the methodology of the CBO as well as the resultant numbers. For example

Bruce Vladeck: “The CBO’s track record in predicting the effects of health legislation is abysmal. Over the last two decades, the CBO has routinely overestimated the costs of expanded government health care benefits and underestimated the savings from program changes designed to reduce expenditures.

Mr. Vladeck, Maggie Mahar, Timothy Jost, Frank Pasquale and Timothy Westmoreland have more company for their doubts regarding the CBO’s numbers.  The rather politic but wholly effective Commonwealth Fund reports that

Over the last 30 years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which assesses the costs of health reform and other legislation as it moves through Congress and is widely respected for its competence and integrity, has underestimated the amount of savings and overestimated the costs that major changes in the health care system would bring, says Jon Gabel in an op-ed published in today’s New York Times.

Drawing on Commonwealth Fund-supported research, Gabel, a senior fellow at the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, analyzed CBO’s forecasts of three major changes in the Medicare program relative to their ultimate outcomes.

What he found was alarming:

In the first, in the early eighties, Congress adjusted the way in which Medicare would pay hospitals-under the new law paying a fixed amount per admission based upon primary medical condition. “CBO predicted that by 1986 total spending would be $60 billion. Actual spending in 1986 was $49 billion.”

That’s $11 billion on 60. That’s wrong by more than 18%.

In the second, Commonwealth Fund reports that Gabel “found that savings from the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which changed the way skilled nursing facilities and home health services were reimbursed under Medicare, turned out to be 50 percent greater in 1998 and 113 percent greater in 1999 than the budget office forecast.”

Wrong by 50% and by 113%.

In the third, Commonwealth Fund reports that “CBO predicted that drug prices would rise following the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which added prescription drug benefits to Medicare, estimating that spending on the drug benefit would be $206 billion. Actual spending was nearly 40 percent less than that, Gabel found.”

Wrong by nearly 40%.

Combining the error rates for the two years stated in regard to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, that’s three major Health Reform changes with an average error rate of  more than 46%. That’s nearly half. Wrong by nearly half.

According to the Commonwealth Fund,

Gabel explains that when CBO analyzes initiatives aimed at reducing costs, it requires considerable evidence that similar previous policy changes have saved money. When there is a lack of historical examples, the “unknown” variable often becomes zero. The task for the budget office becomes even more challenging when it considers the impact of more than one change simultaneously-changes that might have synergies.

Considering that we are entertaining unprecedented Health Care Reform which relies upon  the manifold synergies of numerous changes for cost reduction, the CBO process which ascribes a numerical dollar value of  zero to that which is new, seems particularly ill-equipped to assess the fiscal impact of the proposed changes.

The Commonwealth Fund reports that

Gabel observes that underestimating savings that can come from cost-control initiatives in Medicare and throughout the health system could undermine efforts to pass health reform legislation. “As Congress now works on its greatest push for health care reform in generations, the budget office needs to revise the methods it uses to make predictions about costs,” he says.

Failing the methodology revisions requisite to make the CBO’s estimate’s  of cost reduction a valid measure of fiscal impact, the least they could do is preface their lofty and dire pronouncements with an accurate disclaimer: “Historically, Give or take, roughly 50%.”

Politicized Prognostication at CBO

Back in 2007, wise wonks were already warning that the Congressional Budget Office could torpedo health reform. The CBO dealt Clintoncare a heavy blow by saddling it with huge cost projections — and failing to take into account the savings the program would realize for individual citizens and the private sector. Current CBO director Doug Elmendorf has been riding a wave of notoriety as an objective “referee” in an increasingly bitter reform battle. But as his office’s one-sided estimates enervate reform, it’s beginning to risk its reputation for impartiality. Consider the following observations about CBO’s work:

Bruce Vladeck: “The CBO’s track record in predicting the effects of health legislation is abysmal. Over the last two decades, the CBO has routinely overestimated the costs of expanded government health care benefits and underestimated the savings from program changes designed to reduce expenditures. Most recently, it overestimated the five-year cost of Medicare Part D — the prescription drug benefit — by more than 35%. Even more dramatically, the CBO’s estimates of the Medicare savings from the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 underestimated the impact, on average, by a full 100%. That’s right: In the BBA’s first three years, Medicare spending fell fully twice as fast as the CBO had projected.”

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost: “[A] moment’s reflection would lead one to realize that the CBO’s guess that [a reform proposal] would save [only] $2 billion is about as worthless as an estimate that a loaf of bread will cost $5.65 in 2019, or a gallon of gasoline $4.73. Indeed, the CBO admits as much, stating that it actually believed the proposal would save nothing, but “there is also a chance that substantial savings might be realized.” . . .[T]he media needs to stop reporting CBO reports as though they reflect the real costs of reform.“

Maggie Mahar: “When I read Elmendorf’s testimony suggesting that the [House] bill wouldn’t bend the trajectory of federal health spending, I couldn’t help but wonder: Did he understand how the proposals in the 1,018 page bill dove-tailed with the excellent recommendations that the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPac) has made in recent years? Has Elmendorf read the lengthy MedPac reports?”

When respected experts like Maggie Mahar are wondering if Elmendorf has understood key literature in the area, something’s gone wrong at CBO. The media’s uncritical acceptance of his figures can only last as long as it fails to report the true complexity and uncertainty involved in both substantive reform and the do-nothing option that CBO’s handiwork is unintentionally advancing.

Read more

Taxing Health Benefits, Obama Administration Said To Be “Open”

In a recent post on this blog, Professor Tim Greaney noted that Senator Max Baucus had recently said that

the tax exclusion for employer health insurance payments was on the table, [with Senator Baucus] noting two characteristics that make it an appealing target:  regressivity and potential source of considerable “revenue.”  On these and other issues, Baucus stressed the critical role OMB scoring will play in shaping the ultimate design of the legislation.

Not to say that OMB “scoring” will be influenced by the predilections of its director, but nevertheless, those predilections may be worth noting. The New York Times reports

At a recent Congressional hearing, Senator Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat whose own health plan would make benefits taxable, asked Peter R. Orszag, the president’s budget director, about the issue. Mr. Orszag replied that it “most firmly should remain on the table.”

Mr. Orszag, an economist who has served as director of the Congressional Budget Office, has written favorably of taxing some employer-provided health benefits and using the revenue savings for other health-related incentives. So has another Obama adviser, Jason Furman, the deputy director of the White House National Economic Council.

The Times also noted that

When Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana, advocated taxing benefits at a recent hearing of the Finance Committee, which he leads, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner assured him that the administration was open to all ideas from Congress. Mr. Geithner did, however, allude to the position that Mr. Obama had taken as a candidate.

The Times reports that sentiment elsewhere, however, was not quite as sanguine about the proposal: “Many Democrats, especially House liberals, are opposed. ‘It’s a dumb idea,’ said Representative Pete Stark of California, chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health. “We have to maintain as much as we can of the employer payments.”

The Times article is well worth taking a moment or two to read; it relays a number of different viewpoints regarding the matter, and also features a political aspect certainly worth noting: during the presidential election campaign, Obama was quite critical of  a John McCain proposal to tax health benefits. Obama denounced the McCain plan as “the largest middle-class tax increase in history.” The Times reports that

At the time, even some Obama supporters said privately that he might come to regret his position if he won the election; in effect, they said, he was potentially giving up an important option to help finance his ambitious health care agenda to reduce medical costs and to expand coverage to the 46 million uninsured Americans. Now that Mr. Obama has begun the health debate, several advisers say that while he will not propose changing the tax-free status of employee health benefits, neither will he oppose it if Congress does so.

The Congressional Budget Office Puts Numbers on It

Articles in both the NY Times and Kaiser.org explain the recently published CBO findings regarding the financial impact of various health reform proposals and parts thereof. The CBO issued two reports: “Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals,” and “Budget Options, Volume 1: Health Care.” Both CBO reports may be accessed through the hyperlinks above which include the reports, charts, and a CBO explanatory blog. The reports may also be accessed through the “Resources” section of this blog.

According to the CBO blog, “The first document, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals, focuses on large-scale proposals, provides extensive background information, and explains CBO’s analysis of numerous issues that could arise should the Congress seek to enact major changes in the health insurance system.”

“The second document, Budget Options, Volume 1: Health Care, is much more specific and focused on discrete changes. It presents 115 discrete options, encompassing a broad array of issues related to the financing and delivery of health care. (Volume 2 of Budget Options, which will address policy options in other areas of the federal budget, will be issued in 2009.) The health care volume includes some options that would reduce spending and others that would increase it, as well as changes that would reduce or raise revenues.”