Why Primary Care in Medicare Matters

Why should we care about primary care in Medicare?  Early in the reform discussions, preventive and primary care was emphasized; in addition to extending medical care to all, reform would also implement preventive measures to keep them well.  In the current reform scrum, some are back peddling pretty fast, and in the course of finding “consensus” points (often focusing on cost-savings), we might lose conceptual coherence.

Ken Thorpe’s new Health Affairs article on chronic care patients in Medicare offers sound research and helpful analysis.  Thorpe’s data point toward a subtle explanation for health inflation keyed not to the increased cost of high-tech interventions, but to a shift in the conditions for which treatment is provided:

Our results highlight important changes in the medical conditions accounting for the rise in spending among beneficiaries over time. The most notable changes were in spending on a handful of chronic conditions: diabetes, kidney disease, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, mental disorders, and arthritis.

Thorpe has long argued that our health care delivery and finance system is stuck in a 20^th Century of acute care, while our 21^st Century needs have migrated toward chronic care.  As he has argued previously, these chronic care needs call for care at a human scale, including care management and supportive community-based care.  But he also points out that many chronic conditions are at least partially preventable, and that attention and resources should not be directed only to treating these conditions, but also to forestalling their incidence.

Prevention is, then, vital to any health care system.  But haven’t studies repeatedly shown that preventive care is not cost-effective?   Sorting this out requires that we step back and assess not only what “prevention” means, but also what we value in health care.

Preventive care can usefully be separated into three categories, as Ron Goetzel  (an Emory University colleague of Thorpe’s) has described.

• Primary prevention: Health promotion measures focus on lifestyle and simple interventions such as vaccinations to keep people from developing sickness; often cost-saving.
• Secondary prevention: Targeting people with preconditions for illness, including genetic or lifestyle markers, with screening technology, maintenance drugs, in order to forestall or prevent the manifestation of the condition; rarely cost-saving, in part because it is often applied to low-risk populations. Worth it? That depends on the design of the intervention and one’s metric for assessing health care value.
• Tertiary prevention: In this context, coordinated care management for those with chronic illness.  Properly implemented, chronic car management could “flatten the curve,” but is unlikely to be “cost-saving.”

So, whether “prevention” can save money (a claim Thorpe’s paper doesn’t make) is a complicated question.  In addition, it is often a poorly framed one. Explicitly or implicitly, cost-based objections to prevention often suggest that preventing one illness simply means that the person will die of something else, or less simplistically, that keeping people alive longer is cost-increasing, not cost saving.  Steven Wolf has elegantly responded to both objections:

[S]keptics of prevention argue that everyone dies of something; preventing demise serves only to allow a different disease to generate illness and spending. However, the aim of health promotion and disease prevention is not to prevent the inevitable but to “compress” morbidity, maximizing health until death.

Another common criticism is that prevention rarely saves money; it costs society if people live longer. The same applies to disease treatments. Health is a good; it is not purchased to save money. Health is a good that costs too much under the current medical care system, a problem of inefficiency that calls for wiser resource use, such as spending less per health unit gained (lower cost-effectiveness ratio). Disease prevention offers a way to improve health with low cost-effectiveness ratios and to also modulate disease rates. To reject health promotion and disease prevention because they do not save money (i.e., cost-effectiveness ratios are not negative) misses the point. (citations omitted)

Advocates who would shift our systemic emphasis to prevention and management of chronic illness, then, are not naïve about cost implications.  To the contrary, they address the issue head-on, with a three-step argument:

• The purpose of our system is or should be the maintenance of or restoration to high levels of functioning consistent with a fulfilling life.
• Our needs have largely shifted from acute to chronic interventions, and our system should shift to meet those needs.
• In preventing or managing chronic illness, as with all interventions, we should carefully examine the capacity of methods to meet our needs, and to demand value for those being served.

Applying this sort of argument to primary care, Goetzel elsewhere advocates skepticism of attempts by medicine to turn prevention into a high-tech enterprise:

We have medicalized prevention and health promotion in this country so that most people believe that only doctors in clinical settings can deliver these services. Although effective in many cases, this approach is the most expensive method of delivering prevention. If we expand our arsenal of potential interventions to include environmental, ecological, and policy changes, in addition to individually focused counseling and coaching programs, we can change the cost-effectiveness equation.

Thorpe’s article has garnered much-deserved attention, although it is tempting to think of his data in only cost-benefit terms.  That is not true to Thorpe’s conclusion, which is consistent with efforts to redirect attention from the business enterprise of health care to the health needs of Americans:

The U.S. health system remains predicated on providing acute, episodic care that is inadequate to address the altered patterns of disease now facing the American public. Our results highlight the need for prevention and care outside doctors’ offices and hospitals designed to address the changing needs of patients at risk for or living with chronic disease and, often, multiple comorbidities. As [reformers] continue their efforts to reshape the U.S. health system, they must address these changed health needs through evidence-based preventive care in the community, care coordination, and support for patient self-management.

Little Beds and Little Help at Jfk Hartwyck at Edison Estates

We speak here of health care and health care reform, most often in the larger, policy sense. This weekend I had occasion to witness the beast up close. My younger brother had his knee replaced earlier in the week at JFK Medical Center here in Edison, NJ. By all accounts the operation was a success; although he is only 45 years old (which I’m told is considered young for a knee replacement) he has had a history of knee problems initially ensuing from his having been struck by a car while working a number of years ago. After the surgery, his doctor asked him how he had even been walking– there was, he said, no cartilage left to speak of.

Initially his insurance company balked (perhaps pro forma?) at the prospect of my brother entering a convalescent center for physical therapy and rehab, citing his relatively young age, but relented under the demands of the doctor. He was initially to have been transferred to the rehab center on Thursday, but was inexplicably delayed until Friday late afternoon. He was sent to Jfk Hartwyck at Edison Estates, which seems to function primarily as a Nursing Home– but not a particularly highly rated one.

On Saturday at around 1:30 pm, as I set out to see him, I called to a) make sure he had in fact been transferred and was there; and, b) find out his room number. After three call transfers and three fairly frustrating conversations I was finally able to confirm that he was there; I also learned that he was on the third floor. I gave up on the room number.

To say the place is a bit run down is not to engage in hyperbole; to say that there was an absence of care is merely to mimic the US News Report on the Nursing Home and Rehab Center.

My brother is a big man– 6′ 3″ or 4″ tall, and having lost some weight, scales in at about 295lbs. Despite the fact that his chart says such, provisions were not made to accommodate him. He did not fit in the bed: his head struck against the headboard and his feet crushed against the footboard if he tried to lay straight. Presumably, with his knee having just been replaced, this matters even more than it would normally. There is a contraption that he was supposed to put his leg and knee in– it would not fit on the bed. Furthermore, the foam mattress that came with his too-short bed was so old and beat up that he sunk into the bed’s metal slats tossing and turning (though not laying straight) while trying to sleep. In doing so,  he had actually been cut.

In addition, no one had thought to give him an elevated toilet seat; his knee precluded him from reaching a standard seat.

He had made these problems known to staff earlier, and was told that they would fix them. This did not happen.

After I arrived and reiterated these needs to various levels of staff, I was told of a number of different, but conflicting remedies and the schedules for such. They did not have a bed long enough but would  remove the footboard so that his feet would hang off the bed??? until they could fasten an extender or buy or rent a bed to fit him– which could take either a few hours or a few days.  I said I could live with a few hours, but that a few days was patently unacceptable. The contraption would have to wait.

He is 6′ 3″ or 4″ tall, he is not 7′ 2.” It is decidedly not a new facility. They have 280 beds. Surely, from time to time they get patients taller than 6′ 2″? They acted as though they never had.

The shoddy mattress was soon replaced, though, inexplicably, no one entered the room to assist my brother as he struggled to get out of the bed and hoist himself precariously onto the walker as the mattresses were exchanged. Throughout the four or so hours I was there, this absence of assistance was a recurring theme. Having been trained as a lawyer, this willingness on the part of staff to court, if not embrace, liability was, quite frankly, appalling. I assure you, somewhere there’s an in-house attorney prematurely gray.

As for the elevated toliet seat? I had to ask again, but urgently, as he had to go. The nursing assistant unable to find one elsewhere, ultimately snatched one from another patient’s room and hurried to clean it as my brother, the outcome uncertain, anxiously waited.

The truth is, they ultimately moved in response to my demands formulated in accord with my legal training. Otherwise, I imagine he’d still be lying there with a too-short bed, presumably covered in his own fecal matter as he vainly attempted to make his new knee bend and descend to an unprepared toliet.

In the end, they gave up on removing the footboard as they realized while taking it apart that it would actually disable the bed controls by doing so. When the rental bed came, they had no mattress to fit it but, tired of it all, we assented to pillows shoved in at the end. When the bed was set up, after the rental bed man told the nurse that she was going to want to go over the bed– which had different controls than the former bed– with my brother–and to make sure we set up the height of the bed to accommodate him–the nurse nodded her head and promptly walked directly out of the room. We managed without her.

I won’t bore you with more, but I will say that the attending doctor had briefly visited my brother earlier in the day and, without so much as asking him his relative pain level, apparently changed his pain prescription for the afternoon, but didn’t bother to actually tell my brother that she was doing so. Tentative about leaving the direct care of his surgeon, before he left the hospital my brother actually asked his surgeon if he would continue on this particular prescription that seemed to be working–the surgeon assured him that this prescription was “the law” and would remain in place wherever he went to combat the pain. Apparently, the rehab’s attending had not heard of the law and by the evening it became apparent that something was wrong. My brother, who is tough as nails and has worked a harsh blue collar job all his life, began to cry. The nurse informed us soon thereafter that his prescription had been changed. A lengthy explanation/argument with the nurses and phone call to the doctor filling in for the attending resulted in a reinstatement of “the law.”

It is also worth mentioning that although we were told by the nurses that standard protocol for incoming sub-acute was a physical therapy evaluation within at least, the very next day– that never happened. And although I was assured that although there must have been some form of communication failure which deprived him of his evaluation, he would be evaluated very first thing the next morning. That did not happen either. My brother was told this morning that “no physical therapy staff work on Sundays.” Obviously, he has received no physical therapy yet. At best, he will be evaluated for such come Monday morning– he got there on Friday. His knee and leg have further swollen. Insurance will only pay for so many days stay. It is also my understanding that the first few days of rehab are crucial to an effective recovery.

I routinely villify insurers (as they deserve it), but I can’t help but see at least one of their points here. My question is this: exactly what will this medical facility be charging the insurer for this weekend? Therapeutic Services? Rehab? He was warehoused– and poorly at that.

I’ll keep you posted.

Cost, Choice, and Value

The Massachusetts Massacre has everyone stepping back a bit.  The President says that we should “coalesce around those elements of the package that people agree on,” but it is unclear just which elements those might be, given the extreme polarization that has defined the debate.  He suggests that points of agreement might center on insurance reform and cost containment, which are both important goals.  I’m skeptical that a sudden flowering of bipartisanship will allow such agreement, however.  Ezra Klein, on the other hand, has a paring proposal that goes in another direction, and reminds us of why we got into this in the first place: to extend coverage to the uninsured.  If we must narrow our focus, Klein says we should extend Medicare to those over 50, and expand Medicaid to those under 200% of poverty.  This would get lots of people insured, and could well be accomplished through budget reconciliation if no Congressional coalescing is to be had.

However the parsing, paring, and palavering goes, cost control is and will be at or near the health reform debate for years to come.  Two recent articles are worth a look for those interested in analysis of cost-containment strategies.

In his health care speech to Congress, the President suggested that one component of an effort to lower health care costs should be to empower a commission of “doctors and medical experts” to identify and,

encourage the adoption of  . . . common-sense best practices by doctors and medical professionals throughout the system. Wrapped up in that suggestion are notions of adhering to expert guidance in treatment decisions.

The stimulus bill passed in February pushed for scientific assessment of modes of care, providing $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research.  The current reform bills further emphasize CER, and would encourage the adoption of proven and promising treatments through professional education and some payment reform.  Harvard Medical School professor Jerome Groopman writes on evidence-based medicine in the latest New York Review of Books.   In his 2007 book, How Doctors Think, Groopman did a great job of explaining the complex and fraught process by which doctors make decisions, and he is fully on board with the notion that there is ample room for improvement.  His new article, however, cautions that the use of panels of experts with authority to impose or even recommend best practices is a dangerous way to go.

Groopman acknowledges the need for health policy folks to consider the bounded rationality of both doctor and patient.  He examines the Obama Administration’s policies on evidence-based practice by contrasting the views of two key advisors: Cass Sunstein, whose view of “libertarian paternalism” incline him to favor gentle “nudges” that may encourage certain behavior while leaving people free to reject the advice if they wish, and Peter Orszag, who is more inclined to employ forceful regulatory standards and financial incentives to achieve cost effective medical practice.  Groopman is compellingly  skeptical of expert claims of definitive standards on what “works” in health care, and cautions that such standards can result in harm to patients who fit uncomfortably into the hard categories defined in such best practices.

Groopman’s analysis seems incomplete for two closely intertwined reasons, and surely as a result of space constraints.  First, he suggests that the administration is faced with a stark choice between

aggressively pushing doctors and patients to do what the government defines as best, or [being] respectful of their own autonomy in making decisions.

Surely there is much middle ground between tying doctors’ hands and respecting complete clinical independence.  And it is not enough to say, as does Groopman, that

Most physicians seek data and views on treatments from peers and, as needed, specialists, and then present information and opinion to patients who ultimately decide.

Maybe so, but physicians are sometimes self-interested, and patients’ choices  are sometimes influenced by advertisements or other considerations disconnected from quality concerns.  For these and other reasons, spending decisions are no longer consigned to the doctor/patient dyad, but increasingly must accommodate the cost-containment interests of third party payers — government, employers, or insurers.

Second, Groopman describes two exclusive categories of procedures: “mechanical procedures” such as the  insertion an intravenous catheter (where he argues that enforcing standards to avoid infections is proper) and all other procedures, where the individual patient’s condition becomes relevant, and where he argues that coercing clinical choices is out of bounds.  It is not obvious that the universe of procedures is so divisible; it is even less clear that the dividing line between the two categories is uncontroversial.

Many questions remain.  Groopman is surely right that we must be cautious in enforcing categorical “best practices;” it is important to create public processes for vetting their accuracy and usefulness.  He is also surely right that public and private health finance rules must accommodate variation in medical needs, and must bend readily when a “best practice” is not suitable for a particular case.  But cost is relevant, and encouraging efficient practice can reduce the cost (and therefore the extent) of coverage.

So, how might a balance between financial constraints and patient protection work?  In a Health Affairs article posted  yesterday, Michael Chernew and coauthors examine the growing phenomenon of “value-based insurance” — a structuring of insurance co-payments responsive to the needs of people with chronic illness.  The co-payments imposed by insurers are, of course, intended to reduce demand for health care services (an Orszag, not a Sunstein tool, you might say).  Value based insurance reduces or eliminates these co-payments for services of “high clinical value.”  That is, if an insurer determines that it would rather not discourage utilization for a particular service, it reduces or removes the patient cost-sharing, presumably increasing usage, for cost as well as clinical reasons.  As the authors explain,

The belief that a value-based insurance program will lower health care spending rests on the recognition that the use of high-value health care services reduces the probability of adverse events related to chronic disease and that on a population basis, these events are much more costly than the services aimed at preventing them.

The authors found some evidence that such programs are cost effective, even in the narrow sense of reducing a plan’s health care expenditures.  They suggest that widening the economic lens to consider broader societal goals would only strengthen those conclusions.

The article acknowledges the reality of economic coercion in the clinical setting, and measures attempts to shape the tools of cost containment in a way that protects patients while maintaining cost containment.  One doesn’t have to accept the general wisdom of patient cost-sharing to value attempts to protect patients from untoward effects of its use.

The need to obtain “value” for health care spending and to take steps to restrain health inflation will persist however we come out of the current reform debate.  The discussion will benefit from both the erudite analysis of Groopman and others warning us away from answers that are too easy, and that of Chernew and others who can shine a light on the efficacy of particular cost containing measures.

Does the VA Cost Less Than Private Health Care?

Taking a break from law, this post is about whether the Veterans Health Administration provides care more efficiently than the private sector.  Paul Krugman and others have held the VA out as a shining example of the government’s ability to provide high quality care efficiently, as well as the private sector’s need to lower costs and improve quality through electronic medical records, comparative effectiveness research, reduced overhead, salaried physicians, and integrated delivery systems — all issues that are central to current health reform debates.  It would be a huge blow if it turns out none of this is true — but that’s precisely what’s suggested by an article published by VA researchers earlier this year.

Wm. Weeks, MD (at Dartmouth and the VA’s regional  center) reported that, from 2001-2006, the VA cost 33% more than equivalent care in the private sector, and its quality was not notably better.  Here, I focus on the cost findings, since they diverge dramatically from the prior, state-of-the-art, study by Nugent, Hendricks et al (also from the VA), which found that, in 1999, the VA cost about 20% less than Medicare.  Since Medicare itself costs 25-30% less than the private sector, Dr. Weeks reports the VA costs about twice what Dr. Nugent and other VA colleagues  previously reported.  What makes this discrepancy even more remarkable is that Weeks did not even cite this prior work of VA colleagues, published in multiple articles in leading journals.

What gives?  I’m not expert, but its clear their methods differed sharply.  Nugent et al. took all care delivered at 6 VA centers and valued the services at actual Medicare fee-for-service rates, comparing the total with costs borne by the 6 VA centers.  Thus, the measures and comparison are direct, apples-to-apples.  Weeks, on the other hand, compared total VA medical costs (excluding nursing homes) per user with per person costs reported by VA users in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which values those services at private sector rates.  MEPS is a national survey that contains only a small subsample of 500 VA users, about 1 of every 50,000 VA user.  Extrapolating from such a small sample is a much more indirect comparison, so merits closer scrutiny, which reveals many potential flaws:

1. The 500 VA users in MEPS  are probably not an accurate reflection of 5 million total users.  MEPS surveys people living at home who respond to surveys.  This entirely excludes people who are homeless, institutionalized, or have died earlier in the year, and it under-represents mentally ill or substance abusers.  All of these categories have worse health, and regrettably are prevalent among vets, so MEPS almost certainly omits vets who reflect the highest burden of illness.
2. This sample may lacks much statistical validity, even for the vets it does include.  MEPS weights responses to make them nationally representative for demographic characteristics, but not for veteran status.  Without this weighting, the chance of random error is much greater.  This is suggested, for instance, by the fact that the value of VA care reported over this six-year study ranged two-fold from year to year, with no discernible pattern (the sixth year was twice the fifth year, which was half the third year, etc.)
3. Even for those whom MEPS does represent, it underreports actual health care costs.  Exactly how much and why is somewhat unsettled, but what seem to be the most recent studies conclude that MEPS underreports by 14% - 19%, in large part because reports of both utilization and costs are understated.    Weeks acknowledges these possible flaws, but asserts that studies he and others have done show MEPS is reasonably accurate — again without citing any of the leading studies to the contrary.

Moreover, even Weeks’ self-selected cites do not fully support his accuracy claim.  For instance, he says a RAND study reports that “MEPS expenditure estimates ‘agree quite well’ with estimates from other databases.”  But, the RAND study (p. 34) spoke in that phrase only to utilization, not to expenditures, and even for utilization it said MEPS underreports by 85% for outpatient hospital use.  For expenditures (use X price), RAND (on the very next page) said that MEPS underreports hospital costs by 21% and physician costs by 54%.

What is this Journal of Health Care Finance that would publish a flawed use of MEPS?  It is hardly a leading health research journal.  According to its website, it is

devoted solely to helping you meet your facility’s financial goals. . . . Make easier, better decisions, with advice from industry experts. . . .  Experts in the field share their experiences on successful programs, proven strategies, practical management tools, and innovative alternatives, . . . including hospital/physician contracts, alternative delivery systems, generating maximum margins under PPS, improving productivity, taxation management, health care insurance, employee benefit cost-containment, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, employee incentive systems, and more.

An e-mail from its editor states that most articles are reviewed only internally, by its editorial board whose members are drawn primarily from industry.

It appears the Weeks article did not receive peer academic scrutiny, but what about scrutiny from the study’s own coauthors, who are affiliated with Dartmouth and Washington & Lee?  The second author happens to be Weeks’ wife, and the third appears to be their son.  As for Weeks himself, he is deeply embroiled in two serious legal controversies with the VA.

On balance, the Nugent, Hendricks et al. study remains unrebutted. In my view, the Weeks study suffers from too many serious flaws, and is too lacking in objective critique, to hold much or any credence in this important debate.

Originally posted at the O’Neill Institute for National Global Health.

Mammography, Cervical Cytology Screens, and Rationing

The recent recommendations on mammography and cervical cytology screens by the US Preventive Services Task force and ACOG (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists), respectively, have added a new dimension to reform discussions.  Some are inclined to say “gotcha,” suggesting that the recommendations are evidence of a creeping denial of needed care that would follow governmental insinuation into health finance and benefits design.  Others see the reports as serendipitous irrelevancies, unconnected to reform discussions.  The truth is, not surprisingly, more complex.  The irony is that consumers will be more represented in health technology assessment in a public plan than they have been in private insurance.

It seems inevitable that any future health finance system will rely on evidence-based assessments of new (and old) technologies for both quality and cost purposes.  Our experience with the widespread use of affirmatively harmful (e.g., hormone-replacement therapy) and apparently useless treatments (e.g., knee arthroscopy for osteoarthritis) points to the possible risks of rapid  or uncritical adoption of new technologies.  As Sara Rosenbaum and others have pointed out,  (subscription required) we don’t want to confuse population data with individually-applied diagnostic and treatment judgment.   Both reports, to their credit, got this part right, and advised individual patients and physicians to assess each case in context, notwithstanding the general population-level guidance.  But evidence-based population data on the efficacy and comparative benefit of new and expensive interventions will be of enormous assistance in future treatment and funding decisions.

How should such health technology assessment be done, if not by expert panels?  As Bill Sage has observed, private health plans were opaque and inconsistent when they were in the technology assessment business.  (They have pretty much gotten out of that field, leaving cost control to others.)   One criticism of the mammography and cervical cytology reports has been that they should have included a more public process before issuing recommendations.  As the reports are merely advisory, it is not clear that post-publication comment doesn’t get the job done.  Where, as may be the case in the future, such expert analysis has instrumental effect, pre-implementation public process is essential.   Two guides for public health technology assessment advise as much.  The Institute of Medicine, in guidance issued earlier this year for comparative effectiveness analysis funded by the stimulus bill, observed that,

Clinicians and patients do not always consider the same factors when weighing the tradeoffs posed by important health care alternatives.  To ensure that the fruits of CER support consumers’ health care decision making, the CER Program should focus on the questions of patients as well as their health care providers.

Similarly, a health technology assessment guide created by the European Observatory on Health Systems in 2008 describes well-functioning technical assessment as consultative and transparent:

Social accountability permeates the whole knowledge production and is reflected not only in the interpretation and diffusion of results but also in the definition of the problem and the setting of research priorities.

We don’t want a health system — public or private — that is blind to either sound evidence-based technology assessment or the particular health needs of individual patients.  One advantage to a public system is that the assessment of technologies can and should include a robust public process.  We didn’t get that with private managed care.  The mammography and cervical cytology reports should call our attention to the opportunity for public process in decision making in publicly-funded coverage, and the need for close attention to the implementing regulatory processes if and when a bill is signed.

Here’s an Idea: Asking Doctors about Health Care Reform

The New York Times just published a very interesting article that ties the efforts of the medical community to bring about change in the American health care system with Congress’s attempts to reform health care through legislation.  The article, which details the research of a team of health care providers in the Intermountain Healthcare system in Utah and Idaho, offers insight into what doctors are doing on their own to effect change while waiting for our nation’s leaders to implement the means to better health care for Americans.

As can be seen by American Medical Association’s recent endorsement of the Democratic House bill, and the long time call of the National Physician’s Alliance for reform, there is a consensus among  health care providers for health care reform.

Of course, essential in that reform is delivery system reform. Part of delivery reform is likely to emphasize not only preventive care, a cornerstone of Obama’s plan, but also a careful monitoring and consideration of the outcomes of health care practices.  Although there is debate about the best way to monitor and measure such practices, and some bridle at the prospect of being “confined” to protocols derived from large studies,  the evidence-based medicine model is emerging  as a favored tool with which to analyze how health care providers themselves can produce more cost-effective, life-preserving results. Evidence-based medicine puts protocols in place (which may be overridden at a doctor’s discretion) and relies heavily on the statistical analyses of a health care system’s performance (i.e., patient outcomes from particular practices).  Such is the model executed by the Intermountain Healthcare system highlighted in the Times article.

The protocols ultimately implemented sometimes differ from the usual course of treatment offered by some doctors. The physicians at Intermountain Healthcare admit that it is often hard for doctors to hear that they are doing something wrong– or perhaps “not optimally” would be a better choice of words.  The Executive Director of Intermountain Healthcare Institute for Healthcare Delivery and Research, Brent James, relates that some doctors do not believe the results of the statistical research because doctors are reluctant to change their ways, but that oftentimes when presented with clear statistical evidence doctors change their practices.  He gives the example of obstetricians who were performing elective inductions prior to 39 weeks for pregnant women for the sake of convenience, as the inductions save hours of labor for the mothers and therefore hours of hospital time.  However, an analysis showed that babies born prior to the 39th week of gestation were far more likely to wind up in intensive care. After doctors saw the data, and protocols were put in place, James found that the rate of elective inductions fell dramatically. A similar protocol developed for the treatment of one form of pneumonia was said to have cut the rate of death for that condition by 40% over several years.

Some doctors contend, however, that the medical metrics of evidence-based models are not the best way to bring change in health care practice, both because doctors will feel pressured to follow set protocols without considering other possible treatments and because humans are not statistical data that can be remedied through calculations and formulas. The danger, of course, is in negating the healing art– in throwing the proverbial baby– independent critical thought– out with the bathwater.  Doctors of this school of thought often espouse  revamped medical education as a better way to reform health care practices; after all, the basis of how health care providers develop their practices is the way in which they were/are taught.

And one wonders if there isn’t room for both approaches. If the education of medical students can be changed to incorporate better and cost effective practices based on studied outcomes (perhaps in part culled from the Health IT initiatives), and changed to incorporate greater emphasis on preventive care (coupled of course with a pay system which rewards patient wellness), while still respecting doctor autonomy so as not to prepare a generation of medical robots. It doesn’t sound “un-doable.”

Interestingly enough, medical schools have seen an increase in students applying to their programs.  In response, four new American medical schools have opened.  With the older generation of health care practitioners on its way to retirement, the need for more doctors is imminent.  But, we need doctors that are able to help carry the new ideals and practices of a reformed health care system; reaching into the med school curriculum would seem to make a lot of sense.

Competition in the Health Insurance Marketplace and its Effect on Quality: Intriguing Findings Should Influence Reform Debate

In a previous post I discussed the relationship between the competitiveness of health insurance markets and the cost of insurance. Though the inverse relationship between competitiveness and cost is not unexpected, the studies revealed a complex relationship between the two variables that should be taken into account when reforming our health care system.

In that prior post, I promised to follow up with a discussion of current knowledge concerning the relationship between competitiveness and quality.  Much of the research out there is conflicting. This is somewhat unexpected, as one would assume as a matter of basic market economics that greater competition would force plans to compete on quality. However, as Professor Frank Pasquale has pointed out, there are a variety of activities that insurers engage in to compete, such as “cream skimming” or “cherry picking” their customer base, denying coverage based on preexisting conditions, and remaining largely opaque in their operations. In other words, it appears that a great deal of the competition seems to take the form of mitigating exposure to cost risk.

Instead of competition playing an important role in improving quality, the biggest impact may be the level of HMO penetration. Below I will provide a brief explanation of the “tools of the trade” used in these studies, as well as a brief description of some recent findings.

It is not uncommon to hear that “a public plan is needed because there is no competition in the marketplace” or conversely that “the public plan will destroy the competition that presently exists between private insurers.” Regardless of which of these statements may, or may not, be correct, there is a lingering question that must be answered: how do we know what level of competition exists, and how does competition affect the quality of health care?

Competition

There are three main ways that researchers measure competition in the health insurance market. One way is to simply count the number of insurers in a given market. This method, though instructive in some measure, may give the same weight to an insurer with a few policies as it does to one with a 100,000. Another method is to utilize the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI).  Simply put, HHI is an index based on the sum of the squares of the market share percentages of the competitors.  If the market share is primarily focused in one competitor, while scattered throughout the rest, then the HHI will tend to be large, since squaring that one large participant’s share greatly increases the resulting sum. Alternatively, squaring the shares of many smaller market participants produces a smaller HHI sum. Thus, a lower HHI corresponds to, at least in theory, a more competitive marketplace.

There are, however, problems with the HHI index. As mentioned in my prior post, health insurers often offer a variety of plans, many of which offer different benefits and heterogeneous provider networks. Therefore, even if a market’s HHI is numerically low, the HHI formula may nevertheless inflate the degree of competitiveness. In other words, we may not be comparing apples to apples.

A third way to look at competition, Read more

Rationing or Cost Effectiveness?

In today’s Wall Street Journal, Scott Gottlieb, a former senior official with both the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), warns that “Government Health Plans Always Ration Care.” Aside from recasting the same old aspersions about “rationing,” Gottlieb warns that if reform efforts can’t tame health care costs, the “government will turn to a less appealing but more familiar tool to cut costs: the regulation of access to drugs and medical services.”

Of course, “access” can mean many things. Theoretically, Americans have “access” to the best medical technologies in the world. But practically, most Americans-including those with health insurance-don’t actually access this type of care and couldn’t even if they tried. The bottom line is that every health insurer in the world, public or private, has to “ration” for the simple fact that health care resources are not unlimited. Only wealthy citizens truly have “access” to the best medical care money can buy, regardless of the country they live in or the health system they live under. That won’t change with or without major health reform.

Gottlieb is worried that reformers might formally embrace recommendations by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC), which currently has a broad statutory mandate to advise Congress on the Medicare program. He also warns that rationing is “a European import,” as if no health insurer in the United States has ever had to draw the line somewhere and decide what not to pay for. For example, Gottlieb warns about organizations like the Committee for the Evaluation of Medicines in France and the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care in Germany. He doesn’t mention the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, but it drew similar scorn after the economic stimulus package funded comparative effectiveness research here in the United States. Gottlieb cautions that European countries “aren’t shy about rationing.”

Gottlieb is correct in one aspect: these organizations are prevalent in Europe. However, he misses three important points.

First, the countries in Europe that Gottlieb warns about spend considerably less than we do on health care (and don’t suffer negative health consequences for it).

Second, wealthy residents in pretty much all of these countries can purchase services and technologies over and above what the organizations that Gottlieb warns us about approve.

And third, we’re not exactly strangers to these organizations in the United States. Gottlieb is concerned about European imports, but he’s ignoring our home grown organizations, like the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which makes new technology assessments for Gottlieb’s old agency, CMS, and supports comparative effectiveness research. Or the Medicare Evidence Development and Coverage Advisory Committee (MEDCAC), which also performs new technology assessments. In fact, it’s no secret in Washington that Medicare has long considered some amalgam of cost effectiveness and comparative effectiveness in its coverage decisions, even if nothing in the Medicare statute explicitly allows it to do so. (CMS has long stretched the definition of “reasonable and necessary” in section 1862(a)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act to fit its fiscal realities, even if CMS or its precursor, HCFA, haven’t been successful in cementing cost effectiveness as a formal criterion, as evidenced through failed rulemaking in 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 4,302) and 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 31,124)).

And just as importantly, private insurers make cost and comparative effectiveness determinations too, either by following Medicare’s lead, as expressed through national and local coverage determinations (NCDs and LCDs), or by setting up their own new technology evaluation systems, like BlueCross BlueShield has with its Technology Evaluation Center. Though the offical duties and decisionmaking processes of these organizations differ, the health care community generally understands these decisions as implicitly factoring in cost effectiveness or at least clinical effectiveness-thus doing precisely what the anti-reformers like Gottlieb warn about.

Surprise, Surprise: Older Americans are Sicker than their European Counterparts

In this international study, we found that US adults of all wealth levels reported worse health than did Europeans at comparable wealth levels.  Poor Americans were at particularly worse health compared with their English or other European counterparts, but even well-off Americans reported health comparable to substantially poorer Europeans.  Differences in behavioral risk factors accounted for only a fraction of these disparities.

As behavioral factors were insufficient to account for this disparity, Avendano et al. distinguish between national health care systems.

Features of the US health care system may contribute to the worse health of Americans compared with Europeans.  In particular, most European countries have a stronger primary care orientation than does the United States.  Previous evidence suggests that a strong primary care system is associated with better health outcomes, partly because it entails a stronger focus on primary prevention, a more equitable distribution of resources, and a higher efficacy of the health system.

Investing less at the primary care stage where prevention is key, necessarily means that there is a greater focus on disease maintenance or amelioration after its onset.  Which is to say that Americans, for the most part, are not afforded significant medical attention until they are sick.

In addition to having a stronger focus on primary care than the United States, European countries have greater protections for their poor.  European countries offer virtually universal health care coverage, so even the poor have relatively unfettered access to necessary care.  The United States on the other hand, has an uninsured population totaling 41 million (or over 45 million by some estimates).

The fact that health disparities in England still persists despite access to care,

suggests that mechanisms outside the health care system may also be involved.  Wealth enhances access to material resources such as housing, and is a source of immediate consumption in periods of economic strain. Wealth may also increase sense of control over life and other psychosocial resources that can enhance health.

This study gives further credence to the notion that America has at least something to learn from the European health care system.  Universal health care is one component, but focusing more keenly on primary care and easing the social burdens of the poor are another.  Racial health disparities is also an issue that has to be addressed in the United States, but this study restricted its study population to non-Hispanic Whites in order to determine what factors beyond those attributable to race are at issue in the United States’ lag behind its European peers.  Given the fact that racial health disparities are prevalent in the United States, it would not strain reason to conclude that the gap between Americans and Europeans would be exacerbated if racial minorities were included.  The correlation between economic status, residential segregation and well being may help explain why this is the case.

The United States health care system clearly demonstrates that dollars spent is no indication of the quality or efficacy of health care actually received.  Moving into a more cost-effective health care  paradigm that provides access to comprehensive care at a stage where it can impact long-term health is essential.  The Avendano study offers proof of this.

ABC Special Highlights the Need for Education After SCHIP Expansion

ABC aired A Hidden America: Children of the Mountains last Friday with host Diane Sawyer. Children of the Mountains follows the lives of several children growing up in Central Appalachia.

The special raised several crucial issues, but I was struck by the lack of healthcare available to Appalachian children. Sawyer reported that a diet consisting of high-fat, salty foods and massive amounts of soda pop, particularly Mountain Dew, are responsible for a range of adverse childhood and adolescent health conditions.

One of the most serious health conditions addressed by Children of the Mountains is toothlessness. Sawyer explored how the consumption of large quantities of sugary sodas like Mountain Dew causes extensive cavities and tooth decay. Additionally, Appalachian children experience a lack of resources and health insurance coverage that surpasses that of many other low-income Americans.

The expansion of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program signed into law by President Obama last month requires all states to provide dental care to enrollees. While this is encouraging in light of the serious deficiencies in the availability of dental care to Appalachian children, The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that in 2004, 5.4 million uninsured children were eligible for SCHIP or Medicaid but not enrolled.

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In the Wake of Daschle’s Withdrawal, Obama Signs Bill to Expand SCHIP Coverage

President Obama signed the bill extending health coverage to millions of low-income children yesterday after it the House gave final approval, according to The New York Times. Many see this as a signal of the president’s clear intention to guarantee coverage for all Americans.

Since August 2007, the House has voted at least seven times for legislation to expand the popular State Children’s Health Insurance Program. In a recent blog we explained how Former-president George W. Bush twice vetoed similar legislation. Bush adamantly opposed the legislation on the ground that it would lead to “government-run health care for every American,” reports The Times.

Rep. Henry A. Waxman, a California Democrat said that the bill was “a down payment” and “an essential start” to the ultimate goal of health reform. Speaker Nancy Pelosi proclaimed the passage and signing of the bill as the result of the last fall’s historic presidential election, stating:

“This is the beginning of the change that the American people voted for in the last election, and that we will achieve with President Barack Obama.”

One of the major features of the bill is that it allows states to cover certain legal immigrants, who are currently barred from Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program for five years after they enter the United States.

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