More Institutional Health Economics, Please!

Today’s Nobel Prize award for institutional economists Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom is a welcome step toward methodological pluralism in the profession. Both have looked outside markets to understand the organization of economic life. Ostrom is not even an economist–she is a political scientist by profession. As Bob Shiller observes:

This award is part of the merging of the social sciences. Economics has been too isolated and too stuck on the view that markets are efficient and self-regulating. It has derailed our thinking.

According to the NYT, “The Nobel judges, in their description of Mr. Williamson’s and Ms. Ostrom’s achievement, said that ‘economic science’ should extend beyond market theory and into actual behavior, and the two award winners, in their empirical work, had done this.”

There is a great need for more of this type of work in health economics. Joe White’s Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005 is one good exemplar of needed work here; he eschews “discussions of how economic theory can be applied to medical care production and delivery” and instead “focuses on ‘the market’ in its actual, not theoretical, form, as it existed in the United States.” White describes case after case where consolidation, not medical need, drove industry structure. He leaves the reader with a clear and convincing image of a space where varying levels of provider and insurer power, not productivity, is the key to understanding changes in the profitability of services. I’ve seen few better brief explanations of rising medical costs than the following: Read more

Alternative Revenue Stream for Private Practice Physicians – Research Investigator

Clinical research is the only way [for a physician in the managed care era] to make a boat payment, quips David Stark, M.D.

With increasing frequency, pharmaceutical and medical device companies are turning to physicians in private practice, rather than academic medical centers, to serve as investigators overseeing the 60,000-odd clinical trials each year, between 80 and 90% of which are funded by industry as opposed to, say, NIH. Academic medical centers are losing the “business,” having fallen from 63% to 26% as the site for clinical research between 1994 and 2004. While it might be argued that trials in the private practice setting produce superior results because they occur under circumstances that more closely resemble how the drug or device will actually be used if approved by the FDA, there are significant risks attendant to this phenomenon that have received too little attention.

The ultimate question is whether physicians can compartmentalize the competing incentives that exist in advising patients about whether to pursue conventional therapy or participate in a clinical trial. This is especially true if the physician is being handsomely compensated for each patient she recruits into a trial, and is exacerbated when the physician also has other financial relationships with the trial sponsor (the drug or device company) for, say, speaking and consulting gigs. Clinical Research in the Private Office Setting — Ethical Issues The recruitment process for clinical trials is the longest and most costly part of the process - prospective participants have to undergo testing to see if they qualify for the study, and federal law requires that they receive significant amounts of information and have ample opportunity to have their questions answered pre-enrollment. A per capita payment contingent upon successful enrollment of the patient will tempt a physician to fudge on this process and enroll unqualified subjects. This not only may put them at risk because they are too sick, but also skew the research results because they’re not sick enough. Bonuses for meeting enrollment goals only make it worse.

Without impugning physician integrity, how realistic it is for physicians to serve in the dual capacity of treating physician and researcher? Studies have repeatedly confirmed “therapeutic misconception” whereby study participants believe, no matter how clearly told to the contrary, that they are “patients” receiving treatment, rather than “subjects” of research who may be receiving a placebo or an experimental drug. This phenomenon is certainly exacerbated when the patient’s treating physician is doubling as the investigator of the clinical trial. Most patients continue to believe that their own personal physician would be driven solely by their best interests. Ironically, some people have more faith in an experimental intervention when they learn that the investigator has a “piece of the action.”

Obviously, significant policy and legal questions arise from this practice, and a more holistic approach to the question of the best way to encourage clinical trials while safeguarding the interests of trial subjects is beyond what I can attempt here. But one possible approach could be drawn from informed consent law — whether statutory or common law, which should require physician disclosure of conflicts of interest to patients. Imagine the beginning of a conversation between doctor and patient/potential research subject:

Doctor: “Just so you know, if you agree to participate in this clinical trial, I get paid $1000 by the manufacturer of the product being tested, but if you don’t, and you just want regular treatment, I’ll only get paid $60 by your insurance company. But, in fairness, that’s because a clinical trial is a lot more work for me….”

But to be honest, I don’t really believe in this solution either. Most recipients of this information either don’t understand it, or have no idea what to do with it, or both. Some fear that too much confusing information might kill trials altogether, which would be a terrible outcome. And there are certainly reasons to fear that such trials are becoming harder to run, to the point where they’re not worth the money. Ultimately, I guess, I want to control how physicians get paid to serve as investigators — the Goldilocks Solution — not too much, and not too little. I want them to be paid just right, so that they are willing to conduct clinical trials, but aren’t tempted to act other than in the patient’s best interest. Of course, what is just right and how to enforce it poses its own problems.

Seton Hall Law School, the author’s employer, is the recipient of grants, donations and endowments from the pharmaceutical industry. No part of the author’s compensation is funded by these gifts.

x-posted at Concurring Opinions

Price-Gouging by Doctors and Hospitals

Mark A. Hall, Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University

Carl E. Schneider, Professor of Law and Internal Medicine, University of Michigan

[Ed. note: As noted above, we are very pleased to welcome Professors Mark Hall and Carl Schneider to the blog today.]

We cannot reform health care intelligently unless we understand the medical marketplace well. Debates about reform have scrutinized the health-insurance market, but they have neglected a crucially defective feature of the medical marketplace — the way doctors and hospitals charge patients when prices are not set by regulation or by negotiation with insurers.

The Problem

When patients are not protected by large private or public insurers, doctors and hospitals charge them astonishingly more than patients with Medicare or managed-care insurance.  Some price difference would make sense, because insurers offer providers large volume and economies of scale.  But we are not talking about discounts of 10, or 20, or even 30 percent.  Providers routinely double, triple, or even quadruple prices for unprotected patients.  Such huge mark-ups can only be regarded as price-gouging — exploiting market power to charge prices virtually unrelated to actual cost or market value.

A comprehensive analysis of data hospitals report to Medicare shows that, on average, hospitals charge uninsured patients two-and-a-half times more than they charge insured patients and three times more than their actual costs.  In some states mark-ups average four-fold.

Data for physicians’ prices are less comprehensive, but information from office management systems is disturbing.  Across a range of diagnostic and invasive specialty services (echocardiography, coronary catheterization, liver biopsy, upper GI endoscopy, circumcision, flexible sigmoidoscopies, hysterectomy, appendectomy, gall bladder removal, and arthroscopic knee surgery), many physicians in 2003 charged uninsured patients roughly two to two-and-a-half times what insurers paid.  Only primary care physicians appear to be staying within plausible bounds.  They typically charge uninsured patients only one-third to one-half more for basic office or hospital visits than they received from insurers.

Some Excuses

Providers defend themselves in several ways.  First, they call these price differences steep discounts rather than huge mark-ups.  This is almost laughable.  Most providers charge “list prices” to only a small minority of patients (10-20%), so these are hardly a genuine baseline.  Second, providers argue that because they often cannot collect list prices, they are on balance receiving little more than they would receive from insurers.  However, when patients cannot pay inflated bills, doctors and hospitals regularly send them to collection agencies, ruining patients’ credit and bankrupting millions of them.

Third, providers blame the government by claiming that program and accounting rules require them to bill this way.  But governmental agencies have declared that this is not true, and while some rules may still be irksome, rules about billing certainly do not require providers to set their prices as high as they do.  Many tax-exempt (non-profit) hospitals recently wilted under scrutiny and adopted sliding-scale policies for low-income uninsured patients, but these policies do little to help insured patients who are receiving care out-of-network or uninsured patients from the broad middle class.

The Solution

Insurers’ attempts to stop price gouging have failed.  Some large insurers have refused to reimburse out-of-network providers for the full amounts they charge on the grounds that those amounts are not “usual, customary, and reasonable.”  But New York’s Attorney General called this “consumer fraud” because patients were left owing the full bill.  Courts have been little help.  Consumer class-action lawsuits have attacked price gouging by non-profit hospitals, but courts have dismissed most of these cases on various technical grounds.

Government regulation has inhibited price gouging, but only for people covered by government programs.  Medicare, for instance, prohibits doctors from charging Medicare patients more than about 10% over Medicare-approved rates.  But inflated pricing still afflicts the uninsured and privately insured people buying care out of network.  Some reformers simply advocate greater price transparency so that patients know better what to expect when seeking care without the protection of insurers.  But transparency will not fix the structural dynamics of market power that allow providers to charge almost whatever they want.

To help medical markets work better, the government should cap what doctors, hospitals, and other providers may charge patients who are not protected by regulated or negotiated discounts.  The details can be debated and refined, but one approach is to cap charges at, say, 150% of a normal reference rate.  The reference rate could be what Medicare pays, or a weighted average of what larger private insurers normally pay across a region.  Doctors with boutique practices could still charge what they wished for extra concierge services, or perhaps doctors who don’t accept any insurance should be exempted.  Design features are important and tricky, but they should not keep us from setting reasonable bounds within which markets can function.

The Unconventional Economics of Health Care

In a response to one of my posts on the public plan, Tyler Cowen noted that it was “hard to translate” my points into “econspeak.” I agree, and I think that’s one reason why we need to pay attention to “alternative economics of health care,” to use the title of Geoffrey M. Hodgson’s excellent article. In a series of posts over the next few days, I will focus on the many ways in which classical economic reasoning fails in the health care context, and what that means for law.

For an accessible opening example, consider Charles Morris’s description of the “bargaining” between doctors and insurers in his book “The Surgeons.” From a chapter entitled Money, here is a fascinating and counterintuitive insight on the interplay between incentives and medical care:

There is a strongly held opinion, particularly among conservative think tanks, that with multiple competitive private payers, the normal interactions between vendors and payers will gradually create a more efficient health care system. I saw no evidence to support that belief.

Read more

Paging Dr. Gawande: Health Reform Matters

Atul Gawande’s article “The Cost Conundrum” offers a distinctively moral perspective on health reform. It has also become a cause celebre in policy circles. The Obama White House is reading it, leading journal Health Affairs has sponsored a roundtable on it, and pundits across the political spectrum are invoking it.

There are good reasons for all the attention in health reform circles. But there’s a paradox here, too, because Gawande doesn’t believe that changes to health care finance and regulation can deter the wasteful and uncoordinated provider behavior which he sees at the root of the present crisis. I respectfully disagree. Law may not be doing a good job at this now—largely because health care regulators over the past 20 years vastly overestimated the degree to which the market would improve quality and access. But we have a rare window of opportunity to correct for those assumptions. Moreover, without real reform, the profit-obsessed providers who are the villains of Gawande’s piece will systematically outcompete the integrated delivery systems he champions. Gresham’s Law applies in health care, too.

First, some background. Gawande compares a high-cost Texas town (McAllen) with a nearby, low-cost one (El Paso). He finds very little in the McAllen extravagance that is actually improving the longevity or quality of life of its residents. The piece describes in some detail how commercial imperatives affected medical practice in McAllen:

[M]any physicians are remarkably oblivious to the financial implications of their decisions. They see their patients. They make their recommendations. They send out the bills. And, as long as the numbers come out all right at the end of each month, they put the money out of their minds.

Others think of the money as a means of improving what they do. They think about how to use the insurance money to maybe install electronic health records with colleagues, or provide easier phone and e-mail access, or offer expanded hours. They hire an extra nurse to monitor diabetic patients more closely, and to make sure that patients don’t miss their mammograms and pap smears and colonoscopies.

Then there are the physicians who see their practice primarily as a revenue stream. They instruct their secretary to have patients who call with follow-up questions schedule an appointment, because insurers don’t pay for phone calls, only office visits. They consider providing Botox injections for cash. They take a Doppler ultrasound course, buy a machine, and start doing their patients’ scans themselves, so that the insurance payments go to them rather than to the hospital. They figure out ways to increase their high-margin work and decrease their low-margin work. . . .

In every community, you’ll find a mixture of these views among physicians, but one or another tends to predominate. McAllen seems simply to be the community at [the high-cost] extreme.

Gawande describes a market gone wild in McAllen, where doctors would demand “four or five thousand [dollars] a month” or even sex in exchange for routing their patients to certain home health agencies.

How does such a culture of commercialization develop? Gawande is not a social scientist, but he can extrapolate from his own experience. He knows how physicians mentor one another and provide models of care. He also mentions the work of Woody Powell, who examines how certain leading institutions can set the tone for much of an economic community. These “anchor tenants” led McAllen’s “medical community . . . to treat patients the way subprime-mortgage lenders treated home buyers: as profit centers.”

Gawande contrasts McAllen with several centers of excellence in health care, including the Mayo Clinic and a Grand Junction, Colorado network of physicians. Mayo doctors are salaried, and in Grand Junction “the doctors agreed among themselves to a system that paid them a similar fee whether they saw Medicare, Medicaid, or private-insurance patients, so that there would be little incentive to cherry-pick [and lemon-drop] patients.” A local HMO encouraged the Grand Junction doctors to meet and “focus[] on rooting out problems like poor prevention practices, unnecessary back operations, and unusual hospital-complication rates.” As a result, quality improved, cost declined, and Grand Junction Medicaid patients enjoyed higher rates of effective access than average.

It would seem that a health reform ought to focus on encouraging these types of interventions. But in an interview with Ezra Klein, Gawande is strangely agnostic on whether law can change much:

My vantage point on the world is the operating room where I see my patients. And trying to think about whether a public option would change anything didn’t connect. I order something like $20,000 or $30,000 of health care in a day. Would a public or private option change that?

People say that the most expensive piece of medical equipment is the doctor’s pen. It’s not that we make all the money. It’s that we order all the money. We’re hoping that Medicare versus Aetna will be more effective at making me do my operations differently? I don’t get that. Neither one has been very effective thus far.

I think there are several misconceptions in that quote. First, the public option is not designed to displace private insurance. It’s supposed to be a benchmark for private plans, to incentivize them to act more constructively. Second, Gawande is here invoking his own perspective, that of “good” physicians, those who push “the money out of their minds” as they decide courses of treatment. Law, as Justice Holmes reminds us, should be written and interpreted with the proverbial “bad man” in mind, who “cares only for the material consequences which [knowledge of law] enables him to predict.”

Many of the rules of health care finance and regulation address exactly the types of problematic behavior discussed in the article. Niche facilities and imaging centers are at the cutting edge of the commercialization Gawande worries about. Lawyers have debated them for years, and the policymaking is still ongoing. HHS set a moratorium on the development of specialty hospitals in 2003, but it expired. This led to a flurry of interest in administrative action designed to address specialty hospitals’ “cherry-picking” of lucrative patients and “lemon dropping” of costly cases onto other hospitals. Something as obscure as “certificate of need” rules (operating at a state level) have proven critical in determining the spread of specialty hospitals. Reports from the GAO and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission have investigated their impact, while CMS rulemakings have focused on re-assessing payment levels for procedures at ambulatory surgical centers. Antitrust litigation could also play a pivotal role in the struggles between general and specialty hospitals for what Gawande calls the “soul of medicine.”

In the article, Gawande repeatedly talks about “blunting financial incentives” for bad medicine or patient cherrypicking. But that’s exactly the charge of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) in its examinations of developments like niche providers. State policymakers can also reflect these concerns in various ways–adjusting nonprofit status, facilities licensure rules, taxation, and many other legal variables.

In other words, law matters. Sure, all these laws can be bent in ways that favor the further commercialization of medicine. Much of any book on health care finance regulation is a tale of frustrated hopes and dashed ambitions. But this body of law at least provides some tangible guide to past and potential realignments of incentives–something that can’t be said for the appeals to cultural change at the core of Gawandean quietism.

Gawande concedes that “In the war over the culture of medicine—the war over whether our country’s anchor model will be Mayo or McAllen—the Mayo model is losing.” Calls for cultural change just aren’t being heeded—and why should they be? If an insurer develops an extremely effective protocol for dealing with the chronically ill, it will be rewarded by the market with. . . . more expensive, chronically ill patients wanting to sign up for it. As things stand now, providing high-quality care for the chronically ill is a great way to go out of business in virtually any market where your competitors can “skim the cream” of the healthiest half of the population, who only demand about 3% of health care spending. Health reform (including real risk adjustment to properly compensate such plans) can help change that.

Gawande’s “Cost Conundrum” could be to health reform what Sinclair’s “The Jungle” was to food safety. It explains current trends in the commercialization of medicine better than virtually any journalistic work out there. Sadly, it appears that its author is now more inclined to “stay above the fray” than to try to articulate and lobby for the regulatory infrastructure necessary for the cultural change he so eloquently advocates.

X-Posted at: Concurring Opinions.

Atul Gawande: Why McAllen Texas Kant be the answer to health reform

“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end. ”

-Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals^[1]

Atul Gawande has done it again. He has written a piece for the New Yorker that you simply have to read:  “The Cost Conundrum.What a Texas town can teach us about health care.“

Gawande writes that McAllen “is one of the most expensive health-care markets in the country. Only Miami-which has much higher labor and living costs-spends more per person on health care. In 2006, Medicare spent fifteen thousand dollars per enrollee here, almost twice the national average. The income per capita is twelve thousand dollars. In other words, Medicare spends three thousand dollars more per person here than the average person earns.”

El Paso, Texas, similarly situated, spends significantly less- half as much. The why of it is absolutely compelling. And it struck me while reading that what Gawande finds is essentially a medical culture functioning, and incentivized, contrary to Kant’s categorical imperative (see above): the simple moral admonition that one must not merely “use” others.

Might I suggest that it is passing strange to find ourselves, in the midst of such daunting medical, technical, and financial data contained within the  proposed solutions and counter-solutions to arrive at this–a simple (but difficult) age old moral truth?

Pragmatically, as one looks upon the current system of health care and health care finance,  it is well worth quoting Harold Luft from today’s Washington Times: “A redesigned system must create new incentives for those entities so their self-interested behavior leads to a better societal outcome.” Gawande offers examples of systems which provide an infrastructure conducive to Mr. Kant’s imperative.

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=1

Clinical Research: When the Compensation Begs the Answer

The New York Times reports that New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram announced a settlement agreement with medical device maker, Synthes, for failing to disclose the financial conflicts of interest of doctors researching its products. Synthes is the maker of the ProDisc, an artificial spinal disk.

The settlement agreement with Synthes was described in the AG’s press release, which quoted Ms. Milgram, as “the first of its kind because of its disclosure provisions, as well as its ban on compensating clinical researchers with company stock. She said the latter provision runs counter to widespread industry practice — a practice she called unacceptable.” Notably, the state pursued the case as a matter of consumer fraud. The premise being that the failure to fully disclose such conflicts constituted such for both human trial subjects and the purchasing public.

In a letter to the FDA, critical of the FDA and cc’d to key members of Congress, Ms. Milgram described the results of the AG’s investigation into the business and research practices of Synthes. The letter states:

The investigation revealed that a majority of the physicians who participated in these clinical trials had significant investments in the products -investments that would have been worthless had the product failed to obtain regulatory approval from the FDA. And, the investigation revealed that Synthes, which acquired ProDisc while the clinical trials were underway, failed to disclose these financial conflicts of interest to the FDA.

Yet, despite the fact that Synthes’ failure to adequately disclose these interests should have been obvious from even a cursory review of its FDA submissions, the FDA did nothing to regulate these conflicts. A number of the disclosure forms were signed and dated, but were otherwise left blank. Others indicated that the clinical investigator had a significant equity interest in the product, but did not attach the requisite details. But the FDA approved Synthes’ applications for premarket approval without any delay or further inquiry into this issue.

Leaving aside for the moment the criticism of the FDA (the State of New Jersey joins a long list of increasingly vocal complainants, including the Program on Government Oversight (citing “dramatically reduced inspections of ‘good laboratory practices’ at facilities that do the earliest testing of medical devices. Such inspections declined from 33 in 2005, to seven in 2007, to just one last year”),  and FDA scientists from the Center for Devices and  Radiological Health, who have openly proclaimed that the FDA “is fundamentally broken.”), it’s worth a moment to consider that Synthes has agreed to “stop paying doctors who are conducting clinical trials of its products with stock or stock options,” and that AG Milgram described the compensation of research doctors with stock as being “apparently common” and a “widespread industry practice.”

Compensating a  doctor with stock or stock options financially tied to the results of his research may well be the antithesis of an impetus for objective clinical research.

The basic proposition is this: you, doctor, are charged with investigating whether or not this medical device is safe and fit and shows efficacy for human use. For doing so, we will give you a portion of the company (stock or stock options) which owns the medical device. If the medical device is efficacious and fit for human use, the company will stand to profit. As a holder of stock and/or stock options in the company, you will be paid a portion of that profit and/or the value of your holdings in the company will increase correspondent to your determination of safety for human use and efficacy. If you determine that the device is not safe for human use and/or not efficacious, your holdings in the company will be worth much less, if not worthless. “Is the device safe for human use and efficacious?” Does an answer of “Yes” surprise anyone?

It is also not an answer to say that the doctors may have merely been compensated in cash and then later converted that cash into stock or stock options independently. My guess is that in constructing these compensation packages, as with most securities matters, timing and knowledge is important. That the stock or stock options must be issued or at least contracted for by the researcher simultaneous with the hiring so as to avoid SEC difficulty regarding the particulars of the researchers’ “inside” and “confidential” knowledge regarding the device and the research itself. Researchers who have purchased interested stock (or who have had stock purchased by others) before news of their research has been made public have often paid a price.

And obviously, once the doctor’s research has been made public, any positive results will have been already reflected in the market price of the stock, all but foreclosing the research doctor from reaping profits tied directly to his research determinations.

As part of A.G. Milgram’s “Assurance of Voluntary Compliance agreement (the Synthes case was handled by Deputy Attorney General Megan Lewis, Chief of the Division of Law’s Affirmative Litigation Section, and Deputy Attorney General Michelle T. Weiner) Synthes must disclose any future payments made by the company to physicians conducting clinical trials on its devices, as well as any investments held by such physicians in the devices they test. A $3 billion global company, Synthes has also agreed to stop paying clinical trial physicians with company stock or stock options.”

Attorney General Milgram said that “the Synthes agreement should serve as a template for the entire industry,” and in her letter to the FDA remarked that she was “hopeful the Synthes terms will become “best practices” for disclosure among medical device makers.”

In addition to signifying her hope, Ms. Milgram announced that her office issued subpoenas “to five major medical device manufacturing companies seeking information about their business practices.”

Physician Shortage in Relation to Compensation

The New York Times has run an article regarding physician shortages and physician compensation that is well worth a read. The Times reports that Obama administration officials

said they were particularly concerned about shortages of primary care providers who are the main source of health care for most Americans.

One proposal - to increase Medicare payments to general practitioners, at the expense of high-paid specialists - has touched off a lobbying fight.

But as the Times article does not give particulars as to physician compensation, it may be of some help to actually look at the numbers.  To do so, I’ve re-posted this blog from a few months back. If, after you’ve looked at the numbers, you would like some explanation as to why they are the way they are, Professor Frank Pasquale’s post, Will Specialist Pay Be a Target of Health Care Reform?, will also serve you well. For an even further look at physician compensation, click here, and for a look at physician shortage matters click here.

Physician Compensation II

Yesterday’s post displayed recent Bureau of Labor Statistic figures concerning physician compensation, and offered a link to recent median physician compensation data approved for use by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for calculations regarding direct graduate medical education under 42 CFR 413.78(f). The producer of this data, AMGA, also offers an interactive physician compensation survey which shows “average” and “starting” compensation for various specialties. A click on the arrow underneath “average” will sort from lowest to highest.

Here below is a list of a few of the CMS approved median physician compensation figures for a number of different specialties. The numbers are taken from the 2008 report.

The median compensation for a practitioner:

• Pediatric & Adolescent, Internal 161,444
• Pediatric & Adolescent, Infect. Disease 174,154
• Family Medicine, w/out Obstetrics 176,280
• Family Med., w/out Obst., Branch* 190,182
• Geriatrics 179,344
• Podiatry: 180,080
• Transplant Surgery, Kidney 368,750
• Dermatology, Branch* 301,111
• Dermatology, Mohs 423,848
• Not neural, Non-Interventionist, Radiology 420,858
• Mammography 540,028
• Orthopedic Surgery, Spine 611,670

*Branch is defined by AMGA as: These specialties have the same basic definition as the main specialty. These physicians located in small satellite or branch offices at least five miles from the main campus. The branch office practices primarily as its own separate entity, and often has different compensation and/or performance expectations than its main campus colleagues, there would be no teaching responsibilities at these locations.

With these numbers, over the course of ten career years, if calculated at a constant rate without regard to future increases in compensation, the median paid “Family Doctor, Branch” will have earned $1,900,182. During those same static ten years, a “Mammographer” will have earned $5,400,280. If the Family Doctor were to consult with the Mammographer at the end of those ten years, she would be doing so with someone who had made $3,500,098 more than she-nearly 3 times as much. If that same Family Doctor were to then consult with someone from the lowest paid of the three categories of Radiologist, Not neural, Non-Interventionist, she would be doing so with someone who had made $4,208,580 during that time-which would be $2,308,398 more than she-or more than twice as much.

Perhaps by way of consolation for the PCP, the Geriatrics specialist and the Pediatric Infectious Disease specialist would have fared worse, and even the Kidney transplant specialist who consults with the radiologist would be speaking with someone who had made a half of a million dollars more than he did.

But perhaps it is not consolation enough; the AMA has reported that the nation faces a shortage of 35,000 to 40,000 Primary Care Physicians.

Medical Imaging: Why Are We Spending So Much?

It is not only the sheer number of medical imaging tests (necessary and unnecessary), such as MRIs, CT scans, and PET scans, that is contributing to the overall cost of medical imaging.  Other factors adding to the fact that insurers’ expenditures on medical imaging are growing at 18-20% annually are the use of older imaging machines, the growing trend of physicians who have ownership interests in imaging machines, and radiologists’ high compensation.

Currently, imaging centers are not required to, but may choose to, become accredited by The American College of Radiology.   Therefore, the age of an imaging machine is not regulated and older machines may produce blurry or poor scans.  This leads to repeat tests and misdiagnoses, which can result in an illness remaining undetected or even unnecessary surgery, as is depicted in the NY Times article.

In the current system, compensation is not based on the quality of the scan and therefore there is no incentive for the facility or physician to purchase a new and very costly imaging machine.  As the Wall St. Journal Health Blog points out radiologists read the scans and the insurer who pays for the scan never sees it to determine its quality. Read more

As the Obama Budget Unfurls, Details About Health Care Reform Emerge

The New York Times has published an article, “Obama Offers Broad Plan to Revamp Health Care” which ably outlines the contours of the emergent health plan–and the way we’ll pay for it. Or at least the way President Obama proposes we’ll pay for it. According to the Times, “Mr. Obama asked Congress to set aside $634 billion in a ‘reserve fund for health care reform.’”

Suffice it to say, for the moment, that there are winners:

Cancer research, a multi-year plan designed to double it; Biosimilars (generic versions of biotech drugs), speeded approval through “a new regulatory pathway” at the Food and Drug Administration;” low-income women, increased access to family planning through Medicaid; and doctors, who will not be subjected to the Medicare cuts in payments scheduled to take effect in 2010 under current law (21% in 2010, 5% for a few years thereafter);

And there are losers:

Drug Companies, an increased discount to Medicaid (from 15.1% to 22.1% of avg. manufacturer’s price); Private Insurers, a cut in payments to Medicare Advantage providers; higher income Medicare recipients, increased prescription drug premiums; Hospitals, a decrease in Medicare payments for those hospitals with a high proportion of re-admits within 30 days of initial release (said to be indicative of  poor initial performance); home health agencies, a $37 billion cut over the next 10 years.

Of course, “loser” is a relative term; and sometimes a gored ox, if it lives, is better than no ox at all. And I would imagine that is easier to bear the loss of  some oxen than it is others: specifically, an increased discount in Medicaid prescription drug pricing, is not the ability of Medicare to bargain for the price of prescription drugs. A topic we wrote about in early January, and a reform which the Obama Health Care campaign plan promised:

“At present, Medicare is itself unable to negotiate drug pricing. In Obama’s campaign health plan, he stated that he would

‘Allow Medicare to negotiate for cheaper drug pricing. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act bans the government from negotiating down the prices of prescription drugs, even though the Department of Veterans Affairs’ negotiation of prescription drug prices with drug companies has garnered significant savings for taxpayers. Barack Obama and Joe Biden will repeal the ban on direct negotiation with drug companies and use the resulting savings, which could be as high as $30 billion, to further invest in improving health care coverage and quality’ (footnotes omitted).”

My guess is that this is an ox the drug companies are trying to save.

A Shortage of General Surgeons, Rural Hospitals Must Compete

The Washington Post ran a story today, “Shortage of General Surgeons Endangers Rural Americans,” which, as the title suggests, reported on the shortage of general surgeons. The story describes the sort “jack of all (surgical) trades” existence of a general surgeon and reports that “In 1980, 945 newly trained general surgeons were certified in the United States. In 2008, the number was essentially the same — 972 — even though the population has increased by 79 million. In 1994, there were 7.1 general surgeons per 100,000 people. Today there are five per 100,000.”

WaPo reports

“For the one-quarter of Americans who live outside metropolitan areas, general surgeons are the essential ingredient that keeps full-service medical care within reach. Without general surgeons as backup, family practitioners can’t deliver babies, emergency rooms can’t take trauma cases, and most internists won’t do complicated procedures such as colonoscopies. But various forces — educational, medical and sociological — are making them an endangered species.”

“Many young physicians are opting for non-surgical specialties, such as radiology or cardiology, in which they can earn as much money as a surgeon with less grueling and unpredictable hours. Many young surgeons, in turn, choose to concentrate in fields such as transplant surgery or plastic surgery, in which they can make more money and don’t have to face (usually alone) the wide range of problems a generalist faces.”

Importantly, the article discusses efforts to recruit new general surgeons and relative compensation incentives; it recounts how 57 year old Bob Kuhl, who has spent his entire career as a general surgeon in Creston Iowa, threatened to quit 18 months ago because “When the hospital hired Kuhl’s younger partner, it guaranteed him a salary greater than the $185,000 the older man had been making.” The hospital, however, is said to have made arrangements to assure Kuhl “a higher income, too.”

It is perhaps important to note that the recruitment of general surgeons is said to compete with such lucrative non-surgical specialties such as radiology. As posted recently, the median compensation for a not neural, non-interventionist radiologist is $420,858. As noted in another recent post, this level of radiologist compensation has been ably attributed on Ezra Klein’s blog to advances in technology and antiquated fee for service structures:

“Now because of the explosion of imaging, and practice efficiency, these guys are reading 3x the images they did 15 years, and making three times as much.”

The post on Mr. Klein’s blog assures us that “Eventually, payors and Medicare figures things out and start putting pressures on rates. But it takes a while.” Unfortunately, it seems that as hospitals and other medical providers must compete against such “not yet figured out” largesse for the services of newly minted physicians, the damage has been done– and a benchmark has been set.

Model Wanted

The NY Times reports that according to Dr. Atul Gawande, a surgeon at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston and an associate professor at the Harvard School of Public Health, “there’s a drastic decline in the number of geriatricians - and just 300 new ones are being trained each year - yet the number of people over 65 will double in the next 20 years. Those who work in geriatric care are among the worst paid in the health care system.”

That last statement, as shown in a recent post regarding physician compensation, is backed up by numbers. According to the American Group Medical Association (AMGA) the median compensation for a geriatrician is $179,344. The median compensation for a podiatrist is $180,080. These AMGA numbers have been approved by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for use in CMS related calculations.

Dr. Gawande “and others see a pressing need for new approaches to keep aging patients as healthy as possible and living independently as long as possible.” The Times reports that “Dr. Chad Boult, a geriatrician at Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in Baltimore, says the goal should be care that is well coordinated, and patients and families who are involved in and educated about the care plan.”

To that end, Dr. Boult is participating in the testing of a “team approach” which is somewhat reminiscent of the subject of a recent post, Alaska’s Southcentral Foundation’s “medical home” approach. Southcentral’s “comprehensive” health care strategy has shown some promising results. The Times reports that

Dr. Boult is involved in testing a team approach, in which nurses trained in geriatrics are helping physicians in the Baltimore-Washington area provide coordinated care for 50 or 60 of their highest-risk older patients. The nurses go to patients’ homes, develop comprehensive care plans, help the patients in self-monitoring, help them overcome obstacles to self-care and connect patients and their families to community agencies.

According to geriatrics experts, social workers trained in the problems of the elderly can also participate by performing home assessments, for example, to prevent falls and costly, disabling fractures. They can help overcome barriers to good nutrition, and they can help make the community connections for assistance with the activities of daily living, like shopping.
Dr. Boult said that “The Baltimore team project has already demonstrated an improvement in the quality of care that ailing elderly patients receive, and by keeping patients out of the hospital, he expects it will save money for insurers like Medicare.

The NYTimes also reports, however, that the current fee for services compensation scheme has not yet been structured so as to provide monetary incentives for such prophylactic care. The Times states: “While current insurance systems pay many thousands of dollars for hospital-based care, they cover only a fraction of the far less expensive care delivered by doctors and nurses that can keep patients out of the hospital,” and that experts say “a new model of care is needed.”
Read full article here.

Clinic Expansion Under Bush Thought Likely to Continue Under Obama

The NY Times reports that “President Bush leaves office with a health care legacy in bricks and mortar: he has doubled federal financing for community health centers, enabling the creation or expansion of 1,297 clinics in medically underserved areas.”
The article notes that:

“As a crucial component of the health safety net, they [community health centers] are lauded as a cost-effective alternative to hospital emergency rooms, where the uninsured and underinsured often seek care,”

and that

“Studies have generally shown that the health centers — which must be governed by patient-dominated boards — are effective at reducing racial and ethnic disparities in medical treatment and save substantial sums by keeping patients out of hospitals. Their trade association estimates that they save the health care system $17.6 billion a year, and that an equivalent amount could be saved if avoidable emergency room visits were diverted to clinics.”

As an example, the Times article cited Nashville’s United Neighborhood Health Services, a recipient of increased funding which has expanded more than two-fold in the last 8 years. The Times notes that “One of the group’s recent grants helped open the Southside Family Clinic, which moved last year from a pair of public housing apartments to a gleaming new building on a once derelict corner.” A 68 year old patient of that clinic who had just received breathing treatments, “said she would have sought care for her bronchitis in a hospital emergency room were it not for the new clinic. Instead, she took a short drive, waited 15 minutes without an appointment and left without paying a dime; the clinic would bill her later for her Medicare co-payment of $18.88.”

The article also states that “Despite the clinics’ unprecedented growth, wide swaths of the country remain without access to affordable primary care. The recession has only magnified the need as hundreds of thousands of Americans have lost their employer-sponsored health insurance along with their jobs.”

Widespread Support for Community Health Centers
The Times notes that “In response, Democrats on Capitol Hill are proposing even more significant increases, making the centers a likely feature of any health care deal struck by Congress and the Obama administration.”

In August, President-elect Obama sponsored a bill in the Senate “that would quadruple federal spending on the program - to $8 billion from $2.1 billion — and increase incentives for medical students to choose primary care. His wife, Michelle, worked closely with health centers in Chicago as vice president for community and external relations at the University of Chicago Medical Center.”

In his recent book on health care reform, HHS secretary Tom Daschle referred to the health centers as “godsends.” The Times article also notes that the federal program “was first championed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy” and “has earned considerable bipartisan support.”

Physician Compensation, Subsidies and Service Requirements
The article notes that with United Neighborhood Health Services starting pay for doctors is $120,000. “Because of a nationwide shortage of primary care physicians, the clinics rely on federal programs like the National Health Service Corps that entice medical students with grants and loan write-offs in exchange for agreements to practice as generalists in underserved areas. Of the 16 doctors working for United Neighborhood, seven are current or former participants.”

Follow-up Care Lacking
Although widely lauded as a viable solution to Primary Care medical delivery, the article notes that follow-up for more serious conditions can be problematic.

“A deeper frustration for health centers concerns their difficulty in securing follow-up appointments with specialists for patients who are uninsured or have Medicaid. All too often, said Ms. Bufwack [Chief Executive, United Neighborhood Health Services], medical care ends at the clinic door, reinforcing the need to expand both primary care and health insurance coverage. ‘That’s when our doctors feel they’re practicing third world medicine,’ she said. ‘You will die if you have cancer or a heart condition or bad asthma or horrible diabetes. If you need a specialist and specialty tests and specialty meds and specialty surgery, those things are totally out of your reach.’”
Read full NYT article here. Read WSJ Health Blog report here.

Physician Compensation II

Yesterday’s post displayed recent Bureau of Labor Statistic figures concerning physician compensation, and offered a link to recent median physician compensation data approved for use by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for calculations regarding direct graduate medical education under 42 CFR 413.78(f). The producer of this data, AMGA, also offers an interactive physician compensation survey which shows “average” and “starting” compensation for various specialties. A click on the arrow underneath “average” will sort from lowest to highest.

Here below is a list of a few of the CMS approved median physician compensation figures for a number of different specialties. The numbers are taken from the 2008 report.

The median compensation for a practitioner:

• Pediatric & Adolescent, Internal 161,444
• Pediatric & Adolescent, Infect. Disease 174,154
• Family Medicine, w/out Obstetrics 176,280
• Family Med., w/out Obst., Branch* 190,182
• Geriatrics 179,344
• Podiatry: 180,080
• Transplant Surgery, Kidney 368,750
• Dermatology, Branch* 301,111
• Dermatology, Mohs 423,848
• Not neural, Non-Interventionist, Radiology 420,858
• Mammography 540,028
• Orthopedic Surgery, Spine 611,670

*Branch is defined by AMGA as: These specialties have the same basic definition as the main specialty. These physicians located in small satellite or branch offices at least five miles from the main campus. The branch office practices primarily as its own separate entity, and often has different compensation and/or performance expectations than its main campus colleagues, there would be no teaching responsibilities at these locations.

With these numbers, over the course of ten career years, if calculated at a constant rate without regard to future increases in compensation, the median paid “Family Doctor, Branch” will have earned $1,900,182. During those same static ten years, a “Mammographer” will have earned $5,400,280. If the Family Doctor were to consult with the Mammographer at the end of those ten years, she would be doing so with someone who had made $3,500,098 more than she–nearly 3 times as much. If that same Family Doctor were to then consult with someone from the lowest paid of the three categories of Radiologist, Not neural, Non-Interventionist, she would be doing so with someone who had made $4,208,580 during that time-which would be $2,308,398 more than she–or more than twice as much.

Perhaps by way of consolation for the PCP, the Geriatrics specialist and the Pediatric Infectious Disease specialist would have fared worse, and even the Kidney transplant specialist who consults with the radiologist would be speaking with someone who had made a half of a million dollars more than he did.

But perhaps it is not consolation enough; the AMA has reported that the nation faces a shortage of 35,000 to 40,000 Primary Care Physicians.

Will Specialist Pay Be a Target of Health Care Reform?

Health policymakers are well aware of the pay differential between primary care and specialist physicians. Given this disparity, it’s important to recognize how the divergence arose. To the extent that training programs are limited for each specialty, that’s a natural barrier to entry that is hard to remedy without a great deal of investment in specialist education–or broadening of medical education generally. However, Ezra Klein quotes a comment on his blog which suggests a more artificial basis for specialist prosperity:

Specialist salaries aren’t just determined– they are based on volume of procedures and payment rates for their procedures. The “best” specialties are fluid, as are the best salaries (with exceptions, like Neurosurgery) primarily because physician payment reform is not keeping up with the changing practice of medicine.

Specialties typically have a couple of bread-and-butter procedures that change based on changes in technology, diagnosis and clinical practice. Typically, these bread-and-butter procedures start small, are paid well per procedure, and physician groups figure out out they do a ton of those procedures to drive salary.

Opthamologists used to make a lot more money than they do now. Why? Because cataract surge[ons] used to get paid a lot more [two to five times more per case than they is paid presently]. These docs figured out how to be more efficient so they could do more cases per day, and it takes a while for payors to say– you’re doing one every 20 minutes instead of every 90? Then we’re cutting back fees accordingly. In the meantime, Ophthalmologists rake it in and are a “top” specialty for medical students.

Eventually, payors and Medicare figures things out and start putting pressures on rates. But it takes a while. The same story is now true for Gastroenterologists, Radiologists and Dermatologists. Radiology was one of the easiest fields to get into 15 years ago. You work in the dark, have little contact with patients, its frankly a weird field for people who went into medicine looking to help people. You used to have a couple of nerdy introvert types who liked being in the dark that chose the field. Now because of the explosion of imaging, and practice efficiency, these guys are reading 3x the images they did 15 years, and making three times as much.

Payments will eventually come down for them too. But in the meantime, Radiology is now one of the hottest fields for medical students. Fixing this perverse dynamic is a key question. PS: General surgeons are the wrong specialty to pick on. What specialty has had vacant spot in the residency matching process the last few years? General surgery. Its a pretty tough life– in terms of lifestyle impact, they deserve the $75-100K more than the P[rimary Care Physicians]. It’s the Radiologists and Dermatologists that have PCP hours but are making 300-400K that are the problem.

This strikes me as a step toward the truth, but it raises as many questions as it answers. After following Medicare’s struggle from 2005 to 2008 to update rates paid for out-patient procedures performed at ambulatory surgical centers, I can attest to the slowness of federal updating. (There may have been a lag from 1990 to 2008 if I am reading the rulemaking documents correctly there.) Meanwhile, private insurers may not have the purchasing power needed for foist an adjustment on thriving specialists. If specialists are coordinated or powerful enough, they can refuse to be part of a network–and that refusal can be more harmful to the network than to the specialists.

But one of the key questions here is how did the specialists increase the volume of the procedures they were able to complete? We can sketch two scenarios schematically. In one, exogenous technological change simply makes it easier to do more procedures more quickly. In another, innovation by specialists themselves makes their practices more efficient. It seems that payment systems ought to reward the latter type of efficiency gains.

Pondering the difficulty of distinguishing between these two types of efficiency gains may make one long for a more normal market determination of the price of physicians here. However, the idea of a “just wage” has to enter into policymaking. Pay should be reasonably correlated with the amount of work the physician puts in each week, the value of the services rendered, and the investment of time and money the physician put into her or his training. But when inequality is pronounced and a large proportion of citizens is dependent on public aid for their care (as in virtually every developed country in the world, including the US), the pay of physicians must reflect that fact as well.

I predict that the specialist pay conundrum will only be solved by carrots and sticks that lead to compression of physician incomes and life chances generally: greatly increased educational aid to physicians (so that they can be debt free at the end of their schooling), balanced by lifelong obligations to either take on a percentage of Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP patients, or pay others to take on their share.

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