Market Entry by Health Care Cooperatives: Neither Quick Nor Easy

Tim Greaney, St. Louis University School of Law

The idea of establishing regional cooperatives, advanced as an alternative to President Obama’s public plan option, has attracted attention as a means of assuring that health reform legislation contains some means to improve competition among health plans around the nation. But the proposal, which may have superficial appeal as a “middle ground” between a public plan option and an unchecked private market, is ill-equipped to fix the key problems a public plan would address. In addition, recent experience teaches that timely and effective entry by such plans is unlikely.

The first issue is whether a cooperative, organized by consumers or other groups, can effectively deal with the shortcomings of the existing delivery system and insurance market. Thus far, the proposal advanced by Senator Conrad is pretty sketchy, but are grounds for skepticism. A central reason for having government sponsored plans is to allow the efficiencies of Medicare’s well-established administrative structure and innovative payment experiments to carry over to the private sector. Coops provide no such advantage. A second advantage of public plans is that they would likely achieve some bargaining leverage by virtue of their probable role as insurer for people representing higher risks whom private insurers find some methods to avoid. Hospitals and physicians will be hard pressed to bypass such a significant presence in the market and the public plan can thereby exert market-wide pressure to keep provider and pharmaceutical costs down. Whether co-ops will be willing to undertake the role of covering such individuals or able to sponsor innovative delivery systems to treat them is far from certain.

In any event, it is hard to envision numerous regional coops gathering the necessary data, experience and reputation to serve as a benchmark or counterweight to dominant hospitals and provider groups across the country. Further, there is a serious question regarding the independence and mission of coops. It is a mistake to assume that nonprofit entities will necessarily work to the advantage of the public. Unfortunately, our experience with nonprofit hospitals and HMOs suggest that they can easily be persuaded to play along with other providers and may not always vigorously pursue their charitable mission. Keeping cooperatives’ eye on the ball would require close attention to the control and governance of such entities.

The second objection is based on timing and practical considerations. There is ample evidence from our experience with health insurance markets that developing effective coop-sponsored plans will not come easily or quickly. It is clear that new entrants into health insurance markets face a host of obstacles. The prevalence and magnitude of entry barriers is evidenced by the dominance and profitability of existing insurance plans. One or a handful of companies dominate most health insurance markets around the country and these firms have enjoyed consistent and robust profits. Economic theory would suggest that such profit opportunities should have invited entry by rivals eager to capture some of the profits available in those markets.

Additional proof of the obstacles to entry are found in the investigations by insurance commissioners into proposed mergers in their states. In Pennsylvania for example, the proposed merger of Highmark and Independence Blue Cross would have combined the dominant insurers in two large distinct geographic regions of the state. Evidence provided to the State indicated that numerous attempts by regional and national firms such as Aetna and Coventry to enter both markets had proved unsuccessful over the years. Expert studies suggested that a variety of factors including brand loyalty, difficulties in securing physician and hospital network contracts, regulatory and information gathering costs, and obstacles created by the contracting practices of incumbent providers, thwarted entry. Newly formed coops needing to acquire expertise and develop networks will surely face enormous difficulties penetrating markets.

Making the Case for the Public Plan, Part II: Public Option as Private Benchmark

Ezra Klein has given a nice explanation of the advantages of public options in our health insurance ecosystem. He summarizes three different types of options that could develop, including a “trigger plan” (which be “triggered into existence [where] the private insurance market” failed), a “weak public plan” (which “couldn’t use the low rates that Medicare sets” and would just act as another insurer) and a “strong public plan” (which would basically be modeled on Medicare). Klein argues that, whatever public plan were adopted, “The existence of another option changes the market. Individuals will have access to private insurers, but they’ll no longer be stuck with them.”

I agree with Klein that a public option can help us achieve the trifecta of health reform–increasing access, reducing costs, and improving quality. Tyler Cowen challenged Klein today, and I’ll try to answer Cowen.

First, Cowen argues that the public plan will be very expensive, for if “public and private plans are to coexist, the public plan must be attracting the higher-cost customers, namely the higher medical risks.” Even if that’s the case, other industrialized nations have used prospective and retrospective risk adjustment to level the playing field between plans. As I noted yesterday, even private health insurance lobbies have conceded that “spread[ing] costs for the highest-risk individuals” is necessary to guarantee coverage for all. Risk-adjustment should not be seen as a subsidy—rather, it’s a way to keep a level playing field between the public and private plans.

Private insurers’ apparent acceptance of risk-adjustment may seem irrational if you think that they are only in the business of trying to gain the healthiest customers and shed the sickest. Tempting as it is, that cream-skimming is only one part of the broad range of things that insurers do. Many large insurers make substantial “administrative services only” revenue–for example, by administering self-insured employers’ plans. (In that way they avoid financial risk from sick insures–that risk is assumed by the employer funding the plan). Risk adjustment would further reduce their incentives to avoid people with pre-existing conditions. In terms of quality, private insurers can compete with the public plan on several dimensions, including identifying good providers, incentivizing best practices, and fairly determining access to treatment and payments for providers.

It’s that last function—coverage and payment determinations—where the public plan really has a chance at improving insurance for everyone. Today’s default for private insurers is secrecy in pricing, and opaque “gotchas” buried in thick plan documents. As Uwe Reinhardt has noted,
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Health Insurance Administrative Costs to Doctors = $31 Billion Per Year

Back in January, in a post titled Health Care and Productivity, a National Cost, I had occasion to write a line or two about the affect of insurance paperwork upon my family physician, whom I had just seen. I ventured then in a roughshod way (I was sick), that such would impact his productivity, and consequently that of the nation:

…if my family physician and his staff of two are grudgingly forced to devote numerous hours to a maddening array of paperwork and phone calls (”it gets worse every year”) in an attempt to navigate the various streams of insurance authorizations and payments (”some of it seems designed solely to frustrate and slow or prevent payment”) -he will not be seeing patients. Tomorrow, he will not be seeing patients; he will be trying to catch up on paperwork–as will his staff.

Perhaps then, when we consider that Health Care costs amount to 16% of the GDP, we might also consider that this number does not take into account the difficult to gauge loss of national productivity. And although the sickness of one can be the work of another, the exchange does not seem to be an even one as it relates to national production: the doctor functioning, in a sense, as a support and enabler to the productivity of others. Having said that, if that doctor is unavailable (through lack of insurance or remoteness) to remedy the ills of the now unproductive (or the less productive) the nation suffers for it. If the doctor is needlessly enmeshed in tasks, inefficient and ancillary to patient treatment, the nation suffers for it.

A portion of the suffering has been gauged: L. P. Casalino, S. Nicholson, D. N. Gans et al., “What Does It Cost Physician Practices to Interact with Health Insurance Plans?” Health Affairs Web Exclusive, May 14, 2009, gives us numbers–and they agree with my doctor.

Key Findings

• Physicians, on average, spent 142.3 hours per year interacting with health plans, or 3.0 hours per week and 2.7 physician work weeks per year. Primary care physicians spent significantly more time (164.9 hours per year) than medical specialists (123.7 hours) or surgical specialists (100.3 hours).
• Nursing staff spent an additional 23 weeks per year per physician interacting with health plans, while clerical staff spent 44 weeks and senior administrators spent 2.6 weeks doing so.
• Compared with other interactions, physicians, on average, spent more time dealing with formularies (78.2 hours for primary care doctors, for example), and the least on submitting or reviewing health plan quality data (1.9 hours annually for all physicians).
• Converted into dollars, practices spent an average of $68,274 per physician per year interacting with health plans; primary care practices spent $64,859 annually per physician, nearly one-third of the income, plus benefits, of the typical primary care physician.

The authors further note that “the estimated $31 billion in costs physician practices incur in their interactions with health plans comprises 6.9 percent of all U.S. expenditures for physicians and clinical services. That is six times the amount the federal government spends annually on the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).”

The study also notes that “Primary care physicians, especially those in small practices, spend larger amounts of time interacting with plans than those in other specialties.”

My physician and his staff of two devote an entire day every two weeks, and his staff devotes a great deal of the time in between to this “maddening array of paperwork and phone calls (’it gets worse every year’) in an attempt to navigate the various streams of insurance authorizations and payments” –some of which “seems designed solely to frustrate and slow or prevent payment.” The study estimates that expense for a primary care physician (though more for those “in small practices”) at $64,859 annually.

For more details you can read a brief Commonwealth Fund article on the report  here
or the Health Affairs article with the report here.

Greaney on the Public Plan

Is genuine health reform possible? Several recent developments are promising. President Obama’s big Congressional majorities (plus the Specter defection) are reminiscent of the Johnson-era milieu that led to Medicare and Medicaid. Key interest groups are less “Harry and Louise” and more “try to appease.” Most importantly, the failures of managed care, consumer-directed health care, and other artifacts of the “ownership society” are now self-evident. As unemployment rises, lack of insurance spikes, compounding the misery of many of those unlucky enough to get thrown out of work.

What could derail real health reform? Most likely, fake health care reform, particularly the kind that assumes there is something near a “free market” in operation now. As health care antitrust scholar Thomas Greaney argued yesterday, markets for health care are often very concentrated or riddled with barriers to entry:

The unfortunate fact is that a majority of the country is served by a few dominant insurers. (In 16 states, one insurer accounts for more than 50 percent of private enrollment; in 36 states, three insurers have more than 65 percent of enrollment). Likewise, because of lax antitrust enforcement, most markets are characterized by dominant hospital systems and little competition among high-end physician specialists.

In these circumstances, which economists call ‘bilateral monopoly,” the players often reach an accommodation in which they share the monopoly profits rather than compete vigorously. A prime example is the experience in Massachusetts, where Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the dominant insurer, reached an understanding with the dominant hospital system, Partners Healthcare, that entrenched higher prices for health insurance and hospital care.

Some might hold out hope that the Obama administration’s new emphasis on antitrust enforcement might solve that problem, but I would not hold my breath. After losing seven hospital merger cases in a row, the government is not exactly in a position to go storming into health care markets to demand competition. Only new antitrust laws are likely to accomplish much in that direction, and even if they were by some miracle adopted this year, I can’t imagine them having much effect within any reasonable time frame.
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More Employers Are Adopting Consumer-Directed Health Plans

Photo by liewcf via Flickr

As the cost of health care increases and employers continue to struggle in the bleak economy, many employers are said to be faced with a decision: whether to opt-out of their existing health plans, either by eliminating health benefits for their employees or finding a more cost-friendly alternative. CNN reports that more employers are offering consumer-directed health plans as what is considered a cost-friendly alternative.

CNN states:

More than 51% of U.S. employers now offer a consumer-directed health plan (CDHP), up from 47% last year, according to the latest survey of 489 large U.S. employers from Watson Wyatt, a consulting firm that specializes in employee benefits.

A CDHP is a way of lowering health plan costs of employers by shifting the costs of medical care to individual employees.  The article reports:

Consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs) are typically lower premium but higher deductible health plans. They feature a kind of savings or spending account that helps employees pay their out-of-pocket expenses for covered services, or services that are not covered by a traditional plan.

One form of popular CDHP is Catastrophic Health Insurance– in these plans, often taken out in conjunction  with a tax exempt Health Savings Account (HSA). Under IRS rules, according to Insurance.com “the total out-of-pocket maximum (which includes the deductible and co-payments) for these HSA-linked catastrophic health plans is $5,600 for singles, and $11,200 for families.” In addition, Insurance.com states

Certain pre-existing conditions, such as diabetes and mental health disorders, might mean you can’t qualify for an individual catastrophic health plan without prior qualifying group coverage, or at least that you can’t get coverage for those pre-existing conditions.

Finally, many CDHPs have “lifetime caps” of somewhere between 1 and 5 million dollars. When medical bills surpass these amounts the insurance company is no longer liable.

As the cost of health benefits and health care continues to increase, alternatives to the traditional cost-sharing relationship between the employer and employee are being examined– and understandably so. As for the relative merit of CDHPs and their “catastrophic” brethren, perhaps it depends upon which lens one looks through.

Proponents of CDHPs often cite the increased value in cost conscious “out of pocket” consumer health care choices and the positive affect this “true market” driven approach may have on the cost and quality of care; but the reality of the basis for consumer choice, as Frank Pasquale noted on this blog, is that “brand power has a lot more to do with choices here than objective assessment of outcomes.” In addition, as Professor Pasquale points out, Partners Health in Massachusetts was able to use its power, (market, brand, and sundry), in order to demand “reimbursements up to 30% over what other hospitals receive for identical procedures. Their market share has steadily increased as well, allowing them to stockpile the resources necessary to enter into new markets and threaten the viability of cheaper community hospitals.”

If CDHPs are viewed through the “better than nothing” lens, they obviously have some appeal (But See immediately above); if viewed through the “universal coverage” lens they obviously leave something to be desired. Having said all that, CDHPs may not be a best alternative, but they are becoming– in a woefully ironic twist of the word– a more “popular” alternative.

“Who’s Looking At the Compensation of the Health Care Insurance Executives?” and “Where’s H.R. 676?”

photo by alusiaaa via Flickr

Interesting comments from Kevin T. and Jeremiah regarding Conrad Dillon’s post the other day, “Obama to Unveil Plan for Health Care Reform.” Jeremiah is a proponent of John Conyers “single payer plan,” The United States National Health Insurance Act, H.R. 676 (you can also see the plan in the sidebar of this blog under “Health Reform Plans” and an excellent summary at Healthcare-NOW.org ).

We wrote about H.R. 676 back in December, in a post titled, “Medicare for All?” We noted then that “the plan seems to have received little mention in the media,” though it has a number of supporters–including, at the time, 94 co-sponsors, and “most labor unions, thousands of doctors, nurses and health care professionals.”

The Conyers proposal, also backed by the Physicians for a National Plan, would gradually provide Medicare for everyone who wants it and would pay a premium; it is sometimes referred to as “The Medicare for All plan.”

As Saul Friedman, columnist for Newsday, explained, the Medicare for All plan

“would absorb such programs as Medicaid, SCHIP and be paid for by taxes and premiums. It could relieve auto manufacturers and other businesses of paying for health insurance for employees and retirees. Its sponsors say it would save $300 billion a year in administrative costs, for it would deny insurance companies a role.”

And that may be the rub.

Friedman states:

“Getting over that hurdle may be why HR 676 has gotten so little publicity, even from alleged friends of older people. There is no mention of it on the Web site of AARP, which earns $700 million a year in royalties on the sale of private health insurance it sponsors.”

In an Op-Ed piece in the Atlanta Journal Constitution, Dr. Oliver Fein, associate dean and professor of clinical medicine and public health at Weill Cornell Medical College in New York and president of Physicians for a National Health Program wrote that

“As long as we rely on private health insurers, universal coverage will be unaffordable…. There is a cure, however. Eliminating the private insurance industry would save $400 billion annually in administrative costs, enough to ensure that everyone is covered and to eliminate all co-pays and deductibles.”

Perhaps understandably, there has not been a great deal of support voiced for the Conyers plan (or for Dr. Fein) by the Insurance Industry. The common adage concerning health care reform at present has been that “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.” By all accounts, private insurers have taken a seat at the table–and the “menu” they’re protecting there would seem to readily qualify as sumptuous.

Kevin T. was kind enough to forward to us these figures concerning CEO compensation for major medical insurers. The figures for Insurance Co. profits (2007, Aetna: 1.831 Billion profit) as well as the CEO compensation figures can be found  here, courtesy of the very interesting Insurance Company Rules.org- a project of Health Care for America Now.org. The numbers were culled from the companies’ SEC filings (Schedule 14A) and are well worth a look. But I’ll list a few of the figures here as well:

Ins. Co. & CEO With 2007 Total CEO Compensation

• Aetna Ronald A. Williams: $23,045,834
• Cigna H. Edward Hanway: $25,839,777
• Coventry Dale B. Wolf : $14,869,823
• Health Net Jay M. Gellert: $3,686,230
• Humana Michael McCallister: $10,312,557
• U.Health Grp Stephen J. Hemsley: $13,164,529
• WellPoint Angela Braly (2007): $9,094,271
  L. Glasscock (2006): $23,886,169

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