Seton Hall Law & NYLPI Release Report Documenting Hundreds of Cases of Coerced Medical Repatriation by U.S. Hospitals
Filed under: Cost Control, Health Law, Hospital Finances
Medical repatriations of undocumented immigrants likely to rise as result of federal funding reductions to safety net hospitals under Affordable Care Act
New York, NY, and Newark, New Jersey, December 17, 2012 –Today, the Center for Social Justice (CSJ) at Seton Hall University School of Law and New York Lawyers for the Public Interest (NYLPI) released a report documenting an alarming number of cases in which U.S. hospitals have forcibly repatriated vulnerable undocumented patients, who are ineligible for public insurance as a result of their immigration status, in an effort to cut costs. This practice is inherently risky and often results in significant deterioration of a patient’s health, or even death. The report asserts that such actions are in violation of basic human rights, in particular the right to due process and the right to life.
According to the report, the U.S. is responsible for this situation by failing to appropriately reform immigration and health care laws and protect those within its borders from human rights abuses. The report argues that medical deportations will likely increase as safety net hospitals, which provide the majority of care to undocumented and un- or underinsured patients, encounter tremendous financial pressure resulting from dramatic funding cutbacks under the Affordable Care Act.
The report cites more than 800 cases of attempted or actual medical deportations across the country in recent years, including: a nineteen-year-old girl who died shortly after being wheeled out of a hospital back entrance typically used for garbage disposal and transferred to Mexico; a car accident victim who died shortly after being left on the tarmac at an airport in Guatemala; and a young man with catastrophic brain injury who remains bed-ridden and suffering from constant seizures after being forcibly deported to his elderly mother’s hilltop home in Guatemala.
According to Lori A. Nessel, a Professor at Seton Hall University School of Law and Director of the School’s Center for Social Justice, “When immigrants are in need of ongoing medical care, they find themselves at the crossroads of two systems that are in dire need of reform—health care and immigration law. Aside from emergency care, hospitals are not reimbursed by the government for providing ongoing treatment for uninsured immigrant patients. Therefore, many hospitals are engaging in de facto deportations of immigrant patients without any governmental oversight or accountability. This type of situation is ripe for abuse.”
“Any efforts at comprehensive immigration reform must take into account the reality that there are millions of immigrants with long-standing ties to this country who are not eligible for health insurance. Because health reform has excluded these immigrants from its reach, they remain uninsured and at a heightened risk of medical deportation,” added Shena Elrington, Director of the Health Justice Program at NYLPI. “Absent legislative or regulatory change, the number of forced or coerced medical repatriations is likely to grow as hospitals face mounting financial pressures and reduced Charity Care and federal contributions.”
Rachel Lopez, an Assistant Clinical Professor with CSJ stated, “The U.S. is bound to protect immigrants’ rights to due process under both international law and the U.S. Constitution. Hospitals are becoming immigration agents and taking matters into their own hands. It is incumbent on the government to stop the disturbing practice of medical deportation and to ensure that all persons within the country are treated with basic dignity.”
More information about this issue can be found at medicalrepatriation.wordpress.com, a NYLPI- and CSJ-run website that monitors news and advocacy developments on the topic of medical deportation.
About New York Lawyers for the Public Interest
New York Lawyers for the Public Interest (NYLPI) advances equality and civil rights, with a focus on health justice, disability rights and environmental justice, through the power of community lawyering and partnerships with the private bar. Through community lawyering, NYLPI puts its legal, policy and community organizing expertise at the service of New York City communities and individuals.
About the Center for Social Justice at Seton Hall University School of Law
The Center for Social Justice (CSJ) is one of the nation’s strongest pro bono and clinical programs, empowering students to gain critical, hands-on experience by providing pro bono legal services for economically disadvantaged residents in the region. The cases on which students work span the range from the local to global. Providing educational equity for urban students, litigating on behalf of the victims of real estate fraud, protecting the human rights of immigrants, and obtaining asylum for those fleeing persecution are just some of the issues that CSJ faculty and students team up to address.
Exiling the Poor from the Insurance Market
John Roberts’ jurisprudential wizardry in NFIB has been compared with the artistic genius of pro wrestlers and rappers. Poor Americans in states newly empowered to resist the ACA’s Medicaid expansion may need even more ingenuity to get themselves insured. Both Kevin Outterson and my colleague John Jacobi have observed the perplexing predicament imposed on the poor in states that keep Medicaid 1.0, and resist Medicaid 2.0. From Jacobi’s post:
The reform provides insurance subsidies through tax credits. The credits are calculated on a sliding scale, according to household level, for people with income up to 400% of FPL [the federal poverty line] — subsidizing more generously someone earning 200% of FPL, for example, than someone earning 350% of FPL. But, under 26 USC 36B(c)(1), credits will not be distributed to those with incomes below 100% of the FPL. Why? Because Congress assumed states would take up the Medicaid expansion, obviating the need for exchange-based subsidies for the very poor. . . .Bottom line: states rejecting Medicaid 2.0 will not only forego about 93% federal funding for the program between 2014 and 2022, but they could also be depriving the poorest of the uninsured from any shot at coverage — potentially affecting millions nation-wide.
Georgia hospitals are already worried about the “unexpected prospect of lower reimbursements without the expanded pool of patients” to be covered by the Medicaid expansion:
Last year, Georgia hospitals lost an estimated $1.5 billion caring for people without insurance. The promise of fewer uninsured is what led the national hospital industry to agree to the health law’s $155 billion in Medicare and Medicaid cuts over a 10 year period. The Medicaid curveball comes at a time when Georgia hospitals are already in the throes of a massive industry transformation to improve quality and efficiency driven by market forces as well as the new law. Hospitals face lower payments from insurers and pressures to consolidate. One in three Georgia hospitals lose money. All are busy preparing for new standards under the law that, if not met, could mean millions of dollars in penalties.
It’s hard to imagine how hospitals like Grady can continue to act as a safety net in that environment. The article notes that “Georgians already pay for the cost of care provided to people without insurance through higher hospital bills and inflated insurance premiums.” If that trend continues, all the states refusing Medicaid 2.0 may end up doing is shifting the cost of the Medicaid expansion population from national taxpayers to Georgians with insurance. The superwealthy Americans of Marin County and Manhattan ought to send Georgia Governor Nathan Deal a thank you note for keeping Georgians’ problems for Georgians themselves to solve.
Secret Prices: Free Market Triumph or Tragedy?
Filed under: Hospital Finances, Insurance Companies, Transparency
Can a market work when buyers are kept in the dark about the prices they’ll pay? That’s an increasingly urgent question for fans of consumer directed health care. In vogue during the administration of Bush fils, CDHC is reemerging as Obamacare’s opponents seek a standard to rally around (other than “laissez mourir“). In theory, consumers could force doctors and hospitals to compete by shopping around for services. But when the rubber hits the road, informed consumption is easier said than done, as Josh Barro describes:
Recently, my employer switched to a high-deductible health insurance plan, which means I’m paying at the margin for most of my health care. As a result, I have become more aware of the true cost of the care I receive—and more aware of how difficult it is to figure out that cost. . . . if you ask doctors how much a service costs, they tend not to know. I once had an argument with my doctor, who did not want to give me a blood test for fear that my insurer would deny the claim for the expensive test. I later found out that this test costs all of $9.48 at my insurer’s negotiated rates, despite a list price of $169. When I got orthotics, my podiatrist told me they would cost nearly $600. But that was the list price; the actual insured price was less than $250. . . .
It doesn’t have to be this way. We could legally obligate hospitals and medical practices to disclose their full price lists—both the inflated list prices and the rates negotiated with each insurer that the practice accepts.
A commenter on Barro’s blog retorts:
I’m a little surprised to see a blogger at the [National Review Online] suggest that the government “require” price disclosure from private market participants. This goes well beyond the market interference that some other odious “mandates” require. Why don’t we mandate that everyone disclose exactly what they pay each employee? . . . If you have an HSA or High-deductible policy, I would suggest it’s incumbent on the insurance provider to help you figure it out. If consumers want it enough the system should respond, right? Why not switch to an HDP that is more transparent?
The problem, of course, is that lots of parties have to agree to provide transparency, and there is a great deal of inertia. If all the other insurers aren’t transparent, there’s little reason for one of them to try to distinguish itself if it already has a steady customer base. And when it stirs itself to do so, it will find a wall of resistance from providers, who say “why should we give all this information to you—no one else is demanding it?” (Moreover, the “prices” don’t really exist except on paper on a “chargemaster,” and they’re practically meaningless (except as opportunities to gouge the unlucky). The real price is the negotiated price, and that’s generated out of iterative interactions.) Moreover, many interventions involve multiple providers, as a reader of Andrew Sullivan’s blog explains:
Read more
Why Reduce Health Care Costs?
Filed under: Cost Benefit Analysis, Cost Control, Drug Pricing, Drugs & Medical Devices, Economic Analysis of Health, Health Reform, HHS, Hospital Finances, Medicare, Medicare & Medicaid, Social Justice, Taxation
One rare point of elite consensus is that the US needs to reduce health care costs. Frightening graphs expose America as a spendthrift outlier. Before he decamped to Citigroup, the President’s OMB director warned about how important it was to “bend the cost curve.” The President’s opponents are even more passionate about austerity.
Journalists and academics support that political consensus. Andrew Sullivan calls health spending a “giant suck from the rest of the working economy.” Gregg Bloche estimates that “the 30% of health care spending that’s wasted on worthless care” is “about the price of the $700 billion mortgage bailout, squandered every year.” He calls rising health spending an “existential challenge,” menacing other “national priorities.” Perhaps inspired by Children of the Corn, George Mason economist Robin Hanson compares modern medicine to a voracious brat:
King Solomon famously threatened to cut a disputed baby in half, to expose the fake mother who would permit such a thing. The debate over medicine today is like that baby, but with disputants who won’t fall for Solomon’s trick. The left says markets won’t ensure everyone gets enough of the precious medical baby. The right says governments produce a much inferior baby. I say: cut the baby in half, dollar-wise, and throw half away! Our “precious” medical baby is in fact a vast monster filling our great temple, whose feeding starves our people and future. Half a monster is plenty.
But when you scratch the surface of these sentiments, you have to wonder: is the overall level of health care spending really the most important threat facing the country? Is it one of the most important threats? There are many ways to raise revenue to pay for rising health costs. Aspects of the Affordable Care Act, like ACOs and pilot projects, are designed to help root out unnecessary care.
I am happy to join the crusade against waste. But why focus on total health spending as particularly egregious or worrisome? Let’s explore some of the usual rationales.
Terrible Tax Expenditures and Suspect Subsidies?
Employment-based insurance gets favorable tax treatment, and much Medicare and Medicaid spending is drawn from general revenues. So, the story goes, medicine’s big spenders don’t have enough “skin in the game.” Once health and wealth are traded off at the personal level (as the Harvard Business School’s Clayton Christensen advocates), people will be much less likely to demand so much care. Government can attend to other national priorities, or individuals will enjoy higher incomes and will be free to spend more.
I respect these arguments to a point, but I worry they partake of the “nirvana fallacy.” If I could be certain that leviathan would repurpose all those wasted health care dollars on infrastructure, or green energy, or smart defense, or healthier agriculture, I’d be ready to end tax-advantaged health insurance in an instant. But I find it hard to imagine Washington going in any of these directions presently.
Giving tax dollars back to taxpayers also sounds great, until one processes exactly how unequal our income distribution is. In 2004, “the top 0.1% — that’s one-tenth of one percent — had more combined pre-tax income than the poorest 120 million people.” To the extent health-related taxes are cut, very wealthy households may see millions per year in income gains; the median household might enjoy thousands of dollars per year. Sure, middle income families will find important uses for those funds (other than bidding up the price of housing and education). But at what price? What if the insurance systems start collapsing without subsidies, and more physicians (who are already expressing a desire to work less) start seeking out pure cash practices? A few interactions with the the very wealthy may be far more lucrative than dozens of ordinary appointments.
Consider the math: billing a $20,000 retainer from each of 50 millionaires annually may be a lot more attractive to physicians than trying to wrangle up 500 patients paying $2000 each—or, worse, getting the money from their insurers. There are about 10 million millionaires in the US; that’s a lot of buying power. One $10,000 score by a cosmetic dentist from such a client could be worth 400 visits from Medicaid patients seeking diagnostic procedures. Providers are voting with their feet, and a Medicaid card is already on its way to becoming a “useless piece of plastic” for many patients. Given those trends, simply reducing health care “purchasing power” generally risks some very troubling outcomes for the very people the health care cost cutters claim to protect. No one should welcome a health care plutonomy, where the richest 5% consume 35% of services, regardless of how sick they are.
Is Anyone Underpaid in Health Care?
Health commentators rightly draw attention to big insurer CEO paydays. Top layers of management at hospitals and pharma firms are also getting scrutiny. Wonks are up in arms about specialist pay. Read more
The Normative Meets the Practical: Who Should Can Lead ACOs
Filed under: Accountable Care Organization, Hospital Finances, Physician Compensation
One of the many $64,000 questions in the accountable care organization (ACO) debate has been who should lead these organizations. In a policy adopted in November 2010, the American Medical Association (AMA) made clear its view that ACOs must be physician-led. The American Hospital Association (AHA) refrained (at least in its public letter to CMS) from asserting its entitlement to the ACO helm, based, for example, on its management experience and pools of capital. Instead, it simply urged CMS to “defer details of the organization, such as leadership and management structure, to each ACO.”
CMS seems to have heeded the AHA’s advice because its recently released proposed rule does not directly take on this normative debate. (See Summary of CMS Proposed Rule on Accountable Care Organizations recently posted by Jordan T. Cohen for an overview of the proposed rule.) While “ACO participants must have at least 75 percent control of the ACO’s governing body” to be eligible for participation in the Shared Savings Program (proposed Section 425.5(d)(8)), the definition of “ACO participant” in the proposed rule includes physicians and hospitals, among others (proposed Section 425.4).
V. Van Gogh, "Corridor in the Asylum" (1889)
Similarly, the proposed rule simply requires that the “ACO’s operations must be managed by an executive, officer, manager, or general partner whose appointment and removal are under the control of the organization’s governing body and whose leadership team has demonstrated the ability to influence or direct clinical practice to improve efficiency processes and outcomes” (proposed Section 425.5(9)(ii)). The proposed rule does not address who or what would make the best such leader.
The proposed rule, however, clearly preserves a role for physicians to form and lead ACOs. For example, it recognizes that ACOs may be comprised of professionals in group practice arrangements and networks of individual practices, independent of hospitals (proposed Section 425.5(b)).
In addition, “[c]linical management and oversight [of the ACO] must be managed by a full-time senior-level medical director . . . who is a board-certified physician . . .,” and “[a] physician-directed quality assurance and process improvement committee must oversee an ongoing action-oriented quality assurance and improvement program” (proposed Sections 425.5(9)(iii) and (iv)).
The proposed rule also builds in a preference for ACOs comprised of all physicians or physician groups with fewer than 10,000 assigned beneficiaries by proposing to exempt them from the 2 percent net savings threshold adjustment under the one-sided model (proposed Section 425.9(c)(4)(i)). It also proposes to vary confidence intervals, which affect the minimum savings rate, by the size of the ACO in the one-sided model “to improve the opportunity for groups of solo and small practices to participate in the Shared Savings Program” (Preamble to proposed rule at Section II.F.10).
But on a practical level, the specifics of CMS’ proposal may — unintentionally, perhaps — give hospitals the greater chance to take the reins, at least initially. An apparently leaked CMS internal discussion document reflects some level of concern that physicians may have a hard time taking the lead with ACOs.
The proposed rule’s regulatory impact analysis estimates that the average start-up investment and first year operating expenditures for an ACO in the Shared Savings Program will be $1,755,251. In addition, the proposed rule uses a 6-months claims run-out (proposed Section 425.7(a)). Presumably, that means ACOs — assuming they satisfy all program requirements — will not see a dime of shared savings for more than eighteen months. CMS also proposes to withhold 25 percent of any earned shared savings accrued in a given year to ensure repayment of any losses to the Medicare program in subsequent years of the three-year ACO agreement (proposed Section 425.5(d)(6)(iii)).
Even if private physicians can amass the capital to make these upfront investments, there of course is no guarantee they will regain their outlays. A recent study published online by the New England Journal of Medicine, as reported by the American Medical Association, found that participants in CMS’ Physician Group Practice Demonstration did not recoup, at least in the initial years of the demonstration, all of the money they invested to establish ACOs. As the AMA summarized:
Early adopters, for the most part, did not recoup their set-up costs in the first three years of operation. The 10 integrated health systems that were studied spent an average of $1.7 million to take part in the demonstration project. Eight received no shared savings payments in the first year of the project. Six got a payment in the second year, and five received a bonus in the third year.
The Everett Clinic in Washington, for example, reportedly spent approximately $1 million on infrastructure for its ACO but recouped only $129,268 in shared savings during the first four years of the demonstration project.
The Doctor Luke Fildes, Samuel Luke Fildes (1843-1927)
According to a 2007 report from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), in 2003-04, 80.6 percent of office-based medical practices in the United States consisted of one or two practitioners and 94.8 percent had five or fewer practitioners. The risks associated with forming an ACO are considerable for these smaller practices to absorb, especially when, at best, the ACO will see 75 percent of its portion of any shared savings upwards of eighteen months down the road and could instead be responsible for its share of losses. It is not clear how many small practices are willing and able to assume these risks without some substantial financial or management support. Not surprisingly, the AMA’s statement on the proposed ACO rule specifically identifies “the large capital requirements to fund an ACO” as a significant barrier that must be addressed if physicians in all practice sizes and settings will be able to successfully lead and participate in ACOs.
Another aspect of the proposed rule that may present a particular challenge to independent physicians is proposed Section 425.11(b)’s requirement that “[a]t least 50 percent of an ACO’s primary care physicians must be meaningful [Electronic Health Records (EHR)] users, using certified EHR technology as defined in §495.4, in the [Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)] Act and subsequent Medicare regulations by the start of the second performance year in order to continue participating in the Shared Savings Program.”
Personal Robot Pictogram, Tradelpus
Physician practices indisputably have increased their use of EHR systems in recent years. According to the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey conducted by NCHS (reported here), only 17 percent of physicians in 2008 reported that they had a “basic” EHR system (which is defined as having electronic patient demographic information, patient problem lists, patient medication lists, clinical notes, orders for prescriptions, and laboratory and imaging results). Recent NCHS data (reported here) show that that number has climbed nearly 50 percent to 24.9 percent of office-based physicians.
But basic use of EHRs is not sufficient under the proposed rule, which requires “meaningful use.” Survey data from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, as reported here, show that only 41.1 percent of office-based physicians plan to apply for billions of federal dollars in EHR incentive payments that are available to Medicare and Medicaid providers under the HITECH Act, compared with 80.8 percent of acute care non-federal hospitals. Additionally, as reported here, a recent survey from the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) found that only 13.6 percent of medical practices that have adopted EHRs and plan to apply for the EHR Meaningful Use incentives currently are able to satisfy the fifteen core criteria necessary to establish that they are meaningful users. Medical practices have a long row to hoe.
But the news is not all bad for physicians. The MGMA survey also found something that suggests this issue is far from resolved on a theoretical or practical level. As reported here, “almost 20 percent of responding independent medical practices that owned EHRs said that they had optimized their uses of EHRs” whereas “[o]nly 8.8 percent of responding hospitals — or [integrated delivery system (IDS)] — owned practices with EHRs said they had optimized their EHR use.”
Almost certainly, it is not just a coincidence that physicians are devoting their energy to becoming meaningful EHR users just as the first EHR Meaningful Use incentive payments are available. If CMS or private foundations develop additional incentive programs to help smaller practices cover the start-up costs associated with forming an ACO, the individual physician could still be in this game. Notably, the AMA’s brief statement on the proposed ACO rule reiterates its recommendation to CMS to increase access to loans and grants for small practices as part of this puzzle. It remains to be seen if any such programs are viable in this fiscal climate.
As promised, future posts will address the normative question of who should lead ACOs.
Short Circuited Surge Capacity: Lessons from the Blizzard for Public Health
Filed under: Economic Analysis of Health, Hospital Finances, Primary Physician Shortage, Productivity, Public Health
Bad weather recently caused massive failures at Heathrow Airport, and brought chaos to air travel in the New York area. Both scenarios suggest an intriguing set of dilemmas in health law and policy. We should be doing much more to prepare for sudden, disruptive events in both the transportation and health sectors. But economic short-termism rules the roost, undercutting the infrastructural investments that a more enlightened America would make.
Stuart Altman has wisely compared hospitals and airlines, and worried that many of the former would suffer the fate of legacy carriers:
By 2025 the need for general hospitals to cross-subsidize [i.e., use payments from the well-insured to pay for others' care] will greatly increase, but their ability to do so will be diminished. U.S. hospitals could begin to resemble U.S. airlines: severely cutting costs, eliminating services, and suffering financial instability. . . .
There are numerous similarities between the airline and hospital industries. Both comprise companies that built a complex infrastructure and provided cross-subsidized services. Both were protected by a lack of price transparency and limited competition. In the recently deregulated airline industry, price competition and specialized airlines have emerged that do not have to serve all cities and can focus on the most profitable routes. They need not charge higher prices for these routes to make up for losses incurred elsewhere. Similarly, in the hospital industry, specialty hospitals have emerged that can focus on the most profitable patients and do not have to treat the uninsured or provide money-losing services.
The new specialty hospitals, like the new low-cost carriers, are not saddled with fixed costs from old plant and equipment and do not have to contend with excess capacity that resulted from historical changes in demand.* Both use their inherent cost advantages to compete for more price-sensitive consumers. Legacy airlines cannot raise fares to cover costs because price-sensitive customers can now obtain transparent price information on the Internet and shop for the lowest fares. California is now requiring, and many advocacy organizations are encouraging, hospitals to post their prices on the Internet. Hospital patients, facing increased copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket costs, could begin to behave more like airline passengers. . . .
Because of increased price transparency and specialized competition, legacy airlines could not raise prices sufficiently to cover their costs. Between 1 October 2001 and 31 December 2003, they cut costs by $12.1 billion. They stopped serving some locales and reduced seat capacity. They cut labor costs, services, and amenities. Nevertheless, from 2001 through 2003, the legacy airlines lost $24.3 billion, while the low-cost carriers reported profits of $1.3 billion.
The past few years have witnessed a recovery for many airlines pushed to the brink after 9/11. They filled more seats in each plane (leading to higher “load factors”) and otherwise “cut the fat” (sometimes endangering passengers in the process). Nate Silver observes that filling up planes has some positive effects on prices and the environment, but also sets in motion dynamics that few fully consider until the unexpected strikes:
[L]oad factors have been rising steadily. A decade ago, they were closer to 70 percent, which permitted quite a bit more slack in the event of cancellations. At a 70 percent load factor, there are 2.3 passengers for every available seat, which means, roughly speaking, that one day’s worth of cancellations might take two days to clear through the system. At an 82 percent load factor, on the other hand, there are 4.6 passengers for every seat — roughly twice as many — so one day’s worth of cancellations might require four or five days to get everyone home.
The societal trade-offs here are tough, and airlines need flexibility in determining how far they should go to crowd planes and maximize profits. But in the realm of healthcare, I am much more concerned that a long series of hospital closures will leave the system disastrously overwhelmed in case of an infectious disease outbreak, terrorist attack, or extreme weather event. Like airlines, hospitals have been cutting their surge capacity in order to improve the bottom line. As I noted over four years ago, the asymmetry between projected demand and supply for something as fundamental as ventilators is shocking. A 2006 estimate suggested that only 5,000 spare ventilators would be available to as many as 742,500 people in need in the case of a serious pandemic.
In a 2005 article in the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Lance Gable et al. discuss surge capacity as “the number of critical casualties arriving per unit of time that can be managed without compromising the level of care,” and propose ways of increasing “the availability of skilled health professionals to supplement the existing health workforce.” I applaud their approach and attention to the problem (astonishingly, it is the only article in the Westlaw JLR database with “surge capacity” in the title). But I also worry that scarce physical space is going to cause as large a problem at hospitals as personnel shortages. Like its airports, New York’s community hospitals are fraying:
In New York’s many community hospitals, which provide an essential first line of defense in the effort to safeguard public health, the danger of failure is particularly acute. Combine growing costs, decreasing revenues, and high debt loads, and you can’t dig out. Then what happens? “If you’ve accumulated any reserve over time,” an executive at a major local hospital says, “the first thing you do is eat it up. Then you cut costs on staffing and support services, sometimes below levels you know are safe. Then you stop spending money to keep your physical plant and equipment up to date. The condition of the physical plants of many New York City hospitals is staggering. Then, when there’s nothing else you can do, you declare bankruptcy. That’s the life cycle of a New York hospital.”
Given all these strains, hospitals may have to choose between community service and solvency in the wake of a major outbreak of illness. Vickie J. Williams’s article “Fluconomics” presciently examined the bad financial incentives that hospitals would face in case of a serious outbreak of infectious disease:
[W]e currently have no means of ensuring that hospitals acting as isolation, quarantine, and treatment centers in a pandemic will survive the loss of revenue that they will experience in protecting the public’s health. Our hospitals depend on a fragmented financing system that presumes the hospital’s ability to shift costs from low-paying public payors to higher-paying private payors, and from less lucrative cases to more lucrative, often elective, procedures.
Better Hospital Discharges = Lower Healthcare Costs?
Photo by SeeMidTN.com via Flickr
[Ed. Note: We are pleased to welcome Jae W. Joo to HRW. Jae is a third year student at Seton Hall Law. He graduated from Rutgers College in 2006 with a B.A. in Psychology and a minor in Philosophy. In 2009, he interned for the Honorable Denise A. Cobham in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Currently, he is a summer intern at the New Jersey Attorney General's Tobacco and Securities Litigation Section, and also a research assistant for the Healthcare Compliance Certification Program at Seton Hall Law.]
With healthcare reform fresh out of the congressional oven, many changes are taking place in the field of healthcare and a myriad of new challenges will undoubtedly arise. However, one of the perpetual challenges in the midst of all these changes has been the substantial amount of money needed to fund Medicare. The Patient Protection Affordable Care Act is laden with economically efficient methods and plans to reduce costs. However, as Lesley Alderman suggests in her NY Times article, a drastic cost saving measure may be implemented with a simple change in hospital procedure.
According to the article,
[In] a study published last year in The New England Journal of Medicine, one in five Medicare patients returns to the hospital within 30 days of being discharged. The problem is an expensive one: in 2004 these readmissions cost Medicare $17.4 billion dollars, the researchers also found.
As the study shows, readmission within 30 days of discharge has been costly and remains a substantial contributing source to the Medicare deficit. However, discharge procedures rarely get the same level of attention as admission procedures to a hospital.
At discharge, the assumption is that the patient is better and all will be fine, said Dr. Eric A. Coleman, a geriatrician and professor of medicine at the University of Colorado Denver. But many patients, especially older ones, leave the hospital with a host of issues to manage. They may have additional medications to take, new symptoms to monitor and follow up appointments to keep, all of which require focused attention at a time when patients may not be at their sharpest.
What’s more, while insurers will pay for limited hospital stays, there’s no financial incentive for hospitals to insure that patients get and stay out. ‘A hospital may actually be financially rewarded for mishandled discharge,’ said Dr. Williams, chief of hospital medicine at Northwestern University. ‘If the patient is readmitted, they get paid again.’
While there may be a general lack of concern or awareness to improve conditions of patient discharge, Alderman’s article mentions some initiatives that have been taken to improve the discharge process. Care Transition Intervention is a hospital-based program that helps reduce readmissions by coaching older adults on how to manage their health and take better care. Project Boost provides hospitals guidelines to help standardize and enhance the discharge process. Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid has a program to improve hospital hand-offs for high risk patients and has also been developing a program to incentivize hospitals to lower their readmission rates.
Whether or not hospitals decide to implement new discharge protocols and procedures, individual patients can help alleviate the financial burdens placed on the system by taking an active role in managing their health. Alderman’s article points out a few tips to follow if a hospital does not have an up to date discharge procedure in place. Following these simple tips can, it seems, make a big difference.
Preliminary New Jersey Hospital Charity Care Budget Announced for FY 2011
The Good Samaritan (after Delacroix), Van Gogh, 1890
New Jersey’s Department of Health and Senior Services released its preliminary data on charity care dollars for hospitals for Fiscal Year 2011: $665 million. Fiscal Year 2010′s total budget for such was $660 million, but $25 million of that was cut as part of mid-year budget reductions. If one counts the restoration of the $25 million cut prior, the increase amounts to $85 million.
In a press release announcing the preliminary data, Health and Senior Services Commissioner Dr. Poonam Alaigh said, “This funding increase clearly demonstrates Gov. Chris Christie’s commitment to maintain and strengthen the health care safety net for New Jersey’s most vulnerable residents when they need it most. Despite the state’s current fiscal crisis, the Governor has made charity care a priority.”
Some of the gains were wrought through the leveraging of increased assessments against hospitals for increased federal matching funds. According to the Daily Record:
To get the extra cash, Christie proposes to lift a cap that had limited a tax paid by hospitals; doing so increases the amount of federal matching funds the state receives.
In other words: To get the extra funds into the hospital system, hospitals have to pay $38.7 million in extra assessments. That puts hospitals as a whole $21.3 million ahead of the game — although extra dollars don’t necessarily flow back to the hospitals paying more.
Also according to the Daily Record, the reconfiguration and redistribution will leave 41 hospitals with more money, and 32 with less. The chart below lays out those details.
Physician Income Relative to Hospital Revenue by Specialty
Filed under: Hospital Finances, Physician Compensation
Photo by Felix Nine via Flickr
Wandering through the pages of Health Law Prof Blog, I found this post from a few months ago which looked at a WSJ Health Blog article which examined net hospital revenue derived per physician and compared such revenue generation among various specialties. The average revenue generation per physician amounted to “about $1.54 million based on 114 U.S. hospitals responding to a survey by physician recruiters Merrit Hawkins…. (Revenue here means net inpatient and outpatient dollars derived from referrals, tests and procedures done in the hospital.)”
We’ve looked at physician compensation in relation to physician shortages here at HRW before, noting that “over the course of ten career years, if calculated at a constant rate without regard to future increases in compensation, the median paid “Family Doctor, Branch” will have earned $1,900,182. During those same static 10 years….If that same Family Doctor were to then consult with someone from the lowest paid of the three categories of Radiologist, Not neural, Non-Interventionist, she would be doing so with someone who had made $4,208,580 during that time–which would be $2,308,398 more than she–or more than twice as much.
But this chart below offers a slightly different perspective, showing relative hospital income to specialty and raises some interesting questions regarding hospital finances and chosen areas of focus in relation to return on investment. A focus on kidneys, for instance, would not, it seems, be favored. The ratio of hospital income to physician salary in Nephrology is 2.91 to 1. For Psychiatry it’s 6.45 to 1. For Hematology/Oncology it’s 4.33 to 1. Additionally, in actual income generated, Psychiatry brings in almost 2x as much as Nephrology; Hematology brings in over 2x as much.
One hears often about shortages in dialysis facilities, but mental health clinics and cancer centers barrage the airwaves with their advertisements. Perhaps it is not a coincidence.
Hospital Annual Revenue per Doctor by Specialty
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Hospital Bills, Insurers and Pricing
Filed under: 501(c)(3), Hospital Finances, Uninsured
A few weeks ago I wrote here about my unhappy experience of inadvertently mixing two different types of drain cleaners together. I learned then, and thought it useful to relate, a painful in-home science lesson: the combination of hydrochloric acid and hypochlorite (bleach) apparently forms chlorine gas, which was used as an agent of chemical warfare early in World War I. Serious lung damage and death are real possibilities. After a trip to the emergency room, a follow-up visit to my doctor and the passage of time– I’m ok.
But the other day I got the bill, or thankfully, as I am insured through my employer, the explanation of benefits. My present insurance company, CIGNA, detailed the claim in an easy to read and understandable manner. It is telling.
I was in the Emergency Room for about 4 hours (they had wanted to keep me overnight for observation but released me under the condition (and my pleading) that I return immediately if any number of things happened). I received oxygen and breathing treatments, x-rays, lab work, an electrocardiogram, and the care of a physician. The total billed was $2,270. But perhaps more importantly, the amount “discounted,” or the amount my insurance company did not pay through its negotiated pricing contract with the hospital, was $2007. Which is to say that my insurance company paid a total of only $263 of this bill. Thankfully, I owe nothing except a small co-pay.
The greatest single item of the billed amount is actually the charge for being in the Emergency Room itself. That charge, presumably triggered the moment I signed in, was $1,364.40. My insurance company, by agreement, paid only $158 of that charge.
But what if I weren’t insured?
Presumably, I would presently owe that hospital–which is a tax-exempt entity under 501(c)(3) with a concomitant mandate to deliver “community benefit” — a sum total of $2,270. This for services my insurance company paid a sum total of $263.
I understand robbing Peter to pay Paul, and quite frankly $263 seems a little cheap for the care and services I received (as $2,270 seems rather expensive). But if Peter is out of work and lacks insurance does it make sense to charge him 9x more than Paul? Does anyone wonder why uninsured Peter will do his best to avoid the hospital at almost any cost– even at great risk to his health?
I’ve written about this subject before. How seemingly no one except the uninsured pay “the chargemaster rate”; how many nonprofit hospitals in a recent IRS informational survey disclosed that they count the discounts they offer insurers and Medicare as “community benefit”; how even more nonprofit hospitals who bill greater amounts to the uninsured wind up counting the full amount billed, if collection efforts fail, as “a community benefit.” (e.g., if uninsured Peter above had received the care I received he would have been billed $2,270. If he failed to pay, not considering the harm to his credit record or the potential for being sued and a resultant judgment entered against him, the hospital then counts the unpaid $2,270 as “community benefit.”)
Thankfully, the reverse Robin Hood charging practice is about to change for at least some people. As Associate Dean Kathleen Boozang pointed out in her post last week, provisions in the new Health Reform law, PPACA, address the issue in part. Among other provisions aimed at tax exempt 501(c)(3) hospitals is the following:
Financial Assistance Policy. Hospitals must develop a financial assistance policy which enumerates a) eligibility criteria, b) an explanation of how hospital charges are calculated, c) the process for applying for financial assistance, and d) whether such assistance includes free or discounted care. If the hospital does not have a separate collections policy, the financial assistance policy must explain what happens if a hospital bill is not paid, including collections actions and reports to credit agencies. The financial assistance policy must be widely publicized throughout the entity’s service area.
Limitations on Patient Charges. Hospital charges for emergency or other medically necessary care provided to patients eligible for financial assistance may not exceed the lowest amounts charged to insured patients, and may not be based upon gross charges.
But of course, the Limitations on Patient Charges apply only to patients eligible for financial assistance, which may or may not apply to Peter who, if not eligible for financial assistance, may still be subjected to a $2,270 bill for services I paid $263 for. And seemingly, if Peter, ineligible for financial assistance, doesn’t pay that bill, hospitals are still able to claim as a “community benefit” the full amount of that non-payment of a bill 9x as high as an amount they were willing to accept for the same services from someone else.
In May of last year I wrote the following; it is worth considering again:
In recent posts we’ve pointed out some of the questionable characterizations of “community benefit” by nonprofit hospitals under 501(c)(3), a portion of the Internal Revenue Code which garners tax exemptions for those entities, such as nonprofit hospitals, which it harbors. In particular, we’ve focused on how matters such as “bad debt,” Medicare “shortfalls,” and even Private Insurer “shortfalls” have often been construed by nonprofit hospitals to constitute the conveyance of a community benefit. A “shortfall” may be deemed to have occurred when although the hospital receives the amount it had agreed to with a Private Insurer, or which was designated by the government through Medicare, that amount is less than the hospital’s “list price” for such services.
Despite this rather lax standard, Kaiser.org reports that an in-depth review by the Boston Globe determined that “the value of abundant tax exemptions extended to Massachusetts General Hospital, and other private non-profit hospitals, ‘far exceeds the amount the state’s leading hospitals spend on free care for the poor and other community benefits.’”
Kaiser reports that in Massachusetts
The ten biggest hospitals in the state benefited from $638 million in tax breaks in 2007, but reported only $265 million in “community benefits” provided that year, the Globe found.
Even if one accepts the questionable characterizations of community benefits, that still leaves an excess of $373 million in tax exemptions–for merely 10 hospitals–in only one state.
New Requirements for Tax-Exempt Hospitals in Health Reform Law
Filed under: 501(c)(3), Hospital Finances, Nonprofit Hospitals
I. New Requirements for Tax-Exempt Hospitals Embedded in PPACA
Sen. Grassley’s fingerprints are evident in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3950). The Act includes in Section 9007 requirements to appear in new IRC §501(r), which applies to § 501(c)(3) charitable hospitals. Every hospital facility, including each hospital in a multi-hospital system must meet these requirements, which fall within the following categories:
Community Health Needs Assessment and Implementation Strategy. Hospitals must work with community representatives and experts in public health to develop community needs assessment made available to the public, as well as an implementation strategy. This section takes effect in tax years that begin after March 23, 2012. The hospital must include a description of how it is meeting the requirements of this section in its 990 filing. The Secretary of the Treasury is mandated to review a hospital’s community-benefit activities at least once every three years. IRC Section 4959 is amended to provide for a $50,000 fine for failure to meet the community health needs assessment provision of §501(r)(3).
Financial Assistance Policy. Hospitals must develop a financial assistance policy which enumerates a) eligibility criteria, b) an explanation of how hospital charges are calculated, c) the process for applying for financial assistance, and d) whether such assistance includes free or discounted care. If the hospital does not have a separate collections policy, the financial assistance policy must explain what happens if a hospital bill is not paid, including collections actions and reports to credit agencies. The financial assistance policy must be widely publicized throughout the entity’s service area.
Limitations on Patient Charges. Hospital charges for emergency or other medically necessary care provided to patients eligible for financial assistance may not exceed the lowest amounts charged to insured patients, and may not be based upon gross charges.
Limitations on Collections Policies. Collection actions may not be undertaken until the hospital has undertaken reasonable efforts to determine if the patient is eligible for financial assistance.
Finally, the PPACA requires hospitals for the first time to include their audited financial statements with the 990 filings.
II. IRS 990 Version 2.0
The new Informational Return 990 for tax exempt organizations continues to raise philosophical questions about the “federalization of nonprofit law,” particularly with its many questions about governance. As presumably intended by the IRS, its questions about the existence of particular policies such as whistle-blower, document retention, etc., inspired many tax-exempt organizations to create these policies. Many tax-exempt boards are actually seeing their entity’s 990 for the first time, again inspired by a question on the 990 itself.
The 990 for fiscal year 2009 reflects several changes, such as:
- Whether the entity follows the rebuttable-presumption-of-reasonableness procedure described in Reg. 53.4958-6(c);
- Whether the entity has made any significant changes to its program services or organizational documents.
Most important to hospitals is that the completion of Schedule H is mandatory for fiscal year 2009 (completion was optional last year). Questions include:
- Whether the organization uses Federal Poverty Guidelines (FPG) to determine eligibility for providing free or discounted care to low-income individuals;
- Whether the organization budgets for free or discounted care, and whether actual expenditures exceeded the budgeted amount;
- The amount of unreimbursed costs from government programs;
- Whether the organization has a written debt collection policy, and how patients are advised of financial-assistance programs for which they might be eligible;
- Whether the organization creates an annual community-benefit report which it provides to the public.
Industry Responds to Study Said to Demonstrate Link Between Physician Surgicenter Ownership and Volume of Surgeries
[Ed. note: We received the following response via email from the Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee to Kate Greenwood's post, "Study Demonstrates Link Between Physician Surgicenter Ownership and Volume of Surgeries." In the interest of fairness, it appears below without comment.]
The Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee Responds to Study Published
in Health Affairs
Industry Raises Concerns with Conclusions Drawn in New Study
Washington, D.C., April 7, 2010 – The Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee (ASCAC), a group of leading ASC operators, state associations and the ASC Association, is compelled to respond to the incorrect assumptions made about the ASC industry put forth in a new study published in the April issue of Health Affairs. The ASCAC reinforces the important role that ASCs play in providing patients with access to convenient, high-quality care at a low cost to the health care system.
The study authors make inaccurate statements about the relationship between physician ownership of ASCs and higher surgical volume, inferring that physician owners are driven to refer patients to their facility by financial incentives. While the study authors recognize limitations with their methodology, the ASCAC is particularly concerned with their sole reliance on surgical volume as a proxy for ASC ownership. Volume is not a valid method for identifying which physicians have ownership interests in ASCs. In fact, many non-owners practice at ASCs.
Research identifies a number of positive factors that have increased the volume of surgical procedures in an ASC, including the migration of procedures and services from outpatient facilities to the less-costly ASC setting as well as patient preference and cost savings.
In 2009, KNG Health Consulting produced a report, which found that 70 percent of ASC volume growth between 2000 and 2007 was due to migration from hospitals to ASCs. It noted that for established specialties of ophthalmology and gastrointestinal (focused on in the study), the volume growth due to migration was 94 percent and 78 percent, respectively. Additionally, a larger and aging population as well as increased patient demand and medical innovation that allows for less-invasive procedures are also contributing factors for higher surgical volume in ASCs.
Patients often prefer the ASC setting for their convenient locations, ease of scheduling, shorter waiting times and faster recovery times. Patients report a 92 percent satisfaction rate after having a procedure in an ASC. Additionally, ASCs have fulfilled an important role in providing patients with access to vital preventive services, such as cancer screenings. For example, ASCs perform 40 percent of Medicare colonoscopies and the U.S. Healthy People 2010 objective to increase cancer screenings would not have been met without this expanded capacity for colon cancer screenings.
The study authors failed to recognize the significantly lower cost to patients and payors when identical procedures are performed in an ASC as opposed to the hospital outpatient department (HOPD). Research shows that Medicare patients save more than a 50 percent on out-of-pocket costs, and overall, ASCs save Medicare approximately 40 percent annually. By shifting just half of all eligible outpatient surgeries to the ASC setting, Medicare could save an additional $2.3 billion annually.
ASCs are staffed by a team of experienced medical professionals, including physicians, nurses, physician assistants and other health care experts. Data indicate that their focused expertise leads to efficient care and better patient outcomes when procedures are performed in an ASC, including low rates of medical error, infections and/or complications leading to readmission.
“With a staff of highly trained and certified medical professionals, physicians in ASCs can perform more surgeries with superior patient outcomes and low rates of medical error in our facilities,” said Brent W. Lambert, MD, FACS, Board Member of the Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee and Founding Partner of the Ambulatory Surgical Centers of America, a physician-owned ASC development and management company. “ASCs are important providers of quality, patient-centered care and play an integral role in our country’s health care system.”
Many ASCs are privately owned by physicians, often in partnership with community hospitals or management companies. This structure enables proficient use of the facility, better control of scheduling and an environment conducive to the patient’s needs, as well as adaptable and innovative strategies for governance, leadership, efficiency and improved clinical care.
Data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Survey of Ambulatory Surgery show that ASCs are much more efficient than hospitals. Hospitals have also recognized that ASCs are effective partners in providing high-quality, patient-centered care, with approximately 20 percent of ASCs owned in part or exclusively by hospitals.
Higher volume in the ASC setting can also result from patient-referrals, another scenario the study did not consider.
“A significant number of new patients who ultimately need a surgical intervention are referred to our facilities from current or former patients satisfied with the care they received,” added Dr. Lambert.
The ASCAC and its partners are dedicated to working with physicians, hospitals, policymakers and other health care stakeholders to ensure that ASCs continue their commitment to excellence in quality and outcomes so that patients have the access they need to vital medical services procedures.
About the Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee
Ambulatory Surgery Centers are health care facilitates that specialize in providing important surgical and preventive services in an outpatient setting. With approximately 5,200 Medicare-certified facilities throughout the country, ASCs perform more than 22 million surgeries per year. The Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee is working on behalf of the industry to raise awareness of the important role that ASCs play in the health care system and the high-quality, cost-effective care that ASCs provide. The ASCAC includes the national and state ASC associations as well as representatives of all types of ASC operators and physicians. For more information about ASCs, visit www.advancingsurgicalcare.com.
Study Demonstrates Link Between Physician Surgicenter Ownership and Volume of Surgeries
Photo by Sarah McD via Flickr
There has long been a concern — reflected in the federal Stark Law and its state law analogues — that a conflict of interest arises when a physician refers patients to an ambulatory surgery center he or she owns. Prior research established that a doctor’s rate of referrals of patients for surgery and other hospital-based services is positively correlated with an ownership stake in a specialty hospital; now there is similarly concrete, empirical evidence of the deleterious effect of the conflict created when doctors own surgicenters.
In an article in the April issue of Health Affairs, John M. Hollingsworth and his co-authors present the results of a study comparing “the practice patterns of physician-owners of surgicenters, before and after they acquired ownership, to those of physician-nonowners over the same time period.” Using data from Florida for the years 2003-2005, the authors identified all patients who underwent one of five ambulatory procedures — carpal tunnel release, cataract excision, colonoscopy, knee arthroscopy, and ear tube surgery. The procedures were chosen because “substantial variation exists … in their use,” making them “susceptible to the influences of financial incentives associated with surgicenter ownership.” After accounting for differences in the populations served by physician-owners and physician-nonowners, the authors found that “the mean annual caseloads for owners … were at least twofold greater than those for nonowners.” Even more telling, using earlier data, from 1998-2000, the authors found that, even after accounting for the fact that some of the eventual owners had higher-volume practices before they invested in a surgicenter, for four of the five procedures studied, “acquisition of ownership status kicked owners’ already high volumes even higher.”
In an earlier post, I noted that a 2009 New Jersey law conditions physicians’ ability to refer patients to surgicenters on the following: (1) for patients they refer, they personally perform the surgery; (2) they be paid in proportion to their ownership interests, not the number of patients they refer; (3) they and their physician partners make all healthcare decisions, leaving non-physician partners without a say; and (4) they inform their patients in writing of their ownership interest at the time they make the referral.
The work done by Hollingsworth and his co-authors suggests that while the first and second conditions might eliminate certain especially troubling payment arrangements, a “relationship between surgicenter ownership and surgical volume” can persist even when physician-owners personally perform the surgeries. Similarly, while the third condition would require that physicians make healthcare decisions, it would do nothing to ensure that those decisions are uninfluenced by conflicts of interest. The fourth condition — which puts the burden on patients to suss out which referrals are medically necessary and which result from a physician-owner inappropriately lowering his or her threshold for intervention due to a financial conflict of interest — is also unlikely to reduce “physician-induced demand.” There is no evidence that patients are able to perform such a sifting function. To the contrary, existing evidence suggests that they are not.
Ultimately, as Hollingsworth and his co-authors suggest, the government may need to “intervene through physician reimbursement.” “[P]artial capitation or global payment schemes, or both, implemented in the context of proposed delivery system reforms (such as accountable care organizations) may be needed to discourage the over-use that fee-for-service payment rewards.”
Recording of Sam Maizel’s Discussion of Distressed Hospitals
A noted expert in the restructuring of health care business debts, both in and out of court, Sam Maizel treated Seton Hall to a one hour crash course on the fiscal crisis encountered by many of America’s hospitals. The significant financial hurdles that the hospital industry is facing has made the bankruptcy process that many hospitals encounter one of the fastest growing fields in health law.
Mr. Maizel has represented the federal government as a trial attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Commercial Litigation Branch. He also served in the JAG Corps in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm after serving in the 101st Airborne Division and the 3rd US Infantry Regiment. Mr. Maizel now practices in Los Angeles for Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP.
You can download Mr. Maizel’s talk here, or alternatively, you can stream it to your browser by clicking “Play” below:
Health Care Reform Law: Help for Hospitals?
Filed under: Health Reform Bill, Hospital Finances, Physician Compensation
Photo by James Jordan via Flickr
Last week, Samuel Maizel, a bankruptcy lawyer specializing in representing health care businesses in distress, gave a great talk here at Seton Hall Law on “Hospitals in Crisis: Debt Restructuring Options & Issues for Financial Survival.” Mr. Maizel painted a grim picture of the financial pressures facing hospitals and said he does not believe the situation is going to improve in the near term despite the overall economic recovery.
Near the end of his talk, Mr. Maizel told us that hospitals across the country are combing through the health reform legislation looking for anything that could improve their bottom lines. This piqued my interest and made me wonder what they will find. Using the House Committees’ summary of the provisions in the bill relating to delivery system reform as a guide, I came up with the following.
Sec. 3001. Rewarding High-Quality and Efficient Care.
This provision, which applies to patients discharged on or after October 1, 2012, establishes “value-based purchasing,” meaning that the government will make “value-based incentive payments” to hospitals that provide care to Medicare patients that meets or exceeds certain performance standards to be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Initially the standards must relate to at least the following five conditions: heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, surgery, and healthcare-associated infections. Eventually (by fiscal year 2014) the standards are to incorporate “efficiency measures,” that is Medicare spending per beneficiary must be a factor.
Sec. 3022. Medicare Shared Savings Program.
This provision, which Jordan Cohen analyzed at length here, directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a program by January 1, 2012 through which accountable care organizations that save Medicare money would be entitled to a cut of the savings they achieve. Hospitals are eligible to participate in the program through a partnership or joint venture arrangement with physicians or as employers of physicians.
Sec. 3023. National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling.
Under this 5-year long pilot program, which the Secretary must establish by January 1, 2013, the government will make one bundled payment “for integrated care during an episode of care provided to an applicable beneficiary around a hospitalization in order to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services.” Episodes of care begin 3 days prior to hospitalization and end 30 days after discharge. Hospitals can apply to participate in the program (and/or submit a bid) as part of “[a]n entity comprised of … a hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a home health agency.”
While the above three provisions hold out hope of improvement to hospitals’ bottom lines, the House Committees’ summary also highlights two provisions which establish negative incentives. Section 3008 on Hospital Acquired Conditions provides that, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the government will cut by 1% the payments it makes to hospitals in the top quartile for hospital acquired conditions. Similarly, Section 3025, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, provides that, after October 1, 2012, the government will begin reducing the amount it pays to hospitals with “excess readmissions.”
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