A Guide to Accountable Care Organizations, and Their Role in the Senate’s Health Reform Bill

The accountable care organization has been a model for health care reform, yet its modest success has been limited to a handful of health care systems across the country. However, the accountable care organization model has recently taken on far greater significance since being introduced as one of Medicare’s pilot programs in the Senate’s health reform bill.

The phrase is attributed to Dr. Elliot Fisher of Dartmouth Medical School.  Dr. Fisher has led the Dartmouth Atlas Project — a project that has, for the last 30 years, painstakingly documented the variation in care across the United States. (Click here for an interactive map of some of the Dartmouth Atlas results). The Dartmouth Atlas has focused on both the quality of health care as well as its cost. More importantly, they have reported on the relationship between the two, and their findings are nothing short of an indictment of our current paradigm.

Specifically, their findings illustrate that there exists wide variations in the cost of care across the country, and profoundly, that the regions that spend more per patient do not necessarily obtain better outcomes. So what to do? Dr. Fisher believes he has found at least part of the answer: the Accountable Care Organization, known as an “ACO”.

What is an ACO, and How Does it Differ from Other Payment Reforms?

In his paper “Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff,” Dr. Fisher acknowledges that the term ACO “grew out of an exchange between he and Dr. Glenn Hackbarth at a MedPAC meeting in November of 2006″. (Fisher, 2006 n. 7). Dr. Fisher’s purpose in writing the aforementioned paper was to help identify the proper “locus for shared accountability” for a patient’s health care. HMO’s and other health insurers are obvious candidates, but as Dr. Fisher notes, HMOs only comprise a small percentage of the current market, and health plans in general have focused on negotiating favorable prices within relatively open networks of providers. (Fisher, 2006, p. 45).  The “medical home” (also referred to as a Patient Centered Medical Home or PCMH) is another candidate, but is taken out of the running by Dr. Fisher because of the untested nature of medical homes, and their requirement of new payment mechanisms. (Id.).

Dr. Fisher notes that a better option already exists: “virtual” organizations consisting of the various physicians that are associated with local acute care hospitals. As Dr. Fisher notes, these physicians are either directly affiliated with such hospitals through their inpatient work, or through the care patterns of the patients they serve.  Dr. Fisher refers to these multi-speciality group practices that are bunched around local hospitals as an “extended hospital medical staff.” He argues that improving quality and lowering cost should be realized by fostering greater accountability on the part of this “extended medical staff.”

In a recent Urban Institute paper on ACOs by Kelly Devers and Robert Berenson (pdf summary here, full pdf here), the authors point to three essential characteristics of ACOs:

1. The ability to provide, and manage with patients, the continuum of care across different institutional settings, including at least ambulatory and inpatient hospital care and possibly post acute care;
2. The capability of prospectively planning budgets and resource needs; and
3. Sufficient size to support comprehensive, valid, and reliable performance measurement. (Berenson, p. 2.).

In exchange for investing in this reformed health care provider structure, the ACO members will  share in the savings that results from their cooperation and coordination. Thus, ACOs can–theoretically–act as a reform tool by incentivizing more efficient and effective care. This would help to combat the current perverse incentives of overutilization and overbuilding of health care facilities and technology.

In 2007, Dartmouth’s Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice headed by Dr. Fisher and Dr. James Weinstein, teamed up with the Brookings Institution’s Mark McClellan to create The Brookings-Dartmouth ACO Learning Network. The ACO Learning Network will serve as a support tool for providers looking to transition to the ACO framework. In the “Overview” section of their site (available as a pdf here), the Brookings-Dartmouth team provide a useful chart comparing the ACO model to other payment reform models such as “bundled payments,” “medical homes” and capitation. Click the image below to enlarge.

Various Extant Structures Utilized

Since Dr. Fisher’s introduction of the ACO concept, the idea has continued to be refined. In their 2007 paper “Accountable Care Systems For Comprehensive Health,” Dr. Stephen Shortell and Dr. Lawrence Casalino envision a broad range of ACOs in addition to the “extended medical staff” originally described by Dr. Fisher. Drs. Shortell and Casalino identify extant organizational structures that could be leveraged to create ACOs, including the Multi-speciality Group Practice (MSGP), the Hospital Medical Staff Organization (HMSO), the Physician-Hospital Organization (PHO), the Interdependent Physician Organization (IPO), and the Health Plan Provider Organization or Network (HPPO/HPPN). (Shortell et al., 2007, p. 10). Below is a table from their paper that organizes the different ACO models while comparing their capabilities. Click the image below to Enlarge.

ACOs In Practice

Building on the Physician Group Practice (PGP) demonstration project that rewarded the provision of quality care with a share of the savings, the Brookings-Dartmouth group propose a “voluntary and incremental” ACO program. (Fisher et al., 2009, p. 2).  The ACO would have to be a legal organization that can receive shared savings, and would have to incorporate primary care physicians who solely practice under the ACO. (Id.). Furthermore, the Brookings-Dartmouth group believes there would have to be at least 5,000 beneficiaries in the ACO for it to be viable. The ACO would provide CMS with a list of their providers willing to participate in the ACO. As discussed above, the beneficiaries would be determined by, among other things, the patterns of patient referrals in the region. However, beneficiaries would not be “locked in” to a given provider. (Fisher et al., 2009, p. 4). The ACO would receive savings if their risk-adjusted, per beneficiary spending levels were below their benchmark. Id.

An Ultra-Simplified Example

A hypothetical independent practice association (IPA) teams up with a community hospital to create an ACO. Medicare determines a benchmark, that is, what it will cost to treat the average beneficiary in that geographic area per year–let’s say $10,000. The physicians submit their traditional claims to Medicare under the RBRVS system while the hospital submits its typical DRG-base claim. Thus, the traditional fee-for-service system remains in place. At the end of the year, Medicare determines if the ACO has provided care for less than $10,000. If they have, the ACO is entitled to share in the cost savings, and the savings are divided among the providers and hospital. Though simple in theory, ACOs become more difficult when attempting to construct payment models that will distribute the savings of the ACO to the individual providers. Shortell provides another helpful chart that lays out some of the options; Click on the image to enlarge.

Criticism of the ACO Model

The strongest criticism that I am aware of is from Dr. Jeff Goldsmith PhD, president of Public Health Services at the University of Virginia. In his Health Affairs article entitled “The Accountable Care Organization: Not Ready for Prime Time,” Dr. Goldsmith recalls previous attempts to at implementing payment reform models based on shared risk:

The problem with this movie is that we’ve actually seen it before, and it was a colossal and expensive failure. During the 1990s, many hospitals and physicians believed that the Clinton health reforms would force them into capitated contracts with health plans. . . . Risk-bearing physician/hospital organizations and hospital-sponsored preferred provider organizations (PPOs) sprang up all over the country. . . . Some of these hospital/physician efforts actually succeeded and survive today. . . . However, these were outliers in an expensive failure.  Employers and patients preferred open panels managed by health insurers to closed panels managed by providers. Billions of dollars were lost.. . . Many of the practice acquisitions were reversed, as hospital systems sought to rein in their expenses and adjust to an open-panel world dominated by point-of-service style health plans

However, the 1990s left behind an expensive legacy:  highly concentrated local provider markets….There were numerous reasons for the 1990s collapse of at-risk hospital/physician partnerships, besides the failure to find willing buyers of their services. These efforts lacked infrastructure, experienced management, as well as reliable and timely cost information to support cost management. They assumed global risk but paid for care on a fee basis, just as Fisher and colleagues propose.  But these hospital-sponsored organizations could neither redistribute income nor exclude their high-cost providers (who inconveniently generate most hospital profits).

Some things have clearly changed in the ensuing decade. . . . A rapidly increasing percentage of physicians, particularly primary care physicians, are now hospital employees.  A larger percentage of the physician community receives hospital subsidies for call coverage. Many of these subsidies are, in fact, extorted from the hospital by specialists in scarce supply, destined to become scarcer.  An entire generation of 80-hour-a-week baby-boomer physicians are retiring and being replaced by younger physicians who want to work 30 hours a week.  You are not going to see a lot of these younger physicians in utilization review committee meetings after hours; they are going to be at their kids’ soccer practices.

What hasn’t changed is the fragmentation of care, the huge disparities in income and political power inside physician communities, and also the level of suspicion that physicians have of their now much more powerful local hospitals.  There is also, sadly, a thundering absence of collegiality – in my view, the central precondition of assuming risk and managing care. This absence is palpable in suburbs and even more pronounced in many “lifestyle dominated” resort communities in the sunbelt.. . .They are “collections” of physicians, not communities.

The hospitals in these areas appear formidable:  they have beautiful campuses,  prestigious boards, and deep financial reserves. . . . But these hospitals have been picked clean of vital outpatient services by their medical “communities.”

….Entire disciplines have disappeared from hospitals: ophthalmology, cosmetic surgery, gastroenterology, urology. Even community-based internists and family practitioners have stopped coming to the hospital; their patients are cared for by hospitalists who work full time inside the hospital.

The result of our previous attempts at ACO-like integrated care, Dr. Goldsmith points out, is that…

. . . .while the hospital has become more involved in subsidizing physician practice, physician communities have drawn away from the hospital and function increasingly independently on a day-to-day basis. Wennberg’s own data show that something like 40% of physicians no longer have any Medicare hospital-related fee income. So squashing hospitals and physicians back together into economic interdependence in a joint hospital/physician economic pool makes no real-world sense.

Dr. Goldsmith goes on to note that there have been some successful ACOs, but that they haven’t been “virtual” in the sense that Dr. Fisher points out, rather, they are

. . . real organizations with P+Ls, medical directors, and management infrastructure. Prominent examples in my home region include Carilion Health System in Roanoke and the Bon Secours Health System in Richmond. Voluntary ACO arrangements, with Medicare and with private insurers, may find enthusiastic partnerships with many of these hospital-sponsored physician groups. . . .

The Senate Bill

In defense of the Brookings-Dartmouth model, the group has gone on record in favor of voluntary ACOs. To Dr. Goldsmith’s relief, the Senate’s health reform plan incorporates ACOs on a voluntary pilot program basis. You can read their rebuttal to Dr. Goldsmith here.  Section 3022 of the Senate bill — which amends Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395) — introduces ACOs under the name “Medicare Shared Savings Program. (View a pdf of the extracted ACO part of Senate bill here).

The Senate’s plan is remarkably similar to the Brookings-Dartmouth model. Under the Senate’s plan, ACOs will be eligible to receive a percentage of the cost savings that they have realized under the traditional fee-for-service Medicare system. The requirements are set forth in section (B)(2). Furthermore, the ACO shall enter into a 3 year agreement with HHS whereby the ACO must agree to contain at least 5,000 Medicare beneficiaries, while being prevented from engaging in risk selection. The ACO must define processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care, such as through the use of telehealth or other remote patient monitoring tools. The ACO must also demonstrate to HHS that it meets the yet-to-be defined criteria for “patient-centeredness”.

Whether ACOs will succeed is impossible to determine with certainty. The panopticon that would be ACO management looking over the shoulders of physicians may be enough to turn off many physicians. Nevertheless, as even Dr. Goldsmith acknowledges, some ACOs have thrived. Moreover, the voluntary ACOs in the Senate’s bill represent a measured approach towards reforming our system without a wholesale transformation. As Dr. Atul Gawande describes in a lesser-cited pre-”Cost Conundrum” article, the most sound approach is often “path-dependent,”  that is, it builds on what already exists. As Dr. Gawande notes:

. . .accepting the path-dependent nature of our health-care system—recognizing that we had better build on what we’ve got—doesn’t mean that we have to curtail our ambitions. The overarching goal of health-care reform is to establish a system that has three basic attributes. It should leave no one uncovered—medical debt must disappear as a cause of personal bankruptcy in America. It should no longer be an economic catastrophe for employers. And it should hold doctors, nurses, hospitals, drug and device companies, and insurers collectively responsible for making care better, safer, and less costly. . .

Whether the shared savings will entice physicians on a large scale is uncertain.  What is certain is that our current fragmented system incentivizes providers to offer neither cost-effective nor coordinated care. Though it is unlikely that physicians and hospitals will flock to ACOs from the start, the vision of ACOs conceived of by the Dartmouth-Group and described in the Senate bill may nevertheless prove itself a useful tool in a larger arsenal of approaches meant to salvage our unsustainable health care system. In other words, the Senate’s approach could provide a path-dependent solution toward the collective responsibility and better outcomes that Dr. Gawande mentions. And as described in the Senate bill, physicians and hospitals will not be offered a new path, but rather a resurfaced path that would retain fee-for-service, while providing a safer and smoother ride for the patient.

Obama’s Plan for a Health Care Summit and the Unenthusiastic Response

Last week, President Obama announced plans to hold a bipartisan health care summit to push forward on health care reform and to give both sides an opportunity to discuss ideas for health reform legislation that will be able to garner enough votes for passage.  While President Obama and Democratic Congressional leaders want to use the health care proposals that have already passed in the House and in the Senate, Republicans say that they are unlikely to vote for a bill unless the current proposals are scrapped and the process is started afresh.  It seems like Americans, once again, may be left watching the theatrics of the health care reform debate without actually being the focal point of it.

Some conservative Congress members have already responded to the President’s invitation publicly to make their steadfast positions known.  Representative Eric Cantor (R-Va.) said this past week that he was not willing to discuss a “health reform package that spends money we don’t have.”  He added that “House Republicans have offered the only plan that will lower health care costs.”  If that is true, it is likely attributable to the fact that the House Republican bill would cover only 3 million uninsured Americans, compared to the Democratic House bill which would  insure an additional 36 million Americans.

On Monday night, House Minority Leader John A. Boehner (R-Oh.) joined Cantor in submitting a letter to White House Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, which said that the Republicans were not willing to come to the table unless certain prerequisite questions were answered.  You can see the whole letter here.  In the letter, Cantor and Boehner express their non-support for reform that the American people themselves are not supporting; the basis for such being the recent Republican Senate win in Massachusetts.

Exactly what are the citizens of American thinking about health care reform anyway?  CNN reported on Tuesday that nearly two-thirds of Americans want Congress to persist in passing health care reform legislation.  The poll, an ABC News/Washington Post survey, also indicates that Americans blame both Democrats and Republicans on their unwillingness to compromise.  HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius herself is quoted as saying, “When people look up close at the personal activities of Congress they are confused and disgusted with the whole process and too afraid that whatever is going on can’t possibly be good for them or their families.”

Many believe that the idea for the health care summit was to address the back-door processes that led to American distrust and to make it all more transparent.  Still, there appear to be more differences between the conservative version of reform and the liberal version than points of reconciliation.  Though the prolonged tug-of-war between both sides does not seem like one that might be resolved in a day of convening, the summit is, perhaps, at least a start.

And, while the political contenders decide what to do about the summit, the health reform stalemate has presently-occurring repercussions. Many hospitals, which were holding on to the hope of reform, are now at the point where downsizing their health systems is thought to be the only step left.  Hospitals all around the country have been seeing more and more uninsured patients, and with no one to cover the full cost of services, the hospitals providing unreimbursed care are said to be further sinking into debt– and must therefore cut staff as well as services.  On the individual level, Americans are also finding it difficult to  keep up with the costs of health care, and while many forgo insurance, those that cannot due to chronic illness or necessity of care are finding the cost further prohibitive.

It would make sense, then, that Americans do want reform.  Andrew Rubin, Vice President for Medical Center Clinical Affairs for NYU Langone Medical Center and radio show host for HealthCare Connect, says that one of the underlying reasons why Americans are reluctant to give support for legislation is their lack of understanding of what is happening, not because they do not want to see change.  Let’s hope that the proposed health care summit will be used to clarify issues for Americans who do need and want health care, instead of for just another political brouhaha.

Revisiting CONventional Wisdom on State Hospital Licensure

If there is one aspect of contemporary health care regulation that conservatives have decried, it’s “certificate of need laws.” These laws require licensure of new health facilities (and sometimes expansions of facilities) in thirty-seven states. Denounced as relics of socialist central planning, they were a prime target of the Bush-Era Dose of Competition report. But, as David Leonhardt notes, it appears that CON laws are reducing costs without impairing quality in some areas.

First, a bit of background. As health costs rose in the 1960s, many policymakers believed that a surplus of health services was to blame. Policymakers worried that health care costs were rising due to “induced demand:” the more doctors and hospitals there were, the more these actors would try to counteract the normal price-depressing effect of increased competition by finding more wrong with patients, thus “inducing” demand for their services. Although such a strategy could rarely work in a normal market, health care is a credence service—it is very hard for the average consumer to “second guess” his or her provider about the amount or nature of care needed.*

In 1974, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act. The Act required new health care facilities, and additions to existing facilities, to obtain a Certificate of Need (CON) from the appropriate state agency as a prerequisite to receiving federal funds via the Medicare and Medicaid programs. As a result of these laws, those opening new health care entities needed to demonstrate to state commissions that their services are actually needed by the community.

Over time, state boards started addressing concerns beyond “induced demand,” including social goals of equity and fair distribution of health resources. When I emailed a New Jersey policymaker who has worked in this area, he told me that the state would be unlikely to license specialty hospitals that concentrate on the most lucrative cases because they would threaten the ability of safety net hospitals to use revenue from such cases to cross-subsidize uncompensated care. He called such egalitarian concerns “explicit and leading factor[s] of discussion at all levels in CON proceedings.”

Leonhardt is more concerned about the classic CON goal of cost-control, and sees CON laws as a key reason for positive developments in Richmond, Virginia:

Since 1996, the Richmond area has lost more than 600 of its hospital beds, mostly because of state regulations on capacity. . . . Richmond has gotten rid of 15 percent of its hospital beds, and its health care still looks a lot like the rest of the country’s, only cheaper and a bit better. . . .

[Meanwhile, health facilities vastly expanded in South Dakota after it scrapped its CON law in 1988.] In other industries, all that new capacity might have led to a glut, in which workers and equipment sat idle. But health care is different. Doctors and patients tend to believe that more care is better, and patients often don’t pay much extra for any additional care. So new doctors, nurses and equipment generally stay busy.

Dr. John Wennberg of the Dartmouth Medical School refers to this phenomenon as supply-sensitive care. Dr. Marlon Priest, the chief medical officer of Bon Secours, puts it this way: “If you build 100 beds, they’ll get used.” . . . [But] [m]ore care is not always better care. Sometimes, in fact, it’s worse. Just consider the recent research showing that radiation from CT scans will eventually kill thousands of patients a year.

I’m not fully sold on the Dartmouth studies (here’s one critique of them), and I do worry that efforts to fight overtreatment will lead to some “meat ax” rationing that denies care to the poorest (rather than motivating those who don’t need the attention of the health care system to avoid it). But when cost saving initiatives are combined with a commitment to preserve access to necessary care for all, they may be as close to a “Pareto optimal” health policy as we can get.

*(Lawyers have their own version of this “induced demand” problem, encapsulated in the old saw: “When there was one lawyer in town, he had no business; when another moved in, he was swamped with cases.” I suppose laws against barratry offer a loose parallel to CON in the legal profession. Antitrust may stand in the way of legal and medical professionals’ own actions to avoid “induced demand.”)

X-Posted: Concurring Opinions.

Dollars and Sense & Health Care Reform

With health care reform approaching its culmination point, like all things most memorable of the past year, the overarching question remains, “How much will this cost us?”  As it currently stands, the House version of health reform will cost an estimated $1 trillion over a decade, while the Senate version comes in at $871 billion.  Next, comes the obvious second question, “How will the government pay for it?”  As Kaiser Health News summarizes in its recently released guide to health reform:

Both bills hit up the wealthy, but in different ways. The House would impose a 5.4 percent income tax surtax on individuals who earn more than $500,000 a year and couples that earn more than $1 million. The Senate would increase the Medicare payroll tax rate from 1.45 percent to 2.35 percent for people who earn more than $200,000 a year and families that earn more than $250,000.

To raise money to pay for the legislation, the Senate would impose a 40 percent tax on the portion of most employer-sponsored health coverage that exceeds $8,500 a year for individuals and $23,000 for families. The Senate also would raise the threshold for deducting medical expenses to 10 percent of income, up from 7.5 percent.

Overall, the financing provisions could spur a pitched battle; the House hates the Senate tax on high-cost policies, while the Senate opposes the House’s income-tax surcharge.

In addition, many Americans worry that efforts to contain costs within the bills will lead to decreased standards of care.  As a New York Times piece reveals, however, this may not be the case.  The article examines the health system in Richmond, Virginia, where there are stringent state infrastructural expansion guidelines placed on health care practices and hospitals to contain costs.  The state requires large medical infrastructural expenditures by health care providing institutions– in the form of hospital expansion or even major equipment purchases– to be approved by the state through a “certificate of need.”  Neither of the House or Senate bills  includes such a provision, but there is a great deal of speculation that the oversight and cost-cutting measures in both will have a deleterious impact on the quality of health care.

While Richmond spends less than average per capita on Medicare than other metropolitan areas, patient outcomes are better than average. The Times reports

The quality of care in Richmond is better than in most American metropolitan areas, according to various measures, and it continues to improve. Medicare data, for example, shows that Richmond hospitals do a better-than-average job of treating heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia.

But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Times’ analysis relates to those states that do not police their health care infrastructure expenditures– or, as in South Dakota, had done so formerly, but ceased to do so.  When South Dakota “scrapped” its certificate of need program, one chief operating officer reported going on an expansion binge. In such cases, the number of patients that providers treat is said to correspond proportionally to the level of health care resources available.  One medical officer found this “supply-sensitive” phenomenon to mean that the more hospital beds a hospital has, the more patients it is likely to see.  Build it and they will come– or perhaps more to the point– they will be sent. At our expense.

Developments in the Law Governing Physician-Owned Ambulatory Surgery Centers in New Jersey

Over the past year, one or the other of my sons has had minor surgery in no less than three of New Jersey’s many ambulatory surgery centers (”ASCs”).  So, I noted with interest the Appellate Division’s recent decision in Garcia v. Health Net in which it affirmed a lower court holding that physicians who make referrals to ASCs in which they have an ownership interest violate the Codey Law, New Jersey’s version of the Stark Law.  The Appellate Division also affirmed the lower court’s decision that, despite the illegal referrals, the physician-owners in the case committed no fraud.  They (along with other physicians-owners across the state) acted in reliance on the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners’ conclusion that the Codey Law’s exception to the self-referral ban for services provided at the referring physician’s medical office applied to ASCs.

In response to the lower court’s holding and heavy lobbying from physicians, the New Jersey State Legislature enacted revisions to the Codey Law which were signed into law in March 2009.  Physicians are now expressly permitted to refer patients to ASCs in which they have a financial interest if they meet a list of conditions, including that: (1) for patients they refer, they personally perform the surgery; (2) they be paid in proportion to their ownership interests, not the number of patients they refer; (3) they and their physician partners make all healthcare decisions, leaving non-physician partners without a say; and (4) they inform their patients in writing of their ownership interest at the time they make the referral.

On the other hand, the Legislature acted to all but put a stop to the establishment of new physician-owned ASCs, with the exception of those which are jointly owned by a general hospital.  Development of hospital– and medical school–owned centers may proceed apace.  Fox Rothschild’s Elizabeth Litten notes  that this “resonates more of long-forgotten certificate of need and health planning policy than it does of the original law’s concern with physician profit motives and overutilization.”  Clearly, the Legislature hopes that the new limits will be good for general hospitals’ financial health.  Professor Frank Pasquale has written here and elsewhere about the concern that ASCs and other niche facilities harm general hospitals by “cherry-picking” lucrative patients and “lemon dropping” those that are more costly.

What about patients?  Should we care whether ASCs are physician-owned or not?  Unsurprisingly, the American Medical Association believes that “physician ownership interests in health facilities, products or equipment can benefit patient care.” Peer-reviewed research suggests that physician-ownership makes no difference in health outcomes, however.  And, as Dean Kathleen Boozang states here, there is evidence that “physicians who hold an equity interest in an entity that provides ancillary health care services, such as a clinical laboratory or MRI, more frequently order those services for their patients, referring them, unsurprisingly, to the entity they own,” although there is no evidence that “this higher use equated to over-utilization.”  I would suggest, admittedly based on a small (and potentially unrepresentative) sample, that, if nothing else, physician-owned surgery centers have better amenities than those that are hospital-owned.  Some of these amenities could easily be done without (orchids in the lobby, souvenir teddy bear); others (popsicles and DVDs in the recovery room) are potentially more significant.

Nonprofit Health Related CEO Compensation

Health Insurance Company CEOs in the U.S. earned tens of millions in 2008, but what about nonprofits? If you guessed that nonprofit CEOs are paid less than their private sector counterparts, you are right. But the numbers are no less shocking to the average American. Below are the highest paid nonprofit workers at the largest nonprofit healthcare organizations, hospitals and medical centers in the U.S, courtesy of the Chronicle of Philanthropy.

Last year, some of the top paid nonprofit workers took pay cuts while others saw increases in compensation. Despite a global recession, many health-related nonprofits reported higher income in 2008, according to the report by The Chronicle of Philanthropy, which surveyed compensation information from the top 400 charities and foundations in the U.S.

According to the Chronicle, it asked each organization to answer a questionnaire and provide its most recent 990 tax form. This year, not every organization provided the information. In fact, most of the top paid executives from 2007 did not provide the information in 2008.

Based on 2007 data, the highest paid nonprofit worker was Herbert Padres, chief office of New York-Presbyterian Hospital. Padres earned  $6,170,885 in 2007. That’s $118,671 per week. In some parts of the country, that is enough to purchase a home. Every week. It is certainly enough to purchase one of the finest cars on the market.

As we’ve noted before on this blog:
Under the strictures of 501(c)(3) nonprofits are confined to paying executives “reasonable compensation” and supplying “community benefit.” Unfortunately, neither of these terms are particularly well defined. In [this] study’s executive summary, the IRS puts it so:

“The community benefit standard is the legal standard for determining whether a nonprofit hospital is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.”

“Observations. Both the community benefit and reasonable compensation standards have proved difficult for the IRS to administer. Both involve application of imprecise legal standards to complex, varied and evolving fact patterns.”

The varied and evolving fact pattern of nonprofit executive compensation looks something like this:

The nonprofit healthcare CEO with the highest salary in 2008 (given the incomplete response) was James J. Mongan, CEO of Partners HealthCare Systems. Mongan earned $3,376,554 in 2008.

Nonprofit executive compensation, health-related nonprofit:
New York-Presbyterian Hospital Herbert Pardes (CEO): $6,170,885
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Harold Varmus (CEO): $3,677,402
Partners HealthCare System James J. Mongan (CEO): $3,376,554
New York Presbyterian Hospital Steven J. Corwin (COO): $3,127,051
Mount Sinai School of Medicine Samin Sharma (Professor of Medicine and Cardiology): $2,894,580

Note: Aside from James J. Mongan, all numbers are for the 2007. Compensation amounts include deferred compensation and fringe benefits.

See Health Insurance CEO Compensation Here.

More Institutional Health Economics, Please!

Today’s Nobel Prize award for institutional economists Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom is a welcome step toward methodological pluralism in the profession. Both have looked outside markets to understand the organization of economic life. Ostrom is not even an economist–she is a political scientist by profession. As Bob Shiller observes:

This award is part of the merging of the social sciences. Economics has been too isolated and too stuck on the view that markets are efficient and self-regulating. It has derailed our thinking.

According to the NYT, “The Nobel judges, in their description of Mr. Williamson’s and Ms. Ostrom’s achievement, said that ‘economic science’ should extend beyond market theory and into actual behavior, and the two award winners, in their empirical work, had done this.”

There is a great need for more of this type of work in health economics. Joe White’s Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005 is one good exemplar of needed work here; he eschews “discussions of how economic theory can be applied to medical care production and delivery” and instead “focuses on ‘the market’ in its actual, not theoretical, form, as it existed in the United States.” White describes case after case where consolidation, not medical need, drove industry structure. He leaves the reader with a clear and convincing image of a space where varying levels of provider and insurer power, not productivity, is the key to understanding changes in the profitability of services. I’ve seen few better brief explanations of rising medical costs than the following: Read more

Immigrants, Health Reform, and “Lies”

In a much-anticipated prime time address to Congress, President Obama made the case for health care reform.  One ostensible goal of the speech was to correct misinformation about the bills proposed by Congress.  As a scholar who studies both health care and immigration (and sometimes the intersection between the two), I’ve grown increasingly frustrated with the misconceptions surrounding this issue — and I very much hoped the President would deflate the myth that health reform would provide federal benefits to undocumented immigrants.

Of course, when President Obama made this very point (”The reforms I’m proposing would not apply to those who are here illegally”), he was greeted with a heckle from South Carolina Representative Joe Wilson, who shouted “You lie!”  Although Rep. Wilson later apologized for his “lack of civility,” he didn’t recant the basic factual assertion, making clear that he still disagreed with the President’s statement that health reform doesn’t cover undocumented immigrants.  Of course, the media has jumped on this story, but perhaps unsurprisingly, few bothered to clarify the underlying factual dispute.

Neither bill published by the House or Senate covers undocumented immigrants.  In fact, both bills state in pretty plain terms that they don’t do it.  The House bill, titled America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, states in Section 242 that those not lawfully present in the United States are not eligible for insurance subsidies or tax credits.  To make it even more clear, Section 246 is titled “No Federal Payment for Undocumented Aliens,” and states “Nothing in this subtitle shall allow Federal payments for affordability credits on behalf of individuals who are not lawfully present in the United States.”

Likewise, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pension Committee’s bill, titled the Affordable Health Choices Act, states in Section 3111(h) that “Nothing in this Act shall allow Federal payments for individuals who are not lawfully present in the United States.”  The Senate Finance Committee has yet to release its bill, but it’s a good bet that undocumented immigrants similarly will be excluded.

Although nothing in the bills apparently would prohibit undocumented immigrants from purchasing health insurance in the new national marketplace (called an “exchange” and a “gateway” in the House and Senate bills), it’s not clear why anyone would take issue with immigrants purchasing insurance on their own, without federal subsidies.  Moreover, although nothing in the bills seems to alter federal funding for emergency care provided to immigrants, nothing creates such a benefit either — thus undercutting Rep. Wilson’s contention with the President.

This controversy should remind us that immigrants remain in a sort of health care purgatory, caught in our two most dysfunctional systems — immigration and health care.  In the mid-1990s, Congress severely limited immigrant access to programs like Medicaid as part of welfare reform, making it difficult for even lawful immigrants to enroll.  In fact, even lawful immigrants aren’t eligible for Medicaid for five years after entering the United States — and various peculiarities of immigration law often push this waiting period to ten years.  At the same time, immigrants do receive indirect federal funding for health care through the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires hospitals with emergency departments to screen and at least stabilize patients presenting with emergent conditions.  Thus, hospitals must provide emergency care regardless of the patient’s immigration status.

Unfortunately, most immigrants are ineligible for means-tested public insurance programs like Medicaid.  This regulatory framework has led to “medical repatriation,” in which hospitals effectively deport immigrant patients to unload expensive long-term care burdens.  Of course, hospitals — most of which are run by state and local governments — complain about unfunded federal mandates like EMTALA.  Hospitals can be “stuck” treating immigrants whose medical needs have shifted from acute to long-term (as with the car accident victim who needs neurological rehabilitation and nursing care).  As Prof. Boozang discussed, a growing number have begun “repatriating” immigrant patients by sending them back to their country of origin — without consulting immigration officials — sometimes by purchasing commercial plane tickets or even hiring air ambulances.

Certainly, there are more humane ways to handle health care for immigrants.  California, for example, legalized cross-border health insurance, thus allowing immigrants living in the state to purchase insurance with lower premiums and deductibles that covers care provided in Mexico.  Arizona and Texas have considered similar legislation, to no avail.  Recently, UCLA researchers estimated that over 950,000 people travel from California to Mexico for medical care every year.  For a population being left out of health care reform, traveling to Mexico for care may be the future — whether voluntary or not.

Will Conflicts of Interest Sabotage Health Reform?

With health care reform in full gear, one crucial question is that of prioritization. Where should we focus our efforts? Who needs greater treatment, and what type of care is missing from the everyday lives of everyday Americans? Unfortunately, the politicians crafting the legislation may be swayed–not surprisingly–by stakeholders and lobbyists who are concerned with how reform will affect their bottom line. Interestingly, it is not just private insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies that are influencing the legislation.

A recent New York Times piece underscores how the emerging landscape of physician-owned hospitals is helping to shape congressional legislation.

The Times article states that one of the largest sources of campaign contributions for the Senate Democrats Campaign Committee is from the Doctors Hospital at Renaissance for a not-so-paltry sum of $500,000. Ironically, the event that raised the sum was at the home of Alonzo Cantu, a real estate developer in–you guessed it–McAllen Texas. Another event at Cantu’s house “brought in at least $800,000 for the committee’s House counterpart, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.”

McAllen became (in)famous as the town depicted by Atul Gawande in his now oft-cited piece exposing the framework of incentives available to providers and hospitals to perform a greater number of tests and procedures in order to increase their bottom line, even when the greater volume of tests and procedures does not necessarily correspond to an increase in quality of care. Health Reform Watch has discussed the “cost conundrum” before.  Nevertheless, the incessant media and blog coverage of our inefficient system does not seem to have dissuaded those with a stake in that inefficient system from advocating for the status quo. As the Times points out that:

…like others here, he [Mr. Cantu] is not pleased about the president’s depiction of health care in McAllen.

“What’s so upsetting,” he said, “is that to make his case he threw McAllen under the bus.”

One might ask–given Gawande’s seemingly accurate portrayal of the overly-entrepreneurial nature of McAllen’s health care system–why we shouldn’t throw McAllen under the bus, especially when we can put a face on a problem undermining our system? Mr. Cantu and other Doctors Hospital officials are said to have offered the following argument for why Doctors Hospital and other physician-owned hospitals were beneficial and shouldn’t be singled out:

They have argued they are being unfairly grouped with boutique specialty hospitals that do not have emergency departments and that cater to privately insured patients. Eighty-eight percent of Doctors Hospital patients are either on public insurance or uninsured, 750 babies are delivered there a month, and no one is turned away because of inability to pay, they said.

Physician ownership, they added, has meant major investments in the latest equipment and good staffing ratios for nurses. Appealing to local pride, the hospital markets itself as the first in the area to offer services like PET scans, robotic surgery and breast imaging, which once required trips to Houston or San Antonio.

It is perhaps important to remember, as the McAllen boys attempt to mitigate the damages of the Gawande article, just what Gawande found. As we wrote prior:

Gawande writes that McAllen “is one of the most expensive health-care markets in the country. Only Miami-which has much higher labor and living costs-spends more per person on health care. In 2006, Medicare spent fifteen thousand dollars per enrollee here, almost twice the national average. The income per capita is twelve thousand dollars. In other words, Medicare spends three thousand dollars more per person here than the average person earns.”

El Paso, Texas, similarly situated, spends significantly less– half as much.

Might I suggest that there is little consolation in the fact that the largesse found in McAllen is largely funded through “public insurance,” or that there are “boutique hospitals” which charge even more?

In addition, “Local pride” aside, the real question is whether McAllen needs a PET scan facility or robotic surgery. Importantly, Texas is not a Certificate of Need (C.O.N.) law state. Therefore “local pride” (i.e. desire of a local, often private, facility) may often trump the actual “need” of the community. This idea is reinforced when taking into account that a PET scanner may have an annual operational cost of over $1 million, in addition to the upfront construction costs that can also venture into the millions. Altruism aside for the moment (or perhaps, it seems, longer), the investors in those machines will seek to recoup their cost plus profit. To do so, they simply must use that machine.

Thus, as it stands, the allocation of expensive high-tech machinery in physician-owned hospitals is based upon the government subsidized decision of private investors regarding the liklihood of turning a profit (for the subsidies, think “depreciation” and “expensing” for business equipment; think “public insurance” for billables). Perhaps we should not be quite so surprised when they then comport themselves in a way which ensures such a profit. But, it certainly may be argued that with our health care system in its precarious state, without a showing of actual need, the trip to Houston or San Antonio for very advanced high-tech procedures is a price we must be willing to pay and that the allocation of medical resources (and government subsidies for such) should be based on public need and not private profit.

In addition, given the overlap between physician-owned hospitals and single specialty hospitals, as Professor Frank Pasquale points out, these single specialty hospitals may siphon scarce health resources and undercut the care that community hospitals provide.

In a previous post, I discussed comparing a health care system to a pyramid, the foundation of the pyramid requiring a solid base of primary, preventive, and wellness care, that tapers to the top of the pyramid where we find the specialists utilizing, for example, advanced equipment and procedures like robotic surgery. However, a stable foundation for the pyramid is necessary, and the favoritism described above may stymie actual reform–reform that will provide Americans with the basics that they need at an affordable price.

Democrats are surely not the only ones to blame, and money has flowed to Republicans as well. As we discussed in an earlier post, a Common Cause report finds that $1.4 million dollars per day is being spent by healthcare interests lobbying Congress this year. From the perspective of the physician-owned hospitals and private health insurance companies, donating to both sides of the aisle makes sense; it ensures that both political parties have a financial stake in preventing legislation that would limit physician-owned hospitals from being subject to greater restrictions (like CON laws), or tightly regulating insurer practices. Though there are some restrictions governing physician-owned facilities in the House bill, these have been watered down, and will now allow facilities like Doctors Hospital to maintain their current structure, and even expand in certain future circumstances. As the Times reports:

The Senate Finance Committee has yet to release its final draft, but bills passed by two House committees would prevent the opening of new physician-owned hospitals by disqualifying them from receiving Medicare reimbursements. Existing facilities like Doctors Hospital would be grandfathered in.

One key provision would limit a hospital’s ownership by doctors to the level in place at the time of enactment. That is a change from previous language in House bills to restrict physician ownership to 40 percent. It would have forced Doctors Hospital, where physicians have an 82-percent stake, to be sold or required some of its owners to divest.

The future disallowance by Congress of Medicare funding for procedures performed at physician-owned hospitals is a tacit acknowledgment that the structure is one in which conflicts of interest abound; that he who owns a machine and will profit from its use is apt to refer patients for its use–regardless of actual need. It is the acknowledgment that the foxes are essentially guarding the henhouse–and that hens cost money. The exception made for Doctors Hospital and others of its ilk, however, considering the large campaign contributions, gives rise to other questions about conflicts of interest.

The problem is not simply the amount of money that is being funneled to Congress by the health care industry. The more pertinent issue at this point is: Read more

Medical Repatriation: Montejo v. Martin Memorial Medical Center

[Ed. note: Today's post comes from Dean Kathleen M. Boozang and Erika M. Lopes.  Erika is a Seton Hall Law student and a graduate of Trinity College, Connecticut, where she majored in Political Science. Ms. Lopes is a research assistant to Kathleen M. Boozang, and formerly worked as a litigation paralegal specializing in both Class Action and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act matters for Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP.]

A Florida jury won’t resolve the issue of how to provide health care to severely injured undocumented aliens, but it may signal to hospitals that engage in “medical repatriation” whether there are any legal risks attendant to the practice.  The case, Montejo v. Martin Memorial Medical Center, involves a claim of false imprisonment brought by the legal guardian of a patient transported by private plane in 2003 to Guatemala for rehabilitative care following severe brain injuries sustained in a car accident involving a drunken driver and two deaths.

Mr. Jimenez remained a patient in Martin Memorial Hospital for almost three years following the accident, incurring $1.5 million in medical bills, of which only $80,000 was reimbursed by Medicaid. As reported by local newspapers (here and here) the hospital CEO testified last week that the transfer to Guatemala was motivated by the fact that Mr. Jimenez missed his family and country — the medical staff came up with the idea to return the patient to “his own culture” where he would “be around his language . . . and [] be in a situation that was more relaxed than an acute care hospital.”  According to the hospital executive, the transport to Guatemala had nothing to do with the financial burden to the hospital of Mr. Jimenez’s care.  While the Guatemalan health ministry agreed to assume Mr. Jimenez’s care, a Guatemalan physician who testified for the plaintiff claimed that Guatemala does not have the kind of rehabilitation facility required by Mr. Jimenez’s condition.  In addition, the jury was presented with a 2003 affidavit from the vice consul for the Consulate General of Guatemala, in Miami stating that she had no authority to place Jimenez in a facility, no doctor to care for him and no way to pay for medical care he needed.  Mr. Jimenez, 37, currently lives in a remote village where he is largely cared for by his elderly mother.

The guardianship plan prepared for Jimenez, filed short of two years after his accident, recommended twenty-four hour skilled care.  The hospital intervened in the guardianship proceeding claiming that it was not the appropriate facility for the long-term rehabilitative care required.  Responding to the guardian’s objection to the hospital’s planned repatriation, a trial court directed the guardian to stop frustrating the hospital’s plan for relocation, and directed the hospital to provide a suitable escort and medical support.  On the day that the hospital was due to respond to a motion to stay, Jimenez was transported to Guatemala via private plane.  An appellate court later reversed the trial court order, citing the insufficient evidence that the patient would receive adequate care in Guatemala, a requirement of federal law directing hospitals to prepare appropriate discharge plans for patients.  42 C.F.R. § 482.43.

The guardian’s false imprisonment suit against the hospital was initially dismissed after the hospital argued that Montejo could not demonstrate that the detention was unreasonable and unwarranted — a necessary element of a false imprisonment claim.  The hospital contended that its actions were executed pursuant to a then-valid court order, and were therefore entitled to qualified or quasi-immunity. The appellate court disagreed on the grounds that the actions were not taken during the course of a judicial proceeding nor in an effort to prosecute or defend a lawsuit, but were carried out in the vindication or enforcement of a purely private right.  The court concluded that affording absolute immunity from tort liability would be an unwarranted and improper extension of the litigation privilege.  Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the false imprisonment claim, and remanded to the lower court for a determination of whether the hospital’s actions were unwarranted and unreasonable under the circumstances.

The guardian is seeking the cost of Mr. Jimenez’s care and punitive damages from the hospital.

Price-Gouging by Doctors and Hospitals

Mark A. Hall, Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University

Carl E. Schneider, Professor of Law and Internal Medicine, University of Michigan

[Ed. note: As noted above, we are very pleased to welcome Professors Mark Hall and Carl Schneider to the blog today.]

We cannot reform health care intelligently unless we understand the medical marketplace well. Debates about reform have scrutinized the health-insurance market, but they have neglected a crucially defective feature of the medical marketplace — the way doctors and hospitals charge patients when prices are not set by regulation or by negotiation with insurers.

The Problem

When patients are not protected by large private or public insurers, doctors and hospitals charge them astonishingly more than patients with Medicare or managed-care insurance.  Some price difference would make sense, because insurers offer providers large volume and economies of scale.  But we are not talking about discounts of 10, or 20, or even 30 percent.  Providers routinely double, triple, or even quadruple prices for unprotected patients.  Such huge mark-ups can only be regarded as price-gouging — exploiting market power to charge prices virtually unrelated to actual cost or market value.

A comprehensive analysis of data hospitals report to Medicare shows that, on average, hospitals charge uninsured patients two-and-a-half times more than they charge insured patients and three times more than their actual costs.  In some states mark-ups average four-fold.

Data for physicians’ prices are less comprehensive, but information from office management systems is disturbing.  Across a range of diagnostic and invasive specialty services (echocardiography, coronary catheterization, liver biopsy, upper GI endoscopy, circumcision, flexible sigmoidoscopies, hysterectomy, appendectomy, gall bladder removal, and arthroscopic knee surgery), many physicians in 2003 charged uninsured patients roughly two to two-and-a-half times what insurers paid.  Only primary care physicians appear to be staying within plausible bounds.  They typically charge uninsured patients only one-third to one-half more for basic office or hospital visits than they received from insurers.

Some Excuses

Providers defend themselves in several ways.  First, they call these price differences steep discounts rather than huge mark-ups.  This is almost laughable.  Most providers charge “list prices” to only a small minority of patients (10-20%), so these are hardly a genuine baseline.  Second, providers argue that because they often cannot collect list prices, they are on balance receiving little more than they would receive from insurers.  However, when patients cannot pay inflated bills, doctors and hospitals regularly send them to collection agencies, ruining patients’ credit and bankrupting millions of them.

Third, providers blame the government by claiming that program and accounting rules require them to bill this way.  But governmental agencies have declared that this is not true, and while some rules may still be irksome, rules about billing certainly do not require providers to set their prices as high as they do.  Many tax-exempt (non-profit) hospitals recently wilted under scrutiny and adopted sliding-scale policies for low-income uninsured patients, but these policies do little to help insured patients who are receiving care out-of-network or uninsured patients from the broad middle class.

The Solution

Insurers’ attempts to stop price gouging have failed.  Some large insurers have refused to reimburse out-of-network providers for the full amounts they charge on the grounds that those amounts are not “usual, customary, and reasonable.”  But New York’s Attorney General called this “consumer fraud” because patients were left owing the full bill.  Courts have been little help.  Consumer class-action lawsuits have attacked price gouging by non-profit hospitals, but courts have dismissed most of these cases on various technical grounds.

Government regulation has inhibited price gouging, but only for people covered by government programs.  Medicare, for instance, prohibits doctors from charging Medicare patients more than about 10% over Medicare-approved rates.  But inflated pricing still afflicts the uninsured and privately insured people buying care out of network.  Some reformers simply advocate greater price transparency so that patients know better what to expect when seeking care without the protection of insurers.  But transparency will not fix the structural dynamics of market power that allow providers to charge almost whatever they want.

To help medical markets work better, the government should cap what doctors, hospitals, and other providers may charge patients who are not protected by regulated or negotiated discounts.  The details can be debated and refined, but one approach is to cap charges at, say, 150% of a normal reference rate.  The reference rate could be what Medicare pays, or a weighted average of what larger private insurers normally pay across a region.  Doctors with boutique practices could still charge what they wished for extra concierge services, or perhaps doctors who don’t accept any insurance should be exempted.  Design features are important and tricky, but they should not keep us from setting reasonable bounds within which markets can function.

The Unconventional Economics of Health Care

In a response to one of my posts on the public plan, Tyler Cowen noted that it was “hard to translate” my points into “econspeak.” I agree, and I think that’s one reason why we need to pay attention to “alternative economics of health care,” to use the title of Geoffrey M. Hodgson’s excellent article. In a series of posts over the next few days, I will focus on the many ways in which classical economic reasoning fails in the health care context, and what that means for law.

For an accessible opening example, consider Charles Morris’s description of the “bargaining” between doctors and insurers in his book “The Surgeons.” From a chapter entitled Money, here is a fascinating and counterintuitive insight on the interplay between incentives and medical care:

There is a strongly held opinion, particularly among conservative think tanks, that with multiple competitive private payers, the normal interactions between vendors and payers will gradually create a more efficient health care system. I saw no evidence to support that belief.

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Kaiser Health News, New Jersey Gets a New Hospital?, & Kicking Medicaid Grandma to the Curb

In the wake of declining newspaper presence, the Kaiser Family Foundation, a nonprofit private operating foundation known for its health care concerns, has started Kaiser Health News. In the present issue, there are two articles of special note for New Jerseyans. The one regards the plans of Hackensack University Medical Center, a 775-bed teaching and research hospital that is one of New Jersey’s most prestigious, [which] requested state permission to open a new hospital in Pascack Valley’s empty [hospital] buildings. Although Hackensack is a nonprofit, it announced that Westwood would be getting a for-profit facility financed by a private equity firm from Texas.

Not everyone approves.

The other regards measures that New Jersey legislators are considering in response to a recent investigation of assisted living facilities. KFN reports

Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer reports that “lawmakers this week will consider measures to enhance protections for assisted living residents in New Jersey to ensure they aren’t discharged simply because they pay with Medicaid.” The legislation comes in response to an investigation that found a Wisconsin-based assisted living firm called Assisted Living Concepts, which has eight facilities in New Jersey and more than 200 nationwide, “wrongly showed New Jersey residents the door once they exhausted their savings and were about to go on Medicaid, despite promises to allow them to stay.”

Both stories are worth reading.

Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemptions Worth $638 Million, Exceed “Community Benefit” by $373 Million for 10 Nonprofit Hospitals in Massachusetts

In recent posts we’ve pointed out some of the questionable characterizations of “community benefit” by nonprofit hospitals under 501(c)(3), a portion of the Internal Revenue Code which garners tax exemptions for those entities, such as nonprofit hospitals, which it harbors. In particular, we’ve focused on how matters such as “bad debt,” Medicare “shortfalls,” and even Private Insurer “shortfalls” have often been construed by nonprofit hospitals to constitute the conveyance of a community benefit. A “shortfall” may be deemed to have occurred when although the hospital receives the amount it had agreed to with a Private Insurer, or which was designated by the government through Medicare, that amount is less than the hospital’s “list price” for such a services.

Despite this rather lax standard, Kaiser.org reports that an in-depth review by the Boston Globe determined that “the value of abundant tax exemptions extended to Massachusetts General Hospital, and other private non-profit hospitals, ‘far exceeds the amount the state’s leading hospitals spend on free care for the poor and other community benefits.’”

Kaiser reports that in Massachusetts

The ten biggest hospitals in the state benefited from $638 million in tax breaks in 2007, but reported only $265 million in “community benefits” provided that year, the Globe found.

Even if one accepts the questionable characterizations of community benefits, that still leaves an excess of $373 million in tax exemptions–for merely 10 hospitals–in only one state.

Grassley and Baucus Seek to Further Define the Difference Between Charity Care and Bad Debt for Nonprofit Hospitals. As a Matter of Collections Timing?

According to Inside ARM, an accounts receivable management online magazine, the Senate Finance Committee is presently contemplating imposing strictures upon nonprofit hospitals regarding when those hospitals may outsource the collection of unpaid bills and, presumably, the definition of “bad debt” as it relates to “community benefit.” Inside ARM states that “The proposal is meant to provide more free care and make not-for-profit hospitals more accountable for their tax-exempt status.”

Details of the initiative are said to be scant at this point, but according to Inside ARM, “Committee Chairman Max Baucus of Montana and Chuck Grassley of Iowa, the committee’s top ranking Republican, propose requiring not-for-profit hospitals to follow certain procedures before initiating collection actions against patients.” Sen. Grassley has sought to require nonprofit hospitals to justify their tax exemptions since 2005, the year in which he sent what pretty much amounts to interrogatories to the nation’s leading nonprofit hospitals regarding billing practices and questionable characterizations of “community benefit.”

Although without detail, the new timing distinction for collections seems to be based upon the amount owed being designated as “bad debt,” or that which is essentially deemed “uncollectable.” The prospective prohibition would seem to  require the amount owed to be deemed “uncollectable” or “bad debt” before it can be placed with a collection agency. A prospect the nation’s collectors, who generally work on commission, do not relish. But one hopes this provision is but one small piece of further defining “community benefit” in terms of actual charitable care.

Many nonprofit hospitals have characterized their uncollected receivables as a fulfillment of the ill-defined requirement that they offer a “community benefit” in exchange for the tax exemption they receive under 501(c)(3). Senator Grassley has said that “Neither the IRS nor Congress has done a very good job when it comes to establishing the criteria for enjoying this tax status since the IRS scrapped charity care for its community benefit standard in 1969″ (New York Times, 2/13/09).”

He has a point. But unless the prospective timing provision for outsourcing only “bad debt” is coupled with a prohibition upon characterizing mere “uncollected receivables” and  payor “shortfalls” as “community benefit,” it is hard to see what effect this bad debt collections distinction will have–besides the expansion of in house hospital collection  departments. One hopes that the pointed questions Senator Grassley asked of the nation’s leading nonprofit hospitals in ‘05 will play a substantial role in the Senate effort to reform and redefine the obligations of tax exempt nonprofit hospitals now. I believe Mr. Grassley would well agree that a mere shift in the locus of collection activities will not constitute reform worth the name.

Perhaps some background is in order. As we posted here a little while back in “The IRS, Nonprofit Hospitals, and the Meaning of “Community Benefit,” the IRS recently published the results of a two year study of nonprofit hospitals functioning under 501(c)(3), a portion of the Internal Revenue Code which garners tax exemptions for those entities it harbors. For those of you who have not yet read our post on the topic, I’ve excerpted it here below (if you have already read the piece, you can scroll down to the paragraph before Grassley’s numbered questions for the concusion to this post). The excerpted post describes how uncompensated care, bad debt and “shortfalls” in payments from Medicare and even Private Insurers can, and often are, characterized as somehow providing a “community benefit” which justifies a tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals:

Under the strictures of 501(c)(3) nonprofits are confined to paying executives “reasonable compensation” and supplying “community benefit.” Unfortunately, neither of these terms are particularly well defined. In the study’s executive summary, the IRS puts it so:

“The community benefit standard is the legal standard for determining whether a nonprofit hospital is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.”

“Observations. Both the community benefit and reasonable compensation standards have proved difficult for the IRS to administer. Both involve application of imprecise legal standards to complex, varied and evolving fact patterns.”

These limitations may be seen in the characterizations of “community benefit” available to the hospitals in the study. Bad debt and Medicare payment shortfalls may be construed as  “community benefit.” As the debt, the credit injury, and the collection calls all inure to the community member who received treatment but could not pay, one might question if the “community benefit” involved in a failure of collection practices might be distinguishable from the “community benefit” involved in intentional charitable care. In addition, there simply is no set criteria to determine the appropriate amounts to be charged as “community benefit.” The IRS study poses the following under the heading of

“Limitations: …although the IRS designated the general categories of activities that could be reported as community benefit for purposes of the study, determining what was treated as community benefit (for example, bad debt or Medicare shortfalls) and how to measure it (cost versus charges) was largely within the respondents’ discretion.

Which is to say that those being monitored (nonprofit hospitals) to gauge the amount of money spent– to justify their tax exempt  status– were free to characterize their contributions in the manner they thought best.

Medicare shortfalls: So… if a non-profit hospital has a fee schedule rate of $100 for a procedure, and Medicare has a reimburse rate of $80 for that procedure, if a “charge” rate of measurement is used then there has been a $20 “community benefit” if the federally designated tax exempt nonprofit hospital accepts as payment the federally designated and predetermined Medicare reimbursement amount. Significantly, 19% of the hospitals also claimed “shortfalls” in payment from private insurers as uncompensated care/community benefit (See Chart: “Figure 82,” p. 105, full report).

Cost vs. Charge: So… if a procedure has a cost to the hospital of $80 and a fee schedule [or "chargemaster"] rate of $100, and the recipient of the procedure does not pay and the hospital categorizes the non-payment as “bad debt,” it has the ability to count as “community benefit” not only the cost of its unintended largesse, but also the amount it had expected as profit.

Perhaps even more telling than this latitude in characterization are the amounts actually submitted to the IRS as community benefit. Here are a few of the findings:

• The average and median percentages of total revenues reported as spent on community benefit expenditures were 9% and 6%, respectively.
• Uncompensated care accounted for 56% of aggregate community benefit expenditures reported by the hospitals in the study.

Read more

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