Averting Mental Health and Fiscal Crises: Crisis Intervention Teams and Access to Meaningful Treatment for Mental Illness
Cross-Posted at Bill of Health
Social media recently focused my attention on two very different law enforcement interactions with people with mental illness that reinforce the need for increased training of law enforcement in crisis intervention as well as the need for improved access to treatment for people with mental illness.
The first is a video of the fatal police shooting of Kajieme Powell in St. Louis, Missouri earlier this month. Mr. Powell was twenty-five years old and suspected of shoplifting junk food from a convenience store. The first eighty seconds of the video show Mr. Powell pacing and muttering on the sidewalk — with four pedestrians passing by without incident — before the police arrive. The police then exited their vehicles with their guns drawn, shouted at Mr. Powell to drop his weapon, and fired about twelve shots fewer than twenty seconds after they arrived on the scene.
The second is an NPR story that included an audio recording of law enforcement officials in San Antonio, Texas responding to a 911 call about a twenty-four year old group home resident named Mason, who was off of his medications, had set his blanket on fire, and was a danger to himself and others. When they arrived at the scene, the officers acknowledged that they did not use the “tough guy command voice” that they typically would in responding to a 911 call reporting suspected criminal activity. Instead, in plain clothes and without their weapons drawn, they spoke calmly with Mason, reassuring him that they wanted to get him help. They astutely noticed signs suggesting that Mason was experiencing tactile, auditory, and visual hallucinations, and with patience and skilled questioning, got him to acknowledge the hallucinations and seek psychiatric treatment.
The San Antonio officers were members of a six-person mental health squad that the city created to confront severe prison overcrowding. As NPR correspondent Jenny Gold reported, the city and county have saved $5 million and eliminated prison overcrowding over the past five years by diverting people with mental illness out of prisons and overcrowded emergency rooms and into appropriate mental health treatment. Officers must take forty hours of crisis intervention team (“CIT”) training to help them learn how to handle mental health crises.
By juxtaposing the St. Louis and San Antonio incidents, I am not suggesting that they necessarily can be fairly compared. The facts that were available to the officers in each situation may have justified different law enforcement responses. The San Antonio officers were warned in advance that Mason may have been experiencing increased symptoms of mental illness and, when they arrived, Mason was sitting by himself without any suspected weapon. In contrast, the St. Louis 911 call reportedly did not raise any concerns that Mr. Powell was suffering from a mental illness. In addition, the police claim that Mr. Powell was brandishing a knife as he approached the officers, and a knife reportedly was recovered at the scene. Michael Woody, a CIT expert and former police trainer in Akron, Ohio, has opined that the St. Louis scene was not stable enough for the CIT protocol to be appropriate. (But query whether other tactics short of lethal force could have controlled the situation and spared Mr. Powell’s life.)
The starkly different outcomes in these cases shine a spotlight on the potential for CIT training to arm officers with effective tools to help de-escalate mental health crises in appropriate cases. In a December 2012 article in the Community Mental Health Journal, Kelli E. Canada, Beth Angell, and Amy C. Watson summarized some of the preliminary findings of CIT effectiveness, including:
- “improved officer preparedness and improved disposition of mental health calls”
- “improved attitudes, increased knowledge and patience, and an increase in support of local treatment programs”
- “the potential to reduce stigma and alter beliefs about mental illness”
- “increases in the number of identified mental health calls[,] . . . transports to treatment by CIT officers[,] . . ., and voluntary transports”
- “increasing access to mental health services through linking individuals with community providers”
An analysis of interviews these researchers conducted of CIT and non-CIT trained officers in Chicago “uncovered three specific areas that CIT trained officers demonstrated specialized procedures in comparison to non-CIT trained officers: assessment, response tactics, and disposition.”
Here in New Jersey, Camden was the first city to use CIT training back in 2008, and eleven New Jersey counties currently have CIT programs. A Union County officer reported that the training caused him to think twice before curtly shuffling a homeless man along. Instead by talking with the man, the officer learned that he was suicidal and convinced him to seek treatment for his previously undiagnosed schizophrenia. New Jersey should continue to expand CIT programs in law enforcement agencies throughout the state.
But, as the St. Louis incident reminds us, CIT training alone is not enough. (Indeed, reportedly one of the officers involved in the shooting of Mr. Powell was CIT-trained.) New Jersey also needs to invest in treatment services for patients with mental illness, both to help them avoid a crisis and to have appropriate and available treatment options when they reach a crisis. Officers need places to bring or refer individuals in need of mental health treatment. Yet patients often report difficulty trying to access appropriate mental health services in New Jersey as in other states. We need to be sure there are adequate networks of providers to meet the needs of people with mental illness.
Given current fiscal realities, it is unclear how New Jersey will fund efforts to improve mental health access. Gold reports that jails, hospitals, courts, police, and the mental health department in San Antonio banded together to build the Restoration Center, which offers an array of mental and physical health services, including “a 48-hour inpatient psychiatric unit; outpatient services for psychiatric and primary care; centers for drug or alcohol detox; a 90-day recovery program for substance abuse; plus housing for people with mental illnesses, and even job training.”
New Jersey agencies similarly should explore ways to coordinate. Given the cost savings San Antonio has realized, perhaps New Jersey should revisit the role for social impact financing to improve mental health network adequacy.
Filed under: Drugs & Devices, Health Insurance, Health Law, Health Reform, Litigation and Liability, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Health, Seton Hall Law, Women's Health Issues
We are very pleased to welcome Angela Carmella, a Professor here at Seton Hall Law, to the blog today. Professor Carmella’s intellectual focus is the intersection of law and religion, specifically the First Amendment’s religion clauses, religious land use, and Catholic social thought.
By Angela Carmella
On Monday, June 30, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its path-breaking decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that HHS’s contraception mandate violates the rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of closely-held, for-profit corporations that object to providing this coverage. The mandate requires employers to provide their female employees with insurance coverage for all twenty FDA-approved contraceptives without cost-sharing. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, repeatedly notes the decision’s narrow applicability to the mandate alone; Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, criticizes the decision for its “startling breadth,” fearing that for-profits will now seek exemptions from other requirements of the Affordable Care Act and from other federal laws, to the detriment of employees and customers.
Critical to the Court’s decision is the “accommodation” currently available to religious nonprofits—charities, colleges, hospitals and the like—that object to providing contraceptive coverage to their female employees (and students). In contrast to the targeted exemption given specifically to churches and their close affiliates, which leaves employees without this coverage, the accommodation requires the nonprofit’s insurer (or third party administrator for self-insured plans) to provide coverage directly and separately to employees. Thus, the accommodation attempts to respect the twin goals of religious liberty and women’s health.
Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy (who joined the majority opinion but also wrote a separate concurrence) regarded the accommodation as evidence that the government had already devised a mechanism to address the religious objections of employers while advancing its public health goals. For the Court, extending this accommodation to for-profits was an obvious and straightforward way for the government to satisfy RFRA’s requirement that it use the least restrictive means to advance its objectives.
Hobby Lobby consolidated two challenges to the mandate, one brought by the Green family, evangelical Christian owners of the Hobby Lobby arts and crafts stores and Mardel religious book stores, and the other brought by the Hahn family, Mennonite owners of cabinet manufacturer Conestoga Wood Specialties. They refuse to provide their employees with coverage for four (out of twenty) contraceptives that might interfere with implantation of a fertilized ovum, because to do so would involve them in facilitating abortions. (Some of the other businesses that have brought similar challenges oppose providing coverage for all contraceptives.)
RFRA prohibits government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless it “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. Secs.2000bb-1(a), (b). RFRA applies to “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Sec.2000cc-5(7)(A).
The opinion takes a pragmatic approach, but its driving vision is RFRA’s overarching purpose in this context: to prevent government from excluding religious people “from full participation in the economic life of the Nation” (Alito 46) and to protect the right “to establish one’s religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.” (Kennedy 2). The Court first determines that for-profit corporations are “persons” capable of “exercising religion” under RFRA. “[A]llowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the Hahns,” (Alito 21). Their religious liberty here consists in being able to “run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their religious beliefs” (Alito 2, emphasis supplied).
Next, rejecting HHS’s argument that the connection between the mandate and any immoral act is too “attenuated,” the Court finds that the “mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs.” (Alito 36, emphasis in original) Given the prospect of fines against Hobby Lobby of up to $475 million per year, the answer for the majority is clear. The Court refused to scrutinize the claimants’ arguments regarding complicity in immoral conduct, noting that “it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.” (Alito 37)
The majority opinion assumes that the mandate fulfills a compelling governmental interest, while Justice Kennedy’s concurrence makes clear that the government has demonstrated it. But both opinions focus on the accommodation as the least restrictive alternative to further the government’s compelling interest. Although government provision of contraceptives might be an alternative, the Court concludes that “we need not rely on the option of a new, government-funded program in order to conclude that the HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive means test. HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs.” (Alito 43) The Court notes that under such an accommodation, female employees of Hobby Lobby, Mardel and Conestoga would receive the contraceptive coverage to which they are entitled under the regulations.
Because the Court does not decide whether the accommodation “complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims,” (Alito 44) Justice Ginsburg’s dissent largely ignores the majority’s solution and focuses instead on what she views as a radical interpretation of RFRA that allows businesses to “opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible” with their beliefs (Ginsburg 1) without regard to the impacts on third parties (like the female employees of objecting businesses). Her dissent emphasizes the significance of contraception to women’s health, the expenses associated with contraception, and the compelling nature of the government’s interest in an employer-based insurance system that provides it. She draws a sharp distinction between religious nonprofits, which are accommodated because they “exist to serve a community of believers,” (Ginsburg 29) and commercial entities with diverse workforces. Justice Ginsburg concludes that not only is the claim of burden on religious exercise too attenuated, but “[i]n view of what Congress sought to accomplish, i.e., comprehensive preventive care for women furnished through employer-based health plans, none of the proffered alternatives would satisfactorily serve the compelling interests to which Congress responded.” (Ginsburg 30-31)
In other pending cases many religious nonprofits are challenging the accommodation itself as insufficiently protective of their religious liberty. The Court’s praise for this mechanism as meeting the twin goals of religious liberty and women’s health in the for-profit context might be read as a sign that the nonprofits currently in litigation may be sorely disappointed. But predicting the impact of Hobby Lobby in the nonprofit context became more complicated on July 3, just four days after Hobby Lobby came down, when the Court issued an interim order in Wheaton College v. Burwell.
Wheaton College is a religious nonprofit that is unquestionably eligible for HHS’s accommodation for religiously affiliated institutions. It has challenged the accommodation itself as a violation of RFRA on the grounds that the school will be morally complicit in providing abortifacient coverage when it files the required “self-certification” form; this form, it argues, triggers the third party administrator’s obligations to provide the objectionable coverage. Without deciding the merits, the Court decided 6-3 that the college need not use the government’s form; since the government is already on notice of its objection, HHS (and its third party administrator) can proceed as though the form had been filed.
One can view this as consistent with Hobby Lobby: as in that case, the Wheaton Court finds a solution that both respects the college’s religious exercise (it does not have to sign) and meets the government’s interest (the third party provides the contraceptive coverage). But in her dissent to Wheaton, Justice Sotomayor voiced her frustration: since the Court already found that the accommodation was the least restrictive means of furthering the mandate’s goals—indeed, it “served as the premise” for the decision—the “grant of injunctive relief [in Wheaton] simply does not square with the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby.” (Sotomayor 16, 13)
Although it may be impossible to predict Hobby Lobby’s specific impacts in both commercial and nonprofit contexts, two thing are certain: first, the notion that religious liberty and government interests can be reconciled to avoid harms to third parties is now on the table for further consideration; and second, the Court’s broad reading of RFRA marks a new chapter in free exercise jurisprudence.
Filed under: Drugs & Devices, Health Law, Health Reform, Litigation and Liability
Proponents of tort reform in the United States often express particular ire at class action lawsuits, which they characterize as bonanzas for lawyers that unjustly penalize businesses while providing few benefits for consumers. The enactment of legislation limiting class action lawsuits remains the tort reform movement’s primary achievement at the federal level, having succeeded while efforts to enact federal malpractice reform have consistently failed.
In France, by contrast, a key feature of the government’s recent health reform proposal is to expand the role of class actions by making them available to groups of patients harmed by medical interventions. As explained by Health Minister Marisol Touraine, who announced a package of health law reforms in a press conference in late June,
to reach maturity in the field of health democracy, it is … necessary to strengthen the power given to patients when they are victims of damages. In light of the serial damages in the health sector, a law right could be contemplated: the introduction of class actions. This would represent major progress. Compensations would certainly be determined on a case-by-case basis but our fellow citizens would no longer be alone against the power of some industries.
At first glance, the proposal to introduce health-related class actions seems difficult to reconcile with France’s historic distaste for American-style litigation. Indeed, American-style class actions were not available in any context in France until just a few months ago, when the Constitutional Court approved a new class action mechanism for financial injuries stemming from consumer and competition law violations. The proposal to extend this new law to health-related claims by allowing recovery for bodily injuries and other non-pecuniary damages may strike some observers as a departure from other recent French malpractice reform efforts, which have sought to increase the role of no-fault compensation and to promote non-adversarial mechanisms for resolving disputes.
Yet, class actions à la française are not expected to look anything like their American counterparts. For one thing, the new class action law allows only accredited consumer associations to represent plaintiffs in class action litigation, thereby precluding lawsuits brought by fee-seeking private attorneys. Moreover, because French law does not allow no-fee contingency arrangements, the associations will be required to advance the costs of the litigation. In addition, under the new class action law, plaintiffs must explicitly opt in to class action lawsuits, which may make it difficult to assemble classes of any substantial size. If the class action law is extended to health-related lawsuits, similar limitations would undoubtedly be imposed.
Even with these limitations, the introduction of health-related class actions is likely to significantly shift the power dynamic between plaintiffs and defendants. The impact would be the greatest in cases against pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, as product-related injuries are inherently more amenable to group litigation than claims of professional negligence. As the proposal moves through the legislative process, it will be interesting to see how industry and other stakeholders respond.
Filed under: Children's Issues, Health Insurance, Health Reform, Mental Health, New Jersey, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Cross-Posted at Bill of Health
In a recent, very moving, post about her son’s diagnosis with autism at age eight, blogger Amy Storch writes: “I guess I should mention the obvious — district services for Autism are much more comprehensive than ADHD.” An autism diagnosis should not, as a matter of law, be the key that unlocks needed special education services. Both autism and ADHD “count” as disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the relevant regulation is here), and the Act provides that a child with either diagnosis who needs special education services is entitled to an educational program “designed to meet their unique needs.” As a matter of fact, though, an autism diagnosis may mean—as it apparently does in Storch’s school district—a more comprehensive program. An autism diagnosis can also be the key to getting necessary services outside of the school setting, through private health insurance.
According to the advocacy group Autism Speaks, 37 states plus the District of Columbia and the United States Virgin Islands have enacted laws requiring state-regulated private health insurance plans to pay for applied behavior analysis and other therapies children with autism often need. As I blogged about previously here, some of these state insurance mandates are relatively broad—New Jersey’s law requires private insurers to cover applied behavior analysis for children with autism, but also to cover occupational, physical, and speech therapy for individuals with “autism or another developmental disability.” Other states’ mandates, however, are strictly limited to children on the autism spectrum. Daniela Caruso of Boston University School of Law writes about Florida’s decision to limit its insurance mandate to children with autism here, attributing it at least in part to advocates’ success persuading legislators to view autism through a “dual frame of beauty and invasion.”
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s requirement that individual and small group health insurance plans cover ten essential health benefits, and in particular its requirement that plans cover “rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices,” promised to ease access to applied behavior analysis and other therapies often needed by children by autism. Habilitative care is left undefined in the statute, but it is defined at HealthCare.gov as “[h]ealth care services that help you keep, learn, or improve skills and functioning for daily living,” for example “therapy for a child who isn’t walking or talking at the expected age.”
There is a wrinkle, however. As Michelle Andrews discusses in this article at Kaiser Health News, applied behavior analysis and other therapies might fall into the category “rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices,” but a case can be made that they also fall into another covered category, “mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.” This is of significance because if autism therapies are habilitative services, they can be subject to non-dollar limits, for example limits on the number of hours or units of service that an insurance company will cover. If they are mental health services, then the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 would apply and such limits might not be permissible.
In her article, Michelle Andrews highlights a bulletin issued by the Connecticut’s Insurance Department in April of this year in which it determined that health insurance plans could convert the dollar limit on “behavioral therapy” set forth in the state’s autism insurance mandate into non-dollar limits. The Insurance Department wrote that “[b]ecause the behavioral therapy benefits are classified as habilitative benefits, they are not considered subject to mental health parity. This is consistent with HHS guidance and with the approach taken by other states.”
Connecticut’s autism insurance mandate defines “behavioral therapy” as “any interactive behavioral therapies derived from evidence-based research, including, but not limited to, applied behavior analysis, cognitive behavioral therapy, or other therapies supported by empirical evidence of the effective treatment of individuals diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder, that are: (A) Provided to children less than fifteen years of age, and (B) provided or supervised by (i) a behavior analyst who is certified by the Behavior Analyst Certification Board, (ii) a licensed physician, or (iii) a licensed psychologist.” There may be a meaningful difference between “behavioral therapy” and mental health services, but it is not obvious to me from the statutory definition.
Could this be a case where the autism diagnosis functions to limit access to services, however categorized or defined? Michelle Andrews quotes Sara Rosenbaum of George Washington University’s School of Public Health and Health Services as follows: “The parity rule seems to say you can’t play games like this.”
Filed under: Bioethics, Chronic Health Conditions, Elder Issues, Health Reform, Hospitals, Physicians
There’s a fair chance the New Jersey Assembly will take up the Death with Dignity Act before the legislators head off to the Jersey Shore for the summer. The topic is appropriate for this blog, entitled Health Reform Watch, because physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is a kind of desperate attempt at reforming end-of-life care. The frustration with the limited extent to which we’ve been able to improve end-of-life care over the last three decades is understandable. I suggest, however, that even with the enactment of practitioner orders for life sustaining treatment (POLST) legislation, New Jersey has not been sufficiently creative or aggressive in attempting to change end-of-life care practices in the state, and the legislature should be focused on other initiatives to achieve that end. Based on the experiences of Oregon, Washington, and Vermont, there is no reason to expect that a Death with Dignity law would contribute meaningfully to an improvement in end-of-life care for New Jerseyans.
First, let’s get one matter out of the way: I do not believe that the proponents of Death with Dignity legislation are motivated by a desire to reduce the cost of end-of-life care. The patient suicide movement has been around for a very long time, and has always, in my view, been grounded in the philosophical belief in patient autonomy and an expansive view of a right to control the means and timing of one’s death. Experience in those states where PAS is legal is that too few people take advantage of physician-assisted suicide for its availability to make a dent in health care costs. If anything, reducing healthcare costs is more likely to be a reason supporting improvements to end-of-life care, although nationally, it’s not clear one way or the other whether reforming end-of-life care will actually reduce Medicare costs – the labor-intensive care required for several months of hospice is expensive. New Jersey could be different. Certain indicators suggest that patients dying in New Jersey receive more aggressive treatment than almost any other state in the country. Because that’s not how the majority of people want to die, it could be that in New Jersey, improving care of the terminally ill would save Medicare dollars. If that’s a side benefit, all the better. My primary point in this regard is that I don’t think it’s fair to accuse proponents of PAS of being motivated by potential cost savings; proponents of reforming the care of the chronically and terminally ill are more likely to cite costs as a factor in their search for reform. Ultimately, I believe that both sides are motivated primarily by the desire to provide patients and their families with compassionate, holistic, and high-quality care in the last years and months of life. That will not be accomplished by physician-assisted suicide. Read more