Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the Global Health Initiative

This C-SPAN report is worth considering: “Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies on the Obama Administration’s Global Health Initiative. She discussed the six-year, $63 billion investment that focuses on improving the health of women, children and newborns throughout the world.”

You can see the video (or the transcript) by clicking on the picture.

Global Inequality & Access to Health Care

According to a recent study in The Lancet, “The world’s wealthiest two billion people get 75 percent of all the surgery done each year, while the poorest two billion get only 4 percent and often die or live in misery as a result.” It’s a striking fact; how are we to interpret it?

There are two metanarrative accounts of the relationship between inequality and health care. On a Whiggish, optimistic view, vast inequality can generate the capital necessary to fund investment in innovative health care technologies. Scholars like Richard Epstein have celebrated both general economic inequality and unequal access to health care particularly because, they claim, buying power at the top promotes investment in medical advances. On this view, innovations in the wealthy world can diffuse throughout lesser developed regions. Moreover, the rich can also subsidize the poor locally, paying for infrastructure that serves a broader community.

Interpreted less charitably, inequality enables the well-off to bid away resources and opportunities from the poor. Richer nations and persons may snap up limited resources; for instance, in 2009, Jeanne Whalen at the Wall Street Journal wrote an article entitled “Rich Nations Lock In Flu Vaccine as Poor Ones Fret:”

A scramble among wealthy nations to guard against a swine-flu pandemic is raising concerns that billions of people in poorer countries could be left without adequate supplies of vaccine. . . . The emerging battle between the haves and have-nots underscores a major weakness in the global health system: Pharmaceutical companies have severely limited capacity to produce flu vaccines in emergencies.

Inequalities can be even more stark at the R&D phase. If an anti-baldness cure can generate billions of dollars in revenue while a new therapy for tuberculosis only generates hundreds of millions, for-profit pharmaceutical companies may well have a fiduciary duty to invest scarce research dollars in the unhirsute rather than the truly unhealthy.

Lawrence Gostin’s recent article “Redressing the Unconscionable Global Health Gap” offers some practical ways of addressing these disparities:

The international community is deeply resistant to taking bold remedial action — more concerned with their geostrategic interests than the health of the poor. The scale of foreign aid is both insufficient and unsustainable and fails to address the key determinants of health. As a result, the world’s distribution of the “good” of human health remains fundamentally unfair, causing enormous physical and mental suffering by those who experience the compounding disadvantages of poverty and ill health.

Lest we dismiss such inequalities as “not our problem,” Thomas Pogge’s sobering new book elaborates on his earlier argument that wealthier nations are responsible for the plight of the poorest:

[P]olitical and economic inequalities are rising dramatically both intra-nationally and globally. The affluent states and the international organizations they control knowingly contribute greatly to these evils — selfishly promoting rules and policies harmful to the poor while hypocritically pretending to set and promote ambitious development goals.

Both Pogge and Gostin’s work should guide policy responses to the extraordinary disparities exemplified in the Lancet story. As I continue to study fractal inequality in access to medicine, I will be sure to consult their proposals for a more just world. I also hope to see proposals for taxation of “medical tourism” that would redirect at least some of the funds from overseas patients to infrastructure that would support underserved patients in the regions they visit.

Sunlight is a Weak Disinfectant

One of the most robust “memes” in contemporary law is the power of disclosure. In health law, disclosure comes up again and again: patients need to give “informed” consent, insurers are supposed to explain their policies clearly, and conflicts of interest, when not proscribed, should at the very least be exposed. But there are growing challenges to the disclosure meme, both within health law and without.

George Lowenstein and Peter Ubel note some problems with disclosure approaches in this article on the weaknesses of behavioral economics generally:

It seems that every week a new book or major newspaper article appears showing that irrational decision-making helped cause the housing bubble or the rise in health care costs. Such insights draw on behavioral economics, an increasingly popular field that incorporates elements from psychology to explain why people make seemingly irrational decisions, at least according to traditional economic theory and its emphasis on rational choice. . . . But the field has its limits. As policymakers use it to devise programs, it’s becoming clear that behavioral economics is being asked to solve problems it wasn’t meant to address.

[T]ake conflicts of interest in medicine. Despite volumes of research showing that pharmaceutical industry gifts distort decisions by doctors, the medical establishment has not mustered the will to bar such thinly disguised bribes, and the health care reform act fails to outlaw them. Instead, much like food labeling, the act includes “sunshine” provisions that will simply make information about these gifts available to the public. We have shifted the burden from industry, which has the power to change the way it does business, to the relatively uninformed and powerless consumer.

The same pattern can be seen in health care reform itself. The act promises to achieve the admirable goal of insuring most Americans, yet it fails to address the more fundamental problem of health care costs. . . . [T]he act tries to lower costs by promoting incentive programs that reward healthy behaviors. . . . [But s]tudies show that preventive medicine, even when it works, rarely saves money.

At its worst, disclosure can become merely pro forma; as Kafka (via Trudo Lemmens) puts it, “Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance, and it becomes part of the ceremony.” Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that disclosure is one of many aspects of consumer protection law with little real impact on individual welfare. As Amelia Flood reports,

Ben-Shahar, who spent last summer studying all the mandated disclosure statutes in Illinois, Michigan and California, argues that consumer protection advocates have gotten it wrong when it comes to mandating information access for consumers. He says consumers get lost in a sea of technical language, unread disclaimers and long-shot lawsuits. . . . According to Ben-Shahar, disclosures are of more use to consumer ratings groups like Zagat and Consumer’s Digest than they are to most consumers.

So perhaps there is some hope here: third-party aggregators and raters might use disclosures as part of an overall effort to rate various hospitals or doctors. The question then becomes–who shall pay (and rate) the raters? One irony here is that doctor rating sites have themselves been accused of being insufficiently transparent about the ways in which they evaluate physicians. New York Attorney General Cuomo even pursued the matter. His office eventually settled with insurers who ran rating sites. They pledged to “fully disclose to consumers and physicians all aspects of their ranking system.”

What’s the lesson here? First, that consumers are, by and large, too busy to process piecemeal disclosures by professionals like physicians and other health care providers. Second, third party raters can fill some of this information gap by aggregating information. Third, this process of aggregation and rating itself will likely need to be closely supervised by a good-faith regulator, lest it fail to take into account the full range of interests (and quality of information) proper for the task.

Are GPO’s Suppressing Safer Devices?

S. Prakash Sethi has called group purchasing organizations (GPO’s) an “undisclosed scandal in the U.S. health care industry.” Mariah Blake’s article in the Washington Monthly on GPO’s is a sobering “must-read” for those concerned about the future of health care in the US. She writes about the entrepreneur Thomas Shaw, who’s invented a syringe that drastically reduces the risk of bloodstream infections for patients and healthcare workers. (According to Barry Lynn, who’s also written on the issue, “each year about 6,000 medical workers come down with HIV or infectious hepatitis from such accidents, and dozens end up dead.”) Shaw’s brilliant innovation “added only a few pennies to the cost of production,” but it’s rarely used today. Blake traces the non-diffusion of this innovation to a complex set of deregulatory decisions relating to GPO’s.

GPO’s are supposed to use purchasing clout on behalf of buyers (like hospitals) to drive down prices from sellers. But it appears that these intermediaries, like large Wall Street firms, are often more interested in fees and payments from the sell-side than they are in helping the buy-side. As one analyst testified before the DOJ and FTC, “the compensation of most GPO management is almost always based on . . . fee income [from suppliers] rather than on the real savings to hospital members.”

Shaw’s bad luck was to enter the market shortly after a massive GPO, Premier, struck a multiyear deal with supplier Becton Dickinson. As Blake notes, “Premier signed a $1.8 billion, seven-and-a-half-year deal with Becton Dickinson [whereby its 1700 member hospitals] had to buy 90 percent of their syringes and blood collection tubes from” Becton Dickinson, which also “landed similar deals with all but one major GPO.” Lynn says that “many hospital buying agents won’t even dare to talk to Shaw for fear of upsetting their more powerful suppliers.”

How did the GPO-Supplier nexus grow so strong? Blake does a terrific job explaining developments that transmogrified many cost-cutting intermediaries into self-serving middlemen:

To keep costs in check, in the 1970s many medical facilities began banding together to form group purchasing organizations, or GPOs. The underlying idea was simple: because suppliers generally give price breaks to customers who buy large quantities, hospitals could get better deals on, say, gauze or gloves, if a group of them came together and bargained for ten cases, rather than each hospital buying a case on its own. . . . By decade’s end, virtually every hospital in America belonged to a GPO.

Then, in 1986 Congress passed a bill exempting GPOs from the anti-kickback provisions embedded in Medicare law. This meant that instead of collecting membership dues, GPOs could collect “fees”—in other industries they might be called kickbacks or bribes—from suppliers in the form of a share of sales revenue. (For example, in exchange for signing a contract with a given gauze maker, a GPO might get a percentage of whatever the company made selling gauze to members.) The idea was to help struggling hospitals by shifting the burden of funding GPOs’ operations to vendors. To prevent abuse, “fees” of more than 3 percent of sales were supposed to be reported to member hospitals and (upon request) the secretary of [HHS].

[This shift] turned the incentives for GPOs upside down. Instead of being tied to the dues paid by members, GPOs’ revenues were now tied to the profits of the suppliers they were supposed to be pressing for lower prices. This created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers. . . . Before long, large suppliers began using “fees”—sometimes very generous ones—along with tiered pricing to secure deals that locked GPO members into buying their products. . . .

This situation only grew thornier in 1996, when the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission overhauled antitrust rules and granted the organizations protection from antitrust actions, except under “extraordinary circumstances.” . . . Within a few years, five GPOs controlled purchasing for 90 percent of the nation’s hospitals, which only amplified the clout of big suppliers.

There are a few lessons here. Within the confines of competition law, the message should be clear: Einer Elhauge was right to state in 2003 that “Serious antitrust concerns remain about exclusionary agreements that charge higher prices to GPOs or hospitals that won’t commit to limiting purchases from rivals of dominant manufacturers to a small (often 5-10%) percentage of their purchases.” The broader lesson is that intermediaries in many fields are often tempted to put their own profits ahead of the entities they’re ostensibly serving. In the endless battle for compensation between providers, hospitals, and insurers, there are many profitable opportunities to shift alliances. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs like Thomas Shaw, patients, and thousands of medical workers are enduring unsafe conditions that could easily be remedied.

Mirror, Mirror on the Wall–Who Has the Most Free Market Health Care System of them All?

At least since legal realist Robert Hale published his Freedom through Law, the question of what constitutes state “intervention” in the market has been complex. For example: at what point does licensing of doctors move from being a natural aspect of any competent health system to being termed a suspect “intervention”? If there is to be free trade in services, don’t we at least need some information about what constitutes genuine medical care? “Perfect information” is a cornerstone of idealized markets—isn’t some baseline of information necessary to any actual market?

In health policy circles, the United States health care system is often seen as the most “free market” system internationally. But even the US would appear to be more interventionist than China, on a cursory reading of Blumenthal and Hsiao’s 2005 article in the NEJM:,

in the early 1980s, China virtually dismantled its apparently successful health care and public health system overnight, putting nothing in its place. In retrospect, this startling and almost inexplicable event seems to have been collateral damage from a much more carefully planned and successful policy strike: the privatization of China’s economy and a general effort to reduce the role of Beijing’s central government in China’s regional and local affairs. Only recently have Chinese authorities recognized the pain and the massive disruption in health care that they have caused.

By contrast, by some calculations, “the current tax-financed share of health spending is . . . 59.8 percent.” Very recent Chinese stimulus spending may be reversing prior privatizations there. But it’s clear that Chinese savings rates are still high, largely because so many citizens are scared of being sick and broke in a market-driven health care system.

Of course, it’s hard to develop any clear metric of private/public here; Blumenthal & Hsiao’s piece may only speak to financing and not other practices. Nevertheless, if Americare fails, the US and Chinese health care systems may be en route to superfusion.

Coping with Commodified Caregiving

Roger Scruton has complained that, in our society, “too many goods have a price.” He makes a Walzerian argument that certain experiences cannot be bought and sold without doing violence to their ultimate social meaning:

A century and a half ago John Muir in America and John Ruskin in England initiated the movement to save our world from spoliation. They rightly understood that nothing would  be saved if we simply defend it on economic grounds. A valley might be useful as farmland, but it might be even more useful as a reservoir or an opencast mine. Only if we recognize the intrinsic value of nature will it be proof against our predations; hence we should esteem landscapes and forests for their beauty, for their sacred quality, for the part they play in defining us and ennobling our settlements, rather than for their use. Only this will keep the market at bay and prevent us from consuming our world. . . .

Love is priceless, not because its price is higher than we can pay, but because it cannot be purchased but only earned. Of course, you can purchase the simulacrum of love, and there are people who are accomplished providers. But love that is purchased is only a pretense. Goods like love, beauty, consolation, and the sacred are spiritual goods: they have a value, but no price.

Economists don’t like spiritual goods. Such goods are connected to us not as things to be used, consumed, and exchanged but as parts of what we are. To lose them is to lose ourselves.

Perhaps the ultimate revenge of the economic mindset on commitments like Scruton’s is the rise of the caring industry, which Ronald W. Dworkin incisively examines in a recent article:

Read more

Private Equity in Health Care

As lawmakers squabble over the “carried interest” tax rate, it’s nice to find a big picture overview of some of the economic activity they’re discussing. I recently read Josh Kosman’s book The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Will Cause the Next Great Credit Crisis, and I highly recommend it to our readers. Kosman painstakingly describes the byzantine financial maneuvers behind marquee private equity firms which bought “more than three thousand American companies from 2000-2008.” He describes in detail how they resist transparency (164) and “hurt their businesses competitively, limit their growth, cut jobs without reinvesting the savings, and generate mediocre returns” (195). The recipe for high earnings is simple: the firms “get large fees up front and are largely divorced from their results if their transactions fail” (195).

Like Kwak and Johnson’s account in 13 Bankers, Kosman offers a political economy account of private equity’s favored treatment by government. As he notes,

[F]our of the past eight Treasury Secretaries joined the PE industry . . . . and they have significant influence in Washington. President Bill Clinton, and both President Bushes, have also advised PE firms or worked for their companies. . . . KKR retained former Democratic House majority leader Richard Gephardt as a lobbyist and hired former RNC chairman Kenneth Mehlman as head of global public affairs. (196)

Having analyzed a wide array of buyouts, Kosman concludes that “PE firms manage their businesses to satisfy short-term greed, not for long-term survival” (51). This is a particularly dangerous attitude in health care, an industry too long dominated by short-run thinking. There can also be a troubling trade-off between care and profit in health care, as the nursing home industry demonstrates.

It’s precisely this mentality that FDIC Chair Sheila Bair indicted in her testimony before the FCIC:

[W]hile the establishment of emergency backstops to contain financial crises can help to limit damage to the wider economy in the short-run, without needed reforms these policies will promote financial activity and risk-taking at the expense of other sectors of the economy. Corporate sector practices [have] had the effect of distorting of decision-making away from long-term profitability and stability and toward short-term gains with insufficient regard for risk. . . .Meaningful reform of these practices will be essential to promote better long-term decision-making in the U.S. corporate sector.

We can only hope that members of Congress keep both Bair’s and Kosman’s insights in mind. Congratulations to Kosman for authoring a compelling and well-researched analysis of one of the most troubling engines of inequality in the US.

Cross Posted at Concurring Opinions

CMS and HHS Release New Proposed Rules Governing Health IT – Part 1: Overview of Proposed Rule on “Meaningful Use”

Issues surrounding the implementation of health information technology (HIT) have not garnered anywhere near the amount of attention as issues such as the public plan, the intersection of abortion and health insurance, pre-existing condition provisions, etc. There are a variety of reasons for this.

First, HIT is not as accessible as these other issues. Discussions of HIT often involve the heavy use of acronyms as well as technical jargon that can be intimidating and confusing. This will not likely change in the future. HIT will increase in complexity, especially as variegated computer systems used by providers and hospitals are to be linked together.

A second reason for the lack of coverage of HIT is that there have been few if any significant steps on the federal level towards implementing a national HIT system. As I will discuss below, this is beginning to change, and this change provides for an important New Year’s resolution that all of those interested in health policy should make: stay informed about the changes in the HIT landscape. To make this resolution easier, I will write a series of posts describing the changes.

One of the more recent changes occurred with the passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and more specifically, portions known as the Health Information Technology and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act). The HITECH Act initiated, among other things, an incentive-driven paradigm for transforming our health information system. The general idea is that physicians and hospitals will be paid for using HIT. However, in order for this transformation to take place, guidelines must exist such that physicians, providers and vendors of HIT products understand how to operate within this new system.

On December 30^th 2009, CMS and the Office of the National Coordinator of Health and Human Services (ONC), released two rules. ONC released an interim final rule regarding the standards that will govern the Medicare and Medicaid incentive program. Additionally, CMS released their proposed rule on what is considered meaningful use.

The interim final rule regarding the standards can be found here.

The proposed rule regarding meaningful use can be found here.

Meaningful Use

CMS’s proposed rule on meaningful use is important because it defines how physicians and providers must implement HIT in order to qualify for CMS’s incentive payments for the use of such technology.  Much of the proposed rule is based on the HIT Policy Committee’s proposals on Meaningful Use, but comments had been solicited and incorporated from other committees, HIT vendors, and providers. The proposed rule states that incentive payments will begin in 2011, and that there will be two different payment methodologies: one for Medicare and one for Medicaid. Those receiving incentives must choose either the Medicaid or the Medicare plan. Furthermore, the rule states that hospitals and providers that are not meaningfully using HIT will have their payments from Medicare reduced, with the reductions taking effect in 2015.

The HITECH Act amended the Social Security Act, and in doing so, incorporated a broad definition of what constitutes a meaningful user of Electronic Health Records (EHR). Specifically for a provider to be a meaningful user they must:

1. Demonstrate use of certified EHR technology in a meaningful manner;
2. Demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that certified EHR technology is connected in a manner that provides for the electronic exchange of health information to improve the quality of health care such as promoting care coordination, in accordance with all laws and standards applicable to the exchange of information; and
3. Use its certified EHR technology, submits to the Secretary, in a form and manner specified by the Secretary, information on clinical quality measures and other measures specified by the Secretary.

The proposed rule is an extension of this definition, and aims to provide those EPs and hospitals with the proper information to become a meaningful user.

Specifically, the rule provides for two classes of providers to participate in the incentive system: eligible professionals (EPs) and hospitals.  EPs are defined as non-hospital-based physicians, who either receive reimbursement for services under the Medicare Fee-For-Service program (FFS) or have an employment or contractual relationship with a qualifying Medicare Advantage organization (MA); or healthcare professionals meeting other requirements. (See page 22 of PDF). Hospitals are defined as hospitals that either receive reimbursement for services under the Medicare FFS program or are affiliated with a qualifying MA organization as described in section 1853(m)(2) of the Act; critical access hospitals (CAHs); or acute care or children’s hospitals. (See page 22 of PDF).

Transitioning to the meaningful use of EHRs will be phased in, taking place in three stages. On page 40 of the proposed rule, CMS describes the stages as follows:

Stage 1 (beginning in 2011):  The Stage 1 meaningful use criteria focuses on electronically capturing health information in a coded format; using that information to track key clinical conditions and communicating that information for care coordination purposes (whether that information is structured or unstructured, but in structured format whenever feasible); consistent with other provisions of Medicare and Medicaid law, implementing clinical decision support tools to facilitate disease and medication management; and reporting clinical quality measures and public health information.

Stage 2: Stage 2 expands upon Stage 1 to use HIT for continuous quality improvement at the point of care and the exchange of information in the most structure format possible, such as the electronic transmission of orders entered using computerized provider order entry (CPOE) and the electronic transmission of diagnostic test results such as blood tests and nuclear imaging tests.

Stage 3: Stage 3 focuses on improving the quality, safety, and efficiency of health care, focusing on decision support for national high priority conditions, patient access to self-management tools, access to comprehensive patient data, and improving public health.

The proposed rule that was recently released only describes the specific criteria for Stage 1, with the criteria for Stage 2 and Stage 3 to be released at the end of 2011 and 2013 respectively. In terms of Stage 1 criteria, there is a hierarchy of organizational structure. At the broadest level there are “health outcome policy priorities.” Within each of these policy priorities there is a group of “care goals,” and associated with each group of care goals are the specific “objectives.” CMS has provided a very helpful table which breaks down the hierarchy, including the various objectives. I have extracted the table, which can be accessed here. However, for reference purposes, I have summarized the organization below, and provided the objectives for the first health policy priority. Note that there is a different list of objectives for hospitals, many of which are similar or identical.

The organization is as follows:

Health Outcome Policy Priority 1: Improving quality, safety, efficiency and reducing health disparities.

Care Goals: 1. Provide access to comprehensive patient health data for patient’s healthcare team 2. Use evidence-based order sets and computerized provider order entry (CPOE) 3. Apply clinical decision support at the point of care 4. Generate lists of patients who need care and use them to reach out+ to those patients. 5. Report information for quality improvement and public reporting.

Objectives for Eligible Professionals (EPs): 1. Use Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) 2. Implement drug-drug, drug-allergy, drug-formulary checks. 3. Maintain an up-to-date problem list of current and active diagnoses based on ICD-9-CM or SNOMED CT®. 4. Generate and transmit permissible prescriptions electronically (eRx). 5. Maintain active medication list. 6. Maintain active medication allergy list. 7. Record demographics 8. Record and chart changes in the following vital signs 9. Record smoking status for patients 13 years old or older. 10. Incorporate clinical lab-test results into EHR as structured data. 11. Generate lists of patients by specific conditions to use for quality improvement, reduction of disparities, research, and outreach. 12. Report ambulatory quality measures to CMS (or, for EPs seeking the Medicaid incentive payment, the States) 13. Send reminders to patients per patient preference for preventive/follow-up care. 14. Implement five clinical decision support rules relevant to specialty or high clinical priority, including for diagnostic test ordering, along with the ability to track compliance with those rules. 15. Check insurance eligibility electronically from public and private payers. 16. Submit claims electronically to public and private payers.

Health Outcome Policy Priority 2: Engaging patients and families in their healthcare

1. Care Goal 1: Provide patients and families with timely access to data, knowledge, and tools to make informed decisions.

Health Outcome Policy Priority 3: Improving care coordination

1. Care Goal 1: Exchange meaningful clinical information among professional health care team.

Interestingly, for CPOE, EPs are required to use CPOE for at least 80 percent of all orders whereas hospitals are only required to use CPOE for 10 percent of orders. Why such a discrepancy exists is presently unclear.

In terms of the requirement for reporting clinical quality measures (as described in the original definition of meaningful use in the HITECH Act), the proposed rule adopts different measurements for EPs and hospitals. For EPs, the proposed rule utilizes the quality measures endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF) including selected for the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI) program that had previously been endorsed by the NQF. For hospitals, the measures are a combination of the NQF measures and those measures from the Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU).

Reporting of these clinical quality measures would be accomplished by one of three methods. The primary method would require EPs or hospitals to log onto a CMS-designated portal and upload the clinical quality data in a specific data structure (as defined by the ONC’s standards). Alternatively, data could be submitted through a Health Information Exchange(HIE)/Health Information Organization (HIO) depending on whether the Secretary can access that network. Another alternative is submission through registries dependent upon the development of the necessary capacity and infrastructure to do so using certified EHRs. See page 169 of the PDF for more details on the uploading process.

As discussed earlier on this blog, one aspect of the transition that remains to be addressed is whether the incentives provided to EPs and hospitals will be sufficient to encourage physicians to take on the initial outlays associated with EHRs. H.R. 3014 ,a bill to provide loans guarantees to solo and small group practices, has been passed by the House and is currently being reviewed by the Senate Committee on  Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Without such measures to spur the initial implementation of EHRs, the incentives or downward payment adjustments may not be sufficient to implement the bold plan set out by CMS.

Convergence on Health Reform (Death of the Public Option)

Thomas (Tim) Greaney

Saint Louis University School of Law

So maybe the two parties are coming together on health reform after all.   Last night we learned that after days of “secret talks” among the “gang of ten” the Democrats have reached agreement to restructure their health care proposal.  The changes are significant:

• ditch the already-watered-down public option plan;
• create a new insurance exchange “option” for individuals and small groups consisting of a nonprofit plan as negotiated by the Office of Personnel Management;
• expand Medicare eligibility to cover uninsured individuals aged 55-64.

What does the Democrats’ “public option ultralight” compromise have  in common with Republicans’ alternative universe?  Well, consider the latter’s proposal to open interstate competition for all health insurers–a move they promise will immediately lower health care costs.   Besides being shameless attempts to offer simple solutions to complex problems, the two proposals are guilty of the same fundamental misunderstanding of health insurance. Simply put, they both ignore a critical economic truth of health insurance today: insurers require a provider network of hospitals and doctors or must have market leverage in order to negotiate for lower provider prices and for controls on excessive volume.

How, then, would a nonprofit insurer not presently competing in one of the concentrated markets succeed in putting competitive pressure on the incumbents?  As one insurance industry observer put it ,

So, Kaiser Permanente, which operates with highly organized and capital intensive networks in its markets, would now come into a state where it has no networks and offer a plan? Blue Cross of Nebraska might offer an individual and small group plan in Rhode Island? Tufts Health Plan out of Boston might offer a plan in Oregon?

Based upon what network of providers in those places where they do not now do business?

Likewise, in expanding Medicare, the Dems are taking a page out of the Republican playbook. For the last several weeks,  Senate Republicans have been loudly touting the benefits of Medicare.  By their lights, not only does the program produce unmatched (and untouchable) health care services in terms of quality of care and beneficiary satisfaction, but any cost-cutting constitutes a betrayal of our commitment to seniors.  As far as one can tell, the expansion proposal will do just that: offer the now-sacrosanct program to a few million almost-seniors.  As to the other 20 million citizens, forced to shop for insurance through an exchange flawed by inadequate competition and inadequate subsidies? Well, maybe the Democrats will borrow the rhetoric of Republican National Chairman Michael Steele: this is no time for a “government-run health-care experiment.”

Holiday Shopping for Health Care

With Black Friday done and out of the way, one cannot help but wonder if any Americans were bargain hunting for health coverage.  After all, barring exigent circumstances, in the current health care market, shopping around to compare prices seems like an economically sensible thing to do.  Individual health care plans have been charging higher and higher premiums; the rate of uninsured Americans is increasing, and those who are insured increasingly face greater deductibles and out-of-pocket expenses. Price can make a real difference.

One uninsured women in Seattle used PriceDoc.com to comparison shop to see which health care providers in her area provided the cheapest gynecological exam.  She said that the only real comparisons she made while searching for health care was price.  In the end, the Seattle woman was able to access what she considered to be quality care at a price she could afford.  But there is that old joke about the perils of looking for bargains in parachutes and brain surgeons to consider. A sheer price comparison implies fungible service.

Congress members are currently in the process of doing their own bargain hunting for health care that won’t break the country’s bank.  While Republicans are said to fear that insurance premiums will increase under the proposed health reform models– partly due to increased taxes on insurers, Democrats counter that the strict regulations to be imposed on insurance companies will drive costs down.  Democrats further talk about the benefits of the health care exchange model, in which the individual market will not be able to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on preexisting conditions, age rating, or gender rating.  The Center for Studying Health System Change says that these rules, if set in place, will directly lower the premiums that people with medical problems and women will pay.

The Obama Administration has commended the House and Senate bills for incorporating cost-cutting tools.  As a guideline for measuring the cost-effectiveness of the health reform proposals, the Obama Administration has identified four pillars– as found in Ronald Brownstein’s “A Milestone In the Health Care Journey.” Those pillars are:

1.      Taxes on high-end health insurance plans;

2.      Payment reforms that focus on incentivizing doctors to provide quality, coordinated care;

3.      An independent Medicare commission to contain costs; and

4.      A bill that is at least deficit-neutral over the next ten years.

The House and Senate bills incorporate each of the pillars to varying degrees, with the Senate bill thus far the most inclusive.  Congress members say that such principles–and specifics– will be heavily discussed in the coming weeks of debate.

While Americans wait for reform to ring in easier times, they may, however, be left to fend for themselves.  In case you were hoping to give the gift of better health care to a loved one, check here to compare plans, and use these helpful tips to save money on health care.  And don’t forget to schedule necessary appointments to  use what’s left of your current health care allowances before benefits get taken away by the start of a new year!

“15 Years or 7 to Pay Off Your Debt. . .”

I have been watching the Alex Gibney documentary film version of Maggie Mahar’s book Money-Driven Medicine. It’s fascinating, and I’ll definitely do a few more blog posts on it. For now, I’d like to reflect on a quote from early in the film, from a Dr. Berwick who’s been a keen observer of the US health system. He notes that physicians who are specialists do lots of compensable and specific procedures, and therefore usually earn much more than primary care doctors, leading to an artificial glut of specialists. I’d known this for some time, but Dr. Berwick makes the fact particularly compelling by comparing the concrete choices faced by med students: “15 years or 7 to pay off” their educational debts. It’s no wonder there are so many specialists.

The quote reminded me of Jesse Larner’s recent idealized “health care speech” for President Obama, which would promise a “publicly paid medical education for qualified medical students, researchers, and other health care workers so that the profession is open to all who are bright and dedicated, regardless of financial resources.” Just as our tax code pushes the average citizen toward unnaturally high levels of debt via the mortgage deduction, medical education financing currently is biasing physicians toward unsustainable debt loads that ultimately drain the public weal by fueling an entrepreneurial mindset in a profession founded in the public interest.

The US already has some limited loan forgiveness programs for physicians who work in underserved regions. It is time to expand these subsidies to cover more physicians working in primary care.

More Institutional Health Economics, Please!

Today’s Nobel Prize award for institutional economists Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom is a welcome step toward methodological pluralism in the profession. Both have looked outside markets to understand the organization of economic life. Ostrom is not even an economist–she is a political scientist by profession. As Bob Shiller observes:

This award is part of the merging of the social sciences. Economics has been too isolated and too stuck on the view that markets are efficient and self-regulating. It has derailed our thinking.

According to the NYT, “The Nobel judges, in their description of Mr. Williamson’s and Ms. Ostrom’s achievement, said that ‘economic science’ should extend beyond market theory and into actual behavior, and the two award winners, in their empirical work, had done this.”

There is a great need for more of this type of work in health economics. Joe White’s Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005 is one good exemplar of needed work here; he eschews “discussions of how economic theory can be applied to medical care production and delivery” and instead “focuses on ‘the market’ in its actual, not theoretical, form, as it existed in the United States.” White describes case after case where consolidation, not medical need, drove industry structure. He leaves the reader with a clear and convincing image of a space where varying levels of provider and insurer power, not productivity, is the key to understanding changes in the profitability of services. I’ve seen few better brief explanations of rising medical costs than the following: Read more