The Good News is that Health Care Spending is Down

The bad news is that the country’s too broke to be sick. The New York Times reports that health care spending rose just 3.9% in 2010, totaling $2.6 trillion or 17.9% of the Gross Domestic Product. The information was derived from the latest report from the government’s National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA), which are, according to the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “the official estimates of total health care spending in the United States. Dating back to 1960, the NHEA measures annual U.S. expenditures for health care goods and services, public health activities, government administration, the net cost of health insurance, and investment related to health care. The data are presented by type of service, sources of funding, and by type of sponsor.”

The Times notes:

Health spending normally grows much faster than the economy. But in 2010 growth rates were similar, so that health care accounted for the same share of total economic output in 2009 and 2010.

“U.S. health spending grew more slowly in 2009 and 2010″ than at any other time in the 51 years the government has been collecting such data, said Anne B. Martin, an economist in the office of the actuary at the Department of Health and Human Services.

How bad is it? The data is, well, record-breaking.

The Times:

In 2010, the study said, hospitals reported a decline in admissions and slower growth in emergency room visits and outpatient visits. Likewise, it said, doctor’s office visits declined, and spending for doctors’ services grew just 1.8 percent, to $416 billion in 2010. Total health spending averaged $8,402 a person, up 3.1 percent from 2009, the report said.

Doctors often prescribe drugs during office visits, and the decline in visits helped slow the growth of drug spending, as did the use of lower-cost generic medications. The number of prescriptions filled rose just 1.2 percent in 2010, and total retail spending on prescription drugs also grew 1.2 percent, to $259 billion, the slowest rate of growth in a half-century, the report said.

Those numbers of slowed growth are even more incredible given the context of a slowed generation of aging baby boomers.

But in the inimitable words of R. Hunter and J. Garcia,

Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills
One man gathers what another man spills

The Times notes:

For the first time in seven years, total private health insurance premiums grew faster than insurers’ spending on health care benefits, the administration said. Premiums totaled $849 billion in 2010, while spending on benefits totaled $746 billion. The difference includes administrative costs and profits.

There are a number of other interesting points to be found in the New York Times article, not the least of which is the growth in federal expenditures. It’s well worth a read.

Health Affairs on Community Development

New Profit Opportunities In American Health Care

I notice there is a lot of handwringing over the Affordable Care Act’s “government takeover” of the health care system. So let’s take a look at some exciting new markets that are still thriving.

1) At the beginning of the summer, I noted some problematic drug shortages (bottom half of post). The problem keeps getting worse. There is a steady stream of heartrending stories about care being compromised. Reform measures to assure an adequate supply are moving at a snail’s pace, thanks both to truculent manufacturers and the bipartisan drumbeat to “cut health care costs.” But at least some folks are thriving: as the NY Times notes, ‎”Unscrupulous wholesalers have made matters worse by scooping up scarce drugs and offering them to hospitals at markups that often reach 20 times the normal price or more.”

What a great business model! So glad the “free market” is working its magic on health delivery. While we’re at it, let’s allow ER docs to force patients to sign over half their bank accounts before treatment. That will certainly increase the supply of emergency rooms, even if the transition is a little bumpy for some people.

By the way, I’m sure some will argue that, if only Medicare weren’t paying for many of these drugs, we’d be fine. (Or at least the “we” capable of paying for the drugs at a “market price,” whatever that is, would be fine.) Query: Would there have been adequate incentive to create the drugs if a major purchaser like Medicare hadn’t paid what it did while the drug was on patent? No, I didn’t think so. Income and wealth in our society is still equally distributed enough (and coordination problems severe enough) that the top 1% won’t sustain a thriving hospital and drug research system all by themselves, even if they are the critical factors in one’s policy calculus. As I noted earlier, it’s hard to imagine individuals, or even wealthy groups, stockpiling all drugs they might need, particularly the sterile injectables or biotech solutions that are critical to advanced medicine. Even the very wealthy must rely on a steady, more general demand for these products. They can’t just order them up for just-in-time delivery, like a Tiffany watch. Public subvention—ranging from research grants to Medicare and Medicaid funding for the products research generates—provides that demand.

2) Pauline Chen reports on an “insurance maze” for US doctors, based on a new Health Affairs study comparing their practices to those of their neighbors to the north:

Physicians in Canada, where health care is administered mainly by the government, did spend a good deal of time and money communicating with their payers. But American doctors in the study spent far more dealing with multiple health plans: more than $80,000 per year per physician, or roughly four times as much as their northern counterparts. And their offices spent as many as 21 hours per week with payers, nearly 10 times as much as the Canadian offices.

Clearly the US has a comparative advantage in generating insurance-based hassles. Maybe we can keep specializing there, and aim to spend five times as much as the Canadians by 2014. The more choice, the better, whatever the cost, right? Think of all the people employed by this gauntlet of private sector checks and balances:

A young patient complaining of extreme fatigue, for example, might benefit from a $40 blood test that could confirm infectious mononucleosis in 10 minutes. But a doctor cannot order the simple test without first checking with the insurance company to see if it is covered and if there are any constraints on where the patient’s blood can be drawn and the test run.

Tracking down answers often means phone calls with long periods on hold, digging up old patient information and even recruiting office workers to act as specimen couriers to other labs and hospitals in order to expedite results or save frail patients or harried family members the hassle of traveling to an “approved site” for a test or procedure. “If someone comes in with a sick infant who needs a test, we often eat the costs and draw the blood ourselves,” Dr. Star said. “We aren’t going to tell them to put that kid in a car seat, drive a mile to an approved lab, park, register, then wait in line.”

If you’re an insurer (or the insurance industry), you’ve “won” to the extent you’ve foisted these costs and inconveniences onto doctors and patients. You certainly don’t want to abide by new Medical Loss Ratio requirements that limit the extent to which you employ these strategies of cost-shifting, delay, and denial of needed care. The “free market” is your friend, as is anyone who insists that health care delivery can be guided by the same economic principles that govern every other commodity.

What’s Worse than a Kidney Stone? or, “The Part II I had Hoped I Wouldn’t be Writing”

What’s worse than a kidney stone? For those of you who have had one, or read my post the other day describing how it felt–

…broke out in a cold sweat and quickly began writhing around and wailing in pain like a wild animal caught in a bear trap. The pain came in excruciating waves radiating as though I had just been punched below the belt– repeatedly.

that might be difficult to answer. But I’m going to go with two kidney stones– back to back, or more precisely, two kidney stones, and a tiny cyst and a 1.5 cm lesion on and in my kidney, respectively– which is my current diagnosis. An ultrasound  was unable to rule out cancer for the lesion.

And so I wait. A CT scan with contrast is next, probably sometime later this week– after a pre-cert from my insurer, Cigna– which has yet to fail me.

As you might imagine, the last week– what with the back to back kidney stones and all — was less than comfortable. But fortunately, the pain comes in waves and as the week wore on and I became more accustomed to the new and seemingly interminable rhythm, I was able to work in between the waves. And doing so brought me no small measure of joy– no longer reduced to a being defined solely by pain, I produced. I contributed. I was not merely subject to.

And so this blog.

The presence of the cyst caught me unawares. Initially diagnosed as one of two stones waiting in the wings back at the E.R., they were presented to me as nothing I’d have to worry about in the near future. Still in the kidney itself, they might have proved candidates for blasting. The follow-up trip to the urologist disabused me of this notion while apprising me that the one “stone” was a cyst which would have to be further examined so as to rule out density– which is a euphemism for cancer.

And in a moment it all changes. I got the sonogram later that day, and later that night I wrote to this blog’s Editor-in-Chief, somewhat incredulous as to how I signed things for that test– legal documents– in a haze of fear, pain and painkillers. Legally trained, I scribbled my name or initials on everything before me with what barely amounted to a perfunctory glance as I received one sentence explanations from the admittance clerk for one page fine print documents– no doubt painstakingly wrought by the pens of my legal brethren to ensure compliance– and payment. But I assure you, the compliance was a one-sided affair. Because, as our Editor-in-Chief Frank Pasquale has said so many times before, the acquisition of healthcare is fundamentally different than buying other commodities. It is not like buying a car; the economy of healthcare is unconventional– far more akin to “how much would you pay for a glass of water in the desert,” than how much of a rebate is available on that new Kia Soul. A hard bargainer, car dealers hate me. In the legal world, I’ve built a reputation as someone with a cold hard eye for a contract. In the hospital, I signed with an almost wild abandon–wondering who would take care of my children as I did.

And today I got the results. One kidney stone gone, one still making its way, and

“Tiny parapelvic cyst right kidney. This does not appear to correspond to the 1.5 cm visualized right renal lesion on CT scan. Therefore, possibility of a solid lesion not visible ultrasonographically cannot be ruled [out].”

His footsteps loud as he walked down the hall, the melodramatic stringed theme from “The Godfather” played in the room as the doctor entered and explained. Even if it is cancerous, I’m told it’s small. Maybe even too small to do anything but wait to see what it does– and test the rest of me to see if it migrated from someplace else.

But whatever this process may be, I think there might be some value in my writing about it– for both of us. No longer mired in the abstractions of healthcare, I am, it seems, walking straight into the belly of the beast. Consider this a postcard of sorts– with the hope that it can work itself into being a guide.

Exploitations of Immortality

Rebecca Skloot’s remarkable book The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks has quite a following among health lawyers. As an excerpt from the book explains,

Henrietta Lacks was a poor Southern tobacco farmer who worked the same land as her slave ancestors, yet her cells — taken without her knowledge — became one of the most important tools in medicine. The first “immortal” human cells grown in culture, her cells — known as “HeLa cells” — are still alive today, though she has been dead for more than 60 years.

If you could pile all HeLa cells ever grown onto a scale, they’d weigh more than 50 million metric tons — as much as a hundred Empire State Buildings. HeLa cells were vital for developing the polio vaccine; uncovered secrets of cancer, viruses, and the effects of the atom bomb; helped lead to important advances like in vitro fertilization, cloning, and gene mapping; and have been bought and sold by the billions. Yet Henrietta Lacks remains virtually unknown, buried in an unmarked grave.

Skloot tells the story of the Lacks family, which never shared in the prosperity based on the HeLa cells. This is old news for any property student familiar with Moore v. Regents, but it’s particularly poignant in this context.

Now Skloot has worked to share the book’s proceeds with the Lacks family. As a recent news article explains,

Since the book’s debut a year ago, it has earned rave reviews, prizes, a movie deal with HBO and a steady spot on best-seller lists. And Ms. Skloot is making good on her pledge to share the financial windfall with the Lackses. Soon after the book came out, she created the Henrietta Lacks Foundation to help Mrs. Lacks’s descendants, some of whom suffered from the whirlwind of publicity, misinformation and scam artists surrounding HeLa cells, not to mention a lack of insurance to pay for any of the medical advances Mrs. Lacks’s cells made possible. . . .

The foundation — which is still in the process of applying for nonprofit status — is paying for a high-tech hearing aid for Mrs. Lacks’s youngest son, Zakariyya; truck repairs for her middle son, Sonny; new teeth for her granddaughter Kimberly; braces for her great-granddaughter Aiyana Rodgers; and, yes, tuition, books and fees for five of her grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

Whatever one thinks of the proper compensation for research subjects, it is disheartening to consider the economic difficulties of the Lacks family. (How can a society that spends, on average, $1425 per year on care and maintenance of its pets, not provide dental care for all?)

I think part of the answer lies in our constant striving for “innovation,” and the comparative devaluation of dissemination of innovation. My colleague Gaia Bernstein has written about these trends in several contexts. I have also worried about the lack of a US industrial policy for distributing the gains of innovation. I first came to these conclusions in the context of a paper I wrote on “immortal stem lines,” almost a decade ago. As the abstract argued:

[I]nnovations that now look benign might lead to an era of untrammeled biotechnological manipulation of our lives. For example, the same technology used to eliminate disease-causing genes or to clone embryos may eventually be deployed to produce genetically engineered children. That could, in turn, entrench class differences, since only the wealthy could afford the most desirable genetic enhancements. . . . Public debate on regenerative medicine must acknowledge this inequality. Societies and individuals can invest in it in good conscience only if they are seriously committed to extending extant medicine to all.

Without more attention to those at the bottom of the economic heap, the biotech project might recall these haunting lines from John Bunyan’s “The Pilgrim’s Progress:” “Now he had not run far from his own door, but his wife and children perceiving it, began crying after him to return, but the man put his fingers in his ears, and ran on, crying, Life! Life! eternal life.” Gary Shteyngart’s recent novel imagines a world where a company that sells modern-day “immortalization services” only takes on clients who promise to prioritize payments for the company’s “dechronificaiton” over any claims by relatives for help. They don’t even consider the possibility that those seeking endless self-preservation might be tempted to give to charity instead. Michel Houllebecq’s much worse novel, The Possibility of an Island, carries the trope further, imagining a future where the wealthy simply clone themselves into the future rather than worrying about reproducing.

In my article on immortality, I reach conclusions similar to those of Andre Gorz in The Immaterial. Whenever we come across a project that

will enable ‘us’ to free ‘ourselves’ from the contingency of our factuality. . . . to recreate and transcend ‘ourselves’ or even abolish the human condition[,] [t]his re-creation might be said the be the supreme stage of self-production. But it is a grammatical mirage. . .. [There is a] difference between the natural body and the body reprogrammed by science. . . .

In my own words, from my 2002 article:

Artificial-intelligence [based immortality] projects are unconvincing because their products lack bodies, and therefore cannot experience the sense-perceptions that are fundamental to human consciousness. Given the inevitable decay and profound importance of the brain, perpetual rounds of organ replacement seem only to offer their beneficiaries a series of lives, and not really a chance to maintain a coherent one. Neither the inorganic nor the organic forms of immortality offered by these two families of technologies offers indefinite life that is recognizably human or continuous with that of the person who employs them.

Nevertheless, I expect the “immortality project” will continue to attract followers. John Gray’s book “The Immortalization Commission” follows the Soviet elite who wished for a this-worldly resurrection. He sees similar aspirations today:

The hopes that led to Lenin’s corpse being sealed in a Cubist mausoleum have not been surrendered. Cheating aging by a low-calorie diet, uploading one’s mind into a super-computer, migrating into outer space [are all present day aspirations] . . . Longing for everlasting life, humans show that they remain the death-defined animal.

Today it is not a communist elite that is likely to continue the immortality project, but rather those billionaires who believe their lifespans should be as much longer than the average Joe’s as their fortunes eclipse his bank account. There is a slight chance the innovations they fund can “trickle down” to all, but in a world of limited resources, new variations on cryonics may not be the best place for funds to be allocated.

A Guide to the Patient-Centered Medical Home

As the United States continues on its path towards reforming its health care system, it will be governed primarily by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). One of the means by which the legislation attempts to institute reforms is through the use of pilot programs. In a previous post, I examined the pilot program known as the “accountable care organization” (ACO) which effectively formalizes and leverages existing  networks of physicians and providers in an effort to increase cooperation across the continuum of care; the hypothesis being that an organization that is accountable for a broader range of care can more effectively coordinate and efficiently deliver that care.

PPACA does not limit itself to ACOs. Another pilot program contained in the legislation is the medical home, commonly referred to as the “Patient-Centered Medical Home” (PCMH). The PCMH concept is not new. The American Academy of Pediatrics coined the term medical home back in 1967. Through the following decades, the concept of a medical home has, however, been refined. Throughout the 1970’s, the American Academy of Pediatrics continued to discuss the important role of a medical home in pediatric care, releasing a number of reports focusing on the proper role of a medical home for pediatric care.

That medical homes were spawned in the context of pediatrics is not  surprising: children are particularly unable to coordinate their own care, or, in many cases, even effectively communicate the narrative of the care which has transpired.  As such, it becomes the role of  parents, physicians, and others in the health care delivery system to communicate and coordinate the care of  the child. Parents are not always available or able. Logically, there must be some locus of coordination. In some ways, the primary care physician within the Patient- Centered Medical Home stands figuratively, as regards the coordination of medical care, in loco parentis.

Recognizing the importance of the medical home, the AAP created a task force to define the medical home.  In 1996, the influential Institute of Medicine embraced the concept of medical homes. They did not, however, limit their discussion of the medical home to children, but instead stressed the importance of care coordination for many, if not all, patients. (Click here to read IOM’s discussion on the matter). IOM’s belief in the general importance of medical homes has proven prescient in light of the ever-increasing complexity of clinical diagnosis and treatment that operates in an increasingly fragmented health care system. It has become increasingly difficult, even for adult patients, to communicate and coordinate care.

Principles of Patient Centered Medical Homes

In 2007, the American Academy of Family Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Physicians, and the American Osteopathic Association released “Joint Principles of the Patient-Centered Medical Home.” In it they distilled the following seven principles of the medical home. They are, in part:

1.       Personal physician – each patient has an ongoing relationship with a personal physician trained to provide first contact, continuous and comprehensive care.

2.      Physician directed medical practice – the personal physician leads a team of individuals at the practice level who collectively take responsibility for the ongoing care of patients.

3.      Whole person orientation – the personal physician is responsible for providing for all the patient’s health care needs or taking responsibility for appropriately arranging care with other qualified professionals. This includes care for all stages of life; acute care; chronic care; preventive services; and end of life care.

4.      Care is coordinated and/or integrated across all elements of the complex health care system (e.g., subspecialty care, hospitals, home health agencies, nursing homes) and the patient’s community (e.g., family, public and private community-based services). Care is facilitated by registries, information technology, health information exchange and other means to assure that patients get the indicated care when and where they need and want it in a culturally and linguistically appropriate manner.

5.      Quality and safety are hallmarks of the medical home.

6.      Enhanced access to care is available through systems such as open scheduling, expanded hours and new options for communication between patients, their personal physician, and practice staff.

7.      Payment appropriately recognizes the added value provided to patients who have a patient-centered medical home.

The Cornerstones of Patient Centered Medical Homes

Diane Rittenhouse and Steven Shortell have distilled four cornerstones for PCMHs from the above principles:

The four cornerstones of PCMHs, as represented in a talk given by Dianne Rittenhouse

Recently, Rittenhouse gave a talk to UCSF where she did an excellent job of explaining the four cornerstones in the context of the U.S. health care system. The link below jumps straight to the discussion of the cornerstones or you can watch the presentation in its entirety below.

A Discussion by Dianne Rittenhouse on the Cornerstones of the PCMH

As is clear from the joint principles and cornerstones, primary care is the distinguishing factor of the PCMH, as opposed to other models such as the ACO. As Rittenhouse and her colleagues have noted: “The PCMH model emphasizes the creation of a strong primary care foundation for the health care system, and the ACO model emphasizes the alignment of incentives and accountability for providers across the continuum of care.”

Patient Centered Medical Homes in Practice

Are PCMHs a pipe dream? Do we have any experience with them? The answer to the second question is yes, a substantial number of PCMH demonstrations are occurring throughout the country. A recent study by Bitton and colleagues at Harvard Medical School looked at 26 currently active PCMH pilots that incorporated 14,494 physicians, 4,707 practices, and served nearly 5 million patients. The researchers found that there were two ways of using PCMHs to transform health care delivery: a “consultive model” and a “chronic care model.” (For more information see Bitton et al., “Patient Centered Medical Home Demonstration Projects,” Journal of General Internal Medicine, available here.)

The chronic care model focuses on using quality improvement coaching to identify characteristics of care systems that must be changed to improve the treatment of chronic diseases.  The consultive model typically features proscriptive change in practice management most often carried out by external facilitators hired to organize assessment and transformation. (See Bitton page 590). As Bitton notes, the majority of pilot programs surveyed used the chronic care model, with those groups focusing specifically on asthma and diabetes. These initiatives were often the product of state activities, including Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs), Quality Improvement Organizations, and other state programs.

In order to become a PCMH, most practices have needed to apply to be recognized as such. The application process often requires the use of an assessment tool created by the National Committee for Quality Assurance — a group comprised of the same organizations who released the Joint Statement mentioned earlier. To accomplish this process the NCQA created the Physician Practice Connections - Patient-Centered Medical Home (PPC-PCMH) program to create a framework for medical home recognition. As stated on the NCQA website: “There are nine PPC® standards, including 10 must pass elements, which can result in one of three levels of recognition. Practices seeking PPC®-PCMH^TM complete a Web-based data collection tool and provide documentation that validates responses.” These standards are used to gauge the “medical homeness” of the applicant.

Payment Reform as the Rate-Limiting Step

As noted by Rittenhouse and others, payment reform is one of the cornerstones of the PCMH model. In the demonstrations currently underway, payment reform has been typically realized by a “three part” model adopted by the Patient-Centered Primary Care Collaborative (PCPCC) — a coalition of major employers, consumer groups, patient quality organizations, labor unions, and others, that have come together to facilitate the creation of PCMHs. The payment model is comprised of:

1.      Ongoing fee-for-service payments

2.      A fixed (typically monthly) case management fee; and

3.      Pay for Performance potential bonus payments

As the PCPCC states: “Payment reform should correct existing imbalances and distortions in physician payment and take into account value created by primary care, especially in the areas of cost, quality, care coordination, access, and patient centeredness.” However, the Bitton study had some unfortunate conclusions with respect to payment reform in extant PCMHs. The study found that many of the PCMH demonstrations currently retain the fee-for-service model as the core method of reimbursement and, despite the efforts at creating a common framework, “substantial variability” in the form, payment methods, and means of practice transformation. Such variation does not seem to favor smaller practices.

Though the PCPCC has attracted a broad range of industry groups to sign on to their PCMH model, it is unclear how a model that retains the traditional fee-for-service framework will work. Even if the FFS model could work, Bitton’s study found that only some of the demonstrations included up-front payments that could be put towards the required investments for transformation.  For the ACO model, upfront costs and uncertainties can be more easily absorbed because of the larger organizational structure of the ACO. However, many primary care physicians practice in small groups. The IT investments and other transformations will require time and resources that many primary care physicians may find difficult to swallow. Moreover, as Rittenhouse notes, the PCMH model does not provide incentives to those outside of primary care to work with the primary care physicians collaboratively. This will only compound the difficultly of  implementing PCMHs. Rittenhouse does, however, offer a glimmer of hope: the synergizing role of ACOs. As ACOs will benefit from the primary care focus of PCMHs, Rittenhouse believes that PCMHs can leverage the ACOs delivery system infrastructure to make the implementation of PCMHs more realistic.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the Global Health Initiative

This C-SPAN report is worth considering: “Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies on the Obama Administration’s Global Health Initiative. She discussed the six-year, $63 billion investment that focuses on improving the health of women, children and newborns throughout the world.”

You can see the video (or the transcript) by clicking on the picture.

Global Inequality & Access to Health Care

According to a recent study in The Lancet, “The world’s wealthiest two billion people get 75 percent of all the surgery done each year, while the poorest two billion get only 4 percent and often die or live in misery as a result.” It’s a striking fact; how are we to interpret it?

There are two metanarrative accounts of the relationship between inequality and health care. On a Whiggish, optimistic view, vast inequality can generate the capital necessary to fund investment in innovative health care technologies. Scholars like Richard Epstein have celebrated both general economic inequality and unequal access to health care particularly because, they claim, buying power at the top promotes investment in medical advances. On this view, innovations in the wealthy world can diffuse throughout lesser developed regions. Moreover, the rich can also subsidize the poor locally, paying for infrastructure that serves a broader community.

Interpreted less charitably, inequality enables the well-off to bid away resources and opportunities from the poor. Richer nations and persons may snap up limited resources; for instance, in 2009, Jeanne Whalen at the Wall Street Journal wrote an article entitled “Rich Nations Lock In Flu Vaccine as Poor Ones Fret:”

A scramble among wealthy nations to guard against a swine-flu pandemic is raising concerns that billions of people in poorer countries could be left without adequate supplies of vaccine. . . . The emerging battle between the haves and have-nots underscores a major weakness in the global health system: Pharmaceutical companies have severely limited capacity to produce flu vaccines in emergencies.

Inequalities can be even more stark at the R&D phase. If an anti-baldness cure can generate billions of dollars in revenue while a new therapy for tuberculosis only generates hundreds of millions, for-profit pharmaceutical companies may well have a fiduciary duty to invest scarce research dollars in the unhirsute rather than the truly unhealthy.

Lawrence Gostin’s recent article “Redressing the Unconscionable Global Health Gap” offers some practical ways of addressing these disparities:

The international community is deeply resistant to taking bold remedial action — more concerned with their geostrategic interests than the health of the poor. The scale of foreign aid is both insufficient and unsustainable and fails to address the key determinants of health. As a result, the world’s distribution of the “good” of human health remains fundamentally unfair, causing enormous physical and mental suffering by those who experience the compounding disadvantages of poverty and ill health.

Lest we dismiss such inequalities as “not our problem,” Thomas Pogge’s sobering new book elaborates on his earlier argument that wealthier nations are responsible for the plight of the poorest:

[P]olitical and economic inequalities are rising dramatically both intra-nationally and globally. The affluent states and the international organizations they control knowingly contribute greatly to these evils — selfishly promoting rules and policies harmful to the poor while hypocritically pretending to set and promote ambitious development goals.

Both Pogge and Gostin’s work should guide policy responses to the extraordinary disparities exemplified in the Lancet story. As I continue to study fractal inequality in access to medicine, I will be sure to consult their proposals for a more just world. I also hope to see proposals for taxation of “medical tourism” that would redirect at least some of the funds from overseas patients to infrastructure that would support underserved patients in the regions they visit.

Sunlight is a Weak Disinfectant

One of the most robust “memes” in contemporary law is the power of disclosure. In health law, disclosure comes up again and again: patients need to give “informed” consent, insurers are supposed to explain their policies clearly, and conflicts of interest, when not proscribed, should at the very least be exposed. But there are growing challenges to the disclosure meme, both within health law and without.

George Lowenstein and Peter Ubel note some problems with disclosure approaches in this article on the weaknesses of behavioral economics generally:

It seems that every week a new book or major newspaper article appears showing that irrational decision-making helped cause the housing bubble or the rise in health care costs. Such insights draw on behavioral economics, an increasingly popular field that incorporates elements from psychology to explain why people make seemingly irrational decisions, at least according to traditional economic theory and its emphasis on rational choice. . . . But the field has its limits. As policymakers use it to devise programs, it’s becoming clear that behavioral economics is being asked to solve problems it wasn’t meant to address.

[T]ake conflicts of interest in medicine. Despite volumes of research showing that pharmaceutical industry gifts distort decisions by doctors, the medical establishment has not mustered the will to bar such thinly disguised bribes, and the health care reform act fails to outlaw them. Instead, much like food labeling, the act includes “sunshine” provisions that will simply make information about these gifts available to the public. We have shifted the burden from industry, which has the power to change the way it does business, to the relatively uninformed and powerless consumer.

The same pattern can be seen in health care reform itself. The act promises to achieve the admirable goal of insuring most Americans, yet it fails to address the more fundamental problem of health care costs. . . . [T]he act tries to lower costs by promoting incentive programs that reward healthy behaviors. . . . [But s]tudies show that preventive medicine, even when it works, rarely saves money.

At its worst, disclosure can become merely pro forma; as Kafka (via Trudo Lemmens) puts it, “Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance, and it becomes part of the ceremony.” Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that disclosure is one of many aspects of consumer protection law with little real impact on individual welfare. As Amelia Flood reports,

Ben-Shahar, who spent last summer studying all the mandated disclosure statutes in Illinois, Michigan and California, argues that consumer protection advocates have gotten it wrong when it comes to mandating information access for consumers. He says consumers get lost in a sea of technical language, unread disclaimers and long-shot lawsuits. . . . According to Ben-Shahar, disclosures are of more use to consumer ratings groups like Zagat and Consumer’s Digest than they are to most consumers.

So perhaps there is some hope here: third-party aggregators and raters might use disclosures as part of an overall effort to rate various hospitals or doctors. The question then becomes–who shall pay (and rate) the raters? One irony here is that doctor rating sites have themselves been accused of being insufficiently transparent about the ways in which they evaluate physicians. New York Attorney General Cuomo even pursued the matter. His office eventually settled with insurers who ran rating sites. They pledged to “fully disclose to consumers and physicians all aspects of their ranking system.”

What’s the lesson here? First, that consumers are, by and large, too busy to process piecemeal disclosures by professionals like physicians and other health care providers. Second, third party raters can fill some of this information gap by aggregating information. Third, this process of aggregation and rating itself will likely need to be closely supervised by a good-faith regulator, lest it fail to take into account the full range of interests (and quality of information) proper for the task.

Are GPO’s Suppressing Safer Devices?

S. Prakash Sethi has called group purchasing organizations (GPO’s) an “undisclosed scandal in the U.S. health care industry.” Mariah Blake’s article in the Washington Monthly on GPO’s is a sobering “must-read” for those concerned about the future of health care in the US. She writes about the entrepreneur Thomas Shaw, who’s invented a syringe that drastically reduces the risk of bloodstream infections for patients and healthcare workers. (According to Barry Lynn, who’s also written on the issue, “each year about 6,000 medical workers come down with HIV or infectious hepatitis from such accidents, and dozens end up dead.”) Shaw’s brilliant innovation “added only a few pennies to the cost of production,” but it’s rarely used today. Blake traces the non-diffusion of this innovation to a complex set of deregulatory decisions relating to GPO’s.

GPO’s are supposed to use purchasing clout on behalf of buyers (like hospitals) to drive down prices from sellers. But it appears that these intermediaries, like large Wall Street firms, are often more interested in fees and payments from the sell-side than they are in helping the buy-side. As one analyst testified before the DOJ and FTC, “the compensation of most GPO management is almost always based on . . . fee income [from suppliers] rather than on the real savings to hospital members.”

Shaw’s bad luck was to enter the market shortly after a massive GPO, Premier, struck a multiyear deal with supplier Becton Dickinson. As Blake notes, “Premier signed a $1.8 billion, seven-and-a-half-year deal with Becton Dickinson [whereby its 1700 member hospitals] had to buy 90 percent of their syringes and blood collection tubes from” Becton Dickinson, which also “landed similar deals with all but one major GPO.” Lynn says that “many hospital buying agents won’t even dare to talk to Shaw for fear of upsetting their more powerful suppliers.”

How did the GPO-Supplier nexus grow so strong? Blake does a terrific job explaining developments that transmogrified many cost-cutting intermediaries into self-serving middlemen:

To keep costs in check, in the 1970s many medical facilities began banding together to form group purchasing organizations, or GPOs. The underlying idea was simple: because suppliers generally give price breaks to customers who buy large quantities, hospitals could get better deals on, say, gauze or gloves, if a group of them came together and bargained for ten cases, rather than each hospital buying a case on its own. . . . By decade’s end, virtually every hospital in America belonged to a GPO.

Then, in 1986 Congress passed a bill exempting GPOs from the anti-kickback provisions embedded in Medicare law. This meant that instead of collecting membership dues, GPOs could collect “fees”—in other industries they might be called kickbacks or bribes—from suppliers in the form of a share of sales revenue. (For example, in exchange for signing a contract with a given gauze maker, a GPO might get a percentage of whatever the company made selling gauze to members.) The idea was to help struggling hospitals by shifting the burden of funding GPOs’ operations to vendors. To prevent abuse, “fees” of more than 3 percent of sales were supposed to be reported to member hospitals and (upon request) the secretary of [HHS].

[This shift] turned the incentives for GPOs upside down. Instead of being tied to the dues paid by members, GPOs’ revenues were now tied to the profits of the suppliers they were supposed to be pressing for lower prices. This created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers. . . . Before long, large suppliers began using “fees”—sometimes very generous ones—along with tiered pricing to secure deals that locked GPO members into buying their products. . . .

This situation only grew thornier in 1996, when the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission overhauled antitrust rules and granted the organizations protection from antitrust actions, except under “extraordinary circumstances.” . . . Within a few years, five GPOs controlled purchasing for 90 percent of the nation’s hospitals, which only amplified the clout of big suppliers.

There are a few lessons here. Within the confines of competition law, the message should be clear: Einer Elhauge was right to state in 2003 that “Serious antitrust concerns remain about exclusionary agreements that charge higher prices to GPOs or hospitals that won’t commit to limiting purchases from rivals of dominant manufacturers to a small (often 5-10%) percentage of their purchases.” The broader lesson is that intermediaries in many fields are often tempted to put their own profits ahead of the entities they’re ostensibly serving. In the endless battle for compensation between providers, hospitals, and insurers, there are many profitable opportunities to shift alliances. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs like Thomas Shaw, patients, and thousands of medical workers are enduring unsafe conditions that could easily be remedied.

Mirror, Mirror on the Wall–Who Has the Most Free Market Health Care System of them All?

At least since legal realist Robert Hale published his Freedom through Law, the question of what constitutes state “intervention” in the market has been complex. For example: at what point does licensing of doctors move from being a natural aspect of any competent health system to being termed a suspect “intervention”? If there is to be free trade in services, don’t we at least need some information about what constitutes genuine medical care? “Perfect information” is a cornerstone of idealized markets—isn’t some baseline of information necessary to any actual market?

In health policy circles, the United States health care system is often seen as the most “free market” system internationally. But even the US would appear to be more interventionist than China, on a cursory reading of Blumenthal and Hsiao’s 2005 article in the NEJM:,

in the early 1980s, China virtually dismantled its apparently successful health care and public health system overnight, putting nothing in its place. In retrospect, this startling and almost inexplicable event seems to have been collateral damage from a much more carefully planned and successful policy strike: the privatization of China’s economy and a general effort to reduce the role of Beijing’s central government in China’s regional and local affairs. Only recently have Chinese authorities recognized the pain and the massive disruption in health care that they have caused.

By contrast, by some calculations, “the current tax-financed share of health spending is . . . 59.8 percent.” Very recent Chinese stimulus spending may be reversing prior privatizations there. But it’s clear that Chinese savings rates are still high, largely because so many citizens are scared of being sick and broke in a market-driven health care system.

Of course, it’s hard to develop any clear metric of private/public here; Blumenthal & Hsiao’s piece may only speak to financing and not other practices. Nevertheless, if Americare fails, the US and Chinese health care systems may be en route to superfusion.

Coping with Commodified Caregiving

Roger Scruton has complained that, in our society, “too many goods have a price.” He makes a Walzerian argument that certain experiences cannot be bought and sold without doing violence to their ultimate social meaning:

A century and a half ago John Muir in America and John Ruskin in England initiated the movement to save our world from spoliation. They rightly understood that nothing would  be saved if we simply defend it on economic grounds. A valley might be useful as farmland, but it might be even more useful as a reservoir or an opencast mine. Only if we recognize the intrinsic value of nature will it be proof against our predations; hence we should esteem landscapes and forests for their beauty, for their sacred quality, for the part they play in defining us and ennobling our settlements, rather than for their use. Only this will keep the market at bay and prevent us from consuming our world. . . .

Love is priceless, not because its price is higher than we can pay, but because it cannot be purchased but only earned. Of course, you can purchase the simulacrum of love, and there are people who are accomplished providers. But love that is purchased is only a pretense. Goods like love, beauty, consolation, and the sacred are spiritual goods: they have a value, but no price.

Economists don’t like spiritual goods. Such goods are connected to us not as things to be used, consumed, and exchanged but as parts of what we are. To lose them is to lose ourselves.

Perhaps the ultimate revenge of the economic mindset on commitments like Scruton’s is the rise of the caring industry, which Ronald W. Dworkin incisively examines in a recent article:

Read more

Private Equity in Health Care

As lawmakers squabble over the “carried interest” tax rate, it’s nice to find a big picture overview of some of the economic activity they’re discussing. I recently read Josh Kosman’s book The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Will Cause the Next Great Credit Crisis, and I highly recommend it to our readers. Kosman painstakingly describes the byzantine financial maneuvers behind marquee private equity firms which bought “more than three thousand American companies from 2000-2008.” He describes in detail how they resist transparency (164) and “hurt their businesses competitively, limit their growth, cut jobs without reinvesting the savings, and generate mediocre returns” (195). The recipe for high earnings is simple: the firms “get large fees up front and are largely divorced from their results if their transactions fail” (195).

Like Kwak and Johnson’s account in 13 Bankers, Kosman offers a political economy account of private equity’s favored treatment by government. As he notes,

[F]our of the past eight Treasury Secretaries joined the PE industry . . . . and they have significant influence in Washington. President Bill Clinton, and both President Bushes, have also advised PE firms or worked for their companies. . . . KKR retained former Democratic House majority leader Richard Gephardt as a lobbyist and hired former RNC chairman Kenneth Mehlman as head of global public affairs. (196)

Having analyzed a wide array of buyouts, Kosman concludes that “PE firms manage their businesses to satisfy short-term greed, not for long-term survival” (51). This is a particularly dangerous attitude in health care, an industry too long dominated by short-run thinking. There can also be a troubling trade-off between care and profit in health care, as the nursing home industry demonstrates.

It’s precisely this mentality that FDIC Chair Sheila Bair indicted in her testimony before the FCIC:

[W]hile the establishment of emergency backstops to contain financial crises can help to limit damage to the wider economy in the short-run, without needed reforms these policies will promote financial activity and risk-taking at the expense of other sectors of the economy. Corporate sector practices [have] had the effect of distorting of decision-making away from long-term profitability and stability and toward short-term gains with insufficient regard for risk. . . .Meaningful reform of these practices will be essential to promote better long-term decision-making in the U.S. corporate sector.

We can only hope that members of Congress keep both Bair’s and Kosman’s insights in mind. Congratulations to Kosman for authoring a compelling and well-researched analysis of one of the most troubling engines of inequality in the US.

Cross Posted at Concurring Opinions

CMS and HHS Release New Proposed Rules Governing Health IT – Part 1: Overview of Proposed Rule on “Meaningful Use”

Issues surrounding the implementation of health information technology (HIT) have not garnered anywhere near the amount of attention as issues such as the public plan, the intersection of abortion and health insurance, pre-existing condition provisions, etc. There are a variety of reasons for this.

First, HIT is not as accessible as these other issues. Discussions of HIT often involve the heavy use of acronyms as well as technical jargon that can be intimidating and confusing. This will not likely change in the future. HIT will increase in complexity, especially as variegated computer systems used by providers and hospitals are to be linked together.

A second reason for the lack of coverage of HIT is that there have been few if any significant steps on the federal level towards implementing a national HIT system. As I will discuss below, this is beginning to change, and this change provides for an important New Year’s resolution that all of those interested in health policy should make: stay informed about the changes in the HIT landscape. To make this resolution easier, I will write a series of posts describing the changes.

One of the more recent changes occurred with the passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and more specifically, portions known as the Health Information Technology and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act). The HITECH Act initiated, among other things, an incentive-driven paradigm for transforming our health information system. The general idea is that physicians and hospitals will be paid for using HIT. However, in order for this transformation to take place, guidelines must exist such that physicians, providers and vendors of HIT products understand how to operate within this new system.

On December 30^th 2009, CMS and the Office of the National Coordinator of Health and Human Services (ONC), released two rules. ONC released an interim final rule regarding the standards that will govern the Medicare and Medicaid incentive program. Additionally, CMS released their proposed rule on what is considered meaningful use.

The interim final rule regarding the standards can be found here.

The proposed rule regarding meaningful use can be found here.

Meaningful Use

CMS’s proposed rule on meaningful use is important because it defines how physicians and providers must implement HIT in order to qualify for CMS’s incentive payments for the use of such technology.  Much of the proposed rule is based on the HIT Policy Committee’s proposals on Meaningful Use, but comments had been solicited and incorporated from other committees, HIT vendors, and providers. The proposed rule states that incentive payments will begin in 2011, and that there will be two different payment methodologies: one for Medicare and one for Medicaid. Those receiving incentives must choose either the Medicaid or the Medicare plan. Furthermore, the rule states that hospitals and providers that are not meaningfully using HIT will have their payments from Medicare reduced, with the reductions taking effect in 2015.

The HITECH Act amended the Social Security Act, and in doing so, incorporated a broad definition of what constitutes a meaningful user of Electronic Health Records (EHR). Specifically for a provider to be a meaningful user they must:

1. Demonstrate use of certified EHR technology in a meaningful manner;
2. Demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that certified EHR technology is connected in a manner that provides for the electronic exchange of health information to improve the quality of health care such as promoting care coordination, in accordance with all laws and standards applicable to the exchange of information; and
3. Use its certified EHR technology, submits to the Secretary, in a form and manner specified by the Secretary, information on clinical quality measures and other measures specified by the Secretary.

The proposed rule is an extension of this definition, and aims to provide those EPs and hospitals with the proper information to become a meaningful user.

Specifically, the rule provides for two classes of providers to participate in the incentive system: eligible professionals (EPs) and hospitals.  EPs are defined as non-hospital-based physicians, who either receive reimbursement for services under the Medicare Fee-For-Service program (FFS) or have an employment or contractual relationship with a qualifying Medicare Advantage organization (MA); or healthcare professionals meeting other requirements. (See page 22 of PDF). Hospitals are defined as hospitals that either receive reimbursement for services under the Medicare FFS program or are affiliated with a qualifying MA organization as described in section 1853(m)(2) of the Act; critical access hospitals (CAHs); or acute care or children’s hospitals. (See page 22 of PDF).

Transitioning to the meaningful use of EHRs will be phased in, taking place in three stages. On page 40 of the proposed rule, CMS describes the stages as follows:

Stage 1 (beginning in 2011):  The Stage 1 meaningful use criteria focuses on electronically capturing health information in a coded format; using that information to track key clinical conditions and communicating that information for care coordination purposes (whether that information is structured or unstructured, but in structured format whenever feasible); consistent with other provisions of Medicare and Medicaid law, implementing clinical decision support tools to facilitate disease and medication management; and reporting clinical quality measures and public health information.

Stage 2: Stage 2 expands upon Stage 1 to use HIT for continuous quality improvement at the point of care and the exchange of information in the most structure format possible, such as the electronic transmission of orders entered using computerized provider order entry (CPOE) and the electronic transmission of diagnostic test results such as blood tests and nuclear imaging tests.

Stage 3: Stage 3 focuses on improving the quality, safety, and efficiency of health care, focusing on decision support for national high priority conditions, patient access to self-management tools, access to comprehensive patient data, and improving public health.

The proposed rule that was recently released only describes the specific criteria for Stage 1, with the criteria for Stage 2 and Stage 3 to be released at the end of 2011 and 2013 respectively. In terms of Stage 1 criteria, there is a hierarchy of organizational structure. At the broadest level there are “health outcome policy priorities.” Within each of these policy priorities there is a group of “care goals,” and associated with each group of care goals are the specific “objectives.” CMS has provided a very helpful table which breaks down the hierarchy, including the various objectives. I have extracted the table, which can be accessed here. However, for reference purposes, I have summarized the organization below, and provided the objectives for the first health policy priority. Note that there is a different list of objectives for hospitals, many of which are similar or identical.

The organization is as follows:

Health Outcome Policy Priority 1: Improving quality, safety, efficiency and reducing health disparities.

Care Goals: 1. Provide access to comprehensive patient health data for patient’s healthcare team 2. Use evidence-based order sets and computerized provider order entry (CPOE) 3. Apply clinical decision support at the point of care 4. Generate lists of patients who need care and use them to reach out+ to those patients. 5. Report information for quality improvement and public reporting.

Objectives for Eligible Professionals (EPs): 1. Use Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) 2. Implement drug-drug, drug-allergy, drug-formulary checks. 3. Maintain an up-to-date problem list of current and active diagnoses based on ICD-9-CM or SNOMED CT®. 4. Generate and transmit permissible prescriptions electronically (eRx). 5. Maintain active medication list. 6. Maintain active medication allergy list. 7. Record demographics 8. Record and chart changes in the following vital signs 9. Record smoking status for patients 13 years old or older. 10. Incorporate clinical lab-test results into EHR as structured data. 11. Generate lists of patients by specific conditions to use for quality improvement, reduction of disparities, research, and outreach. 12. Report ambulatory quality measures to CMS (or, for EPs seeking the Medicaid incentive payment, the States) 13. Send reminders to patients per patient preference for preventive/follow-up care. 14. Implement five clinical decision support rules relevant to specialty or high clinical priority, including for diagnostic test ordering, along with the ability to track compliance with those rules. 15. Check insurance eligibility electronically from public and private payers. 16. Submit claims electronically to public and private payers.

Health Outcome Policy Priority 2: Engaging patients and families in their healthcare

1. Care Goal 1: Provide patients and families with timely access to data, knowledge, and tools to make informed decisions.

Health Outcome Policy Priority 3: Improving care coordination

1. Care Goal 1: Exchange meaningful clinical information among professional health care team.

Interestingly, for CPOE, EPs are required to use CPOE for at least 80 percent of all orders whereas hospitals are only required to use CPOE for 10 percent of orders. Why such a discrepancy exists is presently unclear.

In terms of the requirement for reporting clinical quality measures (as described in the original definition of meaningful use in the HITECH Act), the proposed rule adopts different measurements for EPs and hospitals. For EPs, the proposed rule utilizes the quality measures endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF) including selected for the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI) program that had previously been endorsed by the NQF. For hospitals, the measures are a combination of the NQF measures and those measures from the Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU).

Reporting of these clinical quality measures would be accomplished by one of three methods. The primary method would require EPs or hospitals to log onto a CMS-designated portal and upload the clinical quality data in a specific data structure (as defined by the ONC’s standards). Alternatively, data could be submitted through a Health Information Exchange(HIE)/Health Information Organization (HIO) depending on whether the Secretary can access that network. Another alternative is submission through registries dependent upon the development of the necessary capacity and infrastructure to do so using certified EHRs. See page 169 of the PDF for more details on the uploading process.

As discussed earlier on this blog, one aspect of the transition that remains to be addressed is whether the incentives provided to EPs and hospitals will be sufficient to encourage physicians to take on the initial outlays associated with EHRs. H.R. 3014 ,a bill to provide loans guarantees to solo and small group practices, has been passed by the House and is currently being reviewed by the Senate Committee on  Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Without such measures to spur the initial implementation of EHRs, the incentives or downward payment adjustments may not be sufficient to implement the bold plan set out by CMS.

Convergence on Health Reform (Death of the Public Option)

Thomas (Tim) Greaney

Saint Louis University School of Law

So maybe the two parties are coming together on health reform after all.   Last night we learned that after days of “secret talks” among the “gang of ten” the Democrats have reached agreement to restructure their health care proposal.  The changes are significant:

• ditch the already-watered-down public option plan;
• create a new insurance exchange “option” for individuals and small groups consisting of a nonprofit plan as negotiated by the Office of Personnel Management;
• expand Medicare eligibility to cover uninsured individuals aged 55-64.

What does the Democrats’ “public option ultralight” compromise have  in common with Republicans’ alternative universe?  Well, consider the latter’s proposal to open interstate competition for all health insurers–a move they promise will immediately lower health care costs.   Besides being shameless attempts to offer simple solutions to complex problems, the two proposals are guilty of the same fundamental misunderstanding of health insurance. Simply put, they both ignore a critical economic truth of health insurance today: insurers require a provider network of hospitals and doctors or must have market leverage in order to negotiate for lower provider prices and for controls on excessive volume.

How, then, would a nonprofit insurer not presently competing in one of the concentrated markets succeed in putting competitive pressure on the incumbents?  As one insurance industry observer put it ,

So, Kaiser Permanente, which operates with highly organized and capital intensive networks in its markets, would now come into a state where it has no networks and offer a plan? Blue Cross of Nebraska might offer an individual and small group plan in Rhode Island? Tufts Health Plan out of Boston might offer a plan in Oregon?

Based upon what network of providers in those places where they do not now do business?

Likewise, in expanding Medicare, the Dems are taking a page out of the Republican playbook. For the last several weeks,  Senate Republicans have been loudly touting the benefits of Medicare.  By their lights, not only does the program produce unmatched (and untouchable) health care services in terms of quality of care and beneficiary satisfaction, but any cost-cutting constitutes a betrayal of our commitment to seniors.  As far as one can tell, the expansion proposal will do just that: offer the now-sacrosanct program to a few million almost-seniors.  As to the other 20 million citizens, forced to shop for insurance through an exchange flawed by inadequate competition and inadequate subsidies? Well, maybe the Democrats will borrow the rhetoric of Republican National Chairman Michael Steele: this is no time for a “government-run health-care experiment.”

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