New Profit Opportunities In American Health Care

I notice there is a lot of handwringing over the Affordable Care Act’s “government takeover” of the health care system. So let’s take a look at some exciting new markets that are still thriving.

1) At the beginning of the summer, I noted some problematic drug shortages (bottom half of post). The problem keeps getting worse. There is a steady stream of heartrending stories about care being compromised. Reform measures to assure an adequate supply are moving at a snail’s pace, thanks both to truculent manufacturers and the bipartisan drumbeat to “cut health care costs.” But at least some folks are thriving: as the NY Times notes, ‎”Unscrupulous wholesalers have made matters worse by scooping up scarce drugs and offering them to hospitals at markups that often reach 20 times the normal price or more.”

What a great business model! So glad the “free market” is working its magic on health delivery. While we’re at it, let’s allow ER docs to force patients to sign over half their bank accounts before treatment. That will certainly increase the supply of emergency rooms, even if the transition is a little bumpy for some people.

By the way, I’m sure some will argue that, if only Medicare weren’t paying for many of these drugs, we’d be fine. (Or at least the “we” capable of paying for the drugs at a “market price,” whatever that is, would be fine.) Query: Would there have been adequate incentive to create the drugs if a major purchaser like Medicare hadn’t paid what it did while the drug was on patent? No, I didn’t think so. Income and wealth in our society is still equally distributed enough (and coordination problems severe enough) that the top 1% won’t sustain a thriving hospital and drug research system all by themselves, even if they are the critical factors in one’s policy calculus. As I noted earlier, it’s hard to imagine individuals, or even wealthy groups, stockpiling all drugs they might need, particularly the sterile injectables or biotech solutions that are critical to advanced medicine. Even the very wealthy must rely on a steady, more general demand for these products. They can’t just order them up for just-in-time delivery, like a Tiffany watch. Public subvention—ranging from research grants to Medicare and Medicaid funding for the products research generates—provides that demand.

2) Pauline Chen reports on an “insurance maze” for US doctors, based on a new Health Affairs study comparing their practices to those of their neighbors to the north:

Physicians in Canada, where health care is administered mainly by the government, did spend a good deal of time and money communicating with their payers. But American doctors in the study spent far more dealing with multiple health plans: more than $80,000 per year per physician, or roughly four times as much as their northern counterparts. And their offices spent as many as 21 hours per week with payers, nearly 10 times as much as the Canadian offices.

Clearly the US has a comparative advantage in generating insurance-based hassles. Maybe we can keep specializing there, and aim to spend five times as much as the Canadians by 2014. The more choice, the better, whatever the cost, right? Think of all the people employed by this gauntlet of private sector checks and balances:

A young patient complaining of extreme fatigue, for example, might benefit from a $40 blood test that could confirm infectious mononucleosis in 10 minutes. But a doctor cannot order the simple test without first checking with the insurance company to see if it is covered and if there are any constraints on where the patient’s blood can be drawn and the test run.

Tracking down answers often means phone calls with long periods on hold, digging up old patient information and even recruiting office workers to act as specimen couriers to other labs and hospitals in order to expedite results or save frail patients or harried family members the hassle of traveling to an “approved site” for a test or procedure. “If someone comes in with a sick infant who needs a test, we often eat the costs and draw the blood ourselves,” Dr. Star said. “We aren’t going to tell them to put that kid in a car seat, drive a mile to an approved lab, park, register, then wait in line.”

If you’re an insurer (or the insurance industry), you’ve “won” to the extent you’ve foisted these costs and inconveniences onto doctors and patients. You certainly don’t want to abide by new Medical Loss Ratio requirements that limit the extent to which you employ these strategies of cost-shifting, delay, and denial of needed care. The “free market” is your friend, as is anyone who insists that health care delivery can be guided by the same economic principles that govern every other commodity.

Reflections on Some Failures of Medicaid Managed Care

The Washington Post has featured two interesting pieces recently on Medicaid managed care. Christopher Weaver reported on a battle between providers and insurers in Texas. Noting that “federal health law calls for a huge expansion of the Medicaid program in 2014,” Weaver shows how eager insurers are to enroll poor individuals in their plans. Each enrollee would “yield on average $7 a month profit,” according to recent calculations. Cost-cutting legislators see potential fiscal gains, too, once the market starts working its magic.

There’s only one problem with those projections: it turns out that “moving Medicaid recipients into managed care ‘did not lead to lower Medicaid spending during the 1991 to 2003 period,’” according to a report published by the National Bureau of Economic Research this month. Sarah Kliff is surprised to find that this is “the first national look at whether Medicaid managed care has actually done a key thing that states want it to do.”
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The Changing Landscape of Health Information Regulation

There is an impressive new issue of the American Journal of Law & Medicine out, with top names in the field participating in a symposium entitled “Marketing Health: The Growing Role of Commercial Speech Doctrine in FDA Regulation.”  I also wanted to recommend a piece from Simon Stern and Trudo Lemmens on pharma ghostwriting, which is getting a lot of play in Canada.  Titled “Legal Remedies for Medical Ghostwriting: Imposing Fraud Liability on Guest Authors of Ghostwritten Articles,” the piece could lead to some interesting litigation opportunities.  Here is the abstract:

Ghostwriting and guest authorship of medical journal articles raise serious ethical and legal concerns, bearing on the integrity of medical research and evidence used in legal disputes. Ghostwriting involves undisclosed authorship, usually by medical communications agencies or a pharmaceutical sponsor of the published research; guest authorship involves taking authorial credit for the published work without making a substantial contribution to it. Commentators have objected to these practices because of concerns involving bias in ghostwritten clinical trial reports and review articles. We also note the effects of ghostwritten articles on questions involving the legal admissibility of scientific evidence. Efforts to curb ghostwriting practices, undertaken by medical journals, academic institutions, and professional disciplinary bodies, have thus far had little success and show little promise.These organizations have had difficulty adopting and enforcing effective sanctions, for specific reasons relating to the interests and competencies of each kind of organization.

Because of those shortcomings, a useful deterrent in curbing the practice may be achieved through the imposition of legal liability on the ‘guest authors’ who lend their names to ghostwritten articles. We explore the doctrinal grounds on which such articles might be characterized as fraudulent. A guest author’s claim for credit of an article written by someone else constitutes legal fraud, and may give rise to claims that could be pursued in a class action based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The same fraud could support claims of “fraud on the court” against a pharmaceutical company that has used ghostwritten articles in litigation. This doctrine has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to impose sanctions on the authors and corporate sponsors of a ghostwritten article. We discuss the potential penalties associated with each of these varieties of fraud.

This promises to inspire some difficult legal challenges to industry practices that have long been considered undesirable as a policy matter.

Private Equity & British Care Homes

In earlier posts I have discussed the “care/profit tradeoff in nursing homes,” focusing on the role of private equity firms in reducing costs by limiting the liability of their enterprises. Cutting nursing staff and increasing the risk of elder neglect isn’t so costly for private equity barons when “complex corporate structures . . . obscure who controls their nursing homes.” One firm constructed a particularly notable series of corporate moats between itself and the nursing home which it first controlled, and then rented land to.

Daniel JH Greenwood has called a good deal of private equity activity a form of looting, and I have explored its shortcomings in a review of a book on the topic. Sadly, it appears that the private equity influence in Britain is undermining a key part of its health care system. Having stacked various care homes with debt in order to buy them, many private equity firms have abandoned (or are about to abandon) the homes:

[A new] report, delving into the running and funding of the care industry, reveals that the collapse of Southern Cross may not be a one-off, as a number of other social care companies are also on the brink. Private equity takeovers of public services that use similar high risk business models, could leave taxpayers picking up the bill for more company failures. The in-depth study of privatisation shows that the second largest care provider, Four Season, is also in severe financial difficulties and others may follow. If both Southern Cross and Four Seasons were to collapse, around 1,150 nursing and residential care homes would be at risk of closure, affecting nearly 50,000 vulnerable people and their families and hitting over 60,000 staff.

Another of the top four largest residential care home operators is Barchester Healthcare — a sister company to Castlebeck, the operators of the Bristol care home exposed by a Panorama documentary . . . for patient abuse. The home owners have admitted that serious wrongdoing took place at Bristol. The report shows that Barchester and other operators of care homes, have repeatedly changed ownership, often through private equity firms buying, consolidating and selling companies. The UK’s largest union is warning that the Government must tackle the crisis in the care industry.

However disruptive the private equity takeovers have been, they have fulfilled their main purpose: huge gains for a few entities that bought and sold at the right time:

Southern Cross was floated on the stock market by Blackstone, which obtained a 400% return in two years on its acquisition. Southern Cross is now at risk of collapse. Allianz Capital Partners made a return of 100% by acquiring Four Seasons in 2004 for £775 million, selling it four years later for £1.4bn - the business then collapsed in value.

3i private equity fund brought a 38% stake in Care Principles for £1.5m in 1997, the remaining amount in 2005 and sold to to Three Delta in 2007 for £270m — a return of 390%. Tunstall was acquired by Bridgepoint Capital in 2005 for £225m, merged with Bridgepoint Investment and sold on after three years for £514m.

Here are more details on Southern Cross. This story and other critical commentary suggest that the goal for owners has been rapid profit rather long term investment in more efficient processes. When the “music stopped” in the acquisition game, it was left with mounting debts.

Chris Sagers’ article “The Myth of Privatization” (59 Admin. L. Rev. 37) suggests that there is very little difference between “public” and “private” operationally, except that “one of them lacks even a nominal obligation toward the public interest.” I have seen little evidence to contradict that idea in the eldercare industry. Further research may reveal more support for Daniel JH Greenwood’s diagnosis of the rise of private equity:

The success of private equity firms challenges mainstream corporate governance theory: according to standard agency cost analysis, this should not have happened. Agency problems—the shorthand term for the tendency of fiduciaries in a capitalist system to work for themselves as well as, or instead of, their clients—cannot be solved by adding an additional layer of extremely highly paid agents supported by an ideology that justifies the most extreme forms of self-interestedness. Therefore, private equity is unlikely to be an innovative solution to the age-old agency problem.

Instead, it is better understood as a clever bit of legal arbitrage: by reclassifying agents as principals, it allows former fiduciaries to instead view themselves, and be viewed by others, as entitled to look out only for themselves. And look out for themselves they have: the private equity managers have extracted hitherto unseen sums from our corporations, appropriating for the private benefit of a handful of individuals surplus that otherwise might have gone to other corporate participants, including consumers, ordinary employees, taxpayers and investors in the public securities markets, or might have been devoted to increasing productivity or innovation for the benefit of future generations.

The basic private equity technique, like the basic hedge fund technique, appears to be to borrow money in order to increase potential returns or losses. If the loans were correctly priced, this would not create new value under standard valuation theories, nor would it be a service that could possibly warrant the high fees typically charged in the hedge fund and private equity worlds. The simplest explanation is that either lenders or fund investors are mispricing risk and have done so for several years at a stretch, contrary to the claims of the efficient market theorists.

This explanation suggests, moreover, that private equity is simply the modern equivalent of the pyramid schemes, margin loans and highly leveraged utility holding companies of the 1920s. Like those earlier edifices built on borrowed money, the contemporary schemes are likely to be highly unstable: if the underlying assets decline in value or fail to provide expected income by even small margins, the lenders are likely to take losses out of scale with their potential profits. Once lenders wake up to this possibility—most likely only after losses have begun—they are likely to cut back lending rapidly, which will, in turn, make the underlying assets both less valuable and less saleable still, thus beginning a new round of lender panic. Any minor downturn, in short, runs the risk of starting a self-reinforcing cycle of credit and business contraction. The rise of private equity in its present form, then, appears to be another step towards the pre-New Deal world of inequality and instability.

And don’t forget about the role of private equity in influencing our political process. Blackstone billionaire Pete Peterson helped fuel concerns about government spending, while doing very little to advocate for increased taxes on the wealthy. And now we see that the CLASS Act—an innovative program to promote full funding for future long-term-care in the US–is likely to be on the chopping block. The primary value of both care homes and care plans to P/E firms appears to be their susceptibility to rapid sales and purchases. The P/E firm’s employees can earn massive bonuses if the value of entities goes up, and can’t lose those bonuses even if things eventually fall apart. It is a heads they win, tails they win scenario. The losers include all the other stakeholders in firms which are treated primarily as ATMs for fleeting owners.

Auditing Studies of Anti-Depressants

Marcia Angell has kicked off another set of controversies for the pharmaceutical sector in two recent review essays in the New York Review of Books. She favorably reviews meta-research that calls into question the effectiveness of many antidepressant drugs:

Kirsch and his colleagues used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain FDA reviews of all placebo-controlled clinical trials, whether positive or negative, submitted for the initial approval of the six most widely used antidepressant drugs approved between 1987 and 1999—Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, Celexa, Serzone, and Effexor. . . .Altogether, there were forty-two trials of the six drugs. Most of them were negative. Overall, placebos were 82 percent as effective as the drugs, as measured by the Hamilton Depression Scale (HAM-D), a widely used score of symptoms of depression. The average difference between drug and placebo was only 1.8 points on the HAM-D, a difference that, while statistically significant, was clinically meaningless. The results were much the same for all six drugs: they were all equally unimpressive. Yet because the positive studies were extensively publicized, while the negative ones were hidden, the public and the medical profession came to believe that these drugs were highly effective antidepressants.

Angell discusses other research that indicates that placebos can often be nearly as effective as drugs for conditions like depression. Psychiatrist Peter Kramer, a long-time advocate of anti-depressant therapy, responded to her last Sunday. He admits that “placebo responses . . . have been steadily on the rise” in FDA data; “in some studies, 40 percent of subjects not receiving medication get better.” But he believes that is only because the studies focus on the mildly depressed:

The problem is so big that entrepreneurs have founded businesses promising to identify genuinely ill research subjects. The companies use video links to screen patients at central locations where (contrary to the practice at centers where trials are run) reviewers have no incentives for enrolling subjects. In early comparisons, off-site raters rejected about 40 percent of subjects who had been accepted locally — on the ground that those subjects did not have severe enough symptoms to qualify for treatment. If this result is typical, many subjects labeled mildly depressed in the F.D.A. data don’t have depression and might well respond to placebos as readily as to antidepressants.

Yves Smith finds Kramer’s response unconvincing:

The research is clear: the efficacy of antidepressants is (contrary to what [Kramer's] article suggests) lower than most drugs (70% is a typical efficacy rate; for antidepressants, it’s about 50%. The placebo rate is 20% to 30% for antidepressants). And since most antidepressants produce side effects, patients in trials can often guess successfully as to whether they are getting real drugs. If a placebo is chosen that produces a symptom, say dry mouth, the efficacy of antidepressants v. placebos is almost indistinguishable. The argument made in [Kramer's] article to try to deal with this inconvenient fact, that many of the people chosen for clinical trials really weren’t depressed (thus contending that the placebo effect was simply bad sampling) is utter[ly wrong]. You’d see the mildly/short-term depressed people getting both placebos and real drugs. You would therefore expect to see the efficacy rate of both the placebo and the real drug boosted by the inclusion of people who just happened to get better anyhow.

Felix Salmon also challenges Kramer’s logic:

[Kramer's view is that] lots of people were diagnosed with depression and put onto a trial of antidepressant drugs, even when they were perfectly healthy. Which sounds very much like the kind of thing that Angell is complaining about: the way in which, for instance, the number of children so disabled by mental disorders that they qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) was 35 times higher in 2007 than it was in 1987. And it’s getting worse: the editors of DSM-V, to be published in 2013, have written that “in primary care settings, approximately 30 percent to 50 percent of patients have prominent mental health symptoms or identifiable mental disorders, which have significant adverse consequences if left untreated.”

Those who would defend psychopharmacology, then, seem to want to have their cake and eat it: on the one hand it seems that serious mental health disorders have reached pandemic proportions, but on the other hand we’re told that a lot of people diagnosed with those disorders never really had them in the first place.

That is a very challenging point for the industry to consider as it responds to concerns like Angell’s. The diagnosis of mental illness will always have ineradicably economic dimensions and politically contestable aims. But doctors and researchers should insulate professional expertise and the interpretation of maladies as much as possible from inappropriate pressures.

How can they maintain that kind of independent clinical judgment? I think one key is to assure that data from all trials is open to all researchers. Consider, for instance, these findings from a NEJM study on “selective publication:”

We obtained reviews from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for studies of 12 antidepressant agents involving 12,564 patients. . . . Among 74 FDA-registered studies, 31%, accounting for 3449 study participants, were not published. Whether and how the studies were published were associated with the study outcome. A total of 37 studies viewed by the FDA as having positive results were published; 1 study viewed as positive was not published. Studies viewed by the FDA as having negative or questionable results were, with 3 exceptions, either not published (22 studies) or published in a way that, in our opinion, conveyed a positive outcome (11 studies). According to the published literature, it appeared that 94% of the trials conducted were positive. By contrast, the FDA analysis showed that 51% were positive. Separate meta-analyses of the FDA and journal data sets showed that the increase in effect size ranged from 11 to 69% for individual drugs and was 32% overall. (emphasis added).

Melander, et al. also worried (in 2003) that, since “The degree of multiple publication, selective publication, and selective reporting differed between products,” “any attempt to recommend a specific selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor from the publicly available data only is likely to be based on biased evidence.” Without clearer “best practices” for data publication, clinical judgment may be impaired.

Full disclosure of study funding should also be mandatory and conspicuous, wherever results are published. Ernest R. House has reported that, “In a study of 370 ‘randomized’ drug trials, studies recommended the experimental drug as the ‘treatment of choice’ in 51% of trials sponsored by for-profit organizations compared to 16% sponsored by nonprofits.” The commodification of research has made it too easy to manipulate results, as Bartlett & Steele have argued:

One big factor in the shift of clinical trials to foreign countries is a loophole in F.D.A. regulations: if studies in the United States suggest that a drug has no benefit, trials from abroad can often be used in their stead to secure F.D.A. approval. There’s even a term for countries that have shown themselves to be especially amenable when drug companies need positive data fast: they’re called “rescue countries.” Rescue countries came to the aid of Ketek, the first of a new generation of widely heralded antibiotics to treat respiratory-tract infections. Ketek was developed in the 1990s by Aventis Pharmaceuticals, now Sanofi-Aventis. In 2004 . . . the F.D.A. certified Ketek as safe and effective. The F.D.A.’s decision was based heavily on the results of studies in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The approval came less than one month after a researcher in the United States was sentenced to 57 months in prison for falsifying her own Ketek data. . . . As the months ticked by, and the number of people taking the drug climbed steadily, the F.D.A. began to get reports of adverse reactions, including serious liver damage that sometimes led to death. . . . [C]ritics were especially concerned about an ongoing trial in which 4,000 infants and children, some as young as six months, were recruited in more than a dozen countries for an experiment to assess Ketek’s effectiveness in treating ear infections and tonsillitis. The trial had been sanctioned over the objections of the F.D.A.’s own reviewers. . . . In 2006, after inquiries from Congress, the F.D.A. asked Sanofi-Aventis to halt the trial. Less than a year later, one day before the start of a congressional hearing on the F.D.A.’s approval of the drug, the agency suddenly slapped a so-called black-box warning on the label of Ketek, restricting its use. (A black-box warning is the most serious step the F.D.A. can take short of removing a drug from the market.) By then the F.D.A. had received 93 reports of severe adverse reactions to Ketek, resulting in 12 deaths.

The great anti-depressant debate is part of a much larger “re-think” of the validity of data. Medical claims can spread virally without much evidence. According to a notable meta-researcher, “much of what medical researchers conclude in their studies is misleading, exaggerated, or flat-out wrong.” The “decline effect” dogs science generally. Statisticians are also debunking ballyhooed efforts to target cancer treatments.

Max Weber once said that “radical doubt is the father of knowledge.” Perhaps DSM-VI will include a diagnosis for such debilitating skepticism. But I think there’s much to be learned from an insistence that true science is open, inspectable, and replicable. Harvard’s program on “Digital Scholarship” and the Yale Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing* have taken up this cause, as has the work of Victoria Stodden.

We often hear that the academic sector has to become more “corporate” if it is to survive and thrive. At least when it comes to health data, the reverse is true: corporations must become much more open about the sources and limits of the studies they conduct. We can’t resolve the “great anti-depressant debate,” or prevent future questioning of pharma’s bona fides, without such commitments.

*In the spirit of full disclosure: I did participate in this roundtable.

Beyond Innovation and Competition, Health IT Edition

Last year I published a piece called “Beyond Innovation and Competition,” questioning the dominance of those values. Economists celebrate innovation and competition as the main source of future growth. Innovation has become the central focus of Internet law and policy. While leading commentators sharply divide on the best way to promote innovation, they routinely elevate its importance. Business writers have celebrated search engines, social networks, and tech startups as model corporations, bringing creative destruction and “disruptive innovation” in their wake. Maximum innovation is the goal, and competition is billed as the best way of achieving it. Players in the vast and dynamic tech marketplace are supposed to constantly strive to innovate in order to attract consumers away from rivals.

In the piece, I explain how both competition and innovation can be as destructive as they are constructive. There are many social values (including privacy, transparency, predictability, and stability), and companies can compete for profits in ways that erode those values. In an era of inequality and hall-of-mirrors stock market valuations, innovations of marginal or negative impact on society at large can be vastly overvalued by a stampede of fickle investors.

The shortcomings of the innovation and competition story also play out in health information technology. Stimulus legislation in 2009 provided many carrots and sticks for doctors to digitize their recordkeeping systems, ranging from bonuses now to reimbursement haircuts later this decade if they fail to implement the technology. Congress structured the incentives to encourage a competitive and innovative marketplace in health information technology. But many doctors are shying away from implementation, in part because they fear that the fast and loose ethics of the market can’t mesh with a medical culture of constant commitment to quality care.

Susan Jaffe’s article for the Center for Public Integrity examines doctors’ fears about adopting any given software suite. According to Jaffe, “570 different electronic health systems certified by private organizations for non-hospital settings may be used to qualify for the” stimulus funds. The long-term consequences of the choice make the jam-shopping examples in Barry Schwartz’s book The Paradox of Choice seem quaint:

The systems can vary in appearance, content, organization and special features. Some can be customized by users in different ways, at no cost or some cost, or not at all. Some are compatible with other systems now, eventually or, some critics say, maybe never. . . . The costs of the systems remain daunting, despite the bonuses, particularly in areas that have been hit hard by an ailing economy.

The pricetag varies widely depending on the type and size of the medical practice, whether new computers are purchased and the extent of customization, among other things. Software alone can cost from $2,000 to $10,000 per doctor. All told, the cost jumps to about roughly $20,000 per doctor, according to a regional extension center consultant who advises physicians in northeast Ohio. On top of that, manufacturers charge hefty annual fees for technical support and periodic upgrades that together can amount to about 35 percent of the upfront costs. The systems are priced in a way that does not make comparison shopping “easy or necessarily valid,” said Dottie Howe, a spokeswoman for the Ohio regional extension center. There is no basic price because each company offers different components, features, options, and level of technical support. . . .

Most manufacturers will also charge the doctors to move the information in their current system to the new one. There could be extra [ongoing, monthly] charges to connect to other systems too.

Doctors have also been burned by sharp operators that emphasize slick salesmanship over solid service:

[T]he Southwest Family Physicians group is worried . . . They bought an electronic health record system five years ago that is now nearly obsolete. The manufacturer was taken over by another company that provides minimal technical support . . . “The salesman said ‘you’re buying a Cadillac, this is going to be the greatest thing,’ ” [one doctor] recalled. But that system can’t display an X-Ray image or send a prescription electronically to a pharmacy. “We’ve got the Model T Ford,” he said.

It does appear that regional extension centers are doing some work to keep pricing reasonable. Jaffe’s article focuses on Ohio, where five “preferred vendors” “agreed to charge prices ‘as good as or better than’ prices offered to other regional extension centers, to provide onsite assistance when a practice turns on its electronic health record system for the first time, offer technical support for at least six years, and limit annual cost increases for continuing technical support, among other things.” But consider the bizarrely proprietary nature of pricing data:

Whether the five preferred vendors offer a better deal than their non-preferred competitors is not known because the state regional extension center doesn’t have pricing information from non-preferred vendors, said Howe, the spokeswoman for the state’s regional extension center. Pricing from the preferred vendors are confidential, she said. And despite their preferred status, the five companies do not guarantee that eligible health care providers who purchase their systems will receive the government’s bonus payments.

I discussed the troubling degree of secrecy in health care before, and I’m very sad to see it persist here. The doctors in Jaffe’s story are making reasonable demands: to be able to understand the nature of the commitment they are making, to avoid big financial losses, and not to be burned by fly-by-night operators attracted only by the government subsidy money. They want to assure that the basic health care values of access, cost-control, and quality are reflected in the software they use.

We are seeing the opening stages of a battle between a medical sector committed to maintaining its own autonomy and traditions, and a tech sector that wants to commoditize health data in as standardized a form as futures markets homogenized corn grades, or credit scores tranched residential mortgage backed securities. Commenting on the demise of Google Health, an informatics expert said that “Google is unwilling, for perfectly good business reasons, to engage in block-by-block market solutions to health-care institutions one by one, and expecting patients to actually do data entry is not a scalable and workable solution.” To be sure, the company can’t expect to make the same profit margins in the health sector as it does in the online ad business. But the “instant millions” ethos of Silicon Valley doesn’t fit well with a sector where we are in principle committed to serving everyone, regardless of ability to pay.

Economist John Van Reenen has observed that the US has a particularly innovative economy in part because our markets are so good at crushing badly run firms. It’s probably good that garden equipment suppliers, toothpaste makers, and pie bakers know they can be out of business in a month or two if they’re “off their game” for a short time. But if I just entrusted three years of medical records to a vendor who suddenly went out of business, I’d take little comfort in the idea that a marginally better competitor had knocked it out of the market. The transition to a new vendor can be slow and costly—doctors in Jaffe’s story speak of seeing 1/3 to 1/2 less patients over weeks or months as they learn a new system.

At a Yale SOM Health Care conference in 2009, the Chief Medical Officer of a major player in the field once remarked to me that choosing an HIT vendor is “like a marriage—you don’t end the relationship lightly.” I first thought that remark was self-serving. But the more one examines the HIT field, the more important it appears to get standard recordkeeping, support capabilities, and interoperability right at the outset, rather than leaving doctors to negotiate the wreckage of several generations of battling systems. Think about how chaotic online music sales seemed before iTunes. Perhaps Apple (whose iPads are already beloved by many docs) is going to bring a swift and highly profitable order to this field, too. I hope the ONC and other decisionmakers will well-regulate whatever behemoth eventually emerges, vindicating the public values that competition and innovation are unlikely to promote.

Photo credits to  Aleksandar Šušnjar, Jakub Halun and loki11.

Medicaid Cuts and the March Toward a Charity Model of Care

Last week, Nic Terry compiled a list of current threats to Medicaid funding. As he noted then, Medicaid coverage is increasingly becoming meaningless for those seeking specialist care. Though more people are slated to enter the program, policymakers are unlikely to fix these flaws before they arrive. To the contrary, “physician reimbursement will decrease, and hospitals are looking to cross-subsidize some of their Medicaid patient expenditures from the privately insured.” Something to remember next time we hear about how imperative it is to cut public health expenditures: there is an inevitable pressure to “rob Peter to pay Paul.”

The budget drama narrative has so far focused on Republican efforts to further slash (or end) Medicaid, and Democratic resistance. But now even the Obama Administration is showing signs of reverting to form and endorsing a patina of Medicaid coverage without its substance. It is now too scared to even try to assess the full extent of the access problem. Like “death panels” before, the buzzword “spying on doctors” ended a promising program to measure the relative difficulty of getting access to care using different forms of insurance.

Obama officials are also engaged in more troubling substantive capitulations. Consider this CBPP report:

An Obama Administration proposal that’s on the table for budget negotiators would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by reducing the federal share of Medicaid and CHIP costs, shifting costs to states and likely prompting states to cut payments to health care providers and to scale back the health services that Medicaid covers for low-income children, parents, people with disabilities, and/or senior citizens (including those in nursing homes). . . . The proposal would replace the various matching rates at which the federal government reimburses states for their costs in insuring people through Medicaid and CHIP with a single “blended rate” for each state. A state’s blended rate would be set at a level that provided the state with less federal funding than under current law, thereby saving the federal government money.

Abigail Moncrief has noted that states “are statutorily required—and should be judicially required—to pay a reasonable price for the services they buy” by the Medicaid Act’s equal access provision (42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A)). But the Obama Justice Department is apparently complementing the budget team cost cutters by arguing that the Supremacy Clause does not “provide[] a cause of action for an injunction to enforce” the equal access provision. As Steve Vladeck observes, this is “a shift in policy that, if endorsed by the Supreme Court, would make it all-but-impossible to enforce the equal access mandate–one of the most important statutory requirements of the Medicaid program.”

Put it all together, and you have what bloggers Joan McCarter and Digby call a serious reversal for the President:

I don’t think anyone expected the Democratic leadership and the president to walk away from their own hard fought health care reforms before they even had a chance to be implemented. . . . I did think they would have wanted to give their legacy issue a chance to be implemented in full at the beginning, so they could continue to brag about bringing health care to 30 million uninsured Americans if nothing else. . . .But as the president says, in these tough times the government has to tighten its belt just like all American families. I guess he must realize that one of the things American families have had to cut out is their health insurance. So much for that legacy.

Perhaps a “balanced solution” to the budget debate is impossible now. But let’s at least acknowledge where we are heading with the endless Medicaid cost cutting. Much of the developing world has what is essentially a “charity option” for the very poor: they have nowhere near the purchasing power necessary to buy care, but have to rely on the kindness of strangers or NGO’s. We are not imminently headed to that level of catch-as-catch-can care for all of the Medicaid population’s problems: very urgent problems will continue to get attention due to some combination of EMTALA and Medicaid funding. But for many other types of issues, we may need to rely more and more on a combination of cost-shifting and charity. One model is the Global Eye Foundation in India, where “more than 80 percent of the surgeries that the model hospital performs are free of cost to the patient.” When you hear establishment economists talk about increasing the “competitiveness” of the American labor force, and fighting rising health care costs, remember that moving to a developing world model of care is one powerful way of achieving those ends.

Power, Knowledge, and Big Pharma: Preliminary Reflections on the Sorrell Vacuum

I have previously commented on Sorrell v. IMS Health, as a co-author of an amicus brief, a Pharma FaceOff panelist, and a blogger. I’m disappointed by the Sorrell ruling, for reasons largely elaborated in Justice Breyer’s dissent. As he observes, the majority opinion “reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decision-making where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.” But I’m not surprised at the Lochner revival, given the First Amendment maximalism of the Citizens United Court. For this Court, “free expression” will have to do in the information age what “freedom of contract” did for the early decades of the 20th century: erase even small and incremental steps toward a fairer social order.

Bill McGeveran has characterized Kennedy’s majority opinion in the case as relatively limited, a surgical strike against an overreaching and incompetent state legislature. I want to respond to his interpretation in a future post, after I’ve digested the opinion a bit more. But for now, I’d like to focus a bit of attention on the types of problems Vermont was addressing, to give the case more of a human face. For behind all the familiar Kennedy rhetoric about sacred speech, deeply disturbing industry practices motivated Vermont’s law.

Both PhRMA and IMS Health want us to believe that the case is about the life-saving power of a marketer to recommend drugs to oblivious doctors once it has access to their prescribing records. Never mind that, as Dr. David Orentlicher notes, “For $98 a year . . . physicians can subscribe to The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics, a respected and independent, biweekly newsletter that provides evaluations of prescription (and over-the-counter) drugs.” Maybe detailing, on occasion, saves lives. But, as the dissent observes, Vermont’s law allowed doctors to permit distribution of their prescribing records in order to receive personalized solicitations. They only needed to opt in.

Now why did Vermont doctors petition the state to limit access to prescriber records? And why might a rational physician choose not to opt in? Hundreds of pages of empirical studies show the problems caused by detailing; many are cited in Breyer’s dissent. But to make the situation a little more concrete, consider some of the literature a physician who rarely prescribes, say, pscyhotropic drugs, may now be reading. These examples are all drawn from two recent pieces by Marcia Angell in the NYRB:

A large survey of randomly selected adults, sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and conducted between 2001 and 2003, found that an astonishing 46 percent met criteria established by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) for having had at least one mental illness within four broad categories at some time in their lives. . . . The new generation of antipsychotics, such as Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel, has replaced cholesterol-lowering agents as the top-selling class of drugs in the US. . . . [Author Robert Whitaker] is outraged by what he sees as an iatrogenic (i.e., inadvertent and medically introduced) epidemic of brain dysfunction, particularly that caused by the widespread use of the newer (“atypical”) antipsychotics.

***

The pharmaceutical industry influences psychiatrists to prescribe psychoactive drugs even for categories of patients in whom the drugs have not been found safe and effective. [There has been an] astonishing rise in the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness in children, sometimes as young as two years old.

The FDA approves drugs only for specified uses, and it is illegal for companies to market them for any other purpose—that is, “off-label.” Nevertheless, physicians are permitted to prescribe drugs for any reason they choose, and one of the most lucrative things drug companies can do is persuade physicians to prescribe drugs off-label, despite the law against it. In just the past four years, five firms have admitted to federal charges of illegally marketing psychoactive drugs. AstraZeneca marketed Seroquel off-label for children and the elderly (another vulnerable population, often administered antipsychotics in nursing homes); Pfizer faced similar charges for Geodon (an antipsychotic); Eli Lilly for Zyprexa (an antipsychotic); Bristol-Myers Squibb for Abilify (another antipsychotic); and Forest Labs for Celexa (an antidepressant).

Despite having to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to settle the charges, the companies have probably come out well ahead.

Whereas IMS Health’s counsel described detailing in oral arguments as “information about lifesaving medications where the detailer goes in and talks about double blind scientific studies that are responsible for the development of drugs that have caused 40 percent of the increase in the lifespan of the American public,” Angell marshals an impressive array of evidence on the unreliability of pharma marketing, and even the underlying studies some of it is based on. Angell also compiles surprising details about the pervasive role of pharmaceutical firm influence over the social construction of mental illness. When you consider the industry’s targeting of “key opinion leaders” (professors and practitioners at elite medical centers), civil society groups, and the DSM, Vermont’s law seems an almost trivial response to a juggernaut of profit-driven promotions for mind cures. And yet even that small step (toward allowing physicians more control over how they are approached by detailers) offended the delicate sensibilities of the majority.

The Breyer dissent’s litany of regulated industry information practices should have dampened Kennedy’s abstracted enthusiasm for a “commercial marketplace” that “provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.” But in the vacuum of First Amendment fundamentalist thought, the complex ecology of fair information practices and calibrated disclosure cannot survive. It’s all-or-nothing: as soon as some parties gain access to prescriber data, everybody has to have it. Doctors can’t choose to structure their interactions with detailers based on profiling of their practices; rather, they face the stark choice of letting in marketers with access to all the prescribing practice data the state requires pharmacies to maintain, or not to talk to them at all.

In Sorrell, privacy and free expression become clashing rights, rather than social values that have long been reconciled (and occasionally reinforced one another) in complex regulatory schemes. We need to maintain that tradition of nuance in information law. Sadly, Sorrell turns its back on it.

Discussion on Pharma Face-Off

I was recently invited to debate issues in the Vermont data mining case on the program Pharma Face-Off. We’ve had some pro-PhRMA and anti-PhRMA perspectives here over the past year, and the program continues the conversation. I’ve been a bit tied up giving 6 talks in four cities over the past 8 days, but I’ll have some thoughts on it next week. One preview of my counterintuitive take: I think IMS Health (and its ally, PhRMA) are likely to win this case, but it could prove a Pyrrhic victory. The less doctors can constructively structure their encounters with detailers and reps, the more likely they are to shut them out altogether (a “solution” to the excessive influence problem that both Justice Scalia and IMS Health’s counsel, Tom Goldstein, repeatedly mentioned in oral arguments). Be careful what you wish for.

Personal Health Records: Is Unraveling Inevitable?

I look forward to reconnecting with everyone who is attending the health law professors conference in Chicago.  My presentation will be applying some of the ideas of Scott Peppet (on self-quantification and unraveling) to personal health records.  I found these ideas from Peppet’s post on biometric identification particularly interesting:

The biometric technologies firm Hoyos (previously Global Rainmakers Inc.) recently announced plans to test massive deployment of iris scanners in Leon, Mexico, a city of over a million people. . . . [T]he company’s roll-out strategy is explicitly premised on the unraveling of privacy created by the negative inferences & stigma that will attach to those who choose not to participate. Criminals will automatically be scanned and entered into the database upon conviction. Jeff Carter, Chief Development Officer at Hoyos, expects law abiding citizens to participate as well, however. Some will do so for convenience, he says, and then he expects everyone to follow: “When you get masses of people opting-in, opting out does not help. Opting out actually puts more of a flag on you than just being part of the system. We believe everyone will opt-in.” (For the full interview, see Fast Company’s post on the project.)

I’ve previously looked at the limits of individualist accounts of autonomy in work on pharmaceuticals (here and here), and scholars like Robert Ahdieh are questioning individualism in law & economics generally.  As Nic Terry has argued, many of the critiques of CDHC apply to PHRs, and vice versa.

As of a few years ago, “it wasn’t illegal to hire and fire people based on their smoking habits” in 21 states. I think there will be many difficult questions raised in coming years by the growth of medical records of all types, and how many secondary uses of them are permitted.  For example, some dating sites will now verify the income and assets of their users.  How soon before they (and other certification and evaluation intermediaries) start vouching for health profiles?  Does law have a role in these situations?  I’ll try to explore these questions, and I’ll post more details about the presentation after getting some feedback.

Review of Reconsidering Law and Policy Debates: A Public Health Perspective

Reconsidering Law and Policy Debates: A Public Health Perspective, edited by John Culhane, is a superb collection of thought-provoking essays which features some of the most well-regarded health law scholars in the US. It also includes contributors from schools of public health, public affairs, and public administration. The chapters are uniformly well-written and instructive. Though I cannot in this brief review give consideration to all of the essays, I will try to highlight contributions related to some of my own areas of interest in the intersection between public health and medico-legal research.

Several authors focus on the difficult questions raised by extreme inequality. For example, Vernellia R. Randall’s Dying While Black in America reflects on the disturbing disparity between white and black death rates in the US. A black American male can expect to live seven years less than a white American male, and black women face a four-year gap. Randall explores a number of potential explanations, including discriminatory policies and practices, lack of language and culturally competent care, inadequate inclusion in healthcare research, and hidden discrimination in rationing mechanisms. Randall argues that these disparities will never be addressed effectively until the legal system develops doctrines that can deter not only intentional discrimination, but also “negligent discrimination in healthcare:”

Negligent discrimination in healthcare would occur when healthcare providers failed to take reasonable steps to avoid discrimination based on race when they knew or should have known that their actions would result in discrimination. An example of this would be decisions to close inner-city hospitals and move them to the suburbs. (86)

Randall expertly characterizes race as a key “social determinant of health” in the United States. Countering the many current legal doctrines that promote the legitimation of discrimination, Randall envisions the type of guarantees of equality that will be necessary to realize the antisubordination and antisubjugation principles that animate the 14th Amendment properly understood.

Diane E. Hoffman also addresses stunning inequalities, this time on a global level. Hoffman’s long engagement with end-of-life care informs a consistently sensitive and insightful public health perspective. Considering the situation in the United States, Hoffman concludes that “it is not as all clear that we would want to give the state a public health justification for taking on end-of-life care,” because “we might have trouble reining in the government and preventing it from implementing increasingly more coercive measures” (59). This judgment is particularly pertinent in a political environment where extreme inequality and ever-lower taxes on the wealthiest have imperiled many important health programs for the aged.

However, Hoffman comes to a different conclusion in the case of many developing countries, where the question is less one of rationing access to life extending technologies than it is one of extending access to basic treatments for pain. In a sobering series of statistics, Hoffman presents a tragic panorama of human suffering. In India, only 1% of the 1.6 million people enduring cancer pain each year are likely to receive any type of pain medication. Morphine dispensaries are rare; Calcutta, with 14 million residents, has only one. Though nearly half its population is extremely poor, India is not an outlier. While developing countries account for 80% of world population, they use only 6% of the morphine consumed each year. Sometimes, shortages of medical personnel help explain the problem: for example, in Sierra Leone, there is only one doctor for every 54,000 people (as opposed to a 1:350 ratio in the US). But Hoffman gives several examples of easily preventable policies and business practices that keep painkillers out of the hands of the world’s poorest individuals. This is a truly neglected global crisis, generating levels of suffering that are rarely encountered or even imagined in the developed world.

Returning to the US, the last two chapters in the book are very interesting contributions to ongoing debates about the nature and role of tort doctrine. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard expertly deconstructs the usual dichotomy between tort law’s individualism and the population focus of public health. As she notes, cases involving asbestos, lead paint, silicone breast implants, the Dalkon shield, hazardous autos, tobacco, firearms, Phen-Fen, OxyContin, and Vioxx have all combined efforts by individuals to secure compensation for injuries with broader strikes against destructive products and practices. Weeks succeeds in demonstrating the “counterintuitive fit between tort law and public health law” (189), arguing that each “offers approaches to addressing inevitable conflicts in organized society between individual interests and community needs.”

Jean Macchiaroli Eggen tries to make the fit better by focusing on punitive damages. Toward the end of her chapter, she proposes that states solve the “plaintiff windfall problem” in punitive damages by requiring that “the portion of the punitive award the plaintiff does not receive [due to split-recovery statutes and other measures] be allocated to a state or private program that will enhance the deterrence of the conduct that gave rise to the warden the particular case.” The contributions of both Weeks Leonard and Macchiaroli Eggen would be of great interest to tort classes and seminars considering the difficult issues raised by judicial efforts to address public health concerns.

John Culhane is to be commended for bringing together such an illustrious group of contributors to address public health, an issue that has been neglected in law schools. Knowing full well that factors like income, race, pollution, and even commute length may have a far greater impact on health than, say, dispute resolution methods used by insurance companies, law professors nevertheless tend to focus on purely legal topics. (I am as guilty of this as anyone, and credit this book (and many interventions by Daniel Goldberg) for pushing me to do more to consider the social determinants of health in my own work.) Well after the sturm und drang surrounding the constitutionality of the ACA has dissolved, we will still face problems of balancing liberty, equality, and welfare that this book’s thoughtful contributors address. Their voices deserve to be heard in those future, more substantive, debates.

Questioning Body Modification

[I've decided to put the whole post beneath the fold, since the topic reminds me of Leontius's Tale, and I don't want anyone to accidentally click through to something they don't want to see.]
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Ag-Gag: A Black-Boxed Food Supply

I recently discussed the OIRA’s contribution to some terrible incidents in egg safety. Denis Sterns has written a challenging article on the bigger picture, explaining “Why Food in the United States May Never be Safe:”

This article . . . interrogates the idea of food safety by opening the question of whether a rational economic actor in a free market for food can reasonably be expected to invest in improving the safety of the food products he makes and sells. It is precisely the lack of (cr)edibility in the market – i.e., the absence of reliable quality signals, the lack of traceability, the high degree of anonymity, and the destruction of trust – that creates the structural impediments and powerful disincentive for improving the quality and safety of food. . . . Recall the huge public uproar, and swift policy changes, that followed the release of video of “downer” cattle being abused at a California meat plant. To obtain the video, the Humane Society had to sneak someone inside the plant to secretly record the offending conduct.

The secrecy of some food suppliers is very troubling. Stearns proposes constant surveillance of their actions: “With video cameras always in place . . . one can only expect that most of the shocking conditions that are found after the fact of an outbreak would be less likely to occur in the first place.” Stearns also criticizes FDA’s “wholly voluntary and largely ineffective” traceback regulations, which would make it easier to find the source of contaminated food. (Maybe the FDA is too busy chasing down raw milk co-ops.)

Unfortunately, Big Meat appears all too eager to hide their actions from both concerned citizens and animal rights activists. Consider the rash of legislation designed to deter actions like the Humane Society’s:

The animal advocacy group Mercy for Animals sent an undercover investigator to E6 Cattle Company in Texas, where he filmed calf abuse over a two-week period. To prevent such whistleblowing, several states have passed so-called “Ag-gag” laws that would make it illegal to clandestinely film inside slaughterhouses, sparking what animal rights activists fear will be a nationwide trend. . . . “They’re trying to criminalize someone being an eyewitness to a crime,” Jeff Kerr, [PETA]’s general counsel, said.

One of Chinese dissident Ai WeiWei’s biggest “offenses” against the Chinese government was trying to publicize the names of the children killed when shoddy schools collapsed after an earthquake. Criminalization of exposes of contamination and animal abuse in America’s heartland could be one more step toward the convergence of Chinese and US politico-economic structures.

X-Posted: Concurring Opinions.

Missing Care, Missing Drugs: Canaries in the Medical Coal Mine

While Washington has been focusing on repealing or rolling back parts of the Affordable Care Act, persistent embarrassments of the American health system show how untenable the status quo is. Both lower and middle class families are facing serious problems as they contend with providers’ and insurers’ cost constraints.

I’ll first address the familiar issue of health disparities. According to a recent news report, Lauren E. Wisk of the School of Medicine and Public Health at University of Wisconsin, Madison “examined data from the 2001-2006 Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys on 6,273 families with at least one child.” Wisk’s study shows that excessive financial burdens from cost-sharing are keeping many children from getting the care they need:

Families aren’t choosing to spend their money on going to the doctor when someone is sick because of how much it cost them to see the doctor last time. They’re sacrificing their health because it costs too much to be healthy. . . . We expect that if people aren’t getting the care they need, they’ll be sicker as a result. When you put this all together and look at the big picture, the cost of health care in the U.S. could actually be causing Americans to be sicker.

We might wonder: how can this be? Isn’t the economy in recovery? But we’ve seen this picture before, in the developing world. Growth does not help everyone. India, for example, has had astonishing economic growth, but it “is home to about a third of the world’s underweight and stunted children under the age of 5,” and “the impressive economic growth of the past decade has made only a modest dent into the obstinately high incidence of severe underweight and stunting of children in the country.” As Amartya Sen has shown, not only China, but also Bangladesh, are ahead of India in reducing the number of underweight children, despite the fact that “GNP per capita of $1,170″ in India, “compared with $590 in Bangladesh.” The critical number really is median GNP, and beyond that, real allocation to the sectors and concerns that matter. As the US surpasses Ivory Coast and Pakistan in inequality, don’t count on gains from growth to go to the people who need it.

It’s not just poor patients who need to worry about misplaced priorities in the health care system. We are increasingly seeing shortages of important drugs in the US. (Apparently this issue first caught mass media attention when prisons had a difficult time finding a key barbiturate used in executions.) Given that Congress is busy planning to cut funding for the statistical abstracts of the US and energy research (adding to prior DOJ cuts to studies of industrial concentration in the US), we shouldn’t be surprised to learn that “no one is systematically tracking the toll of the shortages.” Not many journalists are left to report on the government’s failure to report, either. But the head of FDA’s Drug Shortages Program is worried: “This is affecting oncology drugs, critical-care drugs, emergency medicine drugs.” It turns out that much-ballyhooed globalization has some downsides, too:

“We’ve certainly reached a very global supply chain for drug products, with the active ingredients typically made outside of the United States,” said [a] vice president for regulatory sciences at the Generic Pharmaceutical Association. “It could be Europe, India — some cases China. If there’s a problem at a facility in Italy or India, it leads to disruption of the drug supply in the United States.”

And a whole new triage system has developed to address an entirely avoidable crisis:

“We have heard some horror stories where patients are really begging to get the drugs from other sources and where practices or institutions are forced to kind of triage patients and save the drugs for those — quote — most curable, where they have the best prognosis and using substitutes where there isn’t a cure possibility,” [said the] president-elect of the American Society of Clinical Oncology.

A moving piece by Hagop M. Kantarjian describes the dilemmas facing some leukemia doctors:

Recently I sent out a plea on this national crisis to 8,000 oncologists who subscribe to a monthly e-mail newsletter published by the leukemia department at the MD Anderson Cancer Center. Within 12 hours, my in-box was jammed with replies from doctors in more than 25 states, each with his or her own horror story. . . . Take, for example, the 43-year-old Kentucky father who got a substandard dose of cytarabine because his doctor used all the doses he could find but still didn’t have enough. “I don’t know what I’ll do next,” the doctor told me.

Or the 45-year-old retired Air Force lieutenant colonel from Colorado, father of an incoming Air Force Academy cadet, whose leukemia came back after six months. His doctor looked all over the state for cytarabine with no luck and so was forced to give his patient second-line therapy. Or the 15-year-old boy from Florida who is in remission but can’t get the therapy that will cure him.

I see two takeaways from this sad situation. First, the next time someone says that generic “health care costs” are too high, consider whether they really mean we need to reallocate funds from less productive sectors to this, life-threatening crisis. Second, we need to reconsider the wisdom and necessity of far-flung, fragile supply chains for critical products. Barry Lynn has been making this point for some time. His book Cornered argues that “the drive to reduce costs has led to several competing manufacturers relying on a single overseas supplier for certain components and that this makes the whole system vulnerable to an event like an earthquake, a strike, or a war that might put the single supplier temporarily out of business.” Even for those skeptical of Lynn’s thesis in, say, the automotive or computer sector, his warnings should be salient for the food and health care industries. Too many lives have been put at risk by supply chains that are not robust enough to handle predictable challenges.

Rethinking IMS Health v. Sorrell: Privacy as a First Amendment Value

Today the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in IMS Health v. Sorrell. The case pits medical data giant IMS Health (and some other plaintiffs) against the state of Vermont, which restricted the distribution of certain “physician-identified” medical data if the doctors who generated the data failed to affirmatively permit its distribution.* I have contributed to an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the New England Journal of Medicine regarding the case, and I agree with the views expressed by brief co-author David Orentlicher in his excellent article Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients’ Interests. I think he, Sean Flynn, and Kevin Outterson have, in various venues, made a compelling case for Vermont’s restrictions. But I think it is easy to “miss the forest for the trees” in this complex case, and want to make some points below about its stakes.**

Privacy Promotes Freedom of Expression

Privacy has repeatedly been subordinated to other, competing values. Priscilla Regan chronicles how efficiency has trumped privacy in U.S. legislative contexts. In campaign finance and citizen petition cases, democracy has trumped the right of donors and signers to keep their identities secret. Numerous tech law commentators chronicle a tension between privacy and innovation. And now Sorrell is billed as a case pitting privacy against the First Amendment.
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